Proposition 3

27. Every noble soul has three activities: for from its works is animal activity and intellectual activity and divine activity.

28. Activity moreover is divine because it creates nature with the power that is in it from the first cause.

29. Now, activity is intellectual because it knows things by the power of intelligence that is in it.

30. Activity is animal because it moves the first body and all natural bodies, because it is the cause of the motion of bodies and the cause of the activity of nature.

31. And the soul only brings about these activities because it is an example of superior virtue.

32. This is because the first cause created the being of the soul with a mediating intelligence, and for that reason the soul has been created, bringing about divine activity.

33. Thus, after the first cause created the being of the soul, it made it just like a saddle for the intelligence, on which it brings about its operations.

34. Thus for that reason the intellectual soul brings about the intellectual activity. And because the soul receives the impression of intelligence, it is endowed with an activity inferior to that which is in its own impression toward that which is beneath it.

35. This is because it only makes an impression on things by motion, that is to say, because it only receives that which is under it, if it moves it with respect to its own activity. Thus, on account of this cause it is the case that the soul moves bodies; for it belongs to the soul that it should bring bodies to life, when it informs them with its power, and straightaway leads them to right activity.

36. Therefore it is now manifest that the soul has three operations, because it has three powers: that is to say, divine power and the power of intelligence and the power of its being, accordingly we have spoken and demonstrated.

63. Since those things which are from superiors are in inferiors according to some kind of participation, after he has divided three grades of superior beings of which one is superior to eternity, which is God, another is with eternity, which is intelligence, and a third, after eternity, which is the soul (19–22), now he means to show how the third participates that which is from the first and that which is from the second, saying: every noble soul has three operations: for among its operations is the animal operation and the intellectual operation and the divine operation (27).

64. Now, what is called noble soul can be understood from the words of Proclus who posited this proposition under these words: all divine souls have these triple operations qua souls, some as receiving the divine intellect, others as joined to the gods beyond (Elements of Theology, 201). From which it is clear that noble soul is here called divine soul.

65. For the evidence of this it should be known that Plato posited separate, self-subsisting universal forms of things. And because universal forms of this kind have a certain universal causality, according to him, beyond the particular beings which participate them, on that account all forms of this kind subsisting in this way are called gods: for this name "God" implies a certain universal providence and causality [213].

66. Yet among these forms he posited this order: that to the extent that any form is more universal, it is a more simple and a priori cause: for it is participated by posterior forms. Just as if we posit that animal is participated by man and life by animal and thus concerning others. Now the ultimate, which is participated by all and itself participates nothing else, is the separated one and good itself which is called the highest God and the first cause of all things. Whence also in the book of Proclus, proposition 116 is brought in, like this: every god is participable, that is, participates, except the one.

67. And because forms of this kind, which are called gods, are intelligible according to themselves, the thinking intellect is put in act through the intelligible species, they posited, under the order of the gods, that is, of the aforesaid forms, an order of the intellects which participate the aforesaid forms, in so far as they be intelligent. Among which forms is also the ideal intellect [286]. But the aforesaid intellects participate the aforesaid forms, according to an immobile mode, insofar as they understand them. Whence under the order of the intellect, they place a third order of souls which, with the intellects as intermediaries, participate the aforesaid forms according to motion, insofar as, namely, they are the principles of corporal motions, through which superior forms are participated in corporeal matter and thus the fourth order of things is the order of bodies [351].

68. Now, among the intellects, the superior ones are said to be "divine intellects," and the inferior ones are called "intellects," but not "divine," because the idea intellect which is God per se, according to them, is participated by the superior intellects according to each that is, according to what the intellect is and according to what God is; but it is participated by inferior intellects only according to what the intellect is, and on that account they are not divine intellects. For the superior intellects receive not only that they be intellects, but also that they be divine.

69. Similarly also when souls are applied to the gods with the intellects mediating, as if being nearer, the superior souls themselves are also divine on account of the divine intellects to which they are applied or which they participate; now, inferior souls, as they are applied to intellects which are not divine, are non-divine.

70. And because bodies receive motion only through the soul, consequently superior bodies would also be divine, according to them, and inferior bodies would not be divine. Whence Proclus says in proposition 129: every body which is divine through a deified soul is divine; and every soul is divine on account of a divine intellect; and every intellect is divine according to a participation of divine unity.

71. And because they call first separated forms "gods" insofar as they are universal according to themselves, consequently they also call intellects divine and souls divine and bodies divine because they have a certain universal influence and causality over subsequent members of their own genus and of inferior genera.

72. Now Dionysius corrects this position, insofar as they place in order different separated forms which they call gods, as, namely, being per se is one thing and life per se is another and so on and so forth.

73. For it is necessary to say that all these are essentially the first cause itself of all things, from which things participate all perfections of this kind, and thus we do not posit many gods, but one. And this is what he says in On the Divine Names, 5, that it (that is, Sacred Scripture) does not say that good is one thing and existing is another and life or wisdom is another, nor does it say that there are many causes and other deities productive of others things, some exceeding and some subject, but all goods proceed from the one.

74. Now how this can be he shows consequently from this: because since God is being itself and the very essence of goodness, whatever pertains to the perfection of goodness and being, the whole belongs essentially to him so that, namely, he is the essence of life and of wisdom and of power and of the others. Whence after something he adds: for indeed God is not existing in some mode, but simply and without circumscription he has accepted in advance the whole of being in himself.

75. And the author of this book follows this; for he is not found to bring in any multitude of deity, but he establishes unity in God, but distinction in the order of the intellects and of the souls and of the bodies.

76. According to this, therefore, the soul of the celestial body is called noble soul, that is divine soul, according to the opinion of the philosophers who posited an animated heaven. For this soul, according to them, had some universal influence over things through motion and from this it is called divine, in that manner of speaking by which also among men, those who have a universal care for the republic are called divine.

77. Concerning this noble or divine soul, therefore, he says (28) that it has a divine operation and explaining this, he says that its divine operation is because it creates nature insofar as, that is to say, it is the principle of prime motion, to which all nature is subjected, and it has this by a power participated from the first cause, which is the universal cause of all things, from which it obtains a certain universal causality in nature things. And on that account, assigning from this operation to the divine soul appropriately, he says (31) that it is an example, that is to say an image, of superior power, that is to say divine; for in the aforesaid soul the universality of divine power is exemplified because, to be precise, just as God is the universal cause of all beings so the aforesaid soul is the universal cause of natural things which are moved.

78. Now, he posits the operation of the noble or divine soul as intellectual (27). Which indeed, just as he has expounded (29), is because it knows things, insofar as it participates the power of intelligence. How it participates the power of intelligence he shows (32) by the fact that the soul is created by the first cause with the intelligence as intermediary. Whence the soul comes from God just as from the first cause, but from the intelligence just as from a second cause. Now, every effect participates something of the power of its cause; whence, it remains that the soul, just as it makes a divine operation insofar as it is from the first cause, so it makes an operation of intelligence insofar as it comes from it, participating its power.

79. Now this which is said here (32), that the first cause created the existence of the soul with the intelligence as intermediary, certain ones who understand badly have thought the author of this book meant that the intelligences were creators of the substance of the soul.

80. But this is against the Platonist positions: for indeed causalities of this type are posited of simple beings according to participation. But that which is participating is not participated, but that which is first: namely, by essence as such; think: if whiteness were separate, simple whiteness itself—not something participating in whiteness—would be the cause of all white things insofar as they are white. Therefore, according to this the Platonists posited that that which is itself being is the cause of existing for all things; but that which is itself life is the cause of living for all things; and that which is itself intelligence is the cause of understanding for all things. Whence Proclus says in proposition 18 of his book (Elements of Theology): everything giving being to others, is itself firstly that from which it gives a donation to the recipients. What Aristotle says in Metaphysics, 2, that that which is first and maximally being is the cause of subsequent things, is in harmony with this opinion.

81. It should therefore be understand that the very essence of the soul according to the things said before [80] is caused by the first cause which is itself its own existence, but it has consequent participations from other posterior principles; so, namely, that it has "to live" from the first life and "to understand" from the first intelligence. Whence also in proposition 18 of this book (143) it is said: all things have essence on account of the first being and all living things are in motion through their own essence on account of the first life and all intelligible things have knowledge on account of the first intelligence. Thus therefore he means that the first cause has caused the existence of the soul with the intelligence as intermediary, because the first cause alone caused the essence of the soul, but that the soul be intellectual, this it has from the operation of the intelligence.

82. And this sense is shown clearly through the words which follow (33): therefore after, he says, the first cause caused the being of the soul, it placed it like a saddle for the Intelligence, that is as a substrate for the operation of the Intelligence so that, namely, the intelligence performs the operation in it, that is: giving to it that it be intellectual. Whence he concludes that on account of this the intellectual soul performs an intellectual operation. And this also agrees with that which is said in proposition 1 (14) that the effect of the first cause pre-exists the effects of the secondary causes and is more universally diffused. For being which is most common is diffused into all things by the first cause (23–24) but "to understand" is not communicated to all by the intelligence, but to certain ones, by presupposing the being which they have from the first.

83. But also this position, if not plainly understood, is repugnant to the truth and to the opinion of Aristotle, who argued in Metaphysics, 3, against the Platonists who posit an order of this kind of separate causes according to those things which are said before about individual things, that it follows that Socrates will be many animals, that is, Socrates himself and separate man, and also separate animal: for separate man participates animal and so is animals; and Socrates participates both whence he is both man and animal. Therefore, Socrates would not be truly one if he had only what it is to be animals: and from another what it is to be man.

84. Whence, since intellectual being pertains to the very nature of the soul, as its essential difference, if it had being from one thing and intellective nature from another, it would follow that it would not be simply one. Therefore it is appropriate to say that, from the first cause from which it has essence, it also has intellectuality. And this agrees with the opinion of Dionysius cited above [73–74], namely, that the good itself is not one thing, being itself another, and life itself and wisdom itself, but they are one and the same, which is God, from which it is derived in things that they be and live and think, as he showed at that same place. Whence also Aristotle in Metaphysics, 12, meaningfully attributed to God "to understand" and "to live," saying that he is life and intelligence, so that he excludes the aforementioned Platonist positions.

85. Yet in another mode this can have truth, if it is referred not to the intellectual nature, but to the intelligible forms which intellective souls receive through the operation of the Intelligences; whence Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 4, that souls are made through the angels participants of illumination emanating from God (cf. 148 [348]).

86. But the third operation of the noble or divine soul he posits animal (27) and explains (30) that the animal operation is in that it moves the first body and consequently all natural bodies: for it is the cause of motion in things.

87. And he assigns a reason for this later (34), for because soul is lower than intelligence, insofar as receiving the impression of the intelligence, consequently it operates in an inferior mode on those things which are below itself, than the intelligence impresses on the subjects for itself; because primary causes have more influence than secondary causes, as is clear from proposition 1 (1). Now, the intelligence makes an impression on the soul without motion, insofar as, to be precise, it makes the soul know, which is without motion. But the soul makes an impression on body through motion and that which is below it, i.e., body, receives the impression of the soul only insofar as it is moved by it (35).

88. And consequently, he assigns a cause why it should be said that the motion of natural bodies be from the soul. For we see that all natural bodies directly arrive through their operations and motions at owed ends: which could not be done unless they were directed by some intelligence. From this it seems that the motion of bodies be from the soul which flows its power over bodies, by moving them.

89. This position also is not approved in faith, namely, that the motion of the sky be from the Soul: but Augustine leaves this under doubt in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, 2. That it be by God directing all nature and that the corporal creation be moved by God with the Intelligences or Angels as intermediaries, this Augustine asserts in On the Trinity, 3, and Gregory in the Dialogues, 4.

90. Last (36) he now concludes the proposition, that is, that the noble soul has three aforesaid operations.

91. With that which is said about the divine intellect and the divine soul agrees the opinion of Dionysius who in On the Divine Names, 4 called the superior angels divine minds, that is, intellects through whom also souls by a deiform gift participate according to their own power.

92. But he takes divinity according to conjunction to God, not according to a universal influence on caused things. For that is more divine: because, even in God himself, that which he is, is greater than what he causes in others.