Proposition 10

92. Every intelligence is full of forms; however, among intelligences there are those that contain less universal forms, and those that contain more universal forms.

93. This is because the forms which are in the second, lower intelligences in the particular mode, are in the first intelligences in the universal mode; and the forms which are in the first intelligences in the universal mode are in the second intelligences in the particular mode.

94. And there is great power in the first intelligences, since they are of a stronger unity than the second, lower intelligences; and in the second, lower intelligences there are weak powers, since they are of less unity and more multiplicity.

95. This is because the intelligences that are closer to the one, to the pure truth, are of less quantity and greater power, and the intelligences which are farther removed from the one, the pure truth, are of greater quantity and of weaker power.

96. And because the intelligences closer to the one, the pure truth, are fewer in number and greater in power, it so happens from this that the forms which go forth from the first intelligences go forth in a universal and united procession.

97. And moreover we summarize and we say that the forms which come from the first intelligences to the second are of weaker procession and of stronger separation.

98. On account of this it happens that the second intelligences cast forth their visions over the universal form, which is in the universal intelligences, and they divide it and disperse it, since they are not able to receive those forms according to their true nature and being, except by the mode according to which they can receive them, that is to say, by separation and division.

99. And in the same way it only receives anything from things which are above it by the mode according to which it can receive it, not by the mode according to which the thing which is received exists.

236. After the author of this book shows how the intelligence knows those things which are below it and that which is above it, in this way he begins to show how it may know things other than itself, aside from the first cause.

And first, he shows commonly how it may know things other than itself,

second, he shows specifically how it may know sempiternal things in proposition 11, where he says: every intelligence (100).

237. First, therefore, he premises a proposition like this: every intelligence is full of forms; however, among intelligences there are those that contain less universal forms, and those that contain more universal forms (92).

238. And this is also found in the book of Proclus in proposition 177 under these words: every intellect is an existing plenitude of species: this one containing more universal species, that one containing more particular species.

239. About this proposition one ought to consider two things:

first, that which is common to all intelligences or separated intellects, namely: the plenitude of forms or intelligible species;

second, the difference of universality and particularity in them.

240. About the first therefore it is to be considered that just as we have already said above [67], the Platonists, positing separated forms of things, placed under the order of these forms an order of intellects. For because every cognition takes place through an assimilation of the intellect to the thing understood, it was necessary that separated intellects participate abstract forms in order to understand them. And these kinds of participations of abstract forms are intelligible species or forms about which is said here (92).

241. But because according to the opinion of Aristotle, which, concerning this, is more consonant with the Christian faith, we do not posit other separated forms above the order of the intellects, except the separated good itself to which the whole universe is ordered just as to an extrinsic good, as is said in Metaphysics, 12, we ought to say that, just as the Platonists posited that separated intellects, from participation of diverse separated forms, followed diverse intelligible species, so we should say that intelligible species of this kind follow from participation of the first separated form which is pure goodness, which is God. For God himself is goodness itself and being itself, comprehending virtually in himself the perfections of all beings. For he alone knows all things through his essence without participation of any other form.

242. But inferior intellects, since their substances are finite, cannot know all things through their essence, but in order to have cognition of things, it is necessary that they know by participation in the first cause, with intelligible species having been received, as Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 7, that from wisdom itself, the intelligible and intellectual powers of the angels' minds have simple and happy intellects.

243. And it is to be considered, as Augustine says in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, 2, that just as, from the word of God, forms proceed into corporal matter for the constitution of things, thus from the very same—that is, the word—cognition of things comes about in angels through the reception of intelligible species of this kind; because also the Platonists posited that according to participation of ideas separated intellects know things and corporal matter is varied according to diverse species.

244. But it should be known that the same diversity of participation is found in intellects and in corporal matter. For the matter of inferior bodies participates, indeed, a certain form to a specific being, but yet by that form the potency of the matter is not filled, which thus extends itself to other forms. But the matter of the celestial bodies is filled by the form which it participates, because potency to another form does not remain in it. Similarly also the inferior human intellects are not filled with intelligible species, but from the beginning indeed, the human possible intellect is like a slate on which nothing has been written, as is said in On the Soul 3 (430a1); but presently, in a certain order, it receives species, nevertheless, it is not filled in this life. But separated intellects, immediately from the beginning, are filled with intelligible species for understanding all things to which their natural faculty extends itself.

245. Whence Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 4 that the intellect beyond the world knows and is illuminated according to principles of existing things. And this is what is said here (92) that intelligence is full of forms, or, as Proclus says more explicitly, it is a plenitude of forms, because intellectuality itself pertains to the proper nature of intelligence or separated intellect.

246. About the difference of universality and particularity of the intelligible species, first it should be attended that just as is said here (92–93) and in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 177) superior things have more universal forms, while inferior have less-universal forms. And Dionysius also says this in The Celestial Hierarchy, 12, where he says that the order of Cherubim participate a higher wisdom and cognition, but inferior substances participate in a more particular wisdom and knowledge.

247. Indeed, this universality and particularity is not to be referred to things understood, as if some understood badly, thinking that God would know only the universal nature of a being. To which the consequence would be that in inferior intellects the cognition of each one thing would stand more in the universal by so much, as much as it would be higher; think, that the one intellect would know only the nature of substance, but the inferior would know the nature of body and so on to the individual species. Which estimation indeed openly contains falsity; for cognition by which something is known only in the universal is an imperfect cognition; but cognition by which something is known in its own species is perfect cognition. For cognition of the species includes cognition of the genus, but not vice-versa. Therefore, it would follow that, as much as an intellect would be superior, so much would its cognition be more imperfect.

248. There is, therefore, this difference of universality and particularity to be attended, only according to that by which the intellect understands; for by how much some intellect is superior, by so much that by which it understands is more universal; thus nevertheless that by that universal, its cognition is also extended to the things which are properly to be understood, so much the more than the cognition of the inferior intellect which knows through something more particular. And we also perceive this in ourselves by experience: for we see that those who are more excellent in understanding comprehend the whole truth of some question or business from fewer things heard or known, which others, being of lesser intelligence, are not able to perceive unless it is shown to them individually; for which reason it is necessary to give examples frequently.

249. And on that account, God whose intellect is most excellent, in only one thing—namely his essence—comprehends all his things. But each of the other separated intellects has knowledge of things by so many fewer species extending themselves to more things, insofar as it is higher. So that, the human intellect, which is lowest, cannot have knowledge of things unless it knows the natures of single things by single species. But corporal matter and the corporal sense-perception in every way are found to be lacking from universal participation of species (99).

250. Therefore, of this difference, which is according to the universality and particularity of species, the same proof is posited here and in Proclus, and it is taken from the effect. For just as the intelligences know through intelligible forms, so also they produce their effects through intelligible forms; because every intellect operates by understanding, as will be said below [253].

251. Now the superior intelligences have greater powers (94). And this is on this account, because they are more simple and of less quantity (95)—that is, composition—insofar as they are nearer to the first one; therefore, it is proper that their operative powers extend themselves to more things, and nevertheless that these same powers be more simple. And from this it is clear that the forms of superior intelligences are more universal (96).

252. Now, how forms which are united in superior Intelligences are multiplied in secondary Intelligences, he shows consequently, assigning the reason of this, just like Proclus (Elements of Theology, 177), from the part of the inferior intelligences.

253. For the inferior intelligences obtain intelligible species from the superior intelligences, by looking back at them in a certain way (98); because the intelligence, just like everything that acts, acts by understanding. So everything that receives, receives in an intelligible fashion, according to the mode of, precisely, its proper nature. And because the nature of the inferior intelligence is not of such simplicity and unity as the nature of the superior intelligence, on that account the intelligible forms are not regarded in the inferior intelligence in that unity in which they are in the superior intelligences. And on account of this, intelligible forms are multiplied more in inferior intelligences than in superiors, so that these things which are understood by a superior intelligence through one intelligible species, the inferior intelligence knows through many.

254. But because, as has been said [253], whatever the intelligence does, it does by understanding, just as also it receives what it receives by understanding, the reason for this multiplication of species can be assigned not only from the part of the intelligence impressing, by whose provision the species are multiplied in the inferior intelligence according to its capacity.

255. Whence Dionysius says in The Celestial Hierarchy, 15: each intellectual essence divides the uniform intelligence given to it by a more divine by a provided power and multiplies it to the leader analogy to inferiors, that is, according to the proportion of inferior substance.