Proposition 19

149. Constituted from the intelligences comes that which is the divine intelligence, since it receives from the first goodnesses which go forth from the first cause by a plentiful reception. And from those comes that which is intelligence as such, since it receives from the first goodnesses only with the first intelligence acting as intermediary. And from the souls comes that which is the intellectual soul, because it is depending on the intelligence; and from those comes that which is soul as such. And from natural bodies comes that to which there is a soul ruling it and directing it; and from these come those things which are just natural bodies, which have no soul.

150. And this takes place only because it is not the intellectual whole nor the ensouled whole nor the bodily whole, nor does it depend on a cause which is above it except that which is fulfilled from it inasmuch as it depends on a cause which above it is whole,

151. that is to say, because not every intelligence depends on the qualities of the first cause except that intelligence among them which is complete, among the first things, and whole. Indeed, it can receive qualities that descend from the first cause and depend on them, so that its unity may become strong.

152. And in the same way not every soul depends on the intelligence, except that among them which is complete, whole and more strongly together with the intelligence, because it depends on the intelligence, and it is completed by the intelligence.

153. And in the same way again not every natural body has a soul, except that among them which is complete, whole, as if it were rational.

154. And the rest of the intellectual orders are according to this form.

349. After he has shown in the preceding proposition that all things depend from the first according to their nature, here he shows how certain ones approach it in different ways according to their participation of natural perfection and he posits such a proposition: constituted from the intelligences comes that which is the divine intelligence, since it receives from the first goodnesses which go forth from the first cause by a plentiful reception. And from those comes that which is intelligence as such, since it receives from the first goodnesses only with the first intelligence acting as intermediary*. *And from the souls comes that which is the intellectual soul, because it is depending on the intelligence; and from those comes that which is soul as such. And from natural bodies comes that to which there is a soul ruling it and directing it; and from these come those things which are just natural bodies, which have no soul (149).

350. Now this proposition is found in Proclus' book in proposition 111 under these words: of the whole intellectual series, that is, ordination, certain ones are divine intellects receiving post-habitions—that is, participations—from the gods, others are just intellects; and of the whole ensouled (namely series), certain ones are intellectual souls, depending on proper intellects, while others are just souls; and of the whole corporal nature, certain ones also have souls standing by them from above, while others are just natures, lacking the presence of souls.

351. As evidence for this, it should be known that, according to the Platonists, a four-fold order is found in things: the first was the order of Gods, that is of ideal forms among which there was an order according to the order of universality of forms, as was said above [65-66]; now under this order is the order of separated intellects; under which is the order of souls; under which again is the order of bodies. And these three inferior orders are taken according to the three which are touched on in the proposition put before (143 [338]). For bodies just participate being; souls participate being and living further according to their proper nature; intellects participate being, living, and understanding.

352. Now, the causality of these pertains to the divine order whether many ordered gods are placed under one, according to the Platonists; or just one, having all things in itself, according to us. For universality of causality is proper to God.

Now orders of this kind, since they proceed form the first one, have a certain continuity to one another so that the order of bodies touches on the orders of souls and the order of souls touches on the order of intellects which touches on the divine order. Wherever the different orders are conjoined to one another, it is necessary that that which is the highest of the inferior order, on account of its proximity to the superior order will participate something from the perfection of the superior order. And we see this clearly in natural things: for certain animals participate some similitude of reason, and certain plants participate something of the distinction of sex, which is proper to the genus of animals. Whence also Dionysius says in On the Divine Names, 7, that through the divine wisdom the ends of the first things are conjoined with the beginnings of the second things.

353. So therefore those who are highest in the order of the intellects or intelligences depend through a certain closer, more perfect participation from God and they participate more from his goodnesses and from his universal causality and they on that account they are called divine intellects or divine intelligences, just as Dionysius also says (Celestial Hierarchy, 7, 2) that the highest angels are, as it were, gathered in the vestibules of Godhood. But inferior intellects which do not reach to such excellent participation of divine similitude are just intellects, not having that divine dignity [150-151].

354. And the same proportion holds concerning souls with respect to intellects: for the highest souls are intellectual, insofar as they are close to the order of intellects; but the other inferior souls are not intellectual, but have only that which is of the soul so that, to be precise, they be vivifying, just as is most clear about the souls of animals and plants (152).

355. And the same proportion holds for the order of bodies with respect to souls: for the nobler bodies which are constituted by a more perfect principle, are animated; but other bodies are inanimate (153).

356. And the same proportion holds for all other orders into which the aforesaid general orders are distinguished, because also in bodies there are diverse orders and similarly in souls and intellects.