Proposition 6

57. The first cause is beyond all telling. And tongues fall short of its description only because of the account of being itself, because it is above every cause and it is not told except through second causes which are illuminated by the light of the first cause.

58. This is because the first cause does not cease to illuminate its object, and it itself is not illuminated by any other light, since it is the pure light, beyond which there is no light.

59. From that, then, it comes about that the first is the only one whose account falls short; and it is such only because there is no cause beyond it by which it is known,

60. because indeed everything is known and described only by its own cause. Since therefore the thing is simply cause and is not caused, it is not known by a prior cause nor described because it is superior to description, nor does it follow a discourse.

61. This is because description only takes place by means of discourse, and discourse by means of intelligence, and intelligence by means of cogitation, and cogitation by means of meditation, and meditation by means of sense-perception. Now the first cause is above all things, since it is the cause for them; because of that it thus comes about that it does not fall under sense-perception and meditation and cogitation and intelligence and discourse; thus it is not able to be described.

62. And I say again that a thing is either sensible and it falls under sense-perception and it is the object of meditation and it falls under meditation, or it is fixed, standing according to one disposition and is intellectual, or it is subject to change or destruction falling under generation and corruption and falls under cogitation. And the first cause is beyond intellectual sempiternal things and beyond destructible things, on account of which neither sense-perception nor meditation nor cogitation nor intelligence fall under it.

63. And indeed it is only inferred from the second cause which is intelligence and it is named by the name of its first object only in a higher and better way, because that which belongs to its object is again of its cause, however by a more sublime, better and nobler way, as we have shown.

158. After the author of this book distinguishes (19) superior being generally into three grades, of which the first is beyond eternity, which is appropriate to the first cause; the second is with eternity, which is appropriate to the intelligence; the third is below eternity and beyond time, which is appropriate to the soul, here (57) he begins to follow up on the individual grades.

159. And first about the first cause;

second, about the intelligence, in proposition 7, where he says: intelligence is a substance (64);

third, about the soul, in proposition 14, where he says: in every soul (115).

160. About the first cause, now, this is what we can most possibly know: that it exceeds all our knowledge and speech. For he most perfectly knows God who holds this about him: that whatever can be known or said about him, is less than what God is. Whence Dionysius says in the first book of the Mystical Theology, that man by his better knowledge is united with God just as wholly unknown by the fact that he knows nothing about him, knowing that he is beyond all mind.

161. And to show this he adds this proposition (57): the first cause is superior to narration. By narration, then, must be understood affirmation; because whatever we affirm about God does not belong to him in the way that it is meant by us. For the names imposed by us have meaning in the mode by which we understand them, which indeed the divine mode of Being transcends. Whence Dionysius says in the second chapter of Celestial Hierarchy that negations in divine things are true, but affirmations are not well put together or inappropriate.

162 Proclus also posits this proposition in proposition 123 of his book under these words: every divine thing itself, on account of a supersubstantial union, is indeed ineffable and unknowable by all secondary beings, but it can be grasped and known by its participants. On account of this only the first is wholly unknown inasmuch as it is unparticipated being. By what he calls divine, he understands every ideal form, according to the positions of the Platonists; like: per se man, per se life and others of this sort, which they called gods as was said above [65]. Things of this kind have a super-substantial unity according to themselves, because they exceed all subjects participating in them and on that account he says that no one of these can be said or known by inferior beings. But by superior beings they can be known: as the idea of life can be known by the idea of being.

163. And although they cannot be perfectly known or said by inferiors, yet in some way they may be grasped and known by participants, that is through participating things, just as through those things which participate life, something is known about life itself. But that which is simply first, which according to the Platonists is the very essence of goodness, is nearly unknown, because it does not have anything above it which can know it and this is what it means, that which is called amethectum that is not existing after anything.

164. And because the author of this book does not agree with the Platonists on the position of the other ideal separated natures, but posits only the first, as was said above [75], on that account, when others are set aside, about this first cause, he says that it is superior to narration. And he assigns a cause: on account of its super-stantiality, just as Proclus also does; and this is what he adds in the proposition: and tongues fall short of its description only because of the account of being itself, because it is above every cause (57).

165. Then he shows how it may be described, adding: and it is only described through second causes which are illuminated by the light of the first cause (57). And this is the same which Proclus said that it is graspable by participants and knowable.

166. Now, what is said in the proposition, is proved through this mode: for something is known in three ways:

in one way as an effect is known through a cause;

in another way through itself;

in a third way through its effect.

167. First, therefore, he shows that the first cause is not known in the first way, that is through a cause, when he says, that the first cause does not cease to illuminate what it has caused, and it itself is not illuminated by another light, since it is pure light, above which there is no light (58).

168. To the understanding of which it should be considered that visible things are known in a sensible way through a corporal light, whence that through which something is known can be called "light" by similitude. Now, the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics, 9, that each and everything is known through that which it is in act and on that account the very actuality of the thing is a certain light of its own. And because the effect has that which it is in act through its cause, thence it is what is illuminated and known through its cause. Now the first cause is pure act having no possibility joined to it and on that account it is the pure light by which all others are illuminated and rendered knowable.

169. And from this he concludes below (59) that only the first cause is first in this way that it cannot be described, because it does not have a superior cause through which it is described. For things are accustomed to be described through their causes (60).

170. And because he proceeds from cognition to narration, he shows (61) consequently that the first cause, since it is beyond cognition, is necessarily beyond narration. And this on that account, because narration (that is, affirmation) takes place through speech (that is, through some significative word; now speech is through intelligence, because significative voices are signs of intellects; now intelligence takes place through cogitation, that is, through reason; and this is true in men who arrive by ratiocinating to an understanding of truth; and cogitation takes place through meditation, that is, through imagination and other sensitive interior powers which are a slave to human reason; and meditation takes place through the sense because phantasia is movement made by the sense according to act, as is said in On the Soul, 3 (3, 29a1-2). Whence, since the first cause is beyond all things, it exceeds all the aforesaid.

171. And this Dionysius also posits in On the Divine Names, 1, saying: and there is neither sense nor phantasia of him, what he calls meditation, nor opinion, what he calls cogitation; nor name, what he calls speech, nor discourse, what he calls narration, nor knowledge, what he calls intelligence.

172. But second he shows that it is not known by the second mode, that is, through itself, and he proves this (62) by the diverse mode of cognition. For of those things which are known per se, certain ones are known by the sense, such as sensible things; certain ones by meditation, or imagination, such as imaginable things which are not subject to the sense perception; but certain ones are known by the intellect, such as necessary and immobile things; but certain ones are known by reason or cogitation, such as generable and corruptible things, according to which mode the Philosopher says in Ethics, 6 (2, 1139a12–14) that the ratiocinative is about those things which happen to behave otherwise. Whence since the first cause be beyond every genus of this kind of things, it can be known by none of those modes.

173. Proclus brings in this proof also (Elements of Theology, 123) except that he puts meditation in the place of cogitation and opinion in the place of meditation.

174. And indeed about this reason, it is clear that the first cause is beyond sensible things and imaginable things and corruptible things; but what may be beyond sempiternal intelligible things is not manifest. And this proof is set aside here (62) but Proclus (Elements of Theology, 123) proves through this, that all intellectual or rational cognition is of beings: for that which is first acquired by the intellect is being and that in which the definition of being is not found cannot be grasped by the intellect. Whence since the first cause is beyond being, consequently the first cause is beyond sempiternal intelligible things.

175. Now the first cause according to the Platonists indeed is beyond being, in as much as the essence of goodness and unity, which is the first cause, exceeds even separated being itself, just as was said above [66]; but, according to the truth of the matter, the first cause is beyond being, inasmuch as it is infinite existence itself. Now being is called that which participates existence and this is proportionate to our intellect, whose object is "what it is" as is said in On the Soul, 3 (4, 429b10) which only that which has a quiddity participating existence can be grasped by our intellect; but God's quiddity is his very existence, whence it is beyond understanding.

176. And through this mode he brings in this reasoning of Dionysius (On the Divine Names, 1) saying thus, if all cognitions are of existing things and if existence has an end insofar as, precisely, they participate existence finitely, the one who is beyond all substance, is excluded from all cognition.

177. Third, he shows how the first cause is known through effect and he says (63) that the first cause is not signified in these which are said about it, except from the second cause which is intelligence: for we speak thus about God as if about a certain intelligent substance. And on this account, because intelligence is its first caused, whence it is most similar to God and he can be known to the greatest extent through it. But, nevertheless it is not sufficiently known through it, because that which is intelligence is in the first cause in a higher mode; but the cause, exceeding the effect, cannot be sufficiently be known through its effect.

178. Thus therefore it is clear that the first cause is superior to narration, because neither through a cause nor through itself nor through its effect can it be sufficiently known or spoken.