D. 22 - Division of the divine names

Division of the text

Having considered things that pertain to the unity of the essence and the Trinity of persons, here the Master considers the names by which one designates both the unity of the essence and the plurality of the persons. Now, this is divided into two parts: in the first, he lays out a division of the divine names, and shows what is predicated of the divine persons in the plural, and what in the singular; in the second, he shows how one should understand unity and plurality in the divine, in Distinction 24, at here it is opportune to inquire diligently. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents the universal distinction of divine names; in the second, he treats a certain name that brings in a special difficulty, that is, the name “person,” which does not seem to follow the nature of the others, in Distinction 23, at something is to be added to the foregoing. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows the diversity of the divine names; in the second, he lays out certain rules from which one can gather how each of them is predicated, at it is therefore to be known that those names which properly pertain to the several persons are used of them in relation to each other. (Sent. I, 22.5(94).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he lays out a three-part distinction of the divine names, following Ambrose and Augustine; in the second, he adds three modes of divine names, and concludes that there are six differences of the things that are said of God, at there are also some names which are suitable for God in time. (Sent. I, 22.4(93).1.)

Question 1

The division of the divine names

Here four things are asked:

first, whether God can be named;

second, whether any name befits him properly, or are all names said of him metaphorically;

third, whether he should be named by only one name, or by many, or even by all;

fourth, one asks about the multiplication of divine names presented in the text.

Article 1

Whether God can be named

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: Commentary on the Sentences, bk. 1 (In I Sent.), d. 1, exposition of the text; qa. 6; ST I.13.1; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 1, lect. 1, 3.) It seems that God is not nameable.

Obj. 1: It seems God is not nameable because of what Dionysius says about God, saying, but he cannot be comprehended by any name at all, nor is there sensation of him, nor an image, nor an opinion, nor a name, nor an explanation, nor contact with him, nor knowledge of him. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, para. 1 (PG 3:586).) This also seems to be clear from what the Philosopher says in the Book of Causes, namely, the first cause is higher than description, and tongues fall short of describing him. (Rather: Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 6.)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1, 16a5.) every name is a sign of some form existing in the soul. But, as Augustine says, (See Augustine, Confessions, bk. 12, cc. 6, 28 (CCSL 27; PL 32:827‒28, 841‒42).) God, who evades every form, cannot be penetrated by the intellect. Therefore it seems that he can in no way be named.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if he can be named, he is named either with a noun, or a pronoun, or a verb, or a participle. But he cannot be named with a noun, since every noun signifies a substance with a quality, but in God there is no composition of substance and quality. Nor is he named with a verb or a participle, which consignify time, which is a long way from God. Nor is he named with a pronoun, since the signification of a pronoun becomes determinate through its pointing, or relation; but the pointing is done by the mediation of accidents, which are not in God, and the relation is the recollection of something spoken of before, and he cannot be signified through such a relation unless something else is presupposed or named before. Therefore it seems that in no way can he be named.

On the contrary, in the Psalms it is said, his name is the Lord (Ps 68:4 [67:5]), and Exodus 3:13–14 says, ‘if . . . they ask me, “what is his name?” what shall I say to them?’ God said to Moses, ‘I am who am.’

Furthermore, everything that is known can also be signified by a vocal sound. But we in some way know God, either through faith or through natural knowledge. Therefore we can name him.

I answer that, because vocal sounds are signs of concepts, following the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Interpretation 1, 16a4.) the judgment one makes about knowing a thing is the same as that about naming of it. Whence, just as we know God imperfectly, so too do we name him imperfectly—as though we were stammering, as Gregory says. (See Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 27, ch. 40; bk. 29, ch. 1 (PL 76:439, 477).) However, he himself alone comprehends his very self, and therefore he himself alone has named his very self perfectly, I might then say, by generating a Word coequal with himself.

Reply Obj. 1: All those authorities that say God cannot be named intend to say that no name expresses God himself perfectly. This is signified in the Philosopher’s words when he says, tongues fall short of describing him; (Rather: Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 6.) and elsewhere he says, the first cause is higher than every description, and above everything that is named. (Rather: Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 22.)

Reply Obj. 2: If Augustine understands this as being about bodily form, then it is clear that God has no bodily form, nor is it needed for everything that is named to have a bodily form. However, if he understands this about form absolutely speaking, then he is said to escape every form, not because he is in himself not truly form, since he is pure act, and simple, and the first form, according to Boethius, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) but because whatever form the intellect conceives, God escapes it by his eminence. For if our intellect apprehends wisdom, God himself, in his own wisdom, exceeds every wisdom understood by us. And therefore he concludes that he is impenetrable to our intellect, such that it cannot go into him perfectly, by comprehending him. On account of this Dionysius also says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy*, ch. 2, para. 1 (PG 3:135).)* that whatever we affirm of him can also be denied of him, for it does not befit him in the way we understand and signify it with a name, but rather in a more excellent way.

Reply Obj. 3: He can be signified by a noun, a pronoun, a verb, and a participle. For when one says that a noun signifies a substance with quality, “quality” and “substance” are not understood properly speaking, the way the logician takes them when distinguishing the categories. Rather, the grammarian takes “substance” according to its mode of signifying, and likewise “quality.” And this is why what is signified by a noun is signified as something subsisting, insofar as something can be predicated of it, even if in reality it is not subsisting; for example, the grammarian says that “whiteness” signifies a substance, as different from a verb, which does not signify as something subsisting. And because in every name one must consider that from which the name is imposed—which is, as it were, the principle of our coming to know—therefore in reference to this it has the mode of a quality, insofar as quality or form is the principle of making a thing known. This is why, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.14, 1020a32‒b2.) in one way a substantial form is called a “quality.”

Nor does it matter, as regards a name’s signification, whether the principle of making a thing known is identical in reality with what is signified by the name, as in abstract names, or is diverse, as in the name “man.” And because God is known by his very self, this is why he can be signified through a name that has quality as regards the account from which the name is imposed, and substance as regards that to which it is imposed.

Likewise one should say as regards the pronoun that he can even be signified through pronouns, as is noted in Exodus 3:14, I am who am. And although he cannot be pointed to in reference to the senses, still he can be pointed to in reference to the intellect, according to what the intellect can apprehend of him. He can also be signified through relative pronouns, since it is granted that he is signified through names that can refer to something relative. Similarly, he can be signified through verbs or participles, as when one says that he is understanding, or powerful, or the like. And yet verbs and participles said of him do not signify something temporal in him. But it is true that, as regards their mode of signifying, by which they signify time, they fall short of representing him.

Article 2

Whether any name can be said of God properly

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 4, q. 1, a. 1; d. 33, a. 2; d. 35, a. 1, ad 2; ST I.13.3; SCG I.30; Disputed Questions on the Power of God, q. 7, a. 5.) It seems that no name can be said of God properly.

Obj. 1: For nothing is said properly of something that is more truly denied than affirmed of it. But according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2, para. 3 (PG 3:139).) all names that are said of God are more truly denied of him than affirmed of him; this is why he says that in the divine, negations are true, affirmations incongruous. (The Latin incompactae is a translation of the Greek ἀνάρμοστοι (anarmostoi), meaning “improper, undefined, incongruous.”) Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, we can name God only insofar as we know him. But we do know him only from his effects, either by way of causality, or by way of negation, or by way of eminence. Therefore he can be named by us only from created things. But whenever the name of a created thing is said of God, the predication is true only if it is understood metaphorically or by transference, (Metaphorice (derived from the Greek μεταφορά) and transumptive (and later translative) are derived from root words indicating “carrying” (phora, sumptio, latio) and “across” (meta, trans). In the context of this text, a name is carried from its ordinary application onto a new object while meaning the same thing. Below, Aquinas will tend to use transumptive and translative more frequently than metaphorice; however, given their equivalent etymologies and the clearer meaning of “metaphor,” we will usually translate these words as “metaphorically.”) as when one says that God is a lion or God is a rock. Therefore it seems that no name is said of God properly, but only metaphorically.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, created wisdom or created existence is more different from God than a meadow’s bloom differs from a man’s laughter. But by reason of this latter diversity, a meadow is said to “laugh” only metaphorically. Therefore it seems that so too God could be called “wise,” or anything else, only metaphorically.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whenever any name bringing in some bodily condition repugnant to God’s dignity is said of God, it can be said only metaphorically. And for the same reason, whenever a name brings in a condition that does not fit God, it will be incapable of being said of God properly. But every name imposed by us brings in some condition repugnant to the divine dignity. This is clear in verbs, which signify with time, and in nouns, which are said either in the abstract, like knowledge or humanity, which signify something incomplete and not subsisting in itself, or in the concrete, which bring in a certain composition—neither of which befit God. Therefore it seems that nothing is said properly of God.

On the contrary, whatever is said of certain things by way of priority and posteriority belongs more properly to what it is said of with priority, just as “being” belongs with priority to substance over accident. But there are some things that are said of God with priority over created things, like paternity, as is said in Ephesians 3:15: from whom all fatherhood in heaven and on earth is named; (The Revised Standard Version (RSV) reads every family instead of all fatherhood.) and the account is the same for goodness and other things. Therefore it seems that names of this sort are also said of him more properly than of created things.

Furthermore, this is seen from Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, para. 8 (PG 3:598).) who distinguishes the symbolic names, that is, ones said metaphorically, from the other divine names, so it seems that not all names are said metaphorically. This is also seen from the divisions Augustine and Ambrose give in the text. (Sent. I, 22.1(90).2, Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 8, ch. 1 (PL 42:947); Ambrose, De fide libri V (ad Gratianum Augustum), bk. 2, prol. (PL 16:559).)

I answer that every perfection that is in created things descends from God as from its exemplar, as from a principle that possesses in advance within itself, in a united way, the perfections of all things. Nevertheless no created thing can receive that perfection according to the mode in which it is in God. Whence, according to the mode of receiving, it falls short of perfectly representing the exemplar. And from this as well there is a certain gradation in created things, according to which certain things attain more, and more noble, perfections from God than do others, and they participate in them more fully. And due to this, in names there are two things to consider: the reality being signified, and the mode of the signifying.

Therefore one should consider that, when names are imposed by us, who know God only from created things, they always fall short of representing divine things as far as the mode of signifying goes. For our names signify divine perfections through the mode in which they are participated in by created things. However, if we consider the reality being signified in the name, which is what the name is imposed for signifying, we find that some names are imposed for signifying principally the very perfection from God as exemplar, simply speaking, without being concerned with any mode in its own signification. We also find some names imposed for signifying a perfection received according to a sort of mode of participation. For example, all knowledge is from the divine knowledge as its exemplar, and every science is from the divine science; therefore the name “sensation” is imposed for signifying knowledge through that mode in which it is received materially, according to a power connected to an organ. But the name “knowledge” does not signify any mode of participation within its principal signification.

Whence one should say that all those names that are imposed for signifying some perfection in an absolute way are said of God properly, and are in him by priority, as regards the reality being signified, although not as regards the mode of signifying—for example, “wisdom,” “goodness,” “essence,” and all such names. And these are the ones concerning which Anselm says (Anselm, Monologion, ch. 15 (PL 158:161).) that it is simply speaking and altogether better to be than not to be. However, those names imposed for signifying some perfection from God as exemplar, in such a way that they include an imperfect mode of participation within their own signification, are in no way said of God properly. But nevertheless, by reason of that perfection they can be said of God metaphorically—for example, “to sense,” “to see,” and the like. And the case is similar for all other bodily forms, like “stone,” “lion,” and such; for all of them are imposed for signifying bodily forms according to a determinate mode of participating in existence, or living, or something of the divine perfections.

Reply Obj. 1: Since in a name there are two things, the mode of signifying and the very reality being signified, one can always deny either of God, or both of them. But a name cannot be said of God except according to one of these. And because for the truth and propriety of an affirmation it is required that the whole be affirmed, whereas for the propriety of a negation it is enough if only one of them is absent, therefore Dionysius says that the negations are true absolutely, but the affirmations are true only in a certain respect. For they are true only with respect to what is signified, and not with respect to the mode of signifying.

Reply Obj. 2: Although we name God only from created things, nonetheless we do not always name him from a perfection proper to the created thing according to its proper mode of participating in it. But we can also impose a name for the perfection itself, absolutely, without being concerned with any mode of signifying in the very thing being signified, which is, as it were, the object of the intellect—although it would be necessary, in what is consignified, always to receive the mode of the created thing, on the side of the intellect itself, which is naturally suited to receive from sensible realities the fitting mode of understanding. And these things are said of God properly, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 3: Created wisdom differs more from uncreated wisdom as regards its existence, which consists in the mode of having it, than does the meadow’s bloom from a man’s laughter. But with respect to the account from which the name is imposed, they agree more, for that account is one according to analogy, being in God with priority and in created things with posteriority. And the truth and propriety of the speech is viewed more according to this account signified in the name than according to the mode of signifying, which is given as a consequence of being understood through a name.

Reply Obj. 4: Whenever a bodily condition is brought in by the principal signification, the name cannot be said of God except metaphorically; but the fact that some imperfection is brought in by the mode of signifying, which imperfection does not fit God, does not make the predication false or improper, but only imperfect. And on account of this, no name represents God perfectly.

Article 3

Whether God has only one name

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.13.4; SCG I.35; On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 6; Compendium theologiae, ch. 25.) It seems that God has only one name.

Obj. 1: For a name should correspond to the reality being signified through the name, since, as Hilary says, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 14 (PL 10:107).) the subject is a statement of the reality. But in God there is the highest unity without any diversity. Therefore he is named by only one name.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there are only two modes of predicating in the divine: either substantially or relatively. But names can be distinguished only according to what is being signified or according to the mode of signifying. Therefore it seems that either only one name should be given him, on account of the unity of the reality, or at most two, on account of the two modes of predicating.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, you might say that there is a plurality of the divine names insofar as he is named from diverse created things.

On the contrary, God himself is the efficient and exemplary principle from which every created thing exists. Therefore if the divine names are multiplied according to the diversity of created things, then the names of all created things could be said of him—which is false. Therefore it seems that there is no diversity of divine names due to created things.

Obj. 4: You might say that they are multiplied according to account alone.

On the contrary, a diversity of account is a diversity according to the intellect. But a diversity of the intellect imposing the names, unless something diverse in the reality stands under it, does not cause a multitude of names except insofar as the names are multiplied as synonyms. Therefore, according to this, all the divine names will be synonyms—which the Commentator explicitly denies in Metaphysics 11, (Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126‒1198 AD), Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 39.) saying that the names “living” and “life” do not differ in God the way synonyms do, and much less do “living” and “wise.” And so it seems that the divine names do not differ only according to the reception of the intellect signifying him. And so the same thing as before follows.

On the contrary, many divine names are found to be said of him in Scripture.

Furthermore, no name is sufficient to express the divine perfection. Rather, something of perfection is given to our understanding by way of one name that is not given by way of another. Therefore it seems that, in order that the divine perfection might be made better known to us, we should name him with several names.

I answer that a multiplicity of names can happen in two ways. One is due to the intellect, since, because names express an understanding, it happens that one and the same thing is signified by diverse names, insofar as it can be received within the intellect in diverse ways. And this is why we can name God both according to what is in him, and according to how he stands toward created things. And this happens in two ways. The first is according to negations, by which the conditions of created things are removed from God; and thereby arise negative names, which receive their multitude from the conditions of the created things that are denied of God—and especially the ones that follow universally upon every created thing, such as “unmeasurable,” “uncreated,” and so on. The second way is according to God’s relation to what is created, which relation is nonetheless not really in God, but in what is created; and thereby arise those divine names that bring in a bearing toward what is created, such as “Lord,” “King,” and such.

Additionally, a multiplication of names can happen due to the reality, insofar as names signify a real thing; and thereby arise names expressing what is in God. Now, in God one cannot find any real distinction except that of the persons, who are three realities; and thereby arises the multiplicity of personal names signifying the three realities. But besides this one can also find in God a distinction of accounts, which are really and truly in him—for example, the account of wisdom, and that of goodness, and the like, which are all indeed one in reality, and they differ in account; this is preserved in propriety and truth insofar as we say that God is truly wise and good, and this is not merely so in the understanding of the one thinking about it. And thereby arise the diverse names of his attributes, all of which signify one reality, yet they do not signify the one reality according to one account. And therefore they are not synonyms.

Reply Obj. 1: This answer is clear, because even though there is unity in the essential reality, there is still plurality in the personal reality, and in the accounts by which the one essence can be signified in diverse ways, and in the intellect’s diverse ways of taking it. According to all of these things the divine names are multiplied.

Reply Obj. 2: The equivocal, analogical, and univocal are divided in diverse ways. For the equivocal is divided according to the realities being signified, and the univocal is divided according to diverse specific differences, but the analogical is divided according to diverse modes. Whence, since “being” is predicated of the ten genera analogically, the division in it is according to diverse modes. Whence a proper mode of predicating is owed to each genus. And because in the divine only two genera are preserved according to a common account of genus, that is, substance and toward-something, (“Toward-something” (ad aliquid, πρός τι) is the name Aristotle gives to the logical category of relation (in Categories, ch. 7).) therefore two modes of predicating are spoken in the divine. However, each genus is divided univocally into species contained under that genus, so a proper mode of predicating is not owed to the species. And on account of this, although certain things contained in the category of quality are said of God according to the account of the species, nonetheless they do not bring a new mode of predicating, even though they do bring a new account of signification. Whence, even though there are only the two modes of predicating in God, still there are many accounts of signification, according to which the divine names can be multiplied.

Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from things said above in the body, some names are said of God properly that, as regards what are being signified, are in God with priority, rather than in created things; examples are “goodness,” “wisdom,” and the like. And the diversity of these names is not drawn from reference to created things; rather, the converse is more the case. For because in God the account of wisdom differs from that of goodness, this is why goodness and wisdom are diverse in created things, not only in account, but even in reality. But it is true that the diversity of such names, insofar as they are predicated of God, make him known to us, due to their diversity in created things. In addition, some names are predicated of him metaphorically, that is, by way of transference, and are multiplied according to diverse created things, the names of which are transferred to God. Nevertheless there is no necessity that he be signified by all the names of created things, since some bring in a lack of form or defect, and God is not the author of such, especially not the defect that is a fault. Whence we cannot call God “sinner” or “devil,” which is the name of a depraved nature, even though he is called a “lion,” or a “lamb,” or even “angry.”

Reply Obj. 4: The names of the attributes differ according to account, yet not an account that is merely in the one thinking it; rather, it is an account that is preserved in the reality itself, according to the truth and propriety of the real thing. This is clear as follows. For all names of this sort are said of God and created things not equivocally, but analogically according to one account. Whence, since in what is created the account of wisdom is not the account of goodness, it is necessary that this is also true in God. But it differs in that in God they are the same in reality, whereas in created things they differ in reality, and not only in account. And how this can be so was explained above. (Above, a. 2, ad 3.)

Article 4

Whether the division of the names of God given by Ambrose is insufficient

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that Ambrose’s division (Sent. I, 22.1(90).2, quoting Ambrose, De fide libri V, bk. 1, prologue. Ambrose’s division given in the text is as follows: “there are some names which clearly show a property of the Godhead; and there are some which express the clear truth of the divine majesty; but there are others which are used of God metaphorically and by analogy.” Lombard understands the property in the first member to indicate personal properties.) is insufficient.

Obj. 1: For “Trinity” and “person” are divine names, and they pertain neither to the unity of the majesty, nor do they belong properly to some one person, nor are they said of God metaphorically.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there are some names that are said of God negatively, like “uncreated,” and “unmeasurable.” Now, since these predicate nothing of God, they seem to pertain neither to a property of the persons, nor to the majesty of the Godhead. It is also certain that they are not said metaphorically, since they do not befit created things such that they would be taken across from them into divine predication. Therefore it seems that the division is insufficient.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is certain that the majesty of the Godhead and a personal property are eternal. But some things are said of God from time, such as “Lord,” and the like. Therefore it seems that neither do they pertain to the majesty of the Godhead nor to a personal property. It is also certain that they are not said metaphorically. Therefore it seems that they are not contained under Ambrose’s division. Therefore it is insufficient.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Damascene (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:835).) presents a different division of divine names, saying that some signify an infinite sea of substance, and not what he is, such as the name “he who is”; but a certain one names his activity, such as “God”; whereas some signify what follows on his substance, such as “just,” “good,” and the like; moreover, some signify a relation to things from which he is distinguished, that is, to created things; however, some signify what he is not, such as “incorporeal,” “unmeasurable,” and the like.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, Dionysius presents (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 1, para. 6 (PG 3:595).) a manifold division of divine names. Moreover, the Master, in the passage after Ambrose’s triple division, (Sent. I, 22.2(91)‒5(94).) brings in another three differences of divine names, and that makes six in total. Therefore one asks about the assignment of these divisions.

I answer that the first three-member division presented in the text sufficiently embraces all divine names, and this division is that given by the three saints, Augustine, Ambrose, and Dionysius. For Dionysius himself divides the divine names into those that are said metaphorically, which he names “symbolic theology,” and those that are said properly, that is, those that are in God with priority; and he divides these into “united theology,” that is, according to those that are predicated of the three persons in common, and “discrete theology,” according to those that pertain to the individual persons. From this also the sufficiency of this division right away becomes clear. For God is named either through what is primarily in him, and in created things secondarily, or through a likeness taken from created things. If he is named in the second way, then these are the names said metaphorically. If he is named in the first way, this will be in two ways: for that which is in God with priority is either common, and then it pertains to the unity of the majesty, or it is proper to a person, and then it pertains to the distinction within the Trinity.

Reply Obj. 1: This name “Trinity,” although it does not explicitly signify something proper to one of the persons, still implicitly includes all things proper to all the persons, insofar as it is, as it were, collective of the persons. Similarly, even this name “person,” although it is not imposed from some specific personal property, still is imposed from personhood, which signifies property in a common way; and in a certain way, it even signifies substance, as will be clear below. (Below, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 2: Every negation is caused by some affirmation. And thus even in the divine the account of negative names is founded upon the account of affirmative names; for example, the fact that he is called “incorporeal” is founded on the fact that he is simple existence. Whence it is clear that negative names are traced back either to the unity of the essence, for example “uncreated” and “unmeasurable,” or to the distinction of persons, for example “unbegotten.”

Reply Obj. 3: Names of this sort do not place something in God temporally, because those temporal relations are really in the created things, and in God only according to account. Nonetheless, insofar as they are born from God’s activities in created things, they help us understand something that is in God absolutely. For example, the relation of “Lord” helps us understand the power in God by which he governs the entirety of creation. Whence it is clear also that these names are traced back either to those that pertain to the unity of his majesty, such as “Creator,” “Lord,” and the like, or to the distinction of persons, such as “sent,” “incarnate,” and the like.

Reply Obj. 4: Damascene’s division looks only to one member of the aforesaid division, for all the things he presents pertain to the unity of the majesty. Now, the unity of the majesty can be named in two ways, as is clear from things said in the previous article: either according to what is in God, or according to the reception of the intellect, which receives him according to some comparison to what is created. (In I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 3.) If God is named according to what is in him, there will be a triple diversity of names following the three things that are found in every reality whatsoever, namely, essence, power, and activity; in other things these are really different, but in him they are one in reality and distinct in account. And the name “he who is” is taken according to the essence; the ones that stand in the mode of things following on substance, like “just,” “wise,” and such, are taken according to power; and names of his activity, like “God,” are according to activity. However, if God is named through the intellect’s reception in comparison with what is created, this will be of two sorts: either inasmuch as the things that are created are removed from him—and these will be negative names—or insofar as there is indicated in the names a certain relation of causality toward the created thing, the conditions of which are removed from God—and these will be the names that indicate a relation to other things from which God is essentially distinguished.

Reply Obj. 5: Now, the division of the divine names that Dionysius presents, as is clear from things said in the body, is the same as Ambrose’s division, except that Dionysius multiplies the names beyond those pertaining to the unity of the majesty, according to the diverse processions experienced in created things; by these God is named by those perfections that exist in God with priority, such as “good,” “wise,” “being,” and the like.

Moreover, in the three differences that he adds, the Master specifies Ambrose’s division as regards certain specific modes. Nevertheless, these can be traced back to Ambrose’s division. For what pertains to the properties of the Godhead either names determinately something proper to one person, like “Father” and “Son,” or it gathers all that is proper of the persons, like the name “Trinity,” which signifies the property of a person according to a certain specific mode. Likewise, even the ones that pertain to the unity of the majesty and the property of the divinity befit God either from eternity or from time. If they pertain from time, they are either said relatively according to the name, such as “Lord” and the like, or they are not referred to another according to the name, such as “incarnate” and the like. And in this way it is clear that the names the Master adds are contained in Ambrose’s division through reduction, yet not simply speaking, but in a certain respect, as is clear from things said in the body.

Exposition of the text

It seems to us that we must discuss the diversity of names. (Sent. I, 22.1(90).1.) It does not seem that this is pertinent, since it does not belong to the same science to consider realities and their names. But it should be said, as was said above, (In I Sent., prologue, a. 3.) that theology, insofar as it is the chief of all the sciences, has within itself something from all the sciences, and therefore it treats not only the realities, but the significations of their names. For not only faith about the truth of the realities is necessary to attain salvation, but so is the vocal confession of it through names. As Romans 10:10 says, one believes with his heart and so is justified, and he confesses with his lips and so is saved.

Indications . . . of analogy: splendor, letter of the alphabet, mirror, and suchlike. (Sent. I, 22.1(90).2.) This seems to be false, since, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 4, ch. 28 (Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum [CSEL] 28.1:331; PL 34:315).) light is more properly said of spiritual things than of bodily things, so “splendor” is not contained among the metaphors. But one should say that light, as regards the reality being signified, is properly in bodily things, nor is it in spiritual things unless it is being said metaphorically. But as regards the account from which the name is imposed, which consists in manifestation, it is more properly found in spiritual things. But this will be explained better later. (In II Sent. d. 13, q. 1, a. 2.)

Some names which are suitable for God in time, but are not used relatively, such as incarnated, made man, and suchlike. (Sent. I, 22.4(93).1.) This is said because, with respect to the name, they are not referred to another, although they contain an implicit relation according to which they include union in their conception.

It is therefore to be known that those names which properly pertain to the several persons are used of them in relation to each other. (Sent. I, 22.5(94).5.) Here he presents certain rules about divine names pertaining to the unity of the essence, and others about the properties pertaining to the properties of the persons. Of those pertaining to the unity of the essence he presents four: the first is that they are said of it from itself, and absolutely; the second is that they signify substance; the third is that they are said of the individual persons; and the fourth, that they should be said of them all in the singular, and not in the plural. Of those pertaining to a property of the persons, he lays out three rules: the first is that they are said relatively; the second, that they do not predicate the divine substance; and the third, that they are not said of all the persons.

Those which signify the unity of essence are used in an absolute sense. (Sent. I, 22.5(94).1.) On the contrary, “Lord” is said relatively, and yet it pertains to the unity of the essence. But to this one should say that it does not bring in a relation that is really in God, but one that is merely according to account, as will be explained below. (Below, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2.)

Whatever is said in relation to something else is said relatively and not substantially. (Sent. I, 22.5(94).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 8 (PL 42:916).) This seems false, since relations in the divine are the divine essence itself. But one should say to this that they are indeed really the divine essence itself, but not according to account. And because they are preserved in the divine according to the account of their genus, therefore they retain the specific mode that is owed to the genus, and not that owed to the species. It is otherwise with names like “goodness” and “wisdom,” even though they differ from the essence according to account, because the account of their genus, which the mode of predicating follows, is not preserved in the divine. Therefore according to their mode of predicating they do not differ from the substance, but rather are predicated substantially.

Yet not three great ones, but one great one. (Sent. I, 22.5(94).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 8 (PL 42:916).) This should be understood to be if “great” is taken substantively. However, if it is taken adjectivally, then it can be predicated in the plural, since it draws its number from the supposits.

For God is not great by a greatness which is not himself. (Sent. I, 22.5(94).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 10 (PL 42:916).) Here he wishes to show that greatness is said of God substantially. For what is not great substantially is said to be “great” by participation in some greatness that is not its substance. But that greatness by the participation in which something else is called “great” is greater than what is said to be “great” through it itself. Therefore something is greater than everything that is not great substantially. Now, nothing is greater than God. Therefore he is great substantially.

But it seems that this argument is not valid, since the concrete is not predicated of the abstract, such that white would be predicated of whiteness. Whence it does not seem that, from the fact that he is called “great” incidentally, a greatness is said to be greater than his. And furthermore, in the same greatness one cannot take a more and less, but what participates in greatness has only a participated greatness, so it cannot be said to be “greater” than greatness itself is.

To this one should say that Augustine here wishes this argument to conclude universally about all things said of God which in other things signify an accident; therefore he must assume as a middle that the abstract is predicated more than the concrete. Now, this should be understood such that that is said to be greater which has more truly the account of greatness; and likewise, the whiter is not what has more of whiteness, or what is more properly white, but that to which the account of whiteness more truly belongs. However, the predication that is through a thing’s essence is always more principal than the one that is by participation. And therefore a whiteness that receives the predication of whiteness truly through an essential mode, as when whiteness is said to be whiteness, is said more truly to receive the predication of whiteness than do white things. And this is so even though it does not receive it in the same way, since we call a white thing “white,” but we call whiteness “whiteness.” For what is in the effect need not be in the cause in the same way, but it could be in a more eminent way; and this is how Dionysius explains it, saying, if someone says life lives, or light is lit up, he does not speak correctly, according to my reasoning; rather, these things are said according to a different mode. For the things that are fully and substantially in the effects are beforehand in the causes. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 8 (PG 3:646).) And he calls the cause “life” or “light,” and the effect “living” or “lit up.”