Proposition 2

19. Every superior being is either superior to eternity and prior to it, or it is on the same level as eternity, or it is after eternity and beyond time.

20. Indeed being which is before eternity is the first cause, because it is the cause for it.

21. But being which is with eternity is intelligence, because it is the second being, according to one condition, from which it is not affected nor destroyed.

22. Indeed being which is after eternity and beyond time is soul, because it is lower on the horizon of eternity and still above time.

23. And the designation that the first cause is prior to eternity itself, is because the being which is in eternity has been acquired.

24. And I say that all eternity is being, but not all being is eternity. Thus being is more general than eternity. And the first cause is beyond eternity, because eternity is its effect.

25. And intelligence is put on the same level as eternity, because it is coextensive with it, and it is not changed or destroyed.

26. And soul is connected with eternity, however, in an inferior way, because it is more susceptible to impressions than intelligence, but it is still beyond time, because it is the cause of time.

43. This first proposition being granted as a premise, just as from a certain principle to the whole following tract, here he begins to take up the matter concerning the first causes of things. And it is divided into two parts:

in the first, he talks about the distinction of the first causes;

in the second, about the coordination or dependency of causes on one another, in proposition 16, where he says: all powers which have no end (129).

44. The first part is divided into two parts:

in the first, he distinguishes first causes;

in the second, he makes determinations about individual things in proposition 6, where he says: the first cause is superior (57).

45. Now, the universal causes of things are of three genera, that is to say, the first cause, which is God, intelligences, and souls. Whence, concerning the first, he makes three distinctions:

first, he distinguishes these three genera, of which the first is indivisible, because the first cause is just one thing;

second, he distinguishes intelligences, in proposition 4, where he says: the first of created things is being (37);

in the third, he distinguishes souls, in proposition 5, where he says: superior intelligences (49).

46. Concerning the first, he makes two distinctions:

first, he distinguishes the three aforesaid genera;

second, he shows in what way they are united through a certain participation in the ultimate, in proposition 3, where he says: every noble soul (27).

47. Concerning the first, he posits such a proposition: every superior being is either superior to eternity and prior to it, or it is on the same level as eternity, or it is after eternity and beyond time (19). For the understanding of this proposition it is necessary first to see what eternity is, then, in what way the aforesaid proposition has truth.

48. The name of eternity, then, implies some lack of deficiency or lack of termination: eternity is thus said to be existing as if it were outside of terminations. But because as the Philosopher says in Physics, 8, in every motion there is some corruption and generation inasmuch as something begins to be and something else ceases to be, it is necessary that in whatever motion there is some deficiency, whence every motion is repugnant to eternity. Therefore true eternity, with a lack of deficiency of being, also implies immobility. And because "before" and "after" in duration of time arise from motion, as is clear in Physics, 4, on that account, third, it is necessary that eternity be existing whole all at once, without before and after, according to how Boethius defines it at the end of The Consolation of Philosophy, saying, eternity is the whole perfect and simultaneous possession of endless life.

49. Therefore whatever thing with a lack of deficiency of being has immobility and is without temporal succession, can be said to be eternal. And according to this mode, Platonists and Aristotelians called immaterial separate substances eternal, adding to the definition of eternity that it has always had being; which is not consonant with the Christian faith; such eternity is appropriate to God alone.

50. Indeed we have called them eternal insofar as they begin to obtain from God perpetual and indeficient being without motion and succession of time; whence also Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 10 that those things which are called "eternal" in the Scriptures are not simply coeternal with God. Whence certain ones called eternity thus received "aevum," which they distinguish from eternity received according to the first mode. But if someone should consider rightly, "aevum" and eternity differ only as "anthropos" and "man." For in Greek eternity is called "aevum" just as man is called "anthropos."

51. Therefore, with these premises granted, it must be known that this congruent proposition in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 88) is found under these words: every beingly being is either before eternity or in eternity or participating eternity.

52. Beingly being is said by opposition to movable being just as being is called "standing" as opposed to "being moved." From which it is given to understand that it is what is called in this book every superior being (19), because, specifically, it is beyond motion and time. For being of this kind, according to either author, in either book, is distinguished into three grades; but it is not wholly the same reason in both places.

53. For Proclus brought in this proposition according to the suppositions of the Platonists who, positing an abstraction from universals, posited that insofar as something is more abstract and more universal, to that extent it is prior. For it is clear that this expression, "eternity," is more abstract than "eternal." For by the name of "eternity" the very essence of eternity is designated; but by the name "eternal" is designated that which participates in eternity. And again being itself is more common than eternity: for every eternal thing is a being, but not every being is eternal (cf. Elements of Theology, 24). Whence according to what is said above, separated being itself is before eternity (20); but that which is with eternity (21) is sempiternal being itself. But that which is a participant in eternity and as it were after eternity (22) is everything that participates in that which is eternal.

54. But the author of this book in the first place certainly agrees otherwise with the aforesaid positions. Whence he explains that being which is before eternity is the first cause because it is the cause for eternity (20).

55. And to prove this he brings in that in it—that is, eternity—is acquired being—that is, participated (23). And he proves this because the things that are less common participate in the things which are more common. Now, eternity is less common than being; whence he adds: and I say that every eternity is being, but not every being is eternity; therefore being is more common than eternity (24; cf. Elements of Theology, 87). Therefore, the author thus proves that eternity participates in being; but abstract being itself is the first cause, whose substance is its being. Whence it remains that the first cause is the cause by which sempiternal being is acquired for whatever thing is always existing.

56. But in the other two members of the division the author of this book recedes from the intention of Proclus and accedes more to the common opinions of both the Platonists and Peripatetics.

57. For he expounds the second grade: that being with eternity is intelligence (21). Because indeed eternity, as has been said [48] implies indeficiency with immobility, that which in all aspects is indeficient and immobile attains eternity. Now it is posited according to the aforesaid philosophers that intelligence or separated intellect has indeficiency and immobility, with respect to its being and its power and its operation. Whence proposition 169 of Proclus is every intellect has its substance and potency and operation in eternity. And according to this it is proved here that intelligence is with eternity (21): because it is in every way according to a single characteristic, so that it does not suffer any alteration neither of its power nor of its operation, nor is it destroyed according to its substance. And on account of this also afterwards he says that it is made equal to eternity since it is extended with it and it is not altered (25). Because, that is to say, eternity extends itself to everything that is of the intelligence.

58. Now, he expounds the third grade concerning the soul which has superior being (22), that is to say beyond motion and time. For the soul of this kind comes closer to motion than does the intelligence, because, viz., the intelligence is not attained by motion, neither with respect to its substance nor with respect to its operation. But the soul indeed exceeds time and motion according to its substance, and touches on eternity, but according to its operation it touches on motion: because, as the philosophers prove, it is necessary that everything that is moved by another be reduced into some first thing which moves itself. But this according to Plato indeed is the soul which moves itself but according to Aristotle it is the animated body whose principle of motion is the soul. And thus in either way it is necessary that the first principle of motion be the soul and on that account that motion be the operation of the soul itself. And because motion is in time, time touches on the operation of the soul itself.

59. Whence also Proclus says in proposition 191: every participable soul has an eternal substance indeed, but an operation according to time. And on that account here it is said that it is connected with eternity in an inferior way (26); indeed it is connected with eternity insofar as substance, but in an inferior way, because it participates in eternity in an inferior mode than intelligence.

60. Which he proves because it is more susceptible to impression than the intelligence (26). For the soul not only receives the impression of the first cause as does the intelligence, but also is susceptible to the impression of the intelligence. To the extent that something is more remote from the first, which is the cause of eternity, to that extent it participates more weakly in eternity.

61. And although the soul attains to the lowest level of eternity, yet it is beyond time, just as a cause is above its effect: for it is the cause of time insofar as it is the cause of motion, on which time follows. For he speaks here (26) about the soul which the philosophers attributed to the celestial body and on account of this it is said that it is on the horizon of eternity in an inferior way, and beyond time. For the horizon is the circle terminating the vision, and it is the lowest terminus of the higher hemisphere, but the highest point of the lower. And similarly the soul is the ultimate terminus of eternity and the beginning of time.

62. Dionysius agrees with this opinion in On the Divine Names, 10, with this exception, that he does not assert that the sky has a soul, because the Catholic faith does not assert this. For he says that God is before the eternal and that according to the Scriptures other things are called eternal and temporal; which is to be understood according to the modes posited in the sacred Scriptures; but intermediate between things which are and things which are made (that is, things which can be generated), there are certain ones which are eternal according to one aspect, but according to another aspect participate in time.