Proposition 14

115. In every soul there are sensible things because it is an example for them, and there are intellectual things in every soul, because it knows them.

116. And it is this way only because it is stretched between intellectual things which are not moved and sensible things which are moved.

117. And because the soul is such, it happens that it imprints corporeal things, on account of which it is the cause of bodies and it is that which is caused from the intelligence which is before it.

118. Therefore the things which are produced from the soul are in the soul according to the intention of an example, that is to say, because sensible things are exemplified according to the example of the soul, and things which fall above the soul are in the soul in the mode of their being acquired by the soul.

119. Thus, since it is such, let us return and say that all sensible things are in the soul according to the mode of a cause, because the soul is the exemplary cause.

120. And I mean by "soul" the power acting on sensible things.

121. However, the effective power in the soul is not material, and the corporeal power in the soul is spiritual, and the power that produces things that have dimension is without dimension.

122. However, intellectual things are in the soul according to an accidental mode, that is to say because intellectual things which are not divided are in the soul according to a divisible mode. Thus, intellectual, united things are in the soul according to the mode which is multiplied, and intellectual things which are not moved are in the soul according to the mode of motion.

123. Thus it has now been shown that intellectual and sensible things are in the soul, however, sensible, corporeal and mobile things are in the soul according to the spiritual, united mode of the soul, and that intellectual, united, stable things are in the soul according to the mode which is multiplied with reference to motion.

293. After he determines about the first cause and the intelligence, here (115) he determines about the soul.

And first, he determines about it according to the relationship which it has to other things;

second, he determines about it according to itself, at: everything that knows (124).

294. About the first, he posits such a proposition: in every soul there are sensible things because it is an example for them, and there are intellectual things in every soul, because it knows them.

295. For the understanding of this proposition, let us see what is written in the book of Proclus about this. For in that same place proposition 195 is cited thus: every soul is all things, sensibles in an exemplary way, intelligibles in an iconic way. And in an iconic way is said in the mode of an image; for an image is what is made to the similitude of another, just as the exemplar is that to whose similitude another is made.

296. Now this proposition is proved much the same here as in the book of Proclus, in this way: for the soul, as is said in proposition 2 (22 [58]) is intermediary between intelligibles which are in every way separated from motion and through this made similar to eternity and sensibles which are moved (116) and fall under time. And because the prior things are causes of the posterior things, it follows (117) that the soul be the cause of bodies and the intelligence be the cause of the soul by the mode explained above (31 [79-81]).

297. It is clear, then, that the effects must pre-exist in the causes in an exemplary way, because causes produce effects according to their similitude, and conversely, things which are caused have the image of their causes, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 2. Thus therefore (118) sensible things which are caused from the soul, are in the soul through the mode of an example, so that, to be precise, things of this kind, which are below the soul, are caused to the example and similitude of the soul. Now, things which are above the soul are in the soul through an acquired mode, that is, through a certain participation, so that, namely, they are compared to the soul as exemplars and the soul to it in a certain way as an image. Thus therefore it appears (119) that sensibles preexist in the soul just as in a cause, which, in a certain way, is the exemplar of the effects.

298. Then he explains consequently (120) what he means by soul, saying: I mean by "soul" a power acting on sensible things. For according to those who posit animate celestial bodies, the soul of the heaven is the cause of all sensible bodies, just as each and every one of the souls of inferior things is the cause of its own body. Therefore, no one of the souls of the inferior things has causality in respect of sensibles and on that account sensibles were not in it through the mode of a cause, but only in the soul of the heaven which beyond sensibles has universal causality and this, he calls here a power acting on sensible things. But each and every one of the souls which are here, has a certain causality with respect to its own body, but it does not cause it through the sense or through the intellect. Whence it does not have in advance the intelligible and exemplary reasons of its own body. Now, it causes it through a natural power; whence also in On the Soul, 2, it is said that soul is the efficient cause of the body. Now, such an agent does not act properly through any exemplary reason except its own nature through which it acts, let us say the exemplar of the effect which is produced to its similitude in some way; and through this mode all the sensible parts of its body preexist in nature by virtue of the soul. For they are fitted to the powers of the soul, which proceed from its nature.

299. And although sensible things be in the soul which is their cause, nevertheless they are not in it through the mode by which they are in themselves. For the power (121) of the soul is immaterial, although it be the cause of material things and spiritual although it be the cause of bodies and it is without corporeal dimension, although it be the cause of things having dimension.

And because the effects are in the cause according to the power of the cause, it is necessary (122) that sensible bodies be in the soul indivisibly and immaterially and incorporeally. And just as inferior things in the soul are in it in a higher mode than in themselves, so superior things, namely the intelligences, are in the soul in an inferior mode than in themselves, namely, iconically or through the mode of an image, as Proclus says (Elements of Theology, 195); in the place of which is spoken here (122): through the accidental mode, that is through a certain inferior mode of participation; so namely that intelligible things which are indivisible in themselves and united and immobile are in the soul in a divisible, multiplied, and mobile fashion, through comparison to the intelligence. For they are proportionate to it as they are the causes of multitude and division and motion of sensible things. Or he says: immobile things are in the soul through a mode of motion, because, according to the Platonists, it is proper to the soul to be that which moves itself; but according to Aristotle it is the principle of motion of a thing which moves itself.

300. Finally (123), wrapping it up, he concludes what has been proposed and it is clear from the premises. And from these things which are said it can appear how superior souls of the heavens, if the heavens are animate, can know sensibles and intelligibles. For they know them thus: according to the fact that they are in them.