D. 46 - Certain things that seem to show the inefficacy of the divine will

Division of the text

After having considered what the divine will is, and in how many ways it is spoken of, here he inquires about its efficacy. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents certain questions about some things that seem to show the inefficacy of the divine will; in the second, he shows that it is efficacious in all things, at certainly the will of God is always efficacious. (Sent. I, 47.1(204).1.)

The first part is divided into two parts, according to the two things that could show the inefficacy of the divine will: either that what he wills does not occur, or that what he does not will does occur. In the first part, therefore, he treats this question: whether something he wills to occur might not occur; in the second, whether something he does not will might occur, at therefore, since it is settled that all good things which happen do so by his will, . . . it is rightly usual to ask whether all evil things too that are done, that is, sins, are done by God’s will or against his will. (Sent. I, 46.3(199).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he presents a doubt based on two authorities; second, he explains them, at but let us hear the solution. (Sent. I, 46.2(198).1.)

Therefore, since it is settled that all good things which happen do so by his will, . . . it is rightly usual to ask whether all evil things too that are done, that is, sins, are done by God’s will or against his will. (Sent. I, 46.3(199).1.) Here he treats the second question, by inquiring whether God wills or does not will evils to occur that nonetheless do occur. In reference to this he does three things: first, he presents the question and lays out the diverse opinions; second, he treats them, at those who say that God wills evil things to be or to be done defend their view in the following ways; (Sent. I, 46.3(199).3.) third, he chooses one of them, at leaving aside this and other similar inanities, . . . let us say that God does not will evil things to be done. (Sent. I, 46.7(203).5.)

As regards the second of these, he does two things: first, he treats the first opinion by presenting its two arguments; second, he treats the second opinion, at but those who say that evil things do not exist or are not done by the will of God respond to the foregoing arguments. (Sent. I, 46.3(199).7.)

As regards this latter, he does three things: first he shows how, according to this opinion, the arguments for the first opinion are answered; second, he brings in arguments for the second opinion, at and so, if one diligently attends to what has been written, it is easy for him to perceive that good things come from evil ones; (Sent. I, 46.6(202).2.) third, he excludes a certain sophistical objection against this opinion, at it has already been sufficiently shown that evil things are not done with God as their author. (Sent. I, 46.7(203).3.)

As regards the first, he does two things: he presents first a solution to the first argument; and second, a solution to the second, at as for that which Augustine says, ‘It is good for evil things to be done,’ . . . they assert that it was said by reason of the fact that God draws good things out of the evils which are done. (Sent. I, 46.4(200).1, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 96 (CCSL 46; PL 40:276).)

And so, if one diligently attends to what has been written, it is easy for him to perceive that good things come from evil ones. (Sent. I, 46.6(202).2.) Here he presents the arguments in favor of the second opinion. It is divided into three parts, according to the three arguments. The second begins at afterwards, the same Augustine, asking what the cause is by which man is made worse, asserts that it is not in God. (Sent. I, 46.7(203).1.) The third begins at also, it is shown in another way that evil things are not done with God as author, that is, willing. (Sent. I, 46.7(203).2.)

Question 1

Certain things that seem to show the inefficacy of the divine will

Here four things are asked:

first, whether God wills all men to be saved;

second, whether it is good that evil things occur;

third, whether evil belongs to the perfection of the universe;

fourth, whether God wills evil things to occur.

Article 1

Whether God wills that all men be saved

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 47, aa. 1, 3; ST I.19.6; On Truth, q. 23, a. 2; Commentary on 1 Timothy, ch. 2, lect. 1.) It seems that God wills that all men be saved.

Obj. 1: This seems so, first, from the authority of the Apostle, which is noted even in the text, which is 1 Timothy 2:4: he desires all men to be saved.

Obj. 2: You might say that he wills it with a conditional, and not an absolute will.

On the contrary, a conditional will is an incomplete will. But nothing incomplete should be attributed to God. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a will that has charity imitates the divine will. But one who has charity wishes for the salvation of everyone. Therefore it seems that God also wills the salvation of all.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, anyone acting by intention wills that his work attain its end. But a man’s end is eternal salvation, for the sake of which God created him. Therefore he wills that all men be saved.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no one can be saved unless God wills to save him. Therefore if God does not (We have inserted a “not” here to make better sense of this passage, though it is not found in Mandonnet’s Latin text.) will to save every man, it is not in the power of every man whatsoever that he be saved. But we do not merit punishment or blame for what is not in our power. Therefore it should not be imputed to those who are not saved—which is false. Therefore it seems that God wills to save all men.

On the contrary, predestination is the plan to show mercy, according to Augustine. (Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 3, para. 7 (PL 44:965).) Therefore if God were to will that all be saved, all would be predestined. But this is false, since, because not all are saved, someone would be predestined who would not be saved. Therefore God does not will all men to be saved.

Furthermore, God’s will is the first and highest cause of realities, as has been said before. (Above, d. 45, q. 1, a. 3.) But if the cause is posited, the effect is posited. But not all men are saved. Therefore it seems that neither is God’s will for the salvation of all men.

I answer that, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 29 (PG 94:970).) his will is of two sorts: antecedent and consequent. And this happens not due to any diversity of the divine will, but on account of the diverse conditions of the very thing being willed. For in each man, one can consider his nature and the different circumstances of him himself, such as that he is willing and preparing himself for his own salvation, or that he is opposed and acting contrary to it.

Therefore if in a man only his nature is considered, for every man to be saved is equally good; for all agree in human nature. And since everything good is willed by God, God wills this as well; and this is called his “antecedent will,” whereby he wills that all men be saved, following Damascene. And the effect of this will is the very order of the nature to the end of salvation, and things advancing it to that end, proposed to all men in common: things both natural and gratuitous, like our natural powers and the precepts of the law and such.

However, when one considers all a person’s circumstances, in this sense it is not found to be good that all men be saved. For it is good that he who prepares himself and consents be saved through the bestowal of divine grace, but it is also not good that he who does not want it and resists it be saved, since this is unjust. And because something stands to its being willed by God in the same way that it stands to its being good, therefore such a man, considered under those conditions, God does not will to be saved. Rather, he wills this only for such a man who is willing and consenting. And this is called his “consequent will,” in that it presupposes a foreknowledge of deeds, not as the cause of the will, but as though the account of the thing willed, as was said above. (Above, d. 45, q. 1, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: According to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 29 (PG 94:967‒70).) the Apostle’s word is understood as being about the antecedent will, not the consequent will. But according to Augustine, (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 103 (CCSL 46; PL 40:280).) it is understood as being about the consequent will. Whence he explains it in two ways: in one way, its scope is meant to apply to all those who are being saved, as is said in the text; (Sent. I, 46.2(198).3.) in the other way, its scope is meant to be the genus of individuals, because he has predestined to life some men from every condition of men, and not the individuals of the genus.

Reply Obj. 2: His antecedent will can be said to be conditioned, yet this is not an imperfection on the side of the divine will, but one that is on the side of the thing willed, which is not being taken with all the circumstances that are required for the direct ordination to salvation.

Reply Obj. 3: One who has charity wishes eternal salvation for all in an absolute way, in that, to their knowledge, there are not underlying conditions whereby someone might be ordered against salvation—which conditions would be subject to the divine knowledge. And therefore the judgment of one in possession of charity is not the same as that of God’s own consequent will.

Reply Obj. 4: The wise artisan does not will that his work attain its end except according to the account of the end. For if it were to have any disposition contrary to the form that he intends to give it, he does not give it the form unless somehow that disposition is removed. For example, a builder does not will that stones come together to compose a house while any misshapenness remains in them; so it is with God as well.

Reply Obj. 5: These conditions, whereby a man becomes ordered against the attainment of the end, and under which conditions God does not will him to be saved, come from the man himself. And therefore all that follows is imputed as his own fault.

Article 2

Whether the occurrence of evils is good

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.19.9; I.48.4, 6; SCG I.95; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 6; On Evil, q. 2, a. 1, ad 16.) It seems that the occurrence of evils is good.

Obj. 1: For the true and the good are convertible. But it is true that evils occur. Therefore it is also good.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is willed is good, since evil is outside the will, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 32 (PG 3:731).) But the occurrence of evils is willed by the one voluntarily doing the evil. Therefore the occurrence of evils is a good.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the cause of a good seems to be good, and not evil, just as the cold is not the cause of the hot. But the very occurrence of evils is a cause of good; for example, good suffering is caused by evil action, and many other such things that are elicited from the occurrence of evils. Therefore the occurrence of evils is a good thing.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything just is good. But the occurrence of evils is just. Therefore and so on. Proof of the middle premise: every punishment from God is also just. But one sin is the punishment of another, as Gregory says; (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 25, ch. 9, paras. 20‒21 (CCSL 143B; PG 76:334‒35).) he proves it from what is said in Romans 1:24: therefore God gave them up in the lusts of their hearts to impurity; and in Revelation 22:11: let the evildoer still do evil. Therefore the occurrence of evils is just, and therefore it is good.

On the contrary, there are certain evils, such as the acts of sin, the existence of which is in their coming to be. Therefore if their coming to be is good, they are themselves good—which no opinion grants.

Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 5.1, 224b4‒8.) a motion takes its species from its terminus. But every coming to be is terminated at the existence of what is coming to be. Therefore, since evil is not good, it seems that neither is the coming to be of evil a good.

I answer that two opinions are taken about this in the text, and they accord with each other in a certain respect: in that evils are not good things; but in another they are in discord: in that the one asserts that the occurrence or being of evils is a good thing, while in fact the other denies this. And the latter is more true, as the Master also teaches.

For it is certain to all that evil, speaking essentially, is not a good thing, but incidentally it can be a good thing, insofar as it is joined in the universe to something good to which it has an order incidentally. This is like how a builder is called “white” incidentally insofar as the art of building and whiteness come together in the same subject. And because to be or to come to be asserts a certain order, insofar as it includes a certain composition, the first opinion said that the existence or occurrence of evils is a good thing.

But this is insufficient, for when one says “evils exist” absolutely, without any addition, the word “exist” designates the coupling of this privation with its subject, in which coupling does not consist of the account of goodness. For example, when we say, “whiteness exists” absolutely, we are signifying its order to its subject, since the existence of an accident is existence-in. But the “exist” in this expression signifies the coupling of the evil with the good that is being elicited by God, evils being the occasions for good things. And therefore evils being occasions for good things is a good thing, but evils being, simply speaking, is not a good thing.

Reply Obj. 1: As was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 2.) truth belongs to those things whose account is brought to completion by an activity of the soul and that have their foundation in reality. Now, it is not unfitting that a good activity of the soul be about an evil reality, or that the account of an evil reality be in a good soul, just as even a non-being in reality is called a “being” in the soul when reasoning, like negations and privations, as is clear from Metaphysics 4, according to the Commentator. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 4, text. 2 (on 1003b10).) Whence if one proceeds from the goodness of truth insofar as it is completed in the soul’s activity, to its goodness in reality, one will slip into the fallacy of the incidental. For that evils exist is incidental to that which is intelligible or signifiable as it is in reality, in which consists the account of the true—namely, that something might be signified or understood to be just as it exists in reality. Whence nothing prevents saying that it is true that evils exist, but this truth—whereby it is said or signified truly that evils exist—is a good, even though the evils existing is evil.

Reply Obj. 2: The occurrence of evils is not willed through itself, but incidentally only, insofar as it is assessed as a good by reason of some good connected to it. For nothing is purely evil, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 32 (PG 3:734).) Therefore every evil person is in some way ignorant, according to the Philosopher, (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b15‒1114b26.) insofar as he is deceived in his choosing.

Reply Obj. 3: The occurrence of evils is not the cause of a good except as an occasion, and incidentally. For there is a certain incidental cause that accomplishes nothing as regards the effect, like the musical art of a builder as regards the house. And there is also a certain incidental cause the activity of which does reach the effect, yet it brings something about that is outside the intention; and chance and luck are this sort of incidental cause, like when one digging a grave for burial finds treasure, outside his intention. And there is also a certain incidental cause that accomplishes something, yet its activity does not reach the effect but something connected to the effect, and in this sense the occurrence of evils is an incidental cause of the good. Thus it is clear that the persecution of a tyrant does not aim at the patience of the martyr, but only at the torment of his body, which is the matter of patience. And such a cause is properly speaking called an “occasion.” Whence it does not follow that the occurrence of evils is good, since one contrary can be the incidental cause of the other, like the cold heating something incidentally, as is said in Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a33.)

Reply Obj. 4: Sin through itself is not a punishment, but only incidentally, that is, by reason of what is incidental or consequent to it. For if the act of sin be considered insofar as it comes from a voluntary agent, it has the account of fault and injustice; but what precedes this action—that is, abandonment by God as merited by a preceding fault, insofar as it is due to divine ordination—has the account of punishment, and is just. Whence it does not follow that the occurrence of evils is a good. Likewise, even the defect that follows upon the very act of sin, in that as long as one strives in a disordered way after a small good one falls short of a great good, is a punishment arising from the just ordination of God; for example, when someone seeks the delight of the body and sets aside the delight of God. And on account of this Augustine says (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 1, ch. 12 (CCSL 27; PL 32:670).) that every disordered mind is a punishment to its very self.

Article 3

Whether evil belongs to the perfection of the universe

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 34, a. 1; ST I.22.2, ad 2; I.48.2; SCG III.71; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 6, ad 4; Compendium theologiae, ch. 142; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 4, lect. 16.) It seems that evil belongs to the perfection of the universe.

Obj. 1: For Dionysius says, evil will bestow a perfection on everything, that is, the universe, and according to its very self will not give an imperfect existence on the whole. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 19 (PG 3:718).)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the good of the universe is a good of order. But the evil in the universe is ordered; this is why it says in the text (Sent. I, 46.5(201).1, citing Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 11 (CCSL 46; PL 40:236).) that well ordered evil, put in its own place, commends good things in a more eminent way. Therefore evil belongs to the perfection of the universe.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, that without which many perfections would be left out of the universe contributes to the universe’s perfection. But evil is of this sort. For if there were no corruption of the elements, there would be no form of compounds, nor a soul which is in those compounds as form; and were there no persecution, there would be no patience of martyrs; and were there no misery, there would be no mercy. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every account of goodness confers something for the perfection of the universe. But if there were no evil, a certain account of goodness would be absent from the universe—namely, the goodness of comparison, whereby the good is commended through its comparison to evil. Therefore evil belongs to the universe’s perfection.

On the contrary (5), whatever belongs to the universe’s perfection is either something existing, like substance, or in things existing, like accidents. But evil is not such, as Dionysius proves. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 3, para. 19 (PG 3:717).) Therefore it does not belong to the universe’s perfection.

Furthermore (6), that without which the universe would be better does not contribute to the universe’s perfection. But if there were no evil, the universe would be better, since evil takes away from one thing more than it adds to something else, since that to which it belongs takes away absolute goodness, whereas it adds to the other only a goodness of comparison. Therefore and so on.

I answer that evil through itself does not contribute to the perfection of the universe. For what through itself contributes to the perfection of any whole is a constituent part of that whole, or else is through itself a cause of some perfection in it. But evil is no part of the universe, since it has neither the nature of substance nor of accident, but only of privation, as Dionysius says; (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 32 (PG 3:731).) and neither does it through itself cause any good.

But it does contribute to the perfection of the universe incidentally, insofar as it is joined to something that belongs to the universe’s perfection. Now, this can be through either something antecedent to the evil or consequent to it. The antecedent is, for example, a nature that sometimes falls short and sometimes does not, such as man’s free decision; and without such a nature, from the failure of which evil occurs, the universe would not be perfect in all grades of goodness. However, the consequent is that good that is occasioned by an evil, which is a resultant comeliness in the good from its comparison with the evil; or it is any perfection to which the evil stands as material, like the way persecution stands to patience, or in an infinity of other ways. For incidental causes are infinite, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 196b28.)

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius concludes to this by reducing it to the impossible; and therefore he leaves it as incongruous that evil through itself belongs to the universe’s perfection.

Reply Obj. 2: That good of order whereby evil is ordered is not in that wherein the evil exists, but in something else. For example, the cruelty of the tyrant is ordered through the patience that is in the martyr. Or it can even be in the same one as now different, as the humility that results from a previous sin in the one who, through repentance, already has become a different man. For the just man orders the previous sin in himself. Whence evil does not contribute to the perfection of the universe, except incidentally.

Reply Obj. 3: Evil does not through itself lead to those perfections, but they follow it incidentally. And therefore the argument does not succeed.

Reply Obj. 4: One should say something similar. Nonetheless, one should note that even if there were no evil, there could still be the goodness of comparison of the more good to the less good. For although the less good lacks a certain perfection that is present in the better, nonetheless it is not necessary that it be evil. For evil consists in the lack of what is owed and is naturally apt to be possessed, the way blindness is.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Dionysius’s intention is to say that evil is not anything in a positive sense, nor as subsistent through itself, nor as a being in something else. And from this it can be shown that it does not pertain through itself to the universe’s perfection; rather, nothing prevents it from pertaining to it incidentally.

Reply Sed Contra 6: It is universally true of all evils that, if they were not permitted to exist, the universe would be less perfect. For those natures would not exist whose condition has the ability to fail—and with them taken away, the universe would be less perfect, as not having filled out all the grades of goodness. But there are some evils that, were they not to exist, the universe would be more imperfect: namely, those things on which a perfection follows that is greater than what is taken away; an example is the corruption of the elements, on which composition follows, and the forms of compounds are nobler than the forms of the elements.

But there are also certain evils that, were they not to exist, the universe would be more perfect—namely, those things whereby greater perfections are taken away than are acquired in another. This is especially in the evils of fault, which deprive one of grace and glory, and bestow on someone else the good of comparison, or some account of perfection whereby, even were it not possessed, the ultimate perfection could be possessed. For example, even without actual patience in suffering persecutions, someone can still attain eternal life. Whence if no man were to sin, the entire human race would have been better, since also, even though the salvation of one man is directly occasioned by the fault of another, nonetheless he could have attained that salvation without that fault. Nonetheless, neither these evils nor those through themselves do anything for the perfection of the universe, since they are not the causes of perfections, but only the occasions for them.

Article 4

Whether God wills that evils occur

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.19.9; I.48.6; SCG I.95; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 6; On Evil, q. 2, a. 1, ad 16.) It seems that God wills that evils occur.

Obj. 1: For, according to Seneca, (Seneca, Epistulae morales ad Lucilium, letter 71, para. 19.) it belongs to the wise man not to be disturbed by misfortunes, but more to rejoice in them, in which the good of his own virtue is especially apparent; the Philosopher also hints (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.10, 1100a30‒b22.) at this about the happy man. But God is the wisest and happiest. Therefore, since the comeliness of his justice and wisdom is apparent in evils that occur, it seems that God wills that evils occur.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the occurrence or non-occurrence of evils are opposites following affirmation and negation. But no middle falls between such opposites. Therefore, since “God wills evils not to occur” is false, as is commonly granted, it seems that “God wills evils to occur” is true.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one who is wise wills impossibilities. But it is impossible that evils occur unless one has removed the possibility that evils not occur. Therefore, since the non-occurrence of evils is removed by God’s will—since God does not will the non-occurrence of evil things—it seems that he necessarily wills that evils occur.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as God is the author of grace, so too is he the author of nature; and just as a fault is the privation of the good of grace, so too punishment is the privation of a good of nature, according to Augustine. (See Augustine, The City of God, bk. 12, ch. 3 (CCSL 48; PL 41:350).) Therefore, since God wills the punishments of hell, it seems that for the same reason he wills the evils of fault to occur.

On the contrary, the will is only for the end and for the things ordered to the end. But evils occur only through a disorder from the end. Therefore God does not will the occurrence of evils.

Furthermore, whoever conforms his will to God’s will does not sin. But every sinner, by the very fact that he is sinning, is willing that evils be done by him. Therefore in this he does not conform his will to the divine will, so God does not will that evils occur.

I answer that God’s will is the cause of all good things and of all the things he wills, therefore something stands to its being willed by God in the same way as it stands to its being good. Whence, since the occurrence of evil is, according to itself, not good, as was said in the previous article, it will not be willed through itself by God.

But each good has joined to itself a good that is also willed by God, that is, antecedently; this good is the condition of the nature that is capable of falling short, which nature God instituted and conserves in such a condition. Whence it is said that God does not will the occurrence of evils, but he wills to permit the occurrence of evils. He also wills a consequent good, due to which the evil is put in order. From this it follows that he wills to order evils that are done, but not that he wills that they be done.

Reply Obj. 1: The elegance of divine wisdom is apparent both in its permission of evils, and in its ordination of them, each of which God wills; but he does not will that evil occur, this being according to itself a withdrawal from the beauty of the first exemplar form.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the occurrence or non-occurrence of evils are opposed by way of affirmation and negation, still these two things—to will their occurrence and to will their non-occurrence—are not opposed as contradictory. For each of them is affirmative by the act of the will being affirmed in each. Whence neither should be granted—neither that he wills that evils occur, nor that he wills that evils not occur. Rather, one should grant that he does not will their occurrence, which is a negative—not, however, that he wills their occurrence, since this remains an affirmative act of the will. And the negation of willing is being extended to what is willed, just as is the case with its entire declension. Whence it is the same thing to want a thing not to occur and to will its non-occurrence.

Reply Obj. 3: By his antecedent will, God wills that the evils of fault not occur, but not by his consequent will, except as regards those whom he knows do not will to do evil. For the consequent will takes in the creature’s condition. Nevertheless it does not follow that by his consequent will he wills the occurrence of evils; rather, he wills to permit the occurrence of evils. Nor does he nonetheless will something impossible, since he does not will that evils occur and not occur at the same time, or that neither one of them occur, as the objection assumed. For the occurrence and non-occurrence of evils are contradictory opposites, and therefore there can be no middle between them. But to will the occurrence of evils and to will their non-occurrence are not contradictory. And therefore it is not necessary that either be true.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as the evil opposed to grace is not willed by God, so too neither is the evil opposed to nature. Nevertheless, he does will the order of the one to the other. However, this order is implied in the account of punishment, and therefore he does will to bring about the punishment, but he does not will the occurrence of the fault. For evil is signified in “fault” insofar as it comes forth from a failing cause, and not insofar as it is put in order by the ordering God.

Exposition of the text

Not that there is no man who is not enlightened, but that none is enlightened except by him. (Sent. I, 46.2(198).3, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, cc. 27, 103 (CCSL 46; PL 40:280).) This is understood as about the light of grace. However, if it be understood to be about the natural light of the intellect, then he does illuminate absolutely every man. For, according to Ambrose, (Rather: Ambrosiaster, Commentaria in Epistolas B. Pauli, on 1 Corinthians 12:3 (PL 17:245; CSEL 81.2:131–32).) everything true said by anyone whatsoever is from the Holy Spirit.

For there is something which is good in itself and for the one to whom it is done, but is not good for the one who does it. (Sent. I, 46.5(201).1.) The reason for this distinction is that, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 30 (PG 3:730).) it is certain that the good is from one perfect cause, but evil happens in manifold ways due to particular defects. Therefore for it to be the case that any act is good absolutely, one must gather together both the goodness of the object, due to which goodness the act is good in itself—for example, to give alms, or something like this—and the good on the side of the agent, so that he might act well.

And according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4, 1105a30.) acting well includes three elements: the will or choice, the appropriate end, and steadfastness in the deed, at least as regards intention. And this is enough for the act to be called “good absolutely.” But in acts that are ordered to someone else, a third thing in addition must be present for the perfection of goodness: such that in the one for whom it is occurring it attains an effect of goodness.

And from this is drawn the division of the good into four, presented here in the text. For one is what has these three—that it is good in itself, and good for the doer, and good for the one to whom it is done—and this is the good according to itself, simply speaking, and perfectly. But another is what has two of these—that it is good in itself and for the doer, but not for the one to whom it is done—and this is a good simply speaking, but not a perfect one. And something else has the other two—that it is good in itself and for the one to whom it is done, but not for the doer—and this is not good simply speaking, but it is good through itself. Moreover, the last is what has only one of these—it is not good in itself nor for the doer, but for the one to whom it is done—and this is good incidentally, which is neither good in itself, nor for the doer, nor for anyone else, since all things are ordered to the good.

Augustine plainly concludes by an argument from the lesser case (Sent. I, 46.6(202).3.)—that is, from a lesser reality, and not from what seems less. And therefore the logical topic is negative, and not affirmative. Or this should be taken such that the very thing negated seems less—that a wise man is not the author of his own work becoming worse; it seems to be a lesser thing to deny this of him than to deny it of God.

It is not with a wise man as author that a man becomes worse. (Sent. I, 46.6(202).3, quoting Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 3 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:11).) This seems to be false, since wisdom is in cognition. Now, it is possible to do the contraries of things that are known. And one should say to this that the “wise man” here is being taken as the virtuous man, and this manner of taking “wise” (sapiens) is derived either from the savor (sapor) of virtue, as some say, or more truly from Socrates’ opinion, who asserted that the virtues are knowledge and that only the ignorant sin, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 5; (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1144b19‒30.) however, in a certain way this is true about the ignorance of choice, which is in the particular actually considered. Or it can be said that the wise man is being taken as the prudent man, as is even in the definition of virtue, presented in Ethics 2, where he says, as the wise will determine it. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a1.) However, the prudent man, according to the Philosopher, (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a1; 4.5, 1140b5 and b21.) does not err, just as neither does the courageous or temperate man.

Afterwards, the same Augustine, asking what the cause is by which man is made worse, asserts that it is not in God. (Sent. I, 46.7(203).1.) This argument differs from the previous one, for this one proceeds from the account of goodness, whereas the previous one is based on divine authority, since he is not the author of evils.

He is not the cause of tending toward non-being. (Sent. I, 46.7(203).2.) On the contrary, Deuteronomy 32:39 says, I kill and I make alive. And one should say to this that non-being is never intended through itself by any agent, but rather, one always intends some being, on which follows a certain non-being; for example, on the being of fire follows the non-being of air. And so too God wills there to be the order of justice and of nature in realities, on which follows the corruption and punishment of certain things.

But one who works evil tends toward non-being. (Sent. I, 46.7(203).2.) On the contrary, evil corrupts nothing of existing things, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 19 (PG 3:715).) and thus it does not seem that the sinner tends to non-being. To this one should say that evil is a privation, and every privation is a certain non-being, even though some existence is always standing under a privation. Whence, one who sins tends into the non-being of grace, of which he is deprived, but not into the non-being of nature.