Proposition 32

214. Every substance falling in certain of its dispositions under eternity and falling in certain others of its dispositions under time is being and coming-to-be at the same time.

215. Indeed, [every] thing falling under eternity is truly being and everything falling under time is truly generation. Thus if it is such, then, if one thing falls under eternity and time it is being and generation not by a single mode but by one mode and another.

216. Thus it is now manifest from what we have said that everything generated falls with respect to its substance under time and has substance depending on pure being which is the cause of durability and the cause of all sempiternal and destructible things.

217. It is necessary that there be one which makes the unities come to be, and it is not brought about, but all the rest of unities are acquired.

218. And an indication of this is what I say: if one is found making what is not acquired to acquire, then what difference is there between it and the first which makes things acquire? Indeed there cannot be except either it be similar to it in all its dispositions or there be differences between them. Thus if it is similar to it in all its dispositions then one of them is not first and the other second. And if one of them is not similar to the other in all its dispositions then doubtless one of them is first and the other second. Thus that in which there is fixed unity is not found to be from any other, it is the one first true thing, as we have shown, and that in which the unity is found to be from another exists on account of the one first true thing. Thus if it is from another its unity is acquired from the first one. Thus from this it comes forth that there is again unity for the one pure truth and the rest of ones and there is unity only because of the one truth which is the cause of unity.

219. Thus it is now manifest and plain that every unity after the true one is acquired, created, but the one pure truth which creates, unites and makes them acquire is not acquired, as we have shown.

458. Because in the preceding proposition it has been proved that there is something whose substance is in eternity and whose action is in time, consequently he shows the condition of this substance in this last proposition, saying: every substance falling in certain of its dispositions under eternity and falling in certain others of its dispositions under time is being and coming-to-be at the same time (214).

459. And this same proposition is posited as 107 of Proclus' book, under these words: everything that is in some way eternal, yet in some way temporal, is at the same time both being and generation.

460. For the manifestation of this he makes three propositions:

first, he premises the proof of the proposition brought in, the whole of which depends on the signification of names (215).

461. For because eternity is a simultaneous whole, lacking the succession of past and future, as is held above [48], that which is in eternity, is called being because it is always in act. Now, time consists in the succession of past and future, whence that which is in time is sort of in coming-about: which the name of generation means. Therefore, what is totally in eternity, is totally being; and what is totally in time, is totally generation; but what is according to one thing in time and according to another in eternity, is at the same time being and generation.

462. Second, at: therefore, it is already manifest (216), he brings in a certain corollary. For the disposition of beings is such that the inferiors depend on superiors. Whence it is necessary that that which is totally generation, as having substance and operation in time, should depend from that which is at the same time being and generation, having substance in eternity and operation in time. Now this, it is necessary, depends from that which is totally in eternity according to substance and operation; and this further depends on the first Being which is beyond eternity, which is the principle of the duration of all things both sempiternal and corruptible.

463. Third, at: it is necessary that the one (217), he shows that from this first one, all things depend.

464. And for the meaning of this which is said here, proposition 116 of Proclus should be taken up, which goes like this: every god is participable, except the one. Which proposition is brought in by him to show how the Platonists posited many gods: for they did not posit them all equal, but they posited one first, who participated nothing but is essentially one and good. But they posited other inferior gods participating that very one and good.

465. And he brings in a proof of this because, he says, it is clear concerning the first and supreme God that he participates nothing, otherwise he would not be the first cause of all things: for always a participant presupposes something prior which is through its essence. But that all other gods are participants he proves because if the first God is essentially one and not participative, either some one of the other gods is similarly one and thus differs in nothing from the first, or it would be necessary that it be participative of the one. For if the one itself is the essence of the first, it is necessary that if something differ from it, as if existing after itself, it would not be such that its essence be itself one, but it would be participating unity.

466. And this is what is proposed here (217) that it is necessary to posit a first one making unities be obtained, that is from which they participate unity, whatever things are one; and it is not obtained, that is it does not participate unity from anything else. And the proof of this is brought in, which has been put before [465].

467. And so is ended the book Of Causes.

468. And let there be thanks to the omnipotent God who is the first cause of all things.