Proposition 20

155. The first cause rules all created things while not mixing with them.

156. This is because the ruling does not weaken its unity, which is exalted over everything, nor does it destroy it; nor does the essence of its unity, removed from things, prevent it from ruling them.

157. This is because the first cause is fixed, stable with its ever-pure unity, and it rules all created things and impresses on them the power of life and qualities according to their capacity to receive and their possibility. Indeed the first quality flows goodnesses over all things in a single influx; however, each and every thing receives from that influx according to the mode of its capacity and its being.

158. And the first quality only flows goodnesses over all things according to a single mode, because it is goodness only through its existence and its being and its power, so that it is goodness, and goodness and power and being are one thing. Thus, just as the first being and goodness are one thing, it happens that it flows goodnesses over things by a single common influx. And goodnesses and gifts are differentiated from meeting the receiver. This is because those who receive the qualities do not receive in equal measure, but rather certain ones of them receive more than certain others, this indeed is on account of the size of its generosity.

159. Thus let us return and say that between every agent, which acts through its own being only, and the thing made, there is no middleman, nor any other thing in the middle. And there is no middleman between the agent and the product except an addition over being, that is to say when the agent and the product are in the relation of instrument and the agent does not act through its own being, and are composite. On account of this the receiver receives through a connection between itself and its maker and this agent is removed from its product.

160. But an agent, between whom and its product there is no internal middleman, is a true agent and a true ruler, making things according to a proper end, after which it is not possible that there be any other perfection; and it rules what it has made by a final government.

161. This is because it rules things according to the mode according to which it acts and it only acts through its own being; therefore its being will again be its government. On account of this, it so happens that it rules and it acts through the highest degree of perfection and government in which there is no diversity or convolution. And the operations and government are diversified on account of the first causes only according to the merit of the recipient.

357. After it has been shown how inferiors depend from superiors, here (155) it is shown how superiors influence inferiors by their government. And about this he makes two points:

first, he is concerned about the universal government of the first cause,

second, about the government of the intelligence, in proposition 23, where he says: every divine intelligence (172).

358. About the first, he makes two points:

first, he shows the mode of universal government of the first cause;

second, he shows the aptitude of God for reigning, in proposition 21, where he says: the first is wealthy (162).

359. About the first, he posits a proposition like this: the first cause rules all created things while not mixing with them (155). For the understanding of this it should be considered that we see this happening in human governing: that he who has the care of governing many is necessarily distracted by his governing to many things; but the one who is free from the care of governing others can more greatly conserve uniformity in himself. Whence also the Epicurean philosophers, since they conserved divine quiet and uniformity, posited that the gods had no concern for ruling, but were leisurely and carefree in every way, as thus they appeared to be happy.

360. And on that account, against this, in this proposition it is brought in that these two things, the universal government of things and the highest unity by which God is exalted above all things, are not contraries, nor do they impede one another whence immediately, in the beginning of the exposition (156) it is posited: this is because the ruling does not weaken its unity, which is exalted over everything, nor does it destroy it, because, namely, neither in whole nor in part it does not detract from the divine unity through the universal government. And vice-versa: he adds, nor does the essence of its unity, removed from things, prevent it from ruling them.

361. And this whole thing is posited in proposition 122 of Proclus under these words: every divine provides for the secondary things and it is freed from those for which it provides, and its providence does not subordinate its unmixed and unitary excellence, nor does its separate unity remove its providence.

362. To make this proposition clear, three points are brought in:

first, is shown the diverse mode of receiving the influences of the first cause from the part of the thing receiving (157);

second, the unity from the part of the first cause influence is shown, where he says: and the first goodness (158);

third, from these two a proposition is concluded, namely: that the government of the first cause exists without it being mixed with things, where he says: let us return therefore and say (159).

363. He says (157) therefore first that all goodnesses which are found in things flow out from the first cause and each and every thing receives goodnesses of this sort according to the mode and propriety of its substance and power. Now there are diverse natures and powers of diverse things and thence it is that although the first cause influences with one influx over all things, yet Its influx is received in diverse modes in diverse things. An example of this is evident in light which indeed proceeds in one way from a lucid body, but as the diverse rays pass through a varicolored window they make a different appearance.

364. Then (158) he shows that the first cause flows over all things with a single influx. For it flows over things by reason of good: for it has goodness that makes good, that is to say that it is the principle of goodness in all things. Now the goodness of the first cause is its own being itself and its essence, because the first cause is the very essence of goodness. Whence, because its essence is maximally one, because the first principle is one and good according to itself, consequently the first cause acts on things and influences in them in one mode insofar as it is from its own part. But things receive in a different mode from its influx: certain ones more and certain ones less: each and every one according to its own propriety.

365. Then (159) from these premises he concludes the non-mixed-ness of the first cause to other things. And the meaning of this conclusion can be had more fully, if we accept the words which are in the commentary of Proclus who says thus: nor therefore do the providing ones (namely gods) receive a habitude from those for whom it is provided. For they do good to all through the existence which they are. Now everything which makes through its existence, makes without habitude. For habitude is apposition, something placed besides existence, on account of which is it aside from nature (122). Now, he calls habitude some disposition through which the agent is adapted or proportioned to the patient or recipient. And because thus it acts on diverse things, it is necessary that it have diverse dispositions by which it is adapted to diverse things. And according to this, a certain multitude falls on a thing of this kind which acts in different ways on different things, according to their diverse dispositions which are beside nature or its essence, which is one. And thus one acting according to diverse dispositions is mixed with the things on which it acts, according to a certain adaptation to them.

366. But the first cause acts through its existence, as has been proved (158), whence it does not act through any superadded habitude or disposition, through which it would be adapted and commingled with things. And a habitude of this kind is here called middleman or intermediary (159), because, that is to say, through a disposition or habitude of this sort the agent is adapted to the recipient and it is in some way a middle between the essence of the agent and the patient itself. Because therefore the first cause is acting through its own existence, it is necessary that it rule things in one mode; for thus it rules things, just as it acts (161).

367. Whence it is obvious that his government is the best and most beautiful: for every ruler of a multitude tends to this, that he reduce the many which he rules into one. And this is found most fully in the divine government, which is one according to itself and is not diversified in its effects unless according to the diversity, as if according to the diverse merits of the things added below.