Proposition 21

162. The first is rich in and of itself and there is nothing richer.

163. And an indication of this is its unity, not because its unity is distributed in it, but rather its unity is pure, inasmuch as it is simple, to the highest degree of simplicity.

164. But if anyone wishes to know that the first is rich, let him cast forth his mind over composite things and ask about them with very thorough questioning. He will find then that every composite thing is imperfect needing indeed, either another thing, or the things out of which it is composed. But a simple, single thing which is goodness, is one and its unity is goodness and its goodness is one thing.

165. Thus, that thing is more rich, which informs, and no impression is made on it by any means. But the rest of the intellectual and corporeal things are not rich in and of themselves, but rather they need the one true thing flowing goodnesses and all graces over them.

368. After he has assigned the mode of divine government, here (162) he shows the sufficiency of God for reigning, which indeed follows from two points:

first, indeed, according to God's abundance;

second, according to his super-excellence and this is here: the first cause (166).

For these two are necessary for one who rules: first, that he have an abundance of goods from which he can provide for his subjects; whence Dionysius says, in On the Divine Names, 12, that domination is the whole perfection possession of beauties and goods and government is the whole distribution of end and law and order.

369. Now, to show an abundant sufficiency in God, he proposes this proposition: the first is wealthy in and of itself and it is more wealthy (162). For evidence of which, Proclus' proposition 127 is accepted, which goes like this: every simple divine is most greatly and firstly, and on account of his, most greatly self-sufficient.

370. Now he proves that God is firstly and maximally simple, by reason of unity: for God is most greatly one since he is the first unity just as he is also the first goodness; and simplicity pertains to the definition of unity. For that which is one, not aggregated from many, is called "simple." Whence God, insofar as he is firstly and maximally one, he is also firstly and maximally simple.

371. And from this, lower he proceeds to show the second part of his proposition, namely, that God be maximally self-sufficient, because self-sufficiency follows on simplicity. For every composite needs the many things from which its unity is constituted, just as it appears in mixed bodies. For diverse things only come together into one through some cause which unites them. Since, therefore, God is firstly and maximally simple, insofar as having the whole of his goodness in a most perfect one, it follows that God be firstly and maximally self-sufficient.

372. But the author of this book sets aside the first part of the proposition which is about simplicity, as if supposing it, and talks only about self-sufficiency, which he calls by the name of richnesses. And in the place where in Proclus' proposition it is said that God is self-sufficient, he says that first he is wealthy in and of himself. For in whatever genus, that which is on account of itself is per se prior. But in the place where it is said there that he is maximally sufficient, here it is said that he is more wealthy, that is, than all others.

373. Now the proof of the proposition is the same in both places. For he says first (163) that divine unity, because it is not dispersed in many parts but it is pure unity, is the signification of this that God be in the end of simplicity, that is, maximally simple.

374. And from this, he proves later (164) that God be maximally self-sufficient, through the indigence which is found in composites, as has already been said [371].

375. But because sufficiency is not only understood in the name of richnesses, but also being able to give supplies over to others, he adds later, to show God is wealthy, about the influx of his goodness on things (165): because on account of the abundance of his goodness he flows over other things and there is nothing that would flow over him. But all other things, whether they be intelligible like the intelligences and the souls, or be corporeal, are not wealthy in themselves (as if having an abundance of goodness from themselves) but they need to participate goodness from the first truly one which flows over them—without anything accruing thence to it—all goodnesses and perfections.