Proposition 13

109. Every intelligence knows its own essence.

110. This is because that which knows and that which is known exist at the same time, Thus, since intelligence is knowing and known, then doubtless it sees its own essence.

111. And, when it sees its essence, it knows that it knows its essence through its intelligence.

112. And, when it knows its essence, it knows the rest of things which are below it, because they are from it.

113. However, they are in it according to the intellectual mode. Thus, intelligence and the things intellected are one and the same.

114. This is because, if things of the intellect and intelligence are one, and the intelligence knows its own being, then doubtless when it knows its essence, it knows the rest of things and, when it knows the rest of things, it knows its essence, because when it knows the rest of things, it knows them only because they are intellected. Thus, the intelligence knows its essence and it knows intellectual things at the same time, as we have shown.

285. It having been shown how the intelligence may know things other than itself, now this proposition (109) is brought in to show how it may know itself, which is found in 167 in the book of Proclus under these words: every intellect knows itself.

286. But the meaning of this proposition and its proof we must take from what Proclus says. For as was said above [67] according to the Platonic opinions, the order of intellects is placed under the order of separated forms, from participation of which the intelligences come to be in act. Whence separated forms are compared to them as the intelligible to the intellect. Now, just as they posited certain ideas of other things, so also they posited a certain idea of the intellects which they called the first intellect. Therefore this ideal intellect, insofar as it is intellect, understands; and insofar as it is an ideal form it is the intellectual form. Thus therefore intellect and what is known are united in it in every way. And through this it knows itself perfectly, because its essence is totally intelligible, not only knowing.

287. Now every intellect, according to the Platonists, has a participated intellect, but superior intellects participate that very intellect more perfectly. Whence they participate from it not only that they be intellects but also that they be intelligible and in some way formal intellects. So therefore intellect and what-is-known in some way are joined in them according to their substance. And on that account they also know their own essence, but in a different way from the first intellect. For the first ideal intellect does not participate any prior form of intellectuality, but it itself is the first form of intellectuality. Whence its intelligible object is nothing other than itself. But posterior intellects thus have something of the form of intelligibility in their substance, which yet is derived from the superior ideal intellect. So therefore they understand their essence because they also understand the superior intellect which they participate [312].

288. And this is what Proclus adds in the aforesaid proposition: but indeed the first alone in itself and one in number in this intellect and intelligible. Each, then, of the following knows itself and that which is before it at the same time, and intelligible to the former indeed is what it is, to the latter, that from which it comes (Elements of Theology, 167).

289. But because according to the opinion of Aristotle which in this matter concords more with catholic doctrine, we do not posit many forms above the intellect, but only one which is the first cause, it is necessary to say that just as it is being itself so it is life itself and the first intellect itself. Whence also Aristotle, in Metaphysics, 12, proves that it knows only itself, not so that cognition of other things is lacking from it, but Its intellect is not informed for knowing another intelligible species except itself. So therefore the superior separated intellects, as much as they are close to it, they know themselves both through their own essence and through participation of a superior nature.

290. And on this account, for proving this proposition (109) first here (110) it is brought in that the knower and the known in separated intellects are at the same time, insofar as, namely, according to their own substance they are not only intellects, but intelligibles, according as they are participating most closely in the first intellect. Whence he concludes that intelligence knows it own essence. And because its essence is the essence of one who knows, it follows that, by knowing its essence, it knows that it knows its essence.

291. Consequently then he shows how, because it knows its own essence, it also knows other things (112). For it is held from the proposition set before (113) that all other things are in the intelligence by an intelligible mode and so intelligence and things known are one, according to that [they are] in the intelligence. And on that account (114), when it knows its essence, it knows other things and, for the same reason, whensoever the intelligence knows other things, it knows itself.

292. But whether these are fitting to the intellectual soul we shall consider below (115 [293]).