Proposition 23

172. Every divine intelligence knows things because it is intelligence, and rules them because it is divine.

173. This is because knowledge is a peculiar property of intelligence, and its perfection and completeness do not exist apart from that it thinks. Thus God, blessed and sublime, is what rules, since he fills things with goodnesses. And intelligence is the first created thing and it is what is most similar to the sublime God and on account of that it rules things which are under it. And, just as God, blessed and most high, flows goodness over things, in the same way the intelligence flows knowledge over things inasmuch as they are underneath it.

174. However, although intelligence rules things which are under it, yet God, blessed and sublime, comes before the intelligence with respect to government and rules things with a government of a more sublime and higher order than is the government of the intelligence, since it is that which gives the power of government to intelligence.

175. And an indication of this is that things which do not receive the government of the intelligence, receive the government of the creator of the intelligence, which is because its government does not flee at all from any one of things, since it wishes to make all things receive its goodness. This is because it is not the case that everything desires intelligence nor desires to receive it; and all things desire goodness from the first being and desire to receive it with a great desire. And there is no one who would doubt in this matter.

384. After he has handed down the mode of divine government and shown the sufficiency of God for ruling, here (172) he takes up the matter of the government of the second cause, namely, intelligence: which government of course comes about from the power of the first cause. And he proposes this proposition: every divine intelligence knows things because it is intelligence, and rules them because it is divine. A similar proposition is found in the book of Proclus (Elements of Theology, 134) under these words: every divine mind has knowledge as being mind, but has foreknowledge as being God.

385. It should be considered for evidence for this what is said above in proposition 19 (149) that among the intelligences, certain ones are divine, certain ones non-divine. Indeed the supreme intellects or intelligences are called divine on account of abundant participation of divine goodness from closeness to God. Now, that which participates abundantly in the propriety of another thing is assimilated to it not only in form, but also in action; just as it appears that, of those things which are illuminated by the sun, certain ones participate the light of the sun only to the point that they may be seen; but others to such an extent that they illuminate others, which is the proper action of the sun, as, for example, it appears in the case of the moon.

386. But because form is the principle of action, it is necessary that everything that acquires its action from abundant participation of the influence of a superior agent should have two actions: one, to be precise, according to proper form, but the other according to the form participated by a superior agent: just as a heated knife cuts according to its proper form, but insofar as it is heated, it cauterizes. Thus therefore also each and every one of the supreme intelligences, which is called divine, has a double action: one insofar as it participates abundantly the divine goodness; and the other according to its own nature.

387. Now it is proper to the intelligence (173) insofar as it is something of this sort, to know things, and on that account the divine intelligence, insofar as it is intelligence, is cognizant of things. But it is proper to God, who is the very essence of goodness, that he communicate himself to others. For we see that each thing, insofar as it is perfect and being in act, grants its similitude to other. Whence that which is essentially act and goodness (that is, God) essentially and primordially communicates its goodness to things. And this pertains to his reign: for it is proper for a ruler to lead those which he rules to an owed end, which is good. Thus therefore the divine intelligence, insofar as it participates abundantly the divine goodness, itself comes to be ruling of things.

388. Now, it is manifest that (174) each thing that brings about, according to its proper and natural form, some action, brings about that action more vehemently and perfectly than that which brings it about through participation of a superior agent, just as fire heats more vehemently than a lit body and the sun illuminates more brightly than the moon. Therefore, the government of God, which is his action according to his essential goodness, ought to be higher and more efficacious than the government of the intelligence which comes to it by a participation of divine goodness.

389. And thence it is (175) that the government of the first cause, which is according to the essence of goodness, extends itself to all things. A sign of this is that all desire good, whether with the intellectual or animal or natural appetite. But the government of the intelligence, which is proper to it, does not extend itself to all things, for they do not diffuse intellectual goodness on all things, but only on those things which are born to know. Whence not all things seek an intellectual good, but only the absolute good.