Proposition 8

72. Every intelligence knows that which is above it and that which is below it; however, it knows what is below it because it is the cause for it, and it knows what is above it because it acquires its qualities from it.

73. And moreover intelligence is an intellectual substance; therefore, according to the manner of its substance it knows things which it acquires from above and things for which it is the cause.

74. Therefore, it discerns what is above it and what is below it, and it knows that that which is above it is the cause for it and that which is below it is caused by it; and it recognizes both its cause and its effect through the mode which is its cause; that is to say, by the mode of its substance.

75. And in the same way, everything that knows, knows something greater and something lesser and lower only according to the mode of its substance and its being, not according to the mode according to which the things are.

76. And since this is such, then doubtless qualities which descend upon intelligence from the first cause are intellectual in it, and in the same way corporeal sensible things are intellectual in intelligence.

77. This is because objects which are in the intelligence are not the impressions themselves, but rather they are the causes of the impressions. And an indication of that is that intelligence itself is the cause of things which are below it because of the fact that it is intelligence. Thus if intelligence is the cause of things because it is intelligence, then doubtless the causes of things in intelligence are also intellectual.

78. Now, therefore, it is manifest that things above intelligence and below it are intellectual, by the intellectual power, and similarly corporeal things endowed with intelligence are intellectual, and intellectual things in the intelligences are intellectual because it is the cause of their cause; and because it only apprehends through the mode of its substance and because it is intelligence it apprehends things with an intellectual apprehension, whether they are intellectual things or corporeal.

198. The notification of intelligence as to its substance having been posited, here (72) he begins to demonstrate its cognition.

And first, he declares the mode by which it knows things other than itself;

second, how it knows itself, and this is in proposition 13, where he says: every intelligence knows it own essence (109).

199. About the first, he makes three points:

first, he declares the mode by which intelligence knows both superiors and inferiors;

second, he shows what it is in a superior way in proposition 9, where he says: every constancy of intelligence (79);

third, he shows how it behaves in the cognition of inferiors, where he says: every intelligence is full of forms (92), in proposition 10.

200. Therefore, to declare the mode by which the intelligence knows both superiors and inferiors, he posits a proposition like this: every intelligence knows what is above it and what is under it; nevertheless it knows what is below it since it is a cause for it and it knows what is above it since it acquires goodnesses from it (72).

201. Indeed, the meaning of this proposition seems on the surface to be that causality is the intelligence's reason for understanding. And indeed if this be rightly considered, it does not have truth neither for that by which the Intelligence is caused nor for those things which it causes: for it is not caused by its own cause through its own knowledge, but rather through the knowledge of the cause which causes it. But those things which are under it, although the intelligence may cause them through its own science, it nevertheless does not know them on that account—because it causes them—but rather it causes them on that account—because it knows them.

202. Now, the true meaning of this proposition is to be taken thus: for it is manifest that in the order of things a cause obtains a higher rank than that which is caused; if, therefore, something be both a cause and an effect, it obtains a middle rank between both, and the intelligence is of this sort. For it is caused by the first cause and is below it. Yet it causes in some way those things which are below it, as is explained in proposition 3 (31 [78–81]) and thus it is above them. Therefore, he means that according to its rank, by which it is a cause and an effect, it holds itself in a middle mode in understanding; for it understands that which is above it in an inferior mode than what that is in itself; and those things which are below it, it understands in a higher mode than they are in themselves.

203. And proposition 173 in the book of Proclus is also brought in in this sense, and it goes like this: every intellect is intellectually, both those things which are before it and those which are after it, because, to be precise, superiors as well as inferiors are in the Intellect according to its mode, that is, intellectually.

204. And this proof is also brought in to this sense: for he says (73) that the intelligence is the intelligible substance, because, namely, intelligible is appropriate to it in the definition of its essence; therefore according to the mode of its own substance it knows things which it acquires from above and things for which it is the cause. And the reason for this is because each and every thing operates according to the mode of its form which is the principle of operation, just as a hot thing makes things hot according to the mode of heat, whence it is proper that every knower knows according to the form which is the principle of knowledge, namely: according to the similitude of the thing known which is in the knower according to the mode of its substance.

205. Whence it is necessary that every knower knows according to the mode of its own substance whatever it knows. Since, therefore, the intelligence (74) be a cause and an effect according to the mode of its own substance, it will be like a certain terminus or boundary determining or distinguishing superiors from inferiors, so that, precisely, it knows superiors through the mode of its own substance, in a mode inferior than the superior thing is in itself; but it knows inferiors in a higher mode than they are in themselves (75).

206. Which indeed is to be understood as the mode of cognition is taken from the part of the knower; precisely because although the first cause be super-intellectual, the intelligence does not know it in a super-intellectual way, but intellectually. And similarly, although bodies be material and sensible in themselves, yet the intelligence does not know them sensibly and materially, but intellectually (76–77).

207. But if the mode of cognition were accepted from the part of the thing known, thus it knows each and every thing just as it is in itself: for the intelligence knows that the first cause is super-intellectually in itself and that corporal things have material and sensible being in themselves.

208. And the meaning of all that has been said here is clear from these.