D. 34 - Comparison of the essence to the person

Division of the text

Here the Master compares the person to the essence. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents the comparison; in the second, he presents the end of the matter, at moreover, it is to be understood. (Sent. I, 34.5(149).2.)

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he compares the person to the essence according to identity; in the second, he does this according to the essence’s community with the persons, at here it is to be considered. (Sent. I, 34.2(146).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he presents the error some make, and their mistaken arguments; in the second, he answers those arguments, at they say this because they do not understand the passage of Scripture with pious diligence. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).4.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he presents the error; second, he presents the error’s proof, at for if, they say, the same essence which is the Father is also the Son, then the same is father and son to himself. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).1.)

And this latter is divided into two: first, he presents the proof through argument; second, through authority, at and they strive to defend their view by the testimony of Hilary. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).2.)

They say this because they do not understand the passage of Scripture with pious diligence. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).4.) Here he responds to the proofs. And about this he does two things: first, he responds to the authority; second, he responds to the argument, at yet we do not deny that a distinction is to be drawn according to the mode of understanding. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).9.)

As regards the first he does two things: first, he presents an explanation of the authority; second, he confirms his opinion through the authority of Augustine and Hilary, at these things which are said of God are not to be taken in corporeal ways. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).8.)

Here it is to be considered. (Sent. I, 34.2(146).1.) Here he compares the essence to the persons according to its community. And about this he does two things: first, he treats the community of the essence; second, he considers the signification of a certain name that designates the community of the essence, at and here we must not pass over what Augustine . . . says about this term ‘homoousion.’ (Sent. I, 34.5(149).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he presents what pertains to the community of the essence as signified by the name “essence”; second, he does this insofar as it is signified by the names of the other attributes, at from the above, it is established that, like essence, so also power, wisdom, goodness are said of God according to substance. (Sent. I, 34.3(147).1.)

In the latter he does two things: first, he shows their community; second, he treats the account of appropriation, at therefore the prudence of sacred speech took care to do this. (Sent. I, 34.4(148).1.)

Moreover, it is to be understood. (Sent. I, 34.5(149).2.) Here he announces the end of the treatment of the Trinity. And about this he does two things: first, he describes certain things that seemed to be missing—that is, metaphorical names; second, he admits to the treatise’s insufficiency, on account of the difficulty of the matter, at we have already said many things concerning the mystery of the most high and ineffable Unity and Trinity. (Sent. I, 34.5(149).3.)

There are three questions here:

first, about the comparison of the essence with the person; (Q. 1.)

second, about that appropriation noted in the text; (Q. 2.)

third, about things said metaphorically of God. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

The comparison of the essence to the person

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether the essence is the person;

second, whether it can be said that the three persons are of one essence.

Article 1

Whether the person and the essence are the same thing in the divine

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; ST I.28.2–3; I.39.1.) It seems that the person and the essence in the divine are not the same thing.

Obj. 1: For every person, or hypostasis, in the divine is either begetting, begotten, or proceeding. But the essence is not such, as was said above. (In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, both an affirmation and a negation can never be true of the same thing. Now, they are true for the essence and the person, since the essence is not distinguished whereas the persons are distinguished. Therefore the person and the essence are not the same.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every person, or hypostasis, is a supposit of some nature. But the same thing cannot be a supposit of its very self. Therefore the person and the essence are not the same thing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything proper adds something to what is common. But the essence is common, whereas the person is proper. Therefore the person adds something more to the essence. Therefore they are not wholly the same thing.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no two things are united in what is altogether the same thing as each of them, since then they could not be distinguished. But two persons, like the Father and the Son, are united in the essence. Therefore the essence is not altogether the same as each person.

On the contrary, according to Boethius, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) in the divine that by which he is and that which he is are the same thing. But “essence” is signified as that by which God is, and “person” as that which he is. Therefore the essence and the person are the same thing.

Furthermore, if the person of the Father were not the very Godhead by which he is said to be God, the Father will be called “God” by a participation in a nature. But that thing by participation in which something is denominated is a greater and more perfect thing—as regards that genus according to which it denominates—than the thing that participates in it, as was explained earlier; (Above, d. 22, exposition of the text.) Dionysius also says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 12, para. 4 (PG 3:971).) that participations exceed the very ones participating in them. Therefore it would follow that there is something that is not the Father—namely, divinity itself—and which is greater and more perfect than the Father, which is not fitting. Therefore the essence and the person must be wholly the same.

Furthermore, if the essence were a reality other than the three persons, it would follow that there would be four realities in the divine—which is heretical.

I answer that in the divine, the person and the essence are wholly not distinguished in reality. For in those things wherein the essence is something other than the hypostasis, or supposit, there must be something material through which the common nature is individuated and determined to this singular. Whence in created things, the hypostasis adds that determination of matter, or of something that stands in the place of matter, over and above the essence or nature; and this is why in created things such are not wholly the same thing. However, in God his nature is not subsisting through something at which it is determined as through matter; rather, it is subsisting through its very self, and even his very existence is subsisting. Whence his nature is the very thing that subsists and the existence in which he subsists; and on account of this, in God that by which he is and that which he is are wholly the same thing.

Whence it is necessary that the essence and the person be wholly the same thing in reality, even if one asserts that the properties are not the essence. For the persons are not persons from the fact that they are under their properties, but from the fact that they are under the essence, since “person” signifies an individual subsisting in the genus of substance. Whence it is more incongruous to assert a real difference between the essence and a person than between the essence and a property.

Nevertheless, the essence and the person are distinguished according to account, under which, nonetheless, a reason for the truth of the reality stands as its foundation. For because the highest simplicity and the highest perfection are in God, we can signify God in both ways—that is, as regards his simplicity, using abstract names, and as regards his perfection, using concrete names, which signify something subsisting.

Furthermore, in the divine we find something common according to the reality and something proper. Therefore in this way, the account of “person” includes two elements in the divine. For by the name “person” God is signified as subsisting and as proper, but by the name “essence” he is signified as simple, but not as subsisting, and is signified as common to the persons. But by the name “paternity” he is not signified as subsisting, but as proper, and not as distinguished, but as distinguishing the person.

And thus it is clear that the person does not differ in reality from the essence and the property; rather, they differ only according to account, whereby each is signified as formal with respect to the persons, as regards the two things that belong to the concept of a person. For the essence is signified as the person’s form insofar as it is subsisting, and the property is signified as his form insofar as it is proper and incommunicable.

Reply Obj. 1: To beget and similar acts are attributed to the divine person according to the two modes of signifying whereby he is distinguished from the essence: both because they signify the relations distinguishing the persons, and because they signify through the mode of an act. Now, every act belongs to a subsisting and perfect reality. Therefore they cannot be attributed to the essence from the fact that they are attributed to the hypostasis; for they are attributed to the hypostasis according to that in which it is not the same as the essence. And therefore the argument of the objection falls into the fallacy of the accident.

Reply Obj. 2: It is impossible that one affirm and deny the same thing, of the same thing, in the same respect. But if in some respect the affirmations and the denials pertaining to that distinction are distinguished, they could both be true of it. For every distinction, whether of reality or of account, is founded on an affirmation and a denial, as is clear even with synonyms: for “clothing” and “vestment” signify the same reality, yet the names are diverse; so too of “outfit.” Whence affirmations and denials that pertain to the reality cannot both be true, such that one could say, “the clothing is white, but the outfit is not white.” But affirmations and denials that pertain to the names themselves can both be true, so that one could say, “‘outfit’ is grammatically neuter, but ‘vestment’ is not neuter.”

So too since the person and the essence are the same in reality, nothing that pertains to the nature of the reality predicated of the essence can be denied of the person, such that one could say, “the essence is uncreated, and the person is not uncreated,” or “the essence is God, and the person is not God,” or the like. But because they are distinguished by account, whatever pertains to that account wherein they are distinguished, when it is predicated of one, can be denied of the other; thus, one might say, “the essence is common, the person is not common,” or “the person begets, the essence does not beget,” and so on. Whence in all such, the same thing is not attributed to the essence and the person.

Reply Obj. 3: Properly speaking, in the divine one thing is not under another; this is why, above, (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, exposition of the text; Sent. I, 8.7(27).1.) Augustine does not accept the name “substance” in the divine, and even Richard of Saint Victor changed the name “subsistence” into the name “existence.” Whence neither is “supposit” said here properly, insofar as a supposition is referred to a reality. But we do use such names according to our understanding, which receives in the divine something corresponding to these two in created things, one of which stands under the other, as a reality existing through itself stands under a common simple form. And our intellect receives something simply in God that corresponds to form and something subsisting that is the same in reality with that simple thing. And therefore it names the subsisting reality in the divine the “supposit of the simple nature.”

Reply Obj. 4: The common is of two sorts. For something can be common according to account, and this, by the addition of something proper, is contracted and made determinate, as a genus through the addition of a difference, and a species is individuated through matter. But something can also be common in reality, which in fact remains undivided; whence it is not necessary that it be made determinate by any addition, as is the essence in the three persons. But it is true that it is necessary for the concept of a person that there be some account, that is, of relation, that is not of the concept of the essence; yet this relation does not in reality differ from the essence itself. Whence neither does it make a composition nor does it distinguish the person from the essence in anything real; rather, it distinguishes a person from a person.

Reply Obj. 5: The three persons are united in the essence, which is wholly the same in reality with each of them. Nevertheless it differs in account from each of them, insofar as “person” includes within itself the understanding of relation. Although compared to the essence, this relation differs from it only in account, yet compared to that to which it is opposed relatively, it makes a real distinction. For relation distinguishes really only according to the opposition of reference that it has. Now, that opposition is not toward that within which the relation has its existence, but toward that to which it refers. Therefore the relation is not distinguished really from the essence and the person that it is in, but from the other person to which it refers.

Article 2

Whether it is congruously said that the three persons are of one essence

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 25, exposition of the text; ST I.39.2; 33.3.) It seems incongruous to say that the three persons are of one essence.

Obj. 1: For according to grammar, the oblique cases are transitive. (The oblique cases for nouns are any cases other than the nominative; “of one essence” (unius essentiae) is in the genitive case.) But a transitive construction requires a diversity of the things so construed. Therefore, since the essence is not different than the person, it seems incongruous to say that the three persons are of one essence.

Obj. 2: You might say that the genitives are here being construed intransitively, as when one says, “the gift of the Holy Spirit,” meaning “the gift that is the Holy Spirit.”

On the contrary, just as the three persons are the one essence, so too they are the one God. Therefore if that argument were enough, then it still seems one could similarly say, “the three persons are of one God”—which is denied in the text. (Sent. I, 34.2(146).1.)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every construction of an oblique case can be interpreted through some preposition with causality. But “the three persons are from the same essence,” or “of the same essence,” or “through the same essence,” is false. Therefore it seems that “the three persons are of one essence” is also false. (As in English, in the Latin, “from the same essence,” “of the same essence,” and “through the same essence” translate prepositional phrases, whereas “of one essence” translates only a noun and adjective pair in an oblique case (the genitive). This distinction, however, does not come through clearly in the English language, since it uses little inflection.)

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the account of a reality and of one reality is the same, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b23‒30.) Therefore, if the three persons are of one essence, it will be fittingly said that the three persons are of the essence—which seems to say nothing. Therefore, neither is the first.

On the contrary, as is said in the text, (Sent. I, 34.5(149).1.) the name “homoousion” (Greek: ὁμοούσιον) has been agreed upon and defended by all Catholics. But this is nothing other than being of one essence, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 34.5(149).1.) Therefore the three persons are of one essence.

I answer that the following should be simply conceded: “the three persons are of one essence.” For although there are four causes in created realities, nonetheless not all orientations of causality are found in God. For the orientation of a material cause does not belong to God, either in respect to what is in his very self, or in respect to what is in created things, since matter is imperfect and in potency. But the orientation of a final cause is indeed in God, relative to created things, whose goodness we say is the end of everything created—but not relative to what is in his very self, for one person is not the end of another, for from this would arise a gradation of goodness. Moreover, the orientation of a formal cause also belongs to God, both with respect to what is created, of which God is the exemplar, and with respect to what is in his very self. And yet this orientation is not founded on any real relation, but according to a mode of signifying; for something is signified as a form: the essence, and something else is signified as what subsists in the form: the person. Moreover, the orientation of efficient cause also belongs to God, both with respect to the created and with respect to what is in his very self, but not to the divine essence as regards a person, but to one person with respect to another person, which latter is from the person itself. Nor is this orientation founded on the intellect’s way of taking it, but on a relation that is there in the reality. Yet this is in such a way that “efficient cause” is taken in a broad sense, since in the divine there is no acting and being acted upon. Rather, here there is an origin of one person from another.

And therefore it is clear that every construction in the divine in reference to divine things is either according to the orientation of an efficient cause—as when we say, “the Son of the Father”—or according to the orientation of a formal cause—as when we say, “the three persons are of one essence.” Whence one should say that this genitive “of the one essence” should be construed in the orientation of a formal cause.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the essence and the person are the same in reality, still they differ in account, since the one is signified as the form of the other. And such a diversity is enough for the grammarian, who considers the modes of signifying through the name.

Reply Obj. 2: This is not wholly a construction according to identity, but one according to the orientation of a form, as was said in the body of the article. And because “God” is not signified as the form of the three persons, one cannot say, “the three persons are of one God.” For that construction could be understood only possessively. And likewise, for the same reason one says, “there is one essence of the three persons” but not that there is “one God of three persons,” for in the name “God” is indicated the orientation of a creating and governing principle.

Reply Obj. 3: These prepositions “due to” and “from” designate the orientation of something that stands to motion or activity as the beginning and not as the terminus. And therefore they designate the orientation of an efficient or material cause, not one of form or end, which are rather as the terminus of a motion. And therefore in no way can one say, “the three persons are due to the same essence” or “from the same essence.” But one can say, “they are in the same essence,” since the preposition “in” can denote the orientation of a formal cause containing them.

Reply Obj. 4: Those constructions that are in the designation of form require two genitives, one of which signifies the form itself, and the other the determination of the form, for example, when one says, “the column is of wondrous height.” Or else it requires one genitive that has the force of two genitives, as when one says, “a man of bloods,” that is, a man who is a shedder of much blood. (“Of bloods” is one genitive (sanguinum); “of much blood” is two (multi sanguinis).) And this is why two genitives are needed in the proposed, one of which signifies the divine essence itself, and the other designates its simplicity, or unity, or some other aspect of the essence. Whence one can fittingly say, “the three persons are of one essence,” or “of the same essence,” or “of the uncreated essence”—but not, “they are of the essence,” simply speaking.

Question 2

The appropriation noted in the text

Article 1

Whether power is fittingly attributed to the Father, wisdom to the Son, goodness to the Holy Spirit

Next we ask about the appropriation presented in the text, (Sent. I, 34.3(147).1.) since it seems unfitting.

Obj. 1: For virtue pertains to power, but “virtue” is appropriated to the Son, according to 1 Corinthians 1:24: Christ, the virtue of God. (RSV reads power instead of virtue.) Therefore “power” should not be appropriated to the Father, but rather to the Son.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the principle of a statement or of pronouncing a word is wisdom itself. But to speak the Word, which is the Son, pertains to the Father, who is his principle. Therefore “wisdom” should be appropriated to the Father more than to the Son.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as the Son proceeds through the mode of understanding as the Word, so too does he proceed through the mode of nature as the Son. Therefore, if “wisdom” is appropriated to the Son because he proceeds through the mode of understanding, for the same reason “nature” should be appropriated to him because he proceeds through the mode of nature.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PL 3:694).) the good is diffusive of its very self, and is, as it were, the font-like principle of every emanation of divine goodness. But to be the font-like principle befits the Father. Therefore “goodness” should be appropriated to the Father.

On the contrary, there is what is given in the text. (Sent. I, 34.3(147)–4(148).2.)

I answer that the names of the persons are said of both the divine and created realities, not of course univocally, but through priority and posteriority. Whence paternity and filiation are in created things and in the divine according to different modes, and therefore an appropriation can occur in two ways: in one way, by considering the accounts of names according to how they are said of created things—and then the appropriation should always occur through contrariety, so that the mode of the created might be excluded from the Creator; and in another way, by considering the accounts of names according to how they are found in the divine—and in this way the appropriation should occur through a likeness to what is proper, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 31, q. 2, a. 1.)

Now, in each way this appropriation is fitting. For if the accounts of these names be considered according to the mode whereby they are found in created things, they are found to be made through their contrary. For among us, weakness is found in fathers, on account of their old age; this is why “power” is attributed to the heavenly Father. Likewise, ignorance is found in sons, on account of the motions of youth, and on account of their inexperience; this is why “wisdom” is attributed to the Son of God. But among us, the name “spirit” usually pertains to a certain hardness and haughtiness, or fury; whence Isaiah 2:22 says: turn away from a man in whose nostrils is spirit. (RSV reads breath instead of spirit.) And therefore “goodness” is attributed to the Holy Spirit, and this is the mode of appropriation touched on in the text. (Sent. I, 34.4(148).1–2.)

However, if the accounts of the names are taken according to how they are in the divine, then they could also occur through an assimilation to things proper to the persons. For example, to the Father, who is the font-like principle of the entire divinity, is ascribed “power,” which in its own accounts includes being a principle; for power is a principle of changing things, as is said in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15.) And because the Son proceeds through the mode of understanding, which is perfected by wisdom, “wisdom” is attributed to him. And because the Holy Spirit proceeds through the mode of will, the object of which is goodness, therefore “goodness” is attributed to him.

Reply Obj. 1: “Virtue” does not name power absolutely, but the perfection of power. Whence the Philosopher says (Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.11, 281a11.) that virtue is the limit of power within a reality. Therefore in this way virtue can be considered in three ways: either insofar as it is rooted in power, and then it can be appropriated to the Father, as can power; or insofar as it is that through which a power goes forth into act, and then it is appropriated to the Son, through whom the Father is said to act—whence also the Son is called the “Father’s arm”: have you an arm like God? (Job 40:9), as Gregory interprets this; (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 32, ch. 5, para. 7 (CCSL 143B; PL 76:639).) or insofar as it imposes goodness on his works—whence it is said in Ethics 2 (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1106a16; see also 2.5, 1106a6–13.) that virtue is what makes the one who has it good, and renders his action good. And thus it is appropriated to the Holy Spirit just as goodness is.

Reply Obj. 2: Wisdom can be paired with the word in three ways: either as the same as it, or as prior to it, or as posterior, in divine things just as it is in human things. For when “word” indicates a certain conception of the intellect, this conception among us must follow on some intellectual light, at least the light of the agent intellect and of the first principles from which a conclusion is taken. Whence if among us wisdom be considered insofar as it consists in the knowledge of the conclusion that is received by the mind, then it is the same thing as the word of the mind. But if wisdom is considered insofar as it consists in the light of the agent intellect and the knowledge of the first principles, then it precedes the word that is the conception of the conclusion. Moreover, if the wisdom is taken that is engendered in the mind of the student through the word of the teacher, then it follows after the word.

So too it is in the divine. For begotten Wisdom itself is the same thing as the Word, as is clear from things said before. (Above, d. 32, q. 2, a. 2.) Now, the paternal intellect stands in the production of the Word as the light of the agent intellect along with the principles in the production of the conclusion. And in this sense according to the order of nature, wisdom is the principle of the Word, just as we say unbegotten wisdom is the principle of begotten wisdom. However, created wisdom itself follows on the Word as though brought about through it; whence Sirach 1:5: the source of wisdom is God’s word in the highest heaven. And therefore the essential wisdom, which is unbegotten and not begetting, can be appropriated to the Son on account of its likeness to what is proper to the Son as the Word; it does not have this likeness to anything proper to the Father.

Reply Obj. 3: A nature always has the account of a principle, for it is the principle of motion and rest in that wherein it is, through itself and not incidentally, as is said in Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.1, 192b22.) And therefore it cannot be appropriated to the Son, who is from a principle according to the origin of nature, and not a principle in that origin. But wisdom has not only the account of a principle, but also the account of what is from a principle, and this is more so insofar as wisdom and knowledge are properly about conclusions, even though wisdom is also of the principles, as is said in Ethics 6. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.7, 1141a19.) And therefore it can be appropriated to the Son.

Reply Obj. 4: The good is called “diffusive” through the mode of an end, insofar as it is said that the end moves the efficient cause. However, the Father is not the principle of the divinity in this way; rather, he is more a principle through the mode of an efficient cause, as was said in the body of the article.

Question 3

Those things said metaphorically of God

Next, one asks about things said metaphorically (See the note above in d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2. Given their equivalent etymologies and the clearer meaning of “metaphor,” we will usually translate translative as “metaphorically.”) of God. About this two things are asked:

first, whether anything should be said metaphorically of God;

second, from what things should God be metaphorically named.

Article 1

Whether anything should be said metaphorically of God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., prol., a. 5; ST I.1.9; SCG III.119; Commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity, q. 2, a. 4.) It seems that nothing should be said metaphorically of God.

Obj. 1: For Boethius says (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) that in divine things one must consider intellectually, and not be led by images. But metaphorical expressions are drawn from the images of sensible things. Therefore one should not use them in the divine.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Topics 6.7.) all metaphors are metaphorically extended according to a certain likeness. But according to Boethius, (Boethius, In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda, bk. 3, ch. 9 (CSEL 48:228; PL 64:99).) likeness is the same quality of different realities. Therefore, since the qualities of bodily realities are not found in the divine, it seems that no likeness or metaphor could be drawn from sensible realities such that anything might be said metaphorically of God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, all teaching is for the sake of manifesting the truth, especially the teaching of Sacred Scripture. But such metaphors, or symbolic expressions, are, as it were, veils of the truth, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 3 (PG 3:122).) Therefore it seems one should not use them in theology.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the philosophers, (See Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2, 404b15‒26; 1.5, 409b25‒32; Plato, Timaeus 35a‒b.) knowledge occurs through the intellect’s becoming like the reality known. Now, our intellect, since it is incorporeal and immaterial, has a greater likeness with divine realities than with bodily realities, which are material. Therefore it is more oriented to knowing divine things than to such bodily things, and thus it seems that divine things should not be manifested to us through a likeness with bodily things.

On the contrary, Dionysius says, it is not possible for the divine radiance to shine on us otherwise than when veiled by a variety of likenesses. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 2 (PG 3:122).) Now, the divine radiance is the truth of divine things. Therefore it is necessary that the truth of divine things be proposed to us under bodily likenesses.

I answer that it is most fitting that divine things be designated for us by means of bodily likenesses. The reason for this can be assigned in four ways, the first and principal of which is on account of the height of the matter, which exceeds the capacity of our intellect. Whence we cannot receive the truth of divine things according to its own mode, and therefore it is necessary that it be proposed to us according to our mode. Now, it is connatural to us to come from sensible things to intelligible things, and from posterior things to prior ones. And therefore intelligible things are proposed to us under the shape of sensible things, so that from the things that we have known our mind might rise up to things unknown.

The second reason is that, because in us there are two cognitive parts—the intellectual and the sensitive—the divine wisdom has provided that each part, insofar as it might be possible, might be led back to divine things. And therefore he has brought to bear the shapes of bodily things, which can be received by the sensitive part, since it was unable to reach the intellectual things themselves of the divine.

The third reason is because of God we know more truly what he is not than what he is. Whence Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2, para. 3 (PG 3:142).) that in the divine the affirmations are incongruous, (As noted in d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 1, the Latin incompactae is a translation of the Greek ἀνάρμοστοι (anarmostoi), meaning “improper, undefined, incongruous.”) but the negations are true. And therefore of everything that we say of God, one should understand that they do not fit him in the same way as they are found in created things; rather, they are said according to some mode of imitation and likeness. The eminence of God was more expressly shown in this way, through the things that are more manifestly remote from him. Now, these things are bodily, and so it was more fitting that divine things be signified by means of bodily appearances, so that, made accustomed by such, the human mind might learn that none of the things that it predicates of God is attributed to him except by way of likeness, insofar as what is created imitates its Creator.

The fourth reason is on account of the hiddenness of the divine truth. For the depths of the faith should be hidden both from those outside the faith, lest they laugh at them, and from the simple, lest they derive an occasion for erring. And all of these reasons are assigned by Dionysius at the beginning of the Heavenly Hierarchy and the Letter to Timothy. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 1, para. 2 (PG 3:122); Epistle 9, “To Titus,” para. 1 (PL 3:1103).)

Reply Obj. 1: There are two things to consider in the knowledge of intellectual things: the contemplation’s principle and its terminus. The principle is of course from sensible things, but the terminus is in intelligible things, insofar as in natural cognition we receive universal intentions from the appearances received from sensation, through the light of the agent intellect. And therefore one should say that, as regards the terminus, one must turn to the intellectual day, but as regards the principle of contemplation, one must rise up from certain sensible appearances to the divine.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two sorts of likeness. For a certain likeness is through a participation of the same form, and there is no such likeness of bodily things with divine, as the objection proves. There is also a certain likeness of proportionality, which consists in the same relation of proportion, as when one says, eight is related to four just as six is to three, and as the consul stands to the city just as the pilot stands to the ship. And according to this sort of likeness there can be a metaphorical transference from bodily things to divine, so that if God be called a “fire” because fire stands to its melting things so that they to flow forth through its heat, so too God, through his goodness, diffuses perfections into all created things, or something like this.

Reply Obj. 3: The manifestation of truth should be done according to the proportion of those receiving it. And because for some, the manifestation of truth would be harmful more than it would be beneficial, when they might fight it, due to impiety, or they might make a mistake, due to simplicity, therefore the truth about divine things should be hidden, as is said in Matthew 7:6: do not give dogs what is holy.

Reply Obj. 4: There is a certain becoming-like according to an agreement in nature, and in this way our intellect becomes more like divine things than sensible things. But this is not the becoming-like that is required for knowledge. There is also a becoming-like through being internally formed, which is what is required for knowing, just as sight becomes like a color, by the species of which the pupil becomes internally formed. Now, this forming within cannot occur in our intellect, according to the path of nature, except through species that are abstracted from sensation. For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a15‒19.) as color stands to sight, so do phantasms stand to the intellect. And therefore it is certain that in this way the intellect is more capable of becoming like sensible things than divine.

Article 2

Whether metaphors for the divine should be extended from base things

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that metaphors for the divine should not be extended from base things. (Parallel text: ST I.1.9, ad 3.)

Obj. 1: For, as the previous article said, every metaphorical extension arises through a certain manner of likeness. But no noble conditions are found in base things, from which conditions one might attend to some likeness to divine things. Therefore it seems that one should not extend metaphors for divine things from such realities.

Obj. 2: You might say that in all realities, however base, there is found some likeness of the divine goodness, insofar as they are traces of the Creator.

On the contrary, in every created thing one finds the likeness of a trace or an image. Therefore if this is enough for making a metaphorical extension, it seems that the extension to divine things can be based on all created things—and this is not what we find.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a more express likeness of the divine goodness is present in incorporeal realities than in sensible realities. Therefore it seems that the names of the angels should be extended more in divine predication.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are altogether diverse should not be expressed by the same figures. But some figures are brought in to designate contrary powers and demons, like the names “serpent” and “lion.” Therefore it seems that at least such names should not be extended to the divine.

On the contrary, in the divine Scriptures there are frequently found names even of brute animals extended to divine predication; for example, I will be to them like a lion, like a leopard I will lurk beside the way (Hos 13:7), and the like is found in many other passages. Therefore it seems that metaphors for divine things can be extended even from base things.

I answer that Dionysius treats this question at length in the Heavenly Hierarchy, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 2, para. 2 (PG 3:138).) and he shows that divine things are signified to us through baser creatures with even greater fittingness than through nobler ones. The first reason he gives for this is that divine things are more hidden, the need for which hiddenness was explained in the previous article. The second reason he gives is that such things are more remote and distant from God, so because the most fitting mode of signifying divine things is through negation, we more fittingly use such likenesses. The third reason he bases on our utility, since we are given less occasion of error in the figures of base things than in figures of noble things. For no one doubts that God cannot be properly called any base animal, so it is certain that Scripture does not attribute such things with propriety to God. But among some who are simple, who can barely conjecture about anything beyond sensible things, it might easily seem that things that are most noble among bodies would properly befit God, if they were to be said of him. And therefore likenesses drawn from baser realities, by that very quality of these realities, would draw the mind away from error. Nonetheless in Scripture God is also found to be signified in more noble creatures, like the sun, and a star, and such; yet this is not done frequently.

Reply Obj. 1: According to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, paras. 1–3 (PG 3:694).) nothing wholly lacks a participation in the divine goodness; therefore from all realities, however base, can be drawn certain fitting likenesses for divine things.

Reply Obj. 2: There are some names of created things that name not only what is created, but even a defect connected with fault, just as the name “devil” names a nature deformed by sin. And therefore we cannot use such names metaphorically extended to signify the divine.

Reply Obj. 3: In spiritual creatures we can consider two things. We can consider the very perfections of the divine goodness, taken according to their very selves; and God is named by such—not symbolically, but properly—as when he is called “wise” and “knowing” and such; so too in the Book of Causes it is said (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 6.) that God is named with the name of his first effect, which is “intelligence.” Or we can consider the determinate mode itself of participating in such perfections, which mode pertains to the determinate nature or order of angels. Whence names expressing this mode cannot be properly said of God—not even metaphorically, since metaphor should be drawn from things that are manifest according to sensation. And therefore in Scripture we never find God called a “cherubim” or “seraphim” or the like, whereas we do find him called a “lion” or “bear” or the like.

Reply Obj. 4: In one reality diverse properties can be considered. And therefore it is not unfitting that from the same reality, according to its diverse properties, a metaphorical extension can be made to contrary things. For example, God is called a “lion” on account of his liberality or fortitude, or the like, and the devil too is called a “lion” on account of his cruelty. It also sometimes happens, as Dionysius says in the letter to Titus, (Pseudo-Dionysius, Epistle 9, “To Titus,” para. 2 (PG 3:1107).) that the same name is extended to signify the one participating in something, the participation itself, and the principle of the participation; for example, “fire” might name a man who has charity, the charity itself, and God who infuses that charity. And one should interpret these according to all such manners, but in diverse ways.

Exposition of the text

For if, they say, the same essence which is the Father is also the Son, then the same is father and son to himself. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).1.) This argument is as follows. The divine essence is one and the same reality; but the divine essence is the Father and the Son, as you say; therefore the same reality is Father and Son, and the same reality has begotten and has been begotten. The response to this is clearly to point out an equivocation on “reality”; (Since the word res (“reality,” “thing”) is not actually a part of the text Lombard gives, it may be more accurate to say the equivocation is based on the word idem (“same,” “same thing”).) for if “reality” is taken essentially, then the divine essence is one reality, and that reality neither begot not was begotten, nor is it father or son, if “father” and “son” are taken as adjectives. However, if “reality” is taken personally, then the divine essence is not one reality, but three realities, one of which is the begetter, the other the begotten, and the third the one who proceeds. But the essence is neither begetter, nor begotten, nor proceeding.

And they strive to defend their view by the testimony of Hilary. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).2.) Hilary’s intention in everything he says that is presented here is this. He wants to prove that the Father and the Son are of one nature, and to prove this he draws on the words of the Apostle in Romans 8 where he speaks of the spirit of the Father as the same as the spirit of the Son. (For example, Romans 8:9: but you are not in the flesh, you are in the Spirit, if the Spirit of God really dwells in you. Any one who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him.) The argument proceeds from this as follows: “spirit” is taken in two ways in the divine, since sometimes it is taken essentially, and signifies the divine nature—and in this sense it is sometimes used for the Father, at other times, for the Son, at still other times for the Holy Spirit—and at other times it is taken personally, and thereby signifies the reality of that nature, or the person of the Holy Spirit. Therefore in the Apostle’s words, “spirit of Christ” and that of the Father are taken essentially, for the nature, so that the sense is “spirit who is Christ and the Father.” And what is in the proposed matter plainly holds, that if there is one spirit of each, the nature is the same for each. Or if it is taken for the reality of the nature who is the Holy Spirit, then too the same thing is held—that the Holy Spirit is from the Father and the Son; but no reality of one nature is from diverse natures, so because the Holy Spirit is of one nature, because he is simple, the Father and the Son must not be of diverse natures.

And so distinguish, O heretic, the spirit of Christ from the spirit of God. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 8, paras. 21–22 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:252).) This is as if to say, distinguish them if you can distinguish them, for it is clear, on the authority of the Apostle, that one cannot distinguish them.

In the same way, God is not the same as that which is of God. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 8, paras. 21–22 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:252).) This can be read in two ways. In one way, it is, as it were, a certain reduction to the impossible, as if to say: “if it is this way in God as it is in created things, it would follow that what is of God is not God—which is impossible.” And this is how the Master interprets the text. Or it can be understood absolutely, and then he wishes to say that it is not the same in account. But he manifests . . . all of himself, that is, his perfect self, to be everywhere through his distinctive qualities, that is, through his virtue and power, which is everywhere, by which he contains all things. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).8, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 8, para. 24 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:253).)

Man . . . began to think that the same was true in the Creator as he had seen in creatures, from whom these names are applied in a metaphorical sense to the Creator. (Sent. I, 34.4(148).1.) The Apostle seems to speak against this: from whom every paternity in heaven and on earth is named (Eph 3:15); (RSV reads family instead of paternity.) so metaphors should rather be extended from God to created things. To this one should say that, as regards the reality being signified, “paternity” is by priority in God rather than in a creature, but as regards the mode of signifying through the name, which is imposed by us, it belongs by priority to the creature, and from there it has been extended to the Creator.