Proposition 18

143. All things are beings because of the first being, and all living things are in motion by their own essence because of the first life, and all intellectual things have knowledge because of the first intelligence.

144. This is because, if every cause gives something to its object, then doubtless the first being gives being to all its objects.

145. And in the same way, life gives motion to its objects, because life is a procession going forth from the first being, which is motionless, sempiternal, and the first motion.

146. And in the same way intelligence gives knowledge to its objects.

147. This is because every true knowledge is only intelligence, and intelligence is the first knower which is, and impresses knowledge on the rest of knowing things.

148. Let us return then and say that the first being is motionless and it is the cause of causes, and, if it gives being to all things, then it gives to them according to the mode of creation. However, the first life gives life to those which are under it, not according to the mode of creation, but rather according to the mode of a form. And in the same way intelligence gives to those which are under it concerning knowledge and the rest of things according to the mode of a form.

335. After it has been shown that all things depend from the first according to their power, here he shows that all things depend from the first according to their nature. And about this, he makes two points:

first, he shows the universal dependence of things from the first, according to all things which pertain to their nature or substance;

second, he shows the divine grade of proximity to the first from which they depend, just as he had also said about this dependence of power and this in proposition 19, there: from the intelligences is (149).

336. First, therefore, he posits a proposition like this: all things have essence on account of the first being and all living things are moved by their own essence on account of the first life (143).

337. And this same is said in the book of Proclus in proposition 102 under these words: all beings of whatever kind are from the finite and infinite on account of the firstly being: and all living things are motive of themselves on account of the first life; and all cognitive things participate cognition on account of the first intellect. Now, he says that all things are from the finite and infinite on account of the first being, because, as it is held above in proposition 4: created being is composed out of the finite and infinite (42 [106-108]).

338. Now, for the meaning of this proposition, first it should be considered that all the grades of things seem to reduce to three which are: to be, to live, and to know. And this on that account, because each and every thing can be considered in three ways:

first, according to itself, and thus being is appropriate to it;

second, according as it tends toward something else, and thus it is appropriate to it to be moved;

third, according to the fact that it has others in it and thus it pertains to it to know, because according to this cognition is perfected: that the known is in the knower not materially but formally.

339. Now, just as to have something in it formally and not materially, in which the definition of cognition consists, is the most noble mode of having or containing something, thus to be moved by oneself is the noblest mode of mobility and in this consists the definition of life, for we say they are living which move themselves in some way. Being therefore, which is first, is common to all; but not all things attain that perfection so that they would be motive of themselves, whence not all things are living, but certain ones, which are more perfect among things. Again, because of those which are motive of themselves or of others, not all are motive by the mode of cognition, but through some material principle, as happens in plants, thence also not all living things reach the level of cognition, but only those in which the principle of motion is something formal without matter; for even sense perception itself is susceptive of sensible species without matter, as is said in On the Soul, 2.

340. Second, it should be considered that in every genus the cause is that which is first in that genus, from which all things which are of that genus are constituted in that genus. Just as among elementary bodies, fire is the first hot from which all things acquire heat. Now it is not possible in any order of things to proceed into infinity. Therefore, in the order of beings there must be some first that gives being to all things. And this is what he says (143) that all things have essence on account of the first being (144).

341. Similarly in the genus of living things there ought to be some first thing, and from this all living things have that they live. And because it is proper to a living thing that it be motive of itself, on that account he says (143) that all living things are moved through their essence, that is, moving themselves, on account of the first life, whence it is said in Proclus' book (Elements of Theology, 102): all living things are motive of themselves on account of the first life. And that to move itself proceeds from the first life he proves, adding: since life is a procession proceeding from the first still sempiternal being (145).

342. For the understanding of this it should be known that it is prior for something to be in itself than to be moved into another, whence to be moved presupposes to be. Which if being itself be underlying motion again it will be necessary that some principle of motion be presupposed and thus how far it would reach to some immobile being that is the principle for all things of moving themselves. And this is the first life. Whence it is manifest that life in all living things is a certain procession proceeding from a certain first still and sempiternal being, that is, subject to no mutation.

343. Similarly also in the order of knowing things there must be some first. Now it is manifest that, in the order of perfection and of nature, intellective cognition is prior to the sensitive, because it is more immaterial. Whence also we judge about sensitive cognition through the intellect, as about an inferior through a superior. Now, in the intellective cognition itself, it is manifest that ratiocinative inquisition proceeds from principles known in themselves, of which it is the intellect whence reason follows intellect.

Therefore, the first in the order of knowing things is intellect and on that account it is necessary that all intelligible things—that is cognoscent things—have knowledge—that is, cognition—on account of the first intelligence (143). Whence also in Proclus' book (Elements of Theology, 102) it is said that all cognitive things participate cognition on account of the first intellect. And the reason for this is assigned (146) because all knowledge basically is nothing but intelligence: for intelligence is a certain summit, as Proclus says (Elements of Theology, 102) of all cognition. Whence intelligence is first knowing and flowing cognition over all knowing things.

344. Now just as was said above [65-67, 98, 286], according to the Platonists, the first being which is the idea of being is something beyond the first life, that is, beyond the idea of life and the first life is something beyond the first ideal intellect. But according to Dionysius [72-74, 99-100], the first being and first life and first intellect are one and the same which is God. Whence also Aristotle, in Metaphysics, 12, attributes to the first principle that it be intellect and that its knowing be life; and according to this all things have being, living, and knowing from it.

345. Third, it should be considered that these three are caused in things in different ways, either from different principles according to the Platonists, or from the same principle according to the doctrine of the faith and of Aristotle. For there is a double mode of causing: one, indeed, by which something comes to be, another being presupposed; and in this way something is said to come to be by information, because that which comes later, is related to that which is presupposed, by the mode of a form; in the other way, something is caused with nothing presupposed; and in this way something is said to be made by creation.

346. Therefore, because knowing presupposes living and living presupposes being, but being does not presuppose anything else, thence it is that the first being gives being to all by the mode of creation (148).

347. Now first life, whatever that may be, does not give living by the mode of creation, but by the mode of a form, that is, of information. And similarly it should be said about intelligence.

348. From this it is clear that when he said above (32) that intelligence is the cause of the soul he did not mean that it would be its cause by the mode of creation, but only by the mode of information, as was explained above [79-85, 345].