D. 32 - Comparison of the divine persons according to things proper or appropriated

Division of the text

After he has considered things proper and things appropriated to the persons, here he asks how the divine persons may be compared with each other according to things proper or appropriated. And this is divided into three parts: in the first, he shows how they may be compared according to things proper or appropriated to the Holy Spirit; in the second, he shows how they may be compared according to things proper or appropriated to the Son, at moreover, it is necessary to investigate with diligence whether the Father is wise by the wisdom which he generated; (Sent. I, 32.2(138).1.) in the third, he asks how they may be compared according to both together—that is, about one through comparison with the other, at moreover, it is to be noted with diligence. (Sent. I, 32.6(142).1.)

About the first he does two things: first, he raises the question; second, he considers it, at we shall limit our answer. (Sent. I, 32.1(137).2.)

Moreover, it is necessary to investigate with diligence. (Sent. I, 32.2(138).1.) Here he asks how they may be compared according to what is appropriated to the Son, namely, wisdom. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he raises the question, and determines the truth; in the second, he excludes a certain doubt occasioned by the determination, at after these matters, it is usual for some to ask whether the Son is wise by a begotten or an unbegotten wisdom. (Sent. I, 32.2(138).4.)

The first is divided in two: in the first, he asks whether the Father is wise by begotten or unbegotten wisdom, and determines it; in the second, he asks whether the Son is wise by begotten or unbegotten wisdom, first showing that he is not wise by begotten wisdom, but by unbegotten wisdom, and then showing that he is wise through begotten wisdom. And thereby the response to the question is evident through a distinction. For the ablative “by wisdom” can be taken with the bearing of an efficient principle; and thus the sense is that he is wise from begotten wisdom—and this is false. Or it can be taken with the bearing of a formal cause; and thus the sense is that he is wise through begotten wisdom formally, and this is true. And he shows this at from what is said above, it is established that the Son is not wise by himself, nor from himself. (Sent. I, 32.3(139).1.)

After these things, it is usual for some to ask whether there is only one wisdom of the Father. (Sent. I, 32.4(140).1.) Here he excludes a doubt arising from things said earlier. And about this he does three things: first, he raises the doubt; second, he presents the determination, at we reject such views and others like them as sophistical; (Sent. I, 32.4(140).3.) third, he manifests it through a likeness, at in the Trinity, there is the love which is Father and Son and Holy Spirit . . . and yet the Holy Spirit is a love which is not Father or Son, . . . in the same way, there is a wisdom in the Trinity which is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, . . . and yet the Son is a wisdom which is not the Father or the Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 32.5(141).1.)

Moreover, it is to be noted with diligence. (Sent. I, 32.6(142).1.) Here he asks about the one through comparison to another; and first he raises a question; second, he notes the difficulty of the question, leaving the question unresolved, at I confess that it is difficult for me to resolve this question. (Sent. I, 32.6(142).2.)

Here there are two questions:

first, about the things that pertain to the Holy Spirit; (Q. 1.)

second, about the things that pertain to the Son. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Those things that pertain to the Holy Spirit

About the first, three things are asked:

first, whether the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit;

second, whether the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit;

third, whether the Father and the Son love us by the Holy Spirit.

Article 1

Whether the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.37.2; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9, ad 13.) It seems that the Father does not love the Son by the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For just as to be and to be wise are the same thing for God, so too to be and to love are the same for God. But God the Father is not said to be in any way by the Holy Spirit. Therefore neither is he said to love in this way.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when one says, “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit,” the ablative (The phrase “by the Holy Spirit” translates Spiritu Sancto, a noun/adjective pair expressed in the ablative case.) must be taken with the bearing of some cause, either as though efficient, or as though formal. But every such construction can be resolved and explained through a preposition designating the bearing of a cause. Therefore it seems that the Father would love the Son either from the Holy Spirit, or through the Holy Spirit. But each of these seems to be false, since the Holy Spirit does not have any bearing of a principle with respect to the Father, as a preposition designates. Therefore it seems that this too is false: “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, this word “loves” either signifies an essential act or a notional act. If it is essential, since judgment about all essentials is the same, another essential act can be put in its place, such that the Father might be said to live by the Holy Spirit, or to understand or to will—which is false. But if it means a notional act, it does not indicate any notion other than common spiration. Therefore the verb “spirates” can be put in its place, such that the Father might be said to spirate the Holy Spirit by the Holy Spirit—which is false. Therefore so too the first is in every way false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every love by which persons love each other is a chain or bond uniting them. But the Holy Spirit cannot unite the Father and the Son, since everything that unites has some influx upon the things being united, as the thing making the union. Therefore it seems that the Father and Son do not love each other by the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, just as a man’s love proceeds from him, so too the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son as love. But one man loves another by the love that proceeds from him. Therefore also the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, who is the love proceeding from him. And this is the argument of Hugh of Saint Victor. (Hugh of Saint Victor (c. 1096–1141 AD), Eruditiones didascalicae, ch. 23 (PL 176:833). No letters written by Hugh of Saint Victor to Saint Bernard are extant, although Nicolaï believes the Latin reference is perhaps referring to a letter written by Richard of Saint Victor instead. See Richard of Saint Victor, Quomodo Spiritus Sanctus est amor Patris et Filii (PL 196:1012): animus humanus amor non est, sed ab ipso amor procedit, et ideo seipso non diligit, sed amore quia a seipso procedit. Pater vero amor est, et Spiritus Sanctus ejus amor est, et ideo Pater diligit seipso, diligit Spiritu Sancto. . . . Si recte diligere diceris amore qui de te procedit, cur Pater et Filius non recte dicantur diligere amore qui ex ipsis procedit?; “the human soul is not love, but love proceeds from it, and therefore it does not love by itself, but by the love that proceeds from it. But the Father is love, and the Holy Spirit is his love, and therefore the Father loves by his own self, that is, he loves by the Holy Spirit. . . . If you say correctly that you love by the love that proceeds from you, why would it not be correctly said that the Pater and the Son love by the loves that proceeds from them?”)

Furthermore, by every perfect love something is being loved. Therefore, if the Holy Spirit is perfect love—which is true—it seems that by him someone loves and someone is being loved. But these can be only the Father and the Son. Therefore the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit.

I answer that there are many opinions about this.

For some say that all statements of this sort are false, and that things like them were retracted by Augustine when he retracted his previous assertion that the Father is wise by begotten wisdom, as is clear in the little note in the text. (Sent. I, 32.2(13).3, quoting Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 26 (CCSL 57; PL 32:625).) But this does not seem fitting, since the things Augustine wished to retract he specifically expressed; and further, he did not retract the statements of others, but only his own. Whence, since he and all others commonly use such expressions, it seems presumptuous to deny them.

Therefore others say that they are indeed true, but improper, and to be expounded as follows: “the Father and the Son love each other by the Holy Spirit,” that is, by essential love, which is appropriated to the Holy Spirit. But this also does not seem fitting, since so also the Father would be said to be wise by the Son, that is by essential wisdom, which is appropriated to the Son, and he would be said to be good by the Holy Spirit for the same reason.

Therefore still others have said that it is true and proper; and of these the opinion is manifold. For some say that that ablative should be resolved as a preposition, so that the sense of “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit,” would be “through the Holy Spirit.” And then “through” denotes in the Holy Spirit his being under authority, the authority being in the Father and Son, like when one says, “the Father works through the Son.” But this does not seem fitting, since the preposition “through” designates the bearing of a cause within the causal thing to which it is joined, not with reference to the one acting, but only with reference to what is brought about. For the Son has causality in created things, even though he is not a principle of action within the Father; but when one says, “the Father loves the Son through the Holy Spirit,” no effect in created things is being denoted, nor anything of which the Holy Spirit is a principle. And therefore there is not a similar reason for speaking so.

And therefore some say that the ablative is construed with the bearing of a sign, and, as it were, of an effect. For just as the generation in a certain way has its terminus in the Son, so the spiration that is designated in love has its terminus in the Holy Spirit. Whence they interpret “the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit” as meaning “the Holy Spirit is the sign that the Father and Son love each other.” But this does not seem fitting, since created love is also a sign of the love by which the Father and Son love each other; and so in this way it would be said that the Father and Son love each other by a created love—which is false. Further, the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father, and something is loved by love formally, and so the Father loves by the Holy Spirit, also formally speaking.

And therefore others have said that that ablative is construed with the bearing of a form, since the Father and Son love formally by the love who is the Holy Spirit. But this also does not seem wholly sufficient, since a form does not denominate something unless it inheres in it; and so, since the Holy Spirit does not stand to the Father as inhering in him, but as subsisting through himself, it cannot be that he is like a form eliciting an act of love. And further, form has the account of a principle for that of which it is the form, whatever form it may be, either for substantial existence or incidental existence or a consequent action. And in this way the Holy Spirit would be the principle of something within the Father—which is false.

And therefore others have said, whose author seems to be Hugh of Saint Victor, noted above, (Hugh of Saint Victor, Eruditiones didascalicae, ch. 23 (PL 176:833).) that the ablative is construed with the bearing of, as it were, a formal effect, in the way that everything from a principle can be called an “effect” in a broad sense. For properly speaking, within the divine there is neither efficient cause nor effect; and what has the act of form in denominating can be called “formal.” And the sense is that the love who is the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and Son, by which God loves himself. Whence this opinion includes together the last two of the aforesaid opinions; whence it more perfectly contains the truth, and it seems that it should be accepted.

Nevertheless, to explain this one should be aware that there is a different mode of denomination according to the diverse nature of the genus. For certain genera according to their account signify as inhering—for example, quality, quantity, and such; and in them there arises no denomination except through an inhering form, which is a principle with respect to some existence, whether substantial or incidental. But certain things signify according to their account as from another being, and not as inhering, as is especially evident in action. For an action as action is signified as from an agent; and that the action is in the agent happens to it inasmuch as it is an accident. Whence in the genus of action, an agent’s accident is denominated through what is from it, and not through what is its principle, just as “agent” is said from action, yet the action is not the agent’s principle, but rather, vice versa. And if, assuming the impossible, some action were asserted as not being an accident, it would not inhere in the agent, and nevertheless it would denominate the agent, and then the agent would be denominated through what is from it and is not inhering in it. But since the principle of any action is some inhering form, therefore something can be called an “agent” in two ways: either by the action itself, which denominates the agent and is not its principle; or by a form that is the principle of action in the agent and in a certain respect a principle of the agent, like how we say fire moves upward by its proper motion, and by lightness.

With these things seen, it is quite evident how what was said should be conceded, and what it is that induced the doubt. For in the divine, “love” can be said either essentially, whereby it does not indicate the procession except according to account, or notionally, whereby it does indicate the real procession of love from the lover. And in each way “love” is found to be said in two ways: namely, as a quality, just as “love” signifies the habit of love in the lover; and as an activity, insofar as “love” signifies the act or passion of love in the lover.

Therefore, if love is taken essentially, when one says, “the Father loves the Son,” he will be said to love denominatively, by the love that is an essential act, and as by a principle of that act, by charity itself, which is the divine substance. However, if it is taken notionally, then, if “love” signifies the form that is a principle of this act, the Father will be said to love the Son by the very property that is the principle of the procession of the Holy Spirit, just as paternity is the principle of the generation of the Son. However, if “love” names the proceeding action itself, then the Father is said to love the Son by the love who is the Holy Spirit, or by the Holy Spirit—although this would not contain truth as expressly. And it is similar in other personal names that signify the person through the mode of an action, such as “word”; and therefore it is said that “the Father speaks by his Word.”

Reply Obj. 1: “To love,” insofar as it is taken essentially, is in all ways the same as “to be,” both with respect to the reality they signify and with respect to the mode of signifying, which in the divine is to signify absolutely. Whence taking “love” in this way, in no way does the Father love by the Holy Spirit. But if “to love” be taken notionally, it is not the same as “to be” for the Father according to the mode of signifying. For “to love” is said relatively, and “to be” is said absolutely, so it does not follow that he exists by the Holy Spirit, even though he loves by the Holy Spirit; this is just as he is the Father by paternity, but does not exist by paternity. But “to be wise” in the divine is never said except in reference to the essence, and therefore in no way can one say, “the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom.”

Reply Obj. 2: As was said in the body of the article, the personal love does not stand to the Father loving as a principle of the love, but rather as a denominating act. And therefore it is not construed with the bearing of any principle, nor with the bearing of a form insofar as a form is a principle, but only insofar as the form denominates the Father as loving, as when it is said, “that man is an agent by his action.” And therefore, since the propositions expressly indicate the bearing of a cause, the following is not so proper: “the Father loves the Son through the Holy Spirit,” as is this: “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit.” (In the Latin, the first sentence has a preposition (per, “through”), but the second sentence, instead making use of the ablative case, does not; because English is minimally inflected, we must use prepositions (“through” and “by”) in both sentences, so Aquinas’s distinction is less evident. However, even in English, the preposition “by,” which here translates the ablative case, is less concrete and determinate than “through,” so there is still a stronger claim (and diminished propriety) indicated by the use of the preposition “through.”) Although, even the former also can be conceded, insofar as it is a principle of denomination, but not simply speaking. However, “the Father loves from the Holy Spirit,” should in no way be conceded, since it signifies a principle through the mode of an efficient cause.

Reply Obj. 3: “Love” here does not signify an essential act, but a notional one. Nevertheless, one must know that two things are understood in the notional act which is loving: the act itself, and the act’s going out from the agent. And the act itself is the person of the Holy Spirit, but the emanation of the act from the agent is properly the notion, or the notional act, which is the procession. And therefore also the person of the Holy Spirit is not signified through an act designated by a verb (like “loving”), because a verb signifies an act as going out from an agent; rather, he is signified through an act designated by a noun that signifies the act absolutely, like “love” and “dilection.” However, “loving” properly signifies the notion, since “loving” is the same as “emitting love.” Whence in the verb “loving” is indicated both the act itself, who is a person—by reason of which according to that act the Father is denominated “loving” by the love who is the person of the Holy Spirit—and it also indicates the emission of the act, by reason of which it is notional. But this verb “to spirate” signifies the very emission of the act, and therefore the Father is not said to spirate by the Holy Spirit, but by the act or property of spiration. And it is similar with generation: for since “generation” signifies the emission of the generated, one does not say, “the Father generates by the Word.” But “to speak” signifies the emission of a word, and the word emitted, so one does say, “the Father speaks by the Word.” However, “word” names what is emitted, not the emission, so “word” is personal, as is “love”; and “to love” is notional, as is “to speak.”

Reply Obj. 4: “The Father and the Son are united by the Holy Spirit” is true, insofar as the Holy Spirit is the union itself, just as he is also the love by which they are formally united, as has been said, (In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 4.) as what proceeds from them, just as some persons are united in one act. Nevertheless it should not be simply conceded that the Spirit unites the Father and Son, since “to unite” signifies through the mode of something uniting effectively, which does not befit the Holy Spirit. Yet it can be conceded if “uniting” is understood formally, as whiteness is said to make something white.

Article 2

Whether the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the Father does not love himself by the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For “to love” indicates either the essential act or the notional act. If essential, it is common to the whole Trinity, and signifies the divine essence. Therefore he does not love himself essentially by the Holy Spirit.

However, if it signifies the essential act, then, on the contrary: no such act reflects back upon the one from whom it comes; for the Father does not generate himself. Therefore, if to love is a notional act, it seems that “the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit” is false.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the procession of the Holy Spirit according to the order of nature presupposes the generation of the Son, since the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. But whatever belongs to the Father according to his very self, can also belong to him without the generation of the Son understood. Therefore, since “to love himself” is said of the Father with respect to his very self, it seems that he does not love himself by the Holy Spirit; for then the Holy Spirit would be understood to proceed from the Father through the mode of love even without the existence of the Son.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, gratuitous love always tends into another, just as Gregory says that charity cannot be had between less than two. (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, hom. 17, para. 1 (CCSL 141:117; PL 76:1139).) But created charity has as an exemplar the uncreated charity, which is the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that the love whereby the Father loves himself is not the personal love, who is the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, by whatever love the Father loves himself, the Son and the Holy Spirit love themselves. Therefore, if the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit, then the Holy Spirit will also love himself by the Holy Spirit. But every love proceeds from the lover. Therefore the Holy Spirit proceeds from himself, which is incongruous. Therefore neither does the Father love himself by the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, the Father by the same love loves the Son and himself. But he loves the Son by the Holy Spirit. Therefore also he loves himself by the Holy Spirit.

Furthermore, just as “love” is proper to the Holy Spirit, so also “Word” is proper to the Son. But according to Anselm (Anselm, Monologion, cc. 32–33 (PL 158:185).) the Father speaks himself by the Word, that is, by that which is the Son. Therefore he also loves himself by the love proceeding from him, who is the Holy Spirit.

I answer that when one says, “the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit,” this can be understood of love pertaining to the essence or love pertaining to the notion. If it is understood of essential love, then just as neither does he love the Son by the Holy Spirit, nor does he love himself this way; rather, he loves himself and the Son by the essential charity and by an essential activity. However, if it is understood of notional love, then just as he loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, so also does he love himself this way; for “to love” taken notionally indicates nothing other than being the principle of the personal love who is the Holy Spirit. For the love signified through the mode of action denominates the Father from whom it arises, such that the Father might be said to love by the Holy Spirit.

And because the whole account of love that is in the Son is in the Father, and vice versa, from neither side can it be prevented that the Father would love his very self by the Holy Spirit—that is, neither from the side of the one spirating love, nor on the side of the lovable. For the Father himself, on the one side, is a sufficient principle of the Holy Spirit, and on the other side, there is within him a sufficient account of the lovable—and also in the Holy Spirit. Whence, just as the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit, so also he loves himself and the Holy Spirit by the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 1: This is understood of the notional act. But one should be aware that, since every such act indicates the account of a principle relative to the origin of a divine person, this happens in two ways: for sometimes it designates the account of a principle relative to that wherein the notional act reaches its terminus, as when one says, “the Father generates the Son.” For “to generate” indicates the bearing of a principle that is in the one generating relative to the one generated; and in such things no reciprocity can occur, such that one might say, “the Father generates himself”; for no person is a principle of his very self. But sometimes the bearing of a principle is not indicated relative to that into which the act passes; this is evident when one says, “the Father gives the essence to the Son”; for the Father is not being signified as the principle of the gift, which is the essence, but of the one to whom it is given. It is likewise with the word “to love,” which indicates the bearing of a principle—not of the one loving toward the beloved, but rather, of the one loving toward the love indicated in the word “loves.” And therefore in such things a reciprocity can occur, and this happens because the verb “to love” indicates not only the emission of love, but the emitted love itself. Whence, if one takes separately what pertains only to origin, there will be no conversion; for one cannot say, “the Father spirates himself.”

Reply Obj. 2: If there were no generation of the Son, the Father would not love himself by the Holy Spirit. For neither would he be the Father, since the person of the Father is constituted by paternity. Nevertheless, if, assuming the impossible, it were given that the person of the Father would remain, he would be able through himself to spirate personal love. Nevertheless the Son is not excluded from this, since every perfection of the Father is also that of the Son, in which they are not opposed according to relation of origin.

Reply Obj. 3: A gratuitous love, which reaches out to another, is not a private love. Nevertheless, it does also bend back upon the lover himself. For one should love out of charity not only one’s neighbor, but one ought to love out of charity even one’s very self, with respect to both soul and body. And so too the Father loves himself by the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 4: When one says, “the Holy Spirit loves himself by the Holy Spirit,” if it is understood of essential love, it is expressly true; for just as by his very self he is God, so by his very self he is essentially loving. However, if it is understood of the notional love, then in the verb “to love” is indicated an, as it were, double act: the very act of love, which signifies the person of the Holy Spirit and the emission of love. Whence “to love,” taken notionally, is nothing other than to spirate love. For by “to spirate” is signified the emission itself, but by “love” is signified the person of the Holy Spirit. So it is also if the Father were said to generate the Son. Whence just as to generate the Son does not befit the Son, so neither does to spirate love befit the Holy Spirit. Nor due to this is there some imperfection admitted in the Holy Spirit, or in the Son, as is clear from things said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 1; a. 2, resp. 1.) And therefore, according to this sense it is not conceded that the Holy Spirit loves notionally.

However, if one were to separate the act of origin, whereby it becomes notional, from the understanding of the verb “loves,” and there should remain only what is personal, that is, the love itself, in this way it would befit the Holy Spirit. For he proceeds as the subsistent action of love; whence the action itself is the one acting. And according to this, the Holy Spirit even by his very self would love his very self or the Father; and then “to love” would not indicate a real emission by the Holy Spirit, but only according to account; hence, this “to love” would not indicate something notional, but only the person signified in another way.

Whence this verb “to love” can be taken in three ways. It is taken either insofar as it signifies only the essence—and then it signifies a going-out, according to the account of the essential action, which is the essence itself, done by the divine essence. And in this way the Father does not love by the Holy Spirit, and neither do the Son and Holy Spirit. Or it is taken insofar as it names only the person of the Holy Spirit, and in this way too it signifies a going-out only according to reason; whence according to this “to love” belongs only to the Holy Spirit. But this manner of speaking is not the customary one. Or it signifies a real going-out; and then it indicates simultaneously the active notion and the person of the Holy Spirit; and then it belongs only to the Father and the Son.

Article 3

Whether the Father and the Son love us by the Holy Spirit

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the Father and the Son do not love us by the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For everything said about God connoting an effect in what is created, is essential. But when God is said to love a created thing, in “love” is connoted an effect in the created thing that he confers on it by loving it. Therefore it must be taken essentially. But it was said in the preceding article that the Father and the Son in no way love by the Holy Spirit, if “love” is taken essentially, since the Holy Spirit has no account of a principle as regards anything essential, neither by way of denomination nor in any other way. Therefore it seems that the Father and the Son do not love us by the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when one says, “the Father loves the Son by the Holy Spirit”—as was said above, according to the opinion of Hugh of Saint Victor (See a. 1; Hugh of Saint Victor, Eruditiones didascalicae, ch. 23 (PL 176:833).)—the ablative is construed with the bearing of an, as it were, formal effect. But in that comparison whereby God is paired with what is created, in no way does the Holy Spirit stand as an effect; rather, what is effected in the created thing is the effect. Therefore it seems that this same account of the truth cannot be preserved.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as love stands to the Holy Spirit, so too does generation to the Son. But the Father does not generate us by the Son; rather, he is said to regenerate us by the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that neither does he love us by the Holy Spirit.

On the contrary, John 17:22 says, that they may be one even as we are one. For he is not speaking there only about essential unity, since we not united to God in that way, but of unity of consonance, or of love, which is the Holy Spirit. Therefore it seems that just as the Father and Son love each other by the Holy Spirit, so also they love us.

Furthermore, just as Word is proper to the Son, so also love is proper to the Holy Spirit. But the Father speaks all creation by his Word; whence Augustine says, *he spoke, and they were made—*that is, he begot the Word in which it was that they might come to be. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 2; bk. 2, cc. 6, 8 (CSEL 28.1; PL 34:248; 34:268–69).) Therefore he loves creation by his own love, who is the Holy Spirit.

I answer that simply speaking the Father and the Son do love us by the Holy Spirit, as was expressly said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 1.) Nevertheless, to understand this one must note that the procession of the divine persons is a certain origin of the procession of created things; for everything that is first in any genus is the cause of the things that are after it. But nevertheless the effecting of created things is attributed to the common essence.

Whence one should say that when one says, “the Father and the Son love us by Holy Spirit,” the verb “love” can be taken essentially and notionally, and in either way the statement is true. For if it be taken essentially, then in the verb “love” will be designated the agency of the entire Trinity, and in the ablative (“by the Holy Spirit”) designating the person of the Holy Spirit will be designated the reason (Ratio is here translated as “reason,” since this translation is closest to the principal meaning of the word. The “reason” for something could also indicate a final cause, and ratio is like likely to have this connotation. As the reference to origo indicates in the next clause, “source” might also be a defensible translation, although it omits the connection to intellect.) for that agency—not based on the side of an efficient cause, but based on the side of the effects, the reason for and origin of which effects is the procession of the Holy Spirit, as is the Word as well. But properly speaking the Word is the reason for created things insofar as they go out from God through the mode of understanding. Whence it is said that the Father speaks all things by the Word, or by his art. But the Holy Spirit is the reason for them insofar as they go out from God through the freedom of will; and therefore he is said properly to love what is created by the Holy Spirit, and not by the Word.

However, if it is taken notionally, then it is also a true statement, but it has another account of truth. For the verb “love” will not indicate, from its principal intention, the bearing of an efficient cause with respect to what is created. Rather, principally it will denote the reason for this agency on the side of the effects, and as a consequence it will give one the understanding of the bearing of agency, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 30, q. 1, a. 3.) And then the meaning of “the Father loves the created by the Holy Spirit” is that he spirates the personal love, which is the reason for every liberal giving made by God to what is created.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said in the body of the article, it can be taken in either way. For if it is taken essentially, nothing unfitting follows; for the Holy Spirit will not designate a principle of those loving, but of those being loved. Whence then the bearing of the substantive ablative will be designated in the ablative itself, as Praepositinus says. (Peter Praepositinus (or Praepositivus) of Cremona was an early 13th century theologian.) However, if it is taken notionally, the nominative will be able to connote an effect in what is created in the manner of an orientation toward a terminus, as was said above. (Above, d. 30, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: In the production of works of art one can consider a dual process: first, that of the art itself from the artist, which comes forth from his own heart; and second, the process of the works of art out from the discovered art itself. In the same way, in the process of the will there are two things to consider: namely, the love’s going out from the lover, and second, the going out of the very reality given by love from the love. Whence, with respect to the first going out, the Holy Spirit stands, in the comparison of God to what is created, as an effect—that is, what is from a principle, as does the Word. But with respect to the second going out, both—that is, the Word and the love—stand as a principle, whereas what is created stands as the effect.

Reply Obj. 3: This verb “generates” indicates only the origin of a person, and does not indicate a person through the mode of act, whereas “to love” and “to speak” indicate both. And therefore the Father is not denominated as “generator” by the Son, but by the generation, whereas he is denominated “lover” by the Love who is the Holy Spirit. But the generation by which he regenerates us is not through the divine nature, but through his will; and therefore on our side as receiving it, the Holy Spirit is the reason for such a generation more than the Son, who proceeds through the mode of nature.

Question 2

Those things that pertain to the Son

Next one asks about things that pertain to the Son. With regard to this, two things are asked:

first, whether the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom;

second, whether the Son himself is wise by begotten wisdom or by unbegotten.

Article 1

Whether the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom. (See ST I.37.2; I.39.1, ad 2; I.28.2.)

Obj. 1: For everyone wise is called “wise” by his own wisdom. But the Son is the wisdom of the Father, who is unbegotten Wisdom. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everyone wise is wise by that wisdom without which he would not be wise. But without the Son the Father would not be wise, as Augustine said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 9, division and exposition of the text; Sent. I, 9.2(30).4, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:923).) Therefore it seems that the Father is wise by the Son, or begotten wisdom.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, by that wisdom someone is called “wise” wherein he sees the things that he knows. But above, Augustine said, God sees all things there, (Above: d. 31.) that is, in the Word. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, God would not be called “wise” unless he were to see his very self. But he sees himself in the Son, just as a reality is seen in its image. Therefore it seems that he is wise by the Son, or begotten wisdom.

On the contrary, Augustine says otherwise in the text. (Sent. I, 32.2(138).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:933).)

I answer that, although the Father speaks himself by his own Word, in no way should one grant that he is wise by the begotten wisdom. This is so on account of the diverse mode of signifying in the two. For “word” signifies through the mode of an action, which denominates that from which it proceeds, that is, the one acting; whence the Father is denominated “speaker” by the begotten Word, just as he is denominated “lover” by the proceeding love. But “wisdom” is signified through the mode of a form remaining in the one to whom it belongs; whence someone cannot be denominated “wise” except through what is in him himself, and not through what is from him.

Now, whatever is signified as being in something through the mode of form, whether substantial or incidental, is signified as a principle of something in it. For a substantial form is the principle of substantial existence, and incidental form gives a sort of existence, that is, incidental existence, and each principle belongs to that wherein it exists. However, since the Son has no account of a principle relative to the Father, one cannot say that the Father is wise by the Son, or by begotten wisdom.

Reply Obj. 1: “The wisdom of the Father” is spoken of in two ways: namely, the wisdom that is within him, which is essential wisdom—and by this formally he is wise, just as anyone is denominated “wise” by the wisdom that is in him; and that is also called the “wisdom of the Father” that proceeds from the Father—and by this he is not denominated “wise,” just as neither is a man denominated “wise” by the wisdom that he produces in another by teaching him.

Reply Obj. 2: In that argument against the heretic, Augustine is talking about the essential wisdom, without which the Father would not be wise, according to which the Apostle has appropriated it to the Son: Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God (1 Cor 1:24). And wisdom in an appropriated account would not exist if the Son were not to exist. This is why the Son must be coeternal with the Father, as is also the wisdom appropriated to the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: “To see something in something” is spoken of in two ways. In one way, one receives knowledge of it in that, just as the intellect receives science in sensible things, or the potential intellect in the light of the agent intellect, or the student in the spoken or written word of the teacher. But in the other way, one beholds the reality being known represented in another, as the builder sees his own art in the house that he makes, or as someone sees what he knows in a book where it has been written. Therefore, in the first way, the Father sees nothing in the Son, since he does not receive knowledge from the Son. But in the second way he does, namely, since he himself has placed the reasons for all created things in his own Word by generating him.

Reply Obj. 4: Some say that, although the Father does see what is created within the Word, still he does not see himself there; on the contrary, in himself he sees himself. Nonetheless, I do not see a reason why—just as in the aforesaid way he sees what is created within the Word, which shines forth there—he would not much more see his very self, who is most perfectly represented in the Word. And in this way too it is not unfitting that in that mode he would see himself in what is created, which is representative of the divine goodness itself by an image or vestige. Nonetheless it does not follow that the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom.

Article 2

Whether the Son is wise by the begotten wisdom and by the unbegotten wisdom

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that the Son is not wise by the begotten wisdom.

Obj. 1: For the Son is not wise by anyone other than the Father, neither is he God by something other. But the Father is wise by the essential wisdom. Therefore the Son is also wise by the essential wisdom.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the wisdom whereby someone is denominated “wise” has a certain account of a principle with respect to the wise person himself. But the Son is in no way a principle of his very self. Therefore it seems that he is not wise by the begotten wisdom.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as the Master said above, (Sent. I, 32.4(140).3.) the begotten wisdom is the very hypostasis of the Son. But a hypostasis is not signified through the mode of form. Therefore, since denomination arises from form, it seems that he cannot be called “wise” by the begotten wisdom.

On the contrary (4), everything that is not wise through itself is wise only incidentally. But the Son is not wise incidentally. Therefore he is wise through himself. But he is the begotten wisdom. Therefore he is wise by the begotten wisdom.

Quaestiuncula 2

It is further asked whether he is wise by the unbegotten wisdom, and it seems not.

Obj. 1: For the wisdom by which someone is denominated “wise” is signified as being in the wise person through the mode of an inhering form. Now, the Father is not in the Son in this way, just as neither is the latter in the former. Therefore, just as the Father is not called “wise” by the begotten wisdom, neither is the Son by the unbegotten wisdom.

On the contrary, everyone wise is called “wise” by that wisdom due to which he is wise. But the Son is wise due to the Father, who is the unbegotten Wisdom. Therefore the Son is wise by the unbegotten Wisdom.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that these prepositions “from” and “through” differ in that “from” designates only the bearing of a principle in the mode of efficient causality, but “through” designates the bearing of a principle according to any genus of cause. Whence, everything that is from something is also through it, but not vice versa. However, in the divine there can only be a bearing according to two genera of causality: only one of which is a real bearing, that is, in the mode of an efficient or originating cause, as the Father is called “the principle of the Son”; and the other bearing of a principle can be designated in the divine only according to reason, and not really, that is, the bearing of form, as when we say, “the Father is God through his Godhead.”

Therefore when one says, “the Son is wise by the begotten wisdom,” this ablative (Sapientia is in the ablative case.) can be construed only in a certain bearing of, as it were, an efficient cause. And in this way, it is false, for the meaning is that the Son is wise due to the begotten wisdom, and therefore he is wise due to his very self—which is false. For like with his being, so too he has being wise from the Father, who is the unbegotten Wisdom. Whence in this way he is called “wise” from the unbegotten Wisdom, or through the unbegotten Wisdom—if “through” is designating the bearing of an efficient cause; and similarly he is wise from the unbegotten Wisdom, but not from himself, or through himself, or by his very self.

Or the ablative is construed in the bearing of, as it were, a formal cause. But this happens in two ways: for what follows on the form of any reality can be said to be something through that form, just as a man is said to understand through his soul; or through what has the form, as we say that a man is rational through himself, because through what belongs to his essence, that is, through the rational soul. For according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.18, 1022a26.) “through itself” signifies what is through a thing’s essence.

Therefore if one were to consider that by which the Son is formally wise, this is the essential wisdom, which is neither begotten nor unbegotten. And in this way through it and by it he is called “wise,” but in no way is he so from it, because the essence does not generate. But if one were to consider the one who has the form that is the hypostasis of the Son, which is also called the begotten Wisdom, then in this way he is called “wise” through the begotten Wisdom or through himself, that is, by the begotten Wisdom or by his very self.

Reply Obj. 1: Wisdom insofar as it supposes the divine essence cannot be called “unbegotten” or “begotten,” but insofar as it supposes a hypostasis it can. Nevertheless it always signifies the essence, just as even the name “God” does. And this is why the name “wisdom” can have such supposition more than the name “essence,” as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 2.) And then, even though it is the same essence that is the Father and the Son, yet it is not the same hypostasis. And in this way, it does not follow that the Father is wise by the begotten wisdom, but only the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: In things that are said through themselves, there is something receiving from the thing’s essence that is the principle of what is being predicated through itself: for example, “rational” said of a man. Nor is it necessary that the supposit itself, of which something is being said through itself, is the principle of it, except as the one possessing or acting, as when a certain action is said to be of a thing through itself. In this way it is not even necessary that the very hypostasis of the Son be the principle of its very self, but only that what his essence is, or what is of his essence, be a formal principle of his being wise. And this befits the Son, since through his own essence, which he holds in common with the Father, he is wise. And therefore he is wise through himself.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby the reply to the third objection is clear.

Reply Sed Contra 4: We concede the fourth argument.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To what is further asked, one should say that the Son is wise by the unbegotten wisdom, if the ablative (“By the unbegotten wisdom” translates sapientia ingenita, which is in the ablative case.) is construed in the bearing of, as it were, an efficient principle, but not if it is construed in the bearing of, as it were, a formal principle; rather, in this way he is wise by the essential wisdom, or by his very self.

Exposition of the text

Some say that this can be understood in different ways. (Sent. I, 32.3(139).2.) Right away the reason for these opinions is clear, because the first ones took this preposition “through” insofar as it commonly designates the bearing of any principle whatsoever, but the others took it insofar as it is, as it were, divided against the preposition “from,” which designates the bearing of an efficient principle. Whence in this sense in the divine the preposition “through” designates the bearing of, as it were, a form; and in this way it was simply conceded that the Son is wise through himself.

This is the truth of nature against which you speak. (Sent. I, 32.3(139).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 9, para. 48 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:319). The Silano translation reads unity instead of truth.) In these words Hilary intends to show that the Son does not act from himself, but acts through himself, based on two authorities. The first of which is John 14:10: the Father who dwells in me does his works, from which he concludes that he does not act from himself, but from the Father dwelling in him. The second is John 8:29: I always do what is pleasing to him, from which he concludes that the Son himself acts through his very self; whence he adds, he would be weak in not acting by himself, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 9, para. 48 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:319).) that is, with his not acting from his very self it would follow that he would be weak, unless he receive this from God, (The Silano translation here reads: if he did not act that way, perhaps based on another manuscript of the Sentences.) that is, unless he were to have it from God the Father that he himself acts as a hypostasis subsisting through itself and acting through itself.

After these things, it is usual for someone to ask whether there is only one wisdom of the Father. (Sent. I, 32.4(140).1.) For the same reason the begotten wisdom and the unbegotten wisdom, by which God is begotten and God is unbegotten, are one God. For on account of the community of the form signified—that is, the community of Godhead and wisdom—he is called “one God” and “one wisdom.” But on account of the distinction of the hypostases subsisting in the Godhead and wisdom, he is called “begotten Wisdom” and “unbegotten Wisdom.”

In the Trinity, there is the love which is Father and Son and Holy Spirit, (Sent. I, 32.5(141).1.) and so on. The reason for this is that the personal combined with the essential does not indicate a number, since a person is not distinguished from the essence really, as will be clear below. (Below, d. 33, q. 1, a. 1.)