Proposition 5

49. The superior first intelligences which follow immediately upon the first cause, impress the second forms, while staying identical, which are not destroyed such that it is necessary to renew them in another cycle. The second intelligences, moreover, impress the turned-away forms which are separable, such as the soul.

50. For it proceeds from the impression of the second intelligence which follows created being in an inferior manner.

51. And souls are only multiplied in the way that the intelligences are modified. This is because the being of the soul again has an end, but that which, proceeding from it, is inferior, is infinite.

52. Therefore the souls that follow alachili, that is, intelligence, are complete, perfect, of little turning-away and separation; and souls that follow inferior being are, in their attributes and turning-away inferior to the superior souls.

53. And superior souls flow over the inferior souls with goodnesses which they receive from the intelligence.

54. And every soul receiving more power from the intelligence is stronger with regard to its impression, and what is impressed by it is fixed, persisting, and its motion is an even and continuous motion. And that in which the power of intelligence proceeds from it less, is with regard to its impression below the first souls, and it is because what is impressed by it is feeble, vanishing, destructible.

55. However, even though it is such, it yet persists through generation.

56. Now, therefore, it is shown why many intellectual forms were made, and that being is only one, simple, and why many souls were made, certain of which are stronger than certain others, and their being is one, simple, in which there is no differentiation.

130. After, in the preceding proposition, the author has manifested the distinction of the intelligences, here (49) he deals with the distinction of the souls, which indeed he assigns according to the difference of the intelligences which in some manner are causing them, according to his position. Whence, that which is here said about the distinction of souls can be referred to the distinction of the intelligences, since the distinction of causes is manifested through the distinction of effects. Whence also in certain editions, this proposition is not placed by itself, but adjoined to the comment of the preceding proposition, which also appears from the epilogue which is put here (56), which is common to either proposition.

131. Now, the proposition goes like this: the superior first intelligences which follow immediately upon the first cause, impress the second forms, while staying identical, which are not destroyed such that it is necessary to renew them in another cycle. The second intelligences, moreover, impress the turned-away forms which are separable, such as the soul (49).

132. To this proposition, Proclus posits two corresponding propositions, namely, the first (Elements of Theology, 182) which is like this: every divine participated intellect is participated by divine souls; and another (Elements of Theology, 183) which goes like this: every participated intellect which is just intellectual, is participated by souls which are neither divine nor made in a transmutation of intellect and ignorance.

133. For evidence of this proposition (49), one ought to consider three things:

first, concerning the impression of the soul (50 [134–144]);

second, about the distinction of souls (51 [145–147]);

third, about the difference of distinct souls (52-55 [148–155]).

134. Now, about the impression of the soul,

first one ought to consider how it is appropriate to the soul that it be impressed [135–136];

second, by what it is impressed [137–144].

135. That it is appropriate to the soul to be impressed, appears manifestly if someone should consider the definition of impression, for which two things are required:

first, indeed, that that which is impressed be existing in something;

second, that it not be in it superficially according to just some extrinsic contact, but that it be innermost, as if penetrating into the depth.

136. And these two are appropriate to the soul according to its proper definition. For it was said above in proposition 3 (30) that the proper operation of the soul is that it moves bodies, by the fact that the operation of the soul itself is below the proper operation of the intelligence (33), to whom it belongs to know things without motion. Now the principle of motion ought to be applied to the mobile because, as is proved in Physics, 7 (2, 243a4) mover and moved are simultaneous. Whence it is appropriate to the soul according to the proper definition to be in a mobile body. Now the motion by which the soul moves the body is the motion of a living body, which indeed is not by an extrinsic mover like a violent motion or like the motion of light things and heavy things by the one generating, but it is by an intrinsic mover, whence living things are said to move themselves; and on the same account it ought to be that the soul which moves a body be in the body intrinsically, united to it. And on account of this it is said to be impressed.

137. Now if it is asked by what it is impressed, according to the opinion of the author of this book, it is impressed by the intelligence. For he says (50): for it (that is, the inferior soul) is from the impression of the second intelligence (that is, of the second order of intelligences) which (namely, the second intelligence) follow created being in an inferior way that is, in an inferior part of the same first created being which is the being of the intelligences. Or, what he says: which follow, etc., can be referred to the soul which is below the eternity of the intelligence, as is said in proposition 2 (22).

138. But this opinion is not always approved. For we can speak about the impression of the soul in two ways: in one way, from the part of the soul itself which is impressed; in another way, from the part of the matter on which it is impressed. And this distinction has a place in any soul standing by itself, such as any intelligent soul, as is clear below (128 [311]), because the being of its substance does not totally consist in its union to corporal matter like the being of a non-subsisting soul, such as the souls of animals and plants; whence in these the aforesaid distinction is not necessary, because the being of such souls is considered both from the part of the matter receiving it and from the part of the soul itself at the same time.

139. So if we speak about the soul that stands by itself, that is, the soul that is in some way intellectual or celestial—if animated celestial bodies are posited, as the author of this book supposed—or about the human soul from the part of the soul itself, then according to the roots of the positions of the Platonists, which the author of this book follows in many things, the soul is such from the impression of the intelligence; because, as was said above in the third proposition (33 [82]), the Platonists posited that that which is common is caused in something by another principle, and that which is more individualized is caused by another, inferior principle.

140. According to this, therefore, the soul standing by itself has its being from the first cause; but that it be intellectual and that it be the soul it has from second causes which are the intelligences. Whence, since it pertains to the definition of the soul that it be impressed on a body, it will follow that the soul has this from the intelligence, specifically, that it be impressed on a body.

141. But because, as we have shown above [83–84], the aforesaid position does not have truth and is contrary to the opinion of Aristotle, one ought to say that from the first cause, from which such a soul has its being, it would also have that it be intellectual and that it be a soul and, consequently, that it be impressed on a body. Therefore, according to this, the soul is not from the impression of the intelligence, but from the impression of the first cause.

142. But if we speak about the soul of this kind from the part of the susceptible thing on which it is impressed, such as the celestial soul, if the sky should have a soul, the definition would be similar; for the nature of celestial bodies is not caused in any way by the intelligences, but by the first cause from which they have being.

143. But if we speak thus about the human soul from the part of the susceptible thing, it is from the impression of the Intelligence in some way, insofar as, namely, the human body itself is disposed to be susceptive of such a soul by the power of the celestial body operating in the senses, by reason of which it is said that man and the sun beget man (Physics, 2).

144. Now, celestial bodies, also according to the doctors of Christian faith, namely Augustine and Gregory, are posited to be moved by spiritual creatures which are called angels, or intelligences, or separated intellects. And from this it follows that the intelligences act on something to the same point that the soul is imprinted on the human body from the part of the susceptible. And through this mode it can be said that other souls, which are not standing by themselves, are from the impression of the intelligences and the celestial bodies.

145. Thence, it remains to be considered about the second, that is to say, about the distinction of the souls, and he posits the same reason for distinction or multiplication in souls as he had posited in the intelligences (42): for just as the being of the intelligence is composed from the infinite and the finite, insofar as its being is not subsisting, but participated by some nature, by reason of which it can be distinguished into many things, so also is the case with the being of the Soul.

146. And this is what he says (51): and souls are only multiplied in the way that the intelligences are modified. This is because the being of the soul again has an end, but that which, proceeding from it, is inferior, is infinite. Now he says that the participating nature itself is in an inferior way, which nature he calls infinite because of its power to endure in being into infinity. But he calls participated being finite, because it is not participated according to the whole infinity of its universality, but according to the mode of the nature of the participant.

147. Yet, it should be attended that, because the nature of the Intelligence is wholly separate from body, the distinction of the Intelligences follows on the second grade of appropriate nature, without reference to any body. But concerning the definition of the soul it is that it be impressed on a body and on that account the distinction of souls is attendant on a comparison to animated bodies. Whence if animated bodies be of different species, diverse souls will be impressed on them according to their species, just as one ought to say if celestial bodies were animated. Now if animated bodies are of one species, the impressed souls are also of one species; multiplied only by number, as is clear concerning human souls.

148. Thence, the third point is to be considered, namely, the difference of the distinct souls; and he posits three differences (52–55).

149. The first of these is accepted according to the diverse perfection of the souls; for he says (52) that souls, specifically, superior souls, such as are those of celestial bodies, which follow intelligence, as if placed immediately after them in order, are complete, namely in the perfection of animal nature; and he shows a sign of perfection, adding: of little declination and separation. For it was said above in proposition 2 (26 [60–61]) that the soul, insofar as it is lacking from the complement of the intelligence, approaches to motion, and by the same token, to the extent that the souls be higher and closer to the intelligence, they have less to do with motion.

150. For inferior Souls have motion not only insofar as they move a body, but also insofar as they are not always conjoined with their bodies and that they are not always knowing. But superior Souls are always conjoined with their bodies and are always intelligent, yet they partake of motion in that they move celestial bodies, and on that account he says that they are of little declination, because they decline little from the immobility of the Intelligence; and of little separation because they are separated into diverse things but slightly as they may be found sometimes in this, sometimes in that, specifically, as to the only local motion of celestial bodies; but inferior Souls are lacking in the complement and the paucity of declination or separation from superior souls.

151. The second difference is taken up belonging to the influence of the souls on one another. For just as he said above (44) that the first intelligences cause to flow over the second intelligences, goodnesses which they receive from the first cause, so now (53) he says that: superior souls cause the goodnesses which they received from the intelligence to flow over inferior souls. And in both places the reason is the same: because that which is more imperfect is born to be perfected by the more perfect, just as potency by act.

152. The third difference is taken from the part of the effect. For just as he said about the intelligences, that the superior intelligences impress the more noble souls, so now (54) he says about souls that the superior soul receiving power immediately from the intelligence have a stronger impression; because a superior cause always acts more strongly as was said in the first proposition. And on that account, that which is impressed by a superior soul on its body is fixed, standing that is firm and immobile and its motion is equal that is, uniform and continuous as is clear in the celestial body.

153. But the inferior soul to which the power of the intelligence arrives with the superior soul as intermediary, has a weaker impression on its body, as an inferior cause. And on that account that which impresses in the body, such as life and things of that kind, is weak on account of the vulnerability of the body to an exterior agent; evanescent, transmuted by an interior principle, destructible, because finally it totally desists from being, that which is effected in the body by the soul.

154. And yet the body participates sempiternity in some way, namely, according to the species and this through generation (55). Now in this the author of this book thinks better, attributing the corruptibility of human bodies to the weakness of the impression of its soul, than the Platonists who posited also that the human soul have a certain incorruptible body always united to it.

155. It is also obvious that, according to the opinion of this author, when the human soul was perfected by conjunction to the first cause, it could impress perpetual life on its own body. And according to this, the Catholic faith professes a future eternal life, not only in souls, but also in bodies, after the resurrection.

156. Finally (56), he summarizes what things were said in the two propositions.

157. But those propositions which we said [139, 142, 147, 149–150] about the souls of the heavens, we did not say by asserting them, but by reciting the opinions of others.