Proposition 30

203. Every substance created in time is either always in time and time does not pass by it since it and time were created equally, or it passes by time and time passes by it, since it was created in certain hours of time.

204. This is because if created things follow each other by turns and only a substance similar to a superior substance follows that superior substance, not a substance different from it, there are substances similar to superior substance—and there are created substance which time does not pass by—before the substances which are not similar to sempiternal substances, and there are substances cut off by time, created in certain hours of time. Thus it is not possible that substances created in certain hours of time be continued with sempiternal substances, since they are not similar to them at all. Thus substances sempiternal in time are those which are coextensive with sempiternal substances, and they are intermediaries between fixed substances and substances divided by time. And it is not possible that sempiternal substances which are beyond time follow temporal substances created in time, unless with temporal, sempiternal-in-time substances as intermediaries.

205. And moreover these substances are made intermediaries only because they communicate with sublime substances in permanence and they communicate with temporal substances divided in time by generation; indeed although they are sempiternal yet their permanence is through generation and motion.

206. And substances sempiternal with time are similar to sempiternal substances which are beyond time through durability and are not similar to them in motion and generation. However, substances divided in time are not similar to sempiternal substances which are beyond time according to any mode. Thus if they are not similar to them, then they cannot receive them nor touch them. Thus the substances which touch sempiternal substances which are above time are necessary, and they will be touching the substances divided in time.

207. Thus they will group together by their motion between substances divided in time and sempiternal substances which are beyond time. And they will group together by their durability between substances which are beyond time and substances which are subject to time, that is to say falling under generation and corruption. And they will unite between good substances and bad substances, so that bad substances do not deprive the good substances and deprive them of every goodness and everything appropriate, and there be no permanence or constancy to them.

208. Thus it has now been shown from this that there are two species of durability of which one is eternal, and the other is temporal. However one of the two durabilities is constant, motionless, and the other durability is moved; and one of them is united and all its operations are at the same time, nor is any of them before any other, and the other is running, extended, and certain of its operations are before certain others. And the totality of the one is through their essence and the totality of the other is through its parts of which each one is separated from its companion according to the first and last mode.

209. Thus it is now manifest that certain substances are those which are sempiternal beyond time and from these come substances sempiternal equal to time and time does not pass by them, and from these are those which are divided by time and time passes by them from what is superior to them and inferior to them [i.e., from their beginning to their end] and they are substances that fall under generation and corruption.

438. After he has followed up about the diversity of things which is according to generation and corruption, simplicity and composition, here (203) thirdly he follows up concerning the diversity which is according to the temporal and the eternal.

439. And concerning this, he makes two points:

first, he shows how some things may doubly be sempiternal and temporal;

second, he shows how it is at the same time eternal and temporal, at: between a thing whose substance (210);

or: in the first (203) he posits the order of temporal things to one another;

in the second, the order of eternals to one another, at: between a thing whose substance (210).

440. About the first, he posits a proposition like this: every substance created in time is either always in time and time does not pass by it since it and time were created equally, or it passes by time and time passes by it, since it was created in certain hours of time (203).

441. As evidence of this, it should be considered that, because time is the number of motion, every mobile substance is said to be created in time. Now, there is a twofold mobile substance: one whose motion is in whole time; just as the celestial body, whose motion is made equal with time because time is first and in itself the measure of the motion of the sky and by that motion it measures all other motions. And this whether we posit that the motion of the sky always has been and always will be, as Aristotle and certain other philosophers posited; or even if we posit that the motion of the sky has not always been nor always will be, as the faith of the Church teaches, because thus also the motion of the sky is made equal with time: for time was not before the motion of the sky began nor will there be time after the motion of the sky desists. Whence, in all ways, the substance of the celestial body, by reason of its motion, is always in time and time does not exceed it, but they are made equal to one another.

442. But there are certain mobile substances whose being and motion is not in whole time, but in some part of time, just as appears about generable and corruptible substances. And because a substance of this kind does not have a habitude to all time, but to a part of time, for some part of time is found to be of greater duration than them, and another part less, whence it is that a substance of this kind exceeds time with respect to that part of time which, to be precise, is of less duration than it, and again it is exceeded by time with respect to that part which is of greater duration than it.

443. And in Proclus' book is found this proposition 55 more clearly and briefly thus: everything which subsists according to time is either always in time or having its existence in some part of time.

444. For the manifestation of this premised proposition,

first (204) a proof is posited;

second, a certain corollary is brought in, at: therefore, it has now been shown (208).

445. Now the proof is posited the same in each book. For the order of things proceeds so that similars follow on one another, but those which are entirely dissimilar do not follow each other in the levels of things except through some intermediary. Just as we see that a perfect animal and a plant are entirely dissimilar as far as two: for a perfect animal is sensitive and mobile by a processive motion; but plants have neither of these. Therefore nature does not proceed immediately from perfect animals to plants, but produces in-between imperfect animals which are sensible with animals and immobile with plants.

446. Now, it is manifest that spiritual substances which are made equal to eternity, as has been said above (25), and generable and corruptible substances are entirely dissimilar: for spiritual substances are both always and are immobile, neither of which belongs to generable and corruptible substances, whence one should place between these two extremes some intermediary which is similar to each extreme, as thus the grades of things proceed through similars (204).

447. And thus Proclus proceeds by investigating: between that which is always being immobilely and that which is sometimes in a mobile fashion, there can only be found a three-fold intermediary, namely: that which is always moved; that which sometimes is in an immobile fashion; and that which sometimes is. Now this third cannot be an intermediary because that which sometimes is is the same as that which sometimes is moved, which we said to be an extreme. Also similarly, that which something is in an immobile fashion, cannot be an intermediary: for it is impossible that such a thing exist; for nothing stops being except by some transmutation, whence that which is in an immobile fashion cannot be sometimes being but is always being. Therefore it remains that the intermediary between that which always is in an immobile fashion and that which sometimes is in a mobile fashion is that which is always moved: for this belongs with the superior, in that it is always being, but with the inferior extreme, in that it is to be moved.

448. Now he uses the name of generation (205) commonly for any transmutation, because generation and corruption are included in any motion, as is said in Physics, 8 (254a11-12).

449. So therefore substances which are always moved, i.e., celestial bodies, touch on (206) each extreme according to a certain similitude and through it superior immobile substances are conjoined (207) in a certain way to generable and corruptible inferior substances; insofar as, that is, the power of superior substances is borne down to generable and corruptible things through the motion of celestial bodies.

450. From these he now brings in (208) consequently a certain corollary, to be precise, that perpetuity, or perpetual durability, is two-fold: one through the mode of eternity; but the other through the mode of all time. And these perpetual durations differ in three ways:

first because eternal perpetuity is fixed, standing immobilely; but temporal perpetuity is flowing and mobile, insofar as time is the measure of motion, but eternity is understood as the measure of the immobile.

Second, because eternal perpetuity is all at the same time as if collected into one; but temporal perpetuity has successive extension according to earlier and later which are of the nature of time.

Third, because eternal perpetuity is simple, all existing according to itself, but the universality or totality of temporal perpetuity is according to diverse parts succeeding one another.