Proposition 24

176. The first cause exists in all things according to a single disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to a single disposition.

177. This is because, although the first cause exists in all things, yet each and every one of things receives it according to the mode of its ability [to receive].

178. This is because, among things there are those which receive the first cause in a unified reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a multiple reception, and among them there are those that receive it by an eternal reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a temporal reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a spiritual reception, and among them there are those which receive it by a corporeal reception.

179. And indeed the diversity of the reception does not take place from the first cause but because of the one that receives. This is because that which accepts is diversified: on account of that, what is received is thus diversified. But the one existing thing which makes the impression is not diverse, but flows over all things with goodnesses equally, for goodness informs all things from the first cause equally. Therefore things are the cause of the diversity of the impression of goodness on things. Therefore doubtless all things are not found in the first cause according to a single mode. But now it has been shown that the first cause is found in all things according to a single mode and all things are not found in it by a single mode.

180. Therefore, according to the mode of proximity to the first cause, and according to the mode by which a thing can receive the first cause, according to that quantity, it can receive from it and be delighted through it. This is because a thing receives from the first cause and delights in it only by the mode of its being. And by "being" I mean only cognition, for according to the mode by which a thing recognizes the first, creating cause, according to that quantity, it receives from it and delights in it, as we have shown.

390. After he has shown the mode of divine government and its sufficiency for ruling, here (176) he begins to show how the divine government is participated in different ways by different things:

and first, he manifests this in general;

second, he follows up in particular about the diversity of things which are under the divine government in proposition 25, at: united substances (181).

391. About the first, he posits a proposition like this (176): the first cause exists in all things according to one disposition, but all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition.

As evidence for this it should be considered that something is said to be in another in many ways: in one way, really; in another way, according to a habitude of action and passion. According, therefore, to the first mode, it should be said that all things are in the first cause, in a single mode; because, that is, that according to which all things are in the first cause, is one and the same thing, namely: divine power. For the effects are by power in their cause. Now the first cause, according to this mode is in things in a diverse fashion; because, that is, the first cause is in caused things according to the fact that it impresses its similitude on them. Now, different things receive the similitude of the first cause in different ways.

392. But in the second way it is vice-versa: for the first cause acts on all things according to one mode and on that account it is said to be in all things according to one disposition. Now, not all things receive the action of the first cause in the same way and on that account it is said that all things do not exist in the first cause according to one disposition.

393. As a clarification of this proposition, three things follow:

for first, the proposition is clarified;

second, it is proved, at: and indeed diversity (179);

third, a certain corollary is inferred, at: therefore, according to the mode (180).

394. Therefore he says first (170) that on that account all things are said not to be in the first cause according to one disposition, because even if the first cause should exist in all things, insofar as, precisely, it touches on all things by the effect of its action, yet each thing receives Its action according to the mode of its own power.

395. And he gives examples for this (178) according to three diversities first found in things,

of which the first is according to the diversity of unity and multitude which diversity pertains to substances themselves: for those things whose substance is simple receive the action of the first cause in a united fashion; but those whose substance is composed receive it in a multiplied fashion, that is, according to the mode of their own substance.

The second diversity is taken from the part of the duration of things in their being: for certain ones receive the action of the first cause with an eternal reception, namely those whose being is not subject to motion, whence their duration in their being is not varied according to before and after; but certain others receive the action of the first cause with a temporal reception, namely those whose being is subject to motion and consequently their duration is continued according to a succession of before and after.

The third diversity he posits from the part of the very species or form of the thing according to which certain ones are incorporeal according to their species and these receive the influence of the first cause in a spiritual manner; but certain others are, according to their species, corporeal, and things of this kind receive the influence of the first cause by a corporal reception.

396. Now, all this which is premised, the proposition contains which is posited in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 142) which goes like this: to all things the gods are present in the same way, but not all things are present to the gods in the same way, but each individual according to its own order and potency adopts their presence: some uniformly, others in a multiplied way; and some perpetually, others in time and some incorporeally, others corporeally.

397. Then, when he says: and diversity (179), he proves what was premised in this way: for the diversity of reception can come about from two factors: whether from the agent or influencer, or from the recipient. For because the diversity of cause causes diversity in effects, it is necessary that, if an agent be different and the recipient one, the diversity of reception be caused by the agent, not by the recipient, like water which is frozen by cold and melted by heat. Now if, on the other hand, the agent be one and the recipient diverse, there will be a diversity of reception from the part of the recipient, not from the part of the agent, as appears of the sun which hardens clay and melts wax.

398. Now it is clear that the first cause is one, having no diversity, but those which receive the influence of the first cause are diverse. Therefore the diversity of reception is not from the first cause which is pure goodness, flowing goodness over all things but it is because of the diversity of the recipients. Thus therefore it appears that the first cause is found in all things by one mode, but not vice-versa.

399. Now, it should be paid attention to that the action of the first cause is two-fold: one according to which it institutes a thing, which is called creation; but the other according to which it rules the things already instituted. Therefore, in the first action, it does not have a place which is said here (179) because it is proper to reduce the whole diversity of effects into the diversity of recipients, it will be necessary to say that there be some recipients which be not from the first cause. Which is contrary to that which has been said above in proposition 18: all things have essence through the first cause (143).

Whence it is necessary to say that the first diversity of things according to which they have diverse natures and powers be not from any diversity of the recipients, but from the first cause: not because there be any diversity in it, but because it is knowing diversity. For, it is acting according to its knowledge and on that account it produces the diverse grades of things to the complement of the universe. But in the action of government, about which we are now concerned, the diversity of reception is according to the diversity of the recipients.

400. Then, when he says: therefore, the second (180), he brings in a certain corollary from the aforesaid things. For, if the diversity of reception of the influence of the first cause results in things according to the diverse power of the recipients, since those which are closer to the first cause are of greater power, it follows that they receive the first cause and its influence more perfectly. And because every knowing substance, as much as it has being more perfectly, so much it knows the first cause more perfectly and the influence of its goodness, and the more it receives and knows this, the more it delights in it, the consequence is that the closer something is to the first cause, the more it delights in it.