Proposition 4

37. The first of created things is being, and no created thing is before it.

38. This is because being is beyond sense perception and beyond soul and beyond intelligence, and there is nothing created after the first cause more extensive than or prior to it.

39. For this reason it is thus made superior to all created things and more strongly united.

40. And it is made such only because of its closeness to the pure, the one, and the true being, in which there is no plurality of other sorts.

41. And created being, even though it is one, is nevertheless multiplied, that is to say because it receives multiplicity.

42. And indeed it is only made many because, although it is simple and there is nothing among created things simpler than it, yet it is composed of finite and infinite.

43. This is because everything which from it follows the first cause is achili, that is, intelligence, perfect and ultimate in power and in the other qualities.

44. And the intellectual forms in it are broader and more strongly universal. And that which comes out of it is equally intelligence, however it is below that intelligence in its fulfillment and power and qualities. And the intellectual forms are not thus extended in it, just as their latitude in that intelligence. And indeed the being created first is as a whole intelligence, however intelligence is internally differentiated in it in the way we have said.

45. And because intelligence is differentiated, the intellectual form comes to be differentiated. And just as from one form, because it diversifies, an infinite number of individuals go forth in the world below, so from being which was created first, because it diversifies, infinite intellectual forms appear.

46. Nevertheless, although they are diversified they are not separated from one another, as is the separation of individual things.

47. This is because they are united without corruption and distinguished without separation, since they are a unit which possesses a multitude and a multitude in unity.

48. And the first intelligences inform the second intelligences with qualities which they receive from the first cause, and the qualities in them lead them to the point that they attain their ultimate goal.

93. After the author of this book distinguishes the triple grade of superior being and shows how, in a participative way, the whole is found in the lowest of them, now he intends to show the distinction of the second grade, namely of that being which is with eternity.

94. For the first grade, which is of the first cause existing before eternity, he sets forth as indivisible, as had been said [45].

95. But in this section he proceeds otherwise than in others: for in all the others he sets forth a proposition and, when an explanation has been posited, proves the proposition set forth; but here he proceeds in a manner of divisions;

first he sets forth what is common (37),

second, he divides it, when he says: and although caused being is one (41);

third, he assigns the difference among the parts of the division when he says: that is to say: because everything which follows from it (43).

96. Now that which is common to all distinct intelligences is first caused being, about which he sets forth a proposition thus: the first of created things is being, and there is not anything else created before it (37).

97. And also Proclus posits this proposition in his book (Elements of Theology, 138) under these words: the first and highest of all things participating in the divine character and deified, is being.

98. The reason for this is according to the Platonist positions because, as is said above [66], to the extent that anything is more common, to that extent they posit it as separated being, and as the prior is participated by the posterior, so also being is the cause of posterior things. But in the order of those things which are said about things, they posited the one and the good as most common, even more common than being, because the one or the good is found to be predicated about something about which being is not predicated, according to them: namely, about prime matter, which Plato conjoined with non-being, not distinguishing between matter and privation (as is said in Physics, 1) and yet he attributed unity and goodness to matter, insofar as it has an ordering toward form. For good is not only said about an end, but about that which is ordered to an end. Thus, therefore, the Platonists posited the separated one itself and the good itself as the highest and first principle of things. But after the one and the good nothing is found so commonly as being; and therefore they posited separated being itself as created, since it participates in goodness and unity, but they still placed it first among all created things.

99. But Dionysius departs from the order of separated forms indeed, as is said above [72–74], positing the same order as also the Platonists did, in the perfections which other things participate from one principle which is God: when in On the Divine Names, 4, he pre-ordains the name of good in God, and shows among all divine names that participation of it extends even to non-being, understanding by "non-being," prime matter. For he says, and if it is right to say that even non-being itself desires the good which is above all existing things.

100. But among the other perfections participated in things from God, he places being first. For he says so in On the Divine Names, 5: being is proposed before the other participations of God and being itself according to itself is older than what it is to be life per se and what it is to be wisdom per se and what it is to be divine similitude per se.

101. The author of this book also seems to understand this according to this mode. For he says that the reason for this (37) is because being is beyond sense and beyond soul and beyond intelligence (38). And how it is beyond these he shows, adding: and there is nothing broader after the first cause, that is anything more common and consequently, nor is there a caused thing prior to it. But the first cause is wider because it extends itself to non-being, according to the aforesaid [98]. And from this he concludes (39) that on account of that which has been said, being itself is made superior to all created things, since, that is to say, among the other effects of God it is more common and it is more strongly united, that is more simple. But those things which are less common seem to be related to the more common by a mode of some kind of addition.

102. Nevertheless it seems that it is not his intention to speak about some separated being, as the Platonists spoke; nor about being which is participated commonly in all existing things, as Dionysius speaks; but about participated being in the first grade of a created being, which is superior being (19). And although superior being is in both the intelligence and the soul, yet the being itself in the intelligence itself is considered prior to the reason of intelligence, and it is similarly in the soul. And on account of this he premises (38) that it is above the soul and above intelligence.

103. Therefore, concerning this being which is participated in the intelligences, he assigns a reason why it be maximally united (39); for he says (40) that this depends on account of its propinquity to the first cause which is pure subsisting being and is truly one not participated, in which there is not able to be any multitude of differences found on account of the essence: that which is closer to that which is per se one is more united, as if participating unity more. Whence the intelligence, which is closest to the first cause, has the most united being.

104. Next, when he says: and caused being, although it be one (41), he shows the reason of the distinction which can be in intelligences according to essence.

105. Whence it must be considered that if any form or nature be altogether separate and simple, a multitude cannot fall into it, just as, if something is separated whiteness, it can only be one; now, many different white things are found, which participate whiteness. Thus therefore if caused being were the first abstract being, as the Platonists posited, such being would not be multiplied but would be just one. But because first caused being is participated being in the nature of the intelligence, it is multiplicable according to the diversity of the participants.

106. And this is what he says: and itself indeed (42), i.e., first caused being, is only made many, that is, distinguished into many intelligences, because (that is) it is itself simple and there is not anything among caused things simpler than it, yet it is composed from the finite and infinite.

107. Indeed, Proclus also posits this composition in proposition 89, saying: every beingly being is from the end and from the infinite. Which is explained according to him in this way: For every infinite which exists immobilely exists according to the potency of being; for if that which can last more in being is of greater potency, that which can last into infinity in being is to that extent of infinite potency (cf. Elements of Theology, 84).

108. Whence he premises in proposition 86: everything which truly exists, is infinite, not in multitude or magnitude, but in potency alone, that is, potency of existing, as he explained.

109. Now, if anything should thus have an infinite power of being, which did not participate being from another, then it would be the only infinite, and such is God, as is said below in proposition 16 (132–133). But if there be something which would have infinite power for being according to being which was participated from another, by the very fact that it participates being, it is finite: because that which is participated is not received in the participant in its whole infinity, but in a particular fashion. Therefore, insofar as intelligence is composed in its being from finite and infinite, to that extent the nature of intelligence is called infinite according to its potency of being and the very being which it receives is finite. And from this it follows that the being of the Intelligence can be multiplied, insofar as it is participated being: for this is what composition from finite and infinite means.

110. Then, when he says: this is because everything (43), he shows the difference among the members of the division, that is, among the multiplied intelligences. And this is in three ways.

111. First, with respect to their diverse perfection;

second, with respect to the influence of certain ones over others; at: and the first Intelligences (48);

third, with respect to the effect of the intelligences on souls and this in the following proposition which, in certain books, is found conjoined with this comment, and begins: superior intelligences (49).

112. About the first, he makes two points:

first, he shows the difference;

second, he excludes a certain doubt, at: and because it is diversified (46).

113. About the first, therefore, it should be considered that he assigns a double difference to the intelligences:

one with respect to their nature (43);

but the other with respect to the intelligible species through which they understand (44).

114. Now, as far as their natures, it is necessary that their natures be diversified according to a certain order: for there is no material difference in them, but a formal one. For they are not composed from matter and form, but from the nature which is form, and from participated being as has been said [109]. Now in those which differ materially, nothing prohibits that many be found to behave equally; for in substances, individuals of one species participate equally in the definition of the species. Also, in accidents it is possible that different subjects participate equally in whiteness. But in those things which differ formally, a certain order is always found.

115. For if anyone should diligently consider in all species of one genus he will always find one more perfect than another just as 'white' in colors and 'man' in animals. And this on that account because they differ formally, they differ according to some contrariety: for contrariety is the difference according to form, as the Philosopher says in Metapysics, 10 (9, 1058b). Now, in contraries, there is always one nobler and one viler, as is said in Physics, 1 (5, 189a3–4). And this on that account, because the first contrariety is privation and habitus as is said in Metaphysics, 10 (4, 1055a33). And on account of this, in Metaphysics, 8 (3, 1043b36–1044a2) the Philosopher says that the species of things are like numbers, which diversify by species according to the addition of one upon another.

116. Now, it is manifest that, the more perfect something is, the closer it is to the most perfect one. Whence he posits this difference as far as the nature of the intelligences because its intellectual being, which immediately follows the first cause, is complete intelligence, ultimate in completion, as for the cause being in potency of being and with the remaining goodnesses following. But that intellectual being which is in an inferior way (44) in the order of intelligences indeed retains the nature and reason of intelligence, but nevertheless it is below the superior intelligence in the complement of nature and power of being and operating and in all goodnesses or perfections.

117. As far as the second difference which is from the intelligible species (44), he supposes that the intelligences know through certain intelligible species; and that intelligible species of this kind have more amplitude and universality than do those in inferior intelligences. And this, indeed, we now dismiss undiscussed; it will be manifested in proposition 10 below (92), the whole of which proceeds on this matter.

118. Thence, when he says: and because it is diversified (45), he removes a certain doubt. For because he had said that intelligible species were different in superior and inferior Intelligences, this might seem false to someone, on account of the fact that the object understood is one.

119. And for this reason he shows how intelligible species of this kind are diversified.

And first, he brings in a certain example for this (45);

second, he shows the difference, at: nevertheless, although it is diversified (46).

120. About the first, it is to be considered that, just as has been said above [67], the Platonists posited separated forms of things, through participation of which, the intellects came to be intelligent in act, just as through participation in them corporal matter is constituted in this or that species.

121. And the very same follows, if we do not posit many separate forms but, in the place of them all, we place on first form, from which all are derived, just as was said above [72–74] according to the opinion of Dionysius, which the author of this book seems to follow [75], when he posits no distinction in the divine being.

122. Thus therefore since the intelligences be diverse according to essence, as was said above [114–116], it is necessary that the participated intelligible forms be diverse and different in diverse intelligences, just as also diverse participated forms in this world are found by the sensible, according to the diversity of the individuals who are participating the aforesaid forms.

123. Thence, when he says: nevertheless, although (46), he shows the diversity in the aforesaid example.

124. Because sensible forms, participated in different individuals, are individuated forms and detached from one another by the detachment by which one individual is detached from another, so that the two forms do not pertain to the existence of one things, but of diverse things. Thus intelligible forms are not detached by being in diverse intelligences or intellects, because individual forms are not brought about by this, but they retain the force of their universality, insofar as any of them in the intellect in which it inheres causes a universal cognition of the very thing intellected.

125. And the reason for this appears from what was said above [98–99]: for since the forms of things whether they be in a divided fashion standing by themselves or be united in one first, they have a most universal and divine being, it is clear that the more they approach to this most universal being of forms, the more universal the forms are.

126. And according to this, he said (44), that the participated forms in superior intellects are more universal. Now that which is lowest in things is corporal matter, wherefore it receives forms of this kind as particulars, without any universality. And this is what he says (46) that although intelligible forms are diversified in diverse intelligences, nevertheless they are not divided in this way from one another as diverse individuals are divided in sensible things, because at the same time they have one with a multitude: one, indeed, from the part of universality; but a multitude on account of the diverse mode of participation in diverse intellects (47).

127. And through this is totally excluded the reasoning of Averroes, who wanted to prove the unity of the intellect through the unity of the intelligible form. For he thought that if intelligible forms are diverse in diverse intellects, that they be individuated and intelligible in potency and not in act; which, through what has been premised [124, 126] is clearly frivolous.

128. Thence, when he says: and the intelligence (48), he posits a second difference which follows from the first.

129. For we have found in any order of things, that that which is in act acts on that which is in potency. Now, that which is more perfect is always compared to that which is less perfect as act to potency and on that account more perfect things in any genus are born to act on more imperfect things. Therefore, since superior intelligences are more complete, in power and the rest of goodnesses, consequently, just as the first cause influences superior intelligences, so the superior intelligences influence inferiors and so on to the end.