D. 31 - Appropriations of the divine persons

Division of the text

Having considered things proper to the persons, here he considers things that are appropriated to them. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines what things are appropriated to the persons; in the second, he asks how the divine persons are compared to each other according to those appropriations, in Distinction 32: here arises a question. (Sent. I, 32.1(137).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: first, he considers the significations of certain names that are appropriated to the divine persons; in the second, he treats the diverse appropriations offered by saints, at nor should we here pass over. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).1.)

As regards the first, he does three things: first, he asks about the signification of the name “equality”; second, about “like” and “likeness,” at we say the same also concerning like and likeness; (Sent. I, 31.1(131).3.) third, based on what was said, he approves of the opinion of some, at hence it seems to some, not unlearnedly, that by the name ‘equality’ or ‘likeness,’ there is not the assertion of something, but its removal. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).4.)

Nor should we here pass over. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).1.) Here he presents the names appropriated to the persons. It is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents Hilary’s appropriation; in the second, he presents Augustine’s appropriation, at it is also necessary for it to be known. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).9.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he presents Hilary’s appropriation, along with Augustine’s interpretation; second, the Master removes certain doubts about Augustine’s interpretation, at for according to the aforesaid exposition, the properties of the three persons set out earlier are not differentiated there. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).4.)

It is also necessary for it to be known. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).9.) Here he presents Augustine’s appropriation. Regarding this, he does two things: first, he lays out the appropriation; second, he inquires into the reason for the appropriation, at but many are troubled that he attributes unity to the Father and equality to the Son. (Sent. I, 31.3(133).1.)

And regarding the latter he does three things: first, he shows why unity is appropriated to the Father; second, why equality is appropriated to the Son, at now let us see why equality is said to be in the Son; (Sent. I, 31.5(135).1.) third, why connection is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, at the concord of the two . . . will be easier for us to understand. (Sent. I, 31.6(136).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he asks why unity is appropriated to the Father; second, he asks how unity is predicated in the neuter or in the masculine gender in the divine, at here is it necessary to say that the Father and Son and Holy Spirit are rightly said to be one thing, and one God. (Sent. I, 31.4(134).1.)

Here four questions are asked:

first, about equality; (Q. 1, a. 1.)

second, about appropriation generally; (Q. 1, a. 2.)

third, about the reason for Hilary’s appropriation; (Q. 2.)

fourth, about Augustine’s appropriation. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

Equality and appropriation

Article 1

Whether equality asserts something in the divine

As regards the first, having supposed the things said earlier about equality, one asks whether “equality” asserts anything in the divine. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.42.1.) It seems that it does.

Obj. 1: For whatever is in God and created things is nobler in God than in the created. But “equality” and “likeness” assert something in what is created. Therefore so too in God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Arius was condemned because he denied the equality of the persons. Now, he was not a heretic except because he denied something that is in God. Therefore “equality” predicates something assertively in God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, equality seems to be the one non-differing essence in the three persons, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).3; more precisely, Lombard says that “likeness” is the non-differing essence (similitudo vero est indifferens essentia).) But the non-differing essence is assertively something in God. Therefore it seems that so is equality.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, equality is a certain relation. But relation predicates something assertively, and not privatively. Therefore it seems that equality would predicate something assertively.

On the contrary, the Master says otherwise in the text. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).4.)

Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.5, 1056a17.) that the equal is opposed to the great and small as two privations. Whence the equal is also defined through privation. But a privation predicates nothing assertively. Therefore neither does equality.

I answer that equality is a certain relation founded on the unity of quantity—and in the divine, founded on the unity of essence insofar as it is signified with a name of virtual quantity, as when either eternity or power is spoken of as a “magnitude.” (Or “greatness.”) Whence it is fitting to speak of equality in two ways: either in reference to the unity of the quantity, which is its cause; or in reference to the consequent relation.

If it is spoken of in reference to the unity of the quantity on which this relation is founded, then its account consists in a privation, as does the account of the unity, as has been said before. (Above, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3.) And this is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.5, 1056a17; 10.4, 1055b28.) that the equal is opposed in a privative way to the great and the small, as is the one to the many. And the same thing is implied in the text. However, if equality be considered in reference to relation, then equality in created things really asserts something in each extreme, but in the divine persons it asserts nothing, except according to account.

The reason for this is that if it were to assert some real relation in the persons, then either this would be on the side of the essence, which is common, or on the side of the relations, by which they are distinguished. Now, it does not have it to be a real relation from the side of the essence, since the essence is numerically one and the same, and the same thing is not referred to its very self by any real relation, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.) Nor is this the case from the side of the persons constituted by the relations, since a relation is not itself referred through any intermediate real relation, since otherwise this would have to go to infinity. And therefore I say with the Master that “equality” does not assert anything but relation according to name, or according to account, when it is said of God; but it is true that it does assert something, the unity of the essence—not that this belongs to its concept, but it is presupposed to its concept, as is the case in privative names, and in names said of God from time.

Reply Obj. 1: On the side of unity, taken universally, insofar as it is convertible with being, “equality” predicates something in a positive way neither in God nor in what is created. This is just as neither does “unity,” as was said earlier. (Above, d. 24, q. 1, a. 3.) But because in created things the supposits of equality are absolute, therefore they are referred to each other through a real intermediate relation—which is not fitting in the divine.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the equality is according to account, yet the relation of the persons has something corresponding to it in the reality, by reason of which he who denies the equality is called a heretic. And this is the same as for one who might deny God to be the Lord, even though that relation asserts no reality in God.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as in created things equality is not one quantity of many things, but rather a relation including such a unity, so too equality in the divine is not the one essence, but a relation, according to its concept, following on the unity of the essence.

Reply Obj. 4: That relation cannot really be in God, and therefore it does not follow that it asserts something merely from the fact that it is spoken of relatively.

Article 2

Whether the essential attributes of this sort ought to be appropriated to the persons

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.39.7; On Truth, q. 7, a. 3.) It seems that essential attributes of this sort should not be appropriated to the divine persons.

Obj. 1: For what is common to several ought not to be appropriated to any one of them. But all the essential attributes are common to the three persons. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, of like things the judgment is the same. But all these attributes signify the common essence. Therefore it seems that all of them should be appropriated, or else none of them, and that all of them should be appropriated to one person.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is appropriated according to account follows what is proper to a person, since the proper falls within the account of what is appropriated. But the essential attributes do not follow on things proper according to their concept. For they can be understood without understanding the personal properties, as is the case with those outside the faith. Therefore they should not be called “appropriated.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, we should do nothing that can incline one toward an error of faith. But if something common is appropriated to one person, it can incline one to an error of faith, such that one might believe that either it belongs to only that person, or to that person more so. Therefore we should not appropriate essential attributes to persons.

On the contrary, there is the authority of Hilary and Augustine, noted in the text. (Sent. I, 31.2(132)–6(136).)

Furthermore, the processions of the persons are distinguished and named according to the diverse accounts of the attributes, insofar as we say that the Holy Spirit proceeds through the mode of will, and the Son through the mode of nature. Therefore one attribute that the account of a person’s procession befits can also be appropriated to that person.

I answer that it is fitting to speak in two ways about appropriation: either from our side, or from the side of the reality itself—and a fittingness is found in both ways.

For although the essential attributes are common to the three, still one, according to its own account, has a greater likeness to what is proper to one person than to another, and so it can fittingly be appropriated to that person. For example, “power” in its own account contains “principle,” so it is appropriated to the Father, who is the principle without a principle; “wisdom” is appropriated to the Son, who proceeds as a word; and “goodness” to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as love, the object of which is the good. And so too the likeness of what is appropriated to what is proper to a person causes the fittingness of the appropriation on the side of reality, which would be the case even if we did not exist. But on our side the consequent utility causes its fittingness.

Distinction and order is found in the divine attributes and in the persons, but in different ways. For in the persons the distinction and order is real, whereas in the attributes it is according to account. Whence, even though we cannot sufficiently come to what is proper to the persons through the attributes, nonetheless we do observe within the appropriated attributes a certain likeness of the persons, and thus such appropriation is valuable for a certain manifestation of the faith, albeit an imperfect one. This is like how a certain persuasive path is drawn even from a vestige and image in order to manifest the persons.

Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that any attribute belongs to all of them it is sufficiently proved that it is not proper to one person; yet it does not follow that it is not appropriated to one person. For this preposition “to” (ad), which enters into the composition of the word, (Appropriatum: ad + propriatum.) denotes an approach along with a certain distance. Whence, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Retractions, bk. 1, ch. 26 (CCSL 57; PL 32:626).) man, who so imitates God that there is always found a distance of unlikeness, is called both the “image” and “to the image” of God; on the other hand, the Son, who imitates the Father without any unlikeness, is called the “image” and not “to the image.” On account of this, because essential attributes of this sort approach, through a likeness, to the account of properties and remain distant from them because of their community, they are rightly called “appropriated.”

Reply Obj. 2: Although all of the essential attributes are one in reality, nonetheless they differ in account, and according to their account they have a likeness—either to the origin of the persons, like “power,” which is the principle of bringing things forth, or to the determinate mode of origin, like “goodness” to the procession of love, and “wisdom” to the procession of a word. And thus such can be appropriated to diverse persons. But “essence” from its own account signifies neither origin nor anything pertaining to the mode of an origin. And therefore it is not appropriated.

Reply Obj. 3: What is appropriated can be taken in two ways: either materially, that is, that which is being appropriated—and in this way that attribute does not follow on the account of the property; or formally, that is, insofar as it is being appropriated—and in this way it includes within its own proper account the account of the property.

Reply Obj. 4: By appropriating essential attributes to determinate persons, we do not exclude the other persons, nor do we establish a gradation of participation. Rather, we merely show a likeness in the account of what is appropriated to what is proper to the person, and no error follows from this.

Question 2

The reason for Hilary’s appropriation

As regards the third, two things are asked about:

first, the reason for Hilary’s appropriation; (Q. 2.)

second, Augustine’s explanation when he says that the image is co-equal with him of whom he is the image, (Q. 3.) but not the converse—whether in the divine there is mutual equality; but this latter was considered above. (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 2.)

Article 1

Whether Hilary suitably appropriates eternity to the Father, species to the Son, use to the Holy Spirit

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 14, exposition of the text; d. 34, q. 2; d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5; ST I.39.8; On Truth, q. 1, a. 7; q. 7, a. 3; Commentary on Romans, ch. 11, lect. 5; Commentary on 2 Corinthians, ch. 13, lect. 3.) It seems that Hilary’s appropriation is unsuitable.

Obj. 1: For according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) appropriations of this sort occur for the sake of excluding error; thus, power is appropriated to the Father lest he be believed to be weak, as is the case with our own fathers, on account of their old age. But no one has erred about the eternity of the Father, the way Arius has about the eternity of the Son. Therefore eternity should be appropriated more to the Son than to the Father. (Hilary appropriates “eternity” (aeternitas), “form” (species), and “use” (usus) to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, respectively; see Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 1 (CCSL 62; PL 10:51).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, with equivocals, one does not attend to any likeness. But “eternity” removes a principle of duration, whereas “innascibility” removes a principle of origin. Therefore, since appropriations arise according to their likeness with personal properties, it seems that eternity should not be attributed to the Father, because he is innascible.

Obj. 3: You might say that “eternity” is appropriated to the Father because it indicates a property of the Father as a consequence, that is, innascibility, even though it principally signifies the divine essence.

On the contrary, whenever a notional name is added to an essential one, the whole cannot be predicated of the person to whom that notion does not belong; for example, “God begotten” is not predicated of the Father. Therefore, if eternity in some way were to include innascibility in its concept, then in no way would it befit the Son, which belongs to the Arian impiety.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 7 (PG 3:702).) the beautiful and the good follow on each other. Whence it seems that all things desire the beautiful and the good; this is also why, according to the name in Greek, they are very close, since the good is called kalos and the beautiful kallos. (To be more precise, the adjective kallos (κάλλος) may be translated as “noble, good, beautiful,” and so the adverb kalos (καλώς) may then be translated as “nobly, well, beautifully”; but in fact, this strengthens Aquinas’s point.) But “goodness” is not appropriated to the Son, but to the Holy Spirit. Therefore neither should “form” or “beauty” be.

Obj. 5: To use something is to employ something to obtain that which one should enjoy. But the Holy Spirit is himself the enjoyable itself, and is not employed for something else as for an end. Therefore “use” should not be appropriated to him.

I answer that, in Hilary’s appropriation, three proper names of the persons are presented: “Father,” “image,” and “reward” or “gift”—this is clear from things said before (In I Sent., d. 8. q. 1, a. 1.)—and three names are appropriated: “eternity,” which he says in the Father as appropriated to him; “species,” that is “beauty,” which he says is in the image, that is, in the Son, who is properly the image, as was treated above; (Above, d. 28, q. 2, a. 3.) and “use,” which he says is in the reward, that is, in the Holy Spirit, who is the gift.

Now, the reason for this sort of appropriation is the following. Eternity has in its account two elements. The first is that it is the principle of every duration insofar as it is the first measure; this is why from it flows both aeviternity and time. And so it has a likeness to things proper to the Father, which belong to him insofar as he is the principle, whether through generation or spiration—that is, a likeness to paternity and common spiration. It also has in its account the privation of its own principle, and in this it agrees with a property of the Father that belongs to him insofar as he is the source and is not from a principle—that is, with innascibility.

Now, two things come together for the account of beauty, according to Dionysius (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:702).)—namely, consonance and clarity. For he says that God is the cause of every beauty insofar as he is the cause of consonance and clarity, just as we call people beautiful who have proportionate members and brilliant color. To these two the Philosopher adds (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 4.3, 1123b8.) a third, when he says that beauty is only in a sizeable body; this is why small people can be called commensurate and comely, but not beautiful.

And according to these three things, beauty belongs with things proper to the Son. For insofar as the Son is the perfect image of the Father, so perfect consonance is there; for he is equal to and like him without any inequality and unlikeness. And Augustine touches on this when he says, where the agreement is so great, that is the greatest and first equality and first likeness. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) Indeed, insofar as he is a true Son, he has the perfect nature of the Father, and so too he has the magnitude that consists in the perfection of the divine nature, as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 1, a. 2.) Whence Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931); though he actually says, “first and greatest life” (prima et summa vita).) that here is the perfect and greatest life. But insofar as he is the Father’s perfect Word, he has the clarity that radiates over all things and in which all things shine forth. Whence Augustine says that he is as perfect a Word as could be.

The whole of this can even be taken from Augustine’s words respecting the account of consonance, wherein three things can be considered: that is, his consonance with the Father, to whom he is equal and like in all things; Augustine touches on this where he says, first equality. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) Moreover, one can consider his consonance with his very self, insofar as all the attributes in him are not different, but rather one; he touches on this where he says, for whom it is not one thing to be alive and another to be, but rather it is the same thing to be and to live. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) Moreover, one can consider his consonance in relation to created things, the accounts of which are within him, and are one in him, just as he himself is one with the Father; he touches on this where he says, and all things are one in it, as it itself is One from One, and with One. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).)

Use also has two elements from its own account. The first is that it is drawn into the faculty of the will, and in this way it belongs to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is love; Augustine touches on this when he says, therefore that love, delight, happiness or beauty . . . in the Trinity is the Holy Spirit. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:932).) It also contains the idea that one thing is ordered to another, and even this order befits the Holy Spirit, insofar as the very Love who is the Holy Spirit is not only in the Son, but overflows to all created things, insofar as the name “gift” befits him; Augustine touches on this when he says, he is flooding all created things with his vast largess and abundance for the sake of their capture. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:932).)

Reply Obj. 1: There is a single and decisive reason for appropriation—the likeness to the property, as was said in the body; but there can be many consequent advantages, one of which Augustine is touching upon. Whence it cannot be concluded from this that something should be appropriated to the Father or the Son unless the decisive reason applies.

Reply Obj. 2: In equivocals that occur by luck or chance, like “dog,” (Aquinas uses this example frequently. The reference here is to the equivocal uses of the name for the domesticated animal and the constellation Canis Major (“the Great Dog”), the brightest star of which, Sirus Major, is also called the “Dog” or “Dog Star.”) no likeness is attended to. But in equivocals that are said with respect to one principle, one does attend to a certain likeness of analogy or proportion. And such is the multiplicity of this name “principle”; this is why the Philosopher also teaches (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.1, 1013a19.) one to trace back all such to one first principle.

Reply Obj. 3: Nothing in that argument is valid.

Reply Obj. 4: Beauty does not have the account of the desirable except insofar as it takes on the account of the good; for in this way even the true is desirable. But according to its own proper account it does contain clarity and the things said, which have a likeness with things proper to the Son.

Reply Obj. 5: “Use,” as was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 2.) is taken in two ways: commonly, insofar as to use is to draw something into the faculty of the will; and strictly, insofar as it signifies a relation to an end. And it is being taken in the first way here, whereby it contains within itself even enjoyment; hence, here it is said that happiness or beatitude pertains to use. Nonetheless it fits the proper sense as well insofar as it has the account of order, but not an order into an end but into an effect, wherein the divine goodness is poured out in abundance by the Holy Spirit.

Question 3

Augustine’s appropriation

As regards the fourth, two things are asked about:

first, about the reason for Augustine’s appropriation; (Augustine appropriates the names, “unity,” “equality,” and “concord” (concordia), to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, respectively. He explains: tria haec unum omnia propter Patrem, aequalia omnia propter Filium, connexa omnia propter Spiritum Sanctum; “all three are one because of the Father, all are equal on account of the Son, and all are bound together (connexa) on account of the Holy Spirit”; see On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32; PL 34:21).)

second, about his saying that all are one on account of the Father.

Article 1

Whether Augustine suitably appropriates unity to the Father, equality to the Son, and binding to the Holy Spirit

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 14, exposition of the text; d. 34, q. 2; d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad 5; ST I.39.8; On Truth, q. 1, a. 7; q. 7, a. 3; Commentary on Romans, ch. 11, lect. 5; Commentary on 2 Corinthians, ch. 13, lect. 3.) It seems that Augustine’s appropriation is not suitable.

Obj. 1: For above it was said (In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 3.) that the Holy Spirit is the unity of the two. Therefore it seems that “unity” would not be appropriated to the Father, but to the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, appropriation is according to a likeness with something proper. Therefore unity should be appropriated to the person in which the least plurality is found. But the greatest plurality of notions is found in the Father, who has three notions, whereas the least is in the Holy Spirit, who has only one. Therefore “unity” should be appropriated to the Holy Spirit, not to the Father.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, unity is the cause of equality. Therefore, if “unity” be appropriated to the Father, then “equality” should also be appropriated to him, and not to the Son.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, likeness, rather than equality, is viewed according to agreement in nature or in form. But the Son, as begotten by the Father, has the nature and form of the Father; similarly, “image” and “word” have a likeness with that relative to which they are said. Therefore “likeness” more than “equality” should be appropriated to the Son.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, “binding” is said properly of the Holy Spirit. But “eternity” and “equality” are not said properly of the Father and the Son. Therefore it seems that the appropriation is not uniform.

I answer that Augustine’s appropriation is good, and the reason for the appropriation is as follows. “Unity,” insofar as it is said in a positive way, has the account of a principle insofar as it is the principle of number. Thus, it has a likeness with two properties of the Father: paternity and common spiration, whereby he is called the principle of the Son and the Holy Spirit. However, insofar as its account consists in a negation, so does it negate division, and consequently a preexisting composition; in this way it negates the account of a principle, since that in which something is divided has principles integrating it as a whole. And in this way unity has a likeness with innascibility just as it does with eternity, as the Master says. (Sent. I, 31.3(133).1.)

Similarly, too, “equality” belongs to the Son according to the mode proper to his procession, as is clear in all the personal names of the Son himself. For from this, the Son is said to receive an equal, and the same, nature that his begetter has; likewise too “image” includes within itself the account of equality, as does “perfect Word.”

In this way “binding” also belongs to the Holy Spirit, from the mode of his procession insofar as he is the Love of the Father and the Son, by which they are united; and he is also binding us to God, insofar as he is the gift.

Reply Obj. 1: The united and the one are different, since the united is what is made one from many. Whence “union” indicates a certain relation of several things insofar as they come together in one. But the “one” is said in an absolute way. This is why it is said that “unity,” insofar as it is used for the union of the many in one love, is attributed to the Holy Spirit. However insofar as “unity” is taken absolutely, inasmuch as it is a principle, it has a likeness with what is proper to the Father, so it is appropriated to the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: The three notions in the Father are not three realities, but three accounts that make him known. Whence the plurality of notions does not impede “unity” being appropriated to him, and especially since the account of unity has a likeness with all his notions.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality is not unity, but a relation following on unity. And therefore “equality” is appropriated to the Son, who is equal to the Father, proceeding from him, even though “unity” is not appropriated to him.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as “equality” is appropriated to the Son, so too is “likeness.” But Augustine has proposed “equality” because, within the divine, equality includes likeness, and not vice versa. For because there is no quantity in the divine except that of power, which is founded in some form, it follows that whatever belongs to quantity of power belongs to form. And thus, if they are equal, then they are like. But this does not convert, since equality takes away excess, which likeness does not; this is why two things, one of which is whiter than the other, are alike in whiteness, but not equal.

Reply Obj. 5: The bond or binding of love is proper to the Holy Spirit. But when any things come together in something one, they can be said to be “bound” in it; therefore “binding,” when said in an absolute way, does not indicate anything but a certain coming together; and in this way it is not proper to the Holy Spirit, but only appropriated to him. Yet even if it be taken insofar as it is proper, it would be no great incongruity that the assignment is not simply speaking uniform. For such names are attributed to the persons to the degree that they are appropriated, and thus they approach toward the account of the proper names. This is why the proper and the appropriated, as appropriated, do not have the account of divergence in form.

Article 2

Whether all are one on account of the Father

To the second we proceed as follows. What Augustine says seems to be false. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32; PL 34:21): in Patre unitas, in Filio aequalitas, in Spiritu Sancto unitatis aequalitatisque concordia. Et tria haec unum omnia propter Patrem, aequalia omnia propter Filium, connexa omnia propter Spiritum Sanctum; “in the Father is unity, in the Son equality, in the Holy Spirit the concord of unity and equality; and all three are one because of the Father, all are equal on account of the Son, and all are bound together on account of the Holy Spirit.”)

Obj. 1: For because this preposition “on account of” (propter) indicates the bearing of a cause, when it is said that “all things are one on account of the Father,” this would indicate either the bearing, as it were, of an efficient cause or, as it were, of a form. If it is as of a form, then it is false, since the Son, formally speaking, is not one with the Father, but with the divine essence, or with his own property, or with his very self. If it is as of an efficient cause, then it will be the same thing to say the Son has unity “on account of the Father” as to say he has unity “from the Father.” But just as the Son has unity from the Father, so does he have equality as well. Therefore, just as all are said to be one on account of the Father, all are said to be equal on account of the Father. And then there would be no distinction.

Obj. 2: Whatever is from the Father, it is certain that the Son has no account of a principle relative to the Father. Therefore if this preposition “on account of” indicates the bearing of a principle, it seems wholly false when he says that all are equal on account of the Son.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as for God to be wise and to be are the same thing, so too for God to be equal and to be are the same thing. But it cannot be said that, within the divine, all exist on account of the Son. Therefore neither are all equal on account of the Son.

On the contrary, there is what is recorded in the text. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).9, quoting Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32; PL 34:21).)

I answer that Augustine’s statement can be true in two senses: with respect to the number of the persons and with respect to what is proper to them. For if we consider their number, then unity is found immediately in the Father, and on account of him in whom unity is first found, according to the order of nature, all things are called one. But the twoness of persons is found first in the Son, who proceeds as someone other than and from the Father; and likewise equality is found first in the Son, which is first found in two. And on account of this all things are called equal through the Son, as on account of him in whom equality is first found. But threeness is found first in the Holy Spirit, as is bonding, which requires three—two bound together and one binding. And on account of this all things are said to be bound together on account of the Holy Spirit.

However, if we consider the properties of the persons, in the Father is found the account of the, as it were, first principle. And because in every nature there is found one principle that is not itself from a principle, from the unity of which it arises that one nature is propagated in all, all things are said to be one on account of the Father. And Hilary seems to touch on this in passing. (Hilary, On Synods, paras. 58–60 (PL 10:520–21); see Sent. I, 31.2(132).8.) But if we consider what is proper to the Son, according to all his properties it is fitting for him that he be equal or co-equal with the Father, whether as Son, or as Word, or as image. Moreover, just as we say that the relations that are toward what is created result from created things insofar as they are referred to God, so too the relations by which the Father is referred to the Son, supposing the distinguishing relations, result from the fact that the Son is referred to the Father. And on account of this, the Father is said to be equal to the Son inasmuch as the Son is co-equal with the Father; and from this it also follows that the Holy Spirit is equal to each of them. For unless the Son, who is a principle of the Holy Spirit, were equal to the Father, in no way would he spirate equal love. And thus, in a certain way, the equality within the entire Trinity results from the equality of the Son. Likewise too it is proper to the Holy Spirit that he proceed as love, and love has the account of a bond, so all are said to be bound on account of the Holy Spirit. Yet this could be explained briefly, such that one might say that all are one on account of the Father—that is, on account of the essential unity that is appropriated to the Father—and so on for the others.

Reply Obj. 1: When he says that all are one on account of the Father, the phrase “on account of” says not only the bearing of a principle through the mode of an efficient cause, but also through the mode of a form, insofar as unity of form, that is, the divine essence, by which all are one in the divine, follows the unity of the principle.

Reply Obj. 2: Created things are not a principle of God, even though God is spoken of in relation to them, on account of the fact that created things are referred to him; for such relations are not really in God. In the same way also it does not follow that the Son is a principle of the Father, since equality does not assert a real relation in God.

Reply Obj. 3: The reply to this is clear because all are said to be equal on account of the Son not as if the Son is the principle of equality in the Father, as was said.

Exposition of the text

Moreover, . . . it is necessary to consider. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).1.) He asks about three things pertaining to equality, and first, whether it is being said relatively or absolutely. To this he answers, relatively, at to which we say. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).1.) Second, he asks relative to what is he attending to equality: to the unity of essence, or to the unity of relation; and he shows that it is relative to the unity of the essence. And therefore equality is spoken of according to essence, at and yet the Son is equal to the Father. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).1.) Third, he asks what the equality is, and to this he responds that it is a relation in God only according to name, at and only the name is relative. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).1.)

For if an image perfectly renders that whose image it is, then the image is compared to that of which it is the image, and not the latter to its image. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) From this it seems that in the divine there is no mutual equality, if the Father is not compared to his image. But one should say to this that, just as the Son is equal to the Father, so also the Father is equal to the Son, since the quantity of power is perfectly in each of them. But “compare” signifies motion toward co-equality, and even though in the divine there is no motion, still a reception of equality is there, and because the Son receives equality from the Father, and not vice versa, therefore the Son is compared to the Father and not vice versa.

Entirely corresponds to him whose image it is, (Sent. I, 31.2(132).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:931).) that is, all things in them are the same in nature.

Hilary, in the book On Synods: ‘an image has a form which does not differ from that of the one whose image it is.’ (Sent. I, 31.2(132).6, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 13 (PL 10:490).) This note is brought in to show that an image is coequal with that of which it is the image. In this note Hilary does two things: first, he presents definitions of “image,” which are clear from things said earlier; (Above, d. 28, q. 2, a. 1.) second, based on these definitions he draws two conclusions: through one he manifests the distinction of the Son from the Father, from the fact that an image is referred to something; this is at and so what the Father is, the Son is also, because the Son is the image of the Father; (Sent. I, 31.2(132).6.) through the second definition he manifests the unity of the nature on account of the lack of difference in form, which belongs to the account of an image, at and because he is image, in order to be image truly, he must have in himself the form, nature, and essence of his original. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).6.)

A second note: if anyone says that the Son is incapable of being born and without beginning, as if by saying that there are two without beginning, and two incapable of birth, and two unborn, he makes two gods, let him be anathema. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).8, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 59 (PL 10:520).)

This note is brought in to manifest in what way all are one on account of the Father. Hilary’s intention is to say that, because in every nature there is one principle that is not from a principle, if someone were to assert that in the divine there are two who are innascible, he would assert two natures, and thus, two gods. But this is necessary insofar as, according to the order of the one nature, there is a relation to one principle that is not from a principle, who is the Father: the Son is capable of being born, that is, able to begin, from the innascible essence, that is, from the innascible Father.

All things are referred to the one God by this gradation. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).8, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 60 (PL 10:521); the Silano translation reads step instead of gradation.) This is contrary to what Jerome says above, (Sent. I, 25.3(104).6, actually quoting not Jerome but Pelagius, Libellum fidei ad Innocentium papam, para. 3.) that in the divine persons there is no gradation. To this one should say that here he asserts two relations: one of what is created to the Son, and in this relation there is gradation; and the other of the Son to the Father, wherein there is no gradation. Yet it can also be said that “gradation” is being taken in a broad sense so as to mean “order.”

A second note: the will of God has given substance to all creatures, but a perfect birth gave a nature to the Son from a substance which is impassible and not born. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).8, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 60 (PL 10:521).) This note is introduced to manifest how the Father and the Son are one in nature. He proves this as follows: his will is the principle of the creation of things, so God has made things to be such as he has willed them, but not to be the way he himself is in his own nature. But the principle of the generation of the Son is the Father’s nature. Therefore the Son must not only be such as his Father has willed him, but such as his Father is in his own nature. This is why he says, but the one begotten from the substance of God, that is, the Son, who is of the Father’s nature, assumed, that is, received, an essence, that is, such an essence as the Father’s nature, according to the origin, that is, by generation, of his nature, not like the creatures, that is, as created things receive, of the will, that is, the sort that his will willed. (Sent. I, 31.2(132).8, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 58 (PL 10:520).)

A third note: our faith seems perhaps to have spoken less than clearly about the likeness without difference of the Father and Son, when it declared of the Father and Son and Holy Spirit that in these names was signified the substance and order and glory proper to each of those named, so that they are three in substance, but one in consonance. (Sent. I, 31.4(134).3, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 31 (PL 10:504).) This is introduced to manifest how all things are bound together through the Holy Spirit. And Hilary’s intention is to recite what was said by a certain synod that had been gathered together against the Sabellians—who were saying that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit were the same person. Against them the synod, to distinguish the personal order and glory, or dignity, and substance, that is, hypostasis, confessed the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three in substance and one in consonance. And they take “substance” not for the essence—lest they bring in a division of the essence, following the Arians—but for hypostasis, so as to exclude the Sabellian confusion (Confusio is rightly translated as “confusion,” not in the sense of “being confused about,” but rather, in the sense of “fusing” or blending together such that distinction is lost.) of the persons. And they said that they are one by consonance insofar as they are united by love, who is the Holy Spirit.

That impiety which, through the number of names, avoided the truth concerning the Father and Son and Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 31.4(134).3, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 32 (PL 10:504).) The Sabellian heretics said that these distinct names that are found in Scripture (That is, “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit.”) do not imply any distinction in reality, and that the same reality had the names Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. From this it followed that there would be no truth of the names, since no reality is truly the Father of its very self.

A fourth note: since we confess God the Father and proclaim Christ to be the Son of God, . . . they, who do not differ in nature . . . can only be one. (Sent. I, 31.4(134).3, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 41 (PL 10:543).) This note is brought in against both the Sabellians and the Arians. For he says at once that, since we ourselves name the Son “God,” like the Father, and we are not speaking of several gods, but one, it is certain that the essence of the Father and the Son is one, whose name is one—that is predicated in the singular; for each of them is called “God.” But from this it does not follow that no person is begotten who receives numerically the same essence from the person generating him.

By religious assertion of the unity of the name, (Sent. I, 31.4(134).3, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 42 (PL 10:544).) he means the faithful confession in which the name “God” is predicated in the singular and as common.

The assertion . . . did not take away, that is, did not eliminate, the born essence of the person, that is, the person of the begotten Son, which is the essence, it having been constituted, that is, born of the Father’s essence, being the undifferentiated nature. (Sent. I, 31.4(134).3, quoting Hilary, On Synods, para. 42 (PL 10:544).)