Proposition 25

181. The unified, intellectual substances are not generated from any other thing. Every substance which subsists through its own essence is not generated from any other thing.

182. Because if someone should say: it is possible that it be generated from another thing, we say: if it is possible that a substance which subsists through its own essence be generated from any other thing, doubtless that substance is imperfect, needing that from which it is generated to fill it up.

183. And an indication of this is generation itself.

184. This is because generation is only a way from imperfection to completeness. For, if a thing is found not lacking in its generation, that is to say in its form and its formation, no other thing but itself is both the cause of its formation and of its perfection, it is complete, always whole.

185. And it is the cause of its formation and of its perfection only on account of its relation to what is always its cause. Thus, that "putting-together" is its formation and its perfection at the same time.

186. Thus it is now clear that every substance which subsists through its own essence is not generated from another thing.

401. It has been said above (178) that creatures receive in different ways the government of the first cause, according to a triple diversity, namely: of unity and multitude, which pertains to simplicity and composition; of eternity and [time]; of spiritual and corporeal: for corruption and incorruption happen to the corporeal; whence here (181) he begins to follow up on the aforesaid diversities of things.

And first, about the diversity of the corruptible;

second, about the diversity of the simple and the composite, in proposition 28, at: every substance standing through its own essence is simple (194);

third, about the diversity of eternity and of time, in proposition 30, at: **every substance caused in time **(203).

402. About the first, he makes two points:

first, he shows certain substances to be ungenerable;

second, he is concerned with their lack of corruption, in proposition 26, at: every substance standing through its own self is not falling (187).

403. About the first, he posits two propositions,of which the first is like this: united intelligible substances are not generated from another thing (181). Now, he calls united substances, simple substances, because every composite contains a certain multitude in itself; and he calls intelligible substances those which are born apt to know, which also, since they are immaterial, are intelligible in act. Now, what he says: they are not generated from another thing can be understood either as from a material, according to which, this preposition from means, the habitude of a material cause; or as from an agent cause, according to which the aforesaid preposition means the habitude of an efficient cause. And this meaning seems more to be in agreement with those things which are placed in the proof of the device.

404. The second proposition is such: every substance standing by its own essence is not generated from another thing (182). Now that is called substance standing by its own essence which is subsisting through its own self; but since to subsist through its own self is proper to substance, it would follow according to this that no substance be generated. It must be said therefore that the substance and essence of a thing is principally the form, which the definition principally signifies. Therefore, whatever things have a form founded on matter, substances of this kind are not standing by their own essence; indeed, their essences, i.e., forms, lean on the foundation of matter. Therefore, those substances are standing by their own essence, which are forms alone, not in matter, and it is impossible that for such to be generated.

405. It is, then, to be considered that the first proposition is concluded from this second: for above (128) it was proved that all intelligent substances are standing through their own essence; which is held in proposition 15: every knower who knows (124). If therefore every substance standing through its own essence is not generated, it follows that every intellectual substance be not generated. Now of the two propositions posited, the first (181) is not found in Proclus' book, but only the second (182), which is 45 of his book, like this: every autohypostatic, that is, subsisting through itself, is ungenerable.

406. This sole proposition is proved consequently in the same mode here (183) just as in Proclus' book. For it is manifest that every generated thing is imperfect of itself, because it is being in potency and on that account it lacks what would complete or perfect through that from which it is generated, that is, through the generating one that reduces it from potency into act.

407. And a sign of this is (184) that generation is nothing other than a certain way from the incomplete to the complete, opposed, that is, to the pre-existing incomplete. For the termini of generation are privation and form; but matter, because it exists under privation, has a measure of the imperfect; but because it exists under a form it has a measure of the perfect, and thus it appears that generation is a way or transmutation from imperfect to the opposed perfect. If therefore something which would not need any other thing for its formation, but itself is the cause of its own formation, because, to be precise, its substance is its form, it follows that such a thing would be always complete or perfect. And thus in it there cannot be a transition from the imperfect to the perfect but immediately through its own self it is being and one, as is said in Metaphysics 8. Therefore it remains that every substance which is a subsisting form is ungenerable.

408. But lest from this someone might understand badly that substances of this kind would not have a cause of its being, although it was said above (143) that all things have essence through the first being, he shows consequently (185) how what has been said should be understood. For what has been said (184) that it be the cause of its own formation and complement, is not thus to be understood as if it did not depend from another superior cause, but it is said to be the cause of its own formation by this that it has a sempiternal relation to its first cause, whence through the relation to its cause it has at the same time, that is, immediately, formation and complement.

409. As evidence of this it should be considered that everything participates being according to the habitude which it has to the first principle of being. Now a thing which is composed out of matter and form has being only following from its form, whence through its form it has a habitude to the first principle of being. But because matter pre-exists form in time in this generated thing, consequently it would not always have the aforesaid habitude to the principle of being, and not at the same time when there would have been matter, but later, when the form was added. If therefore any substance be form itself, it follows that it would always have the aforesaid habitude to the first cause, and it would not come to it after some time, but be at the same time, concomitant with its substance which is form.

410. Thus therefore it is manifest that every substance standing through its own essence is not generated from another (186).