D. 28 - Non-personal properties of the divine persons

Division of the text

Here the Master considers the notions of the persons that are not personal. It is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers “innascibility,” which is a property of a person even though it is not a personal property; in the second, he considers common spiration, which is neither a personal property nor the property of a person, at there is also another name denoting a manifold relation. (Sent. I, 29.1(125).1.)

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he shows how the Father is called “unbegotten”; in the second, he shows how everything that is called “begotten” should be taken in reference to the Son, at it is also to be known that, just as the Son alone is called ‘Word’ or ‘image,’ so he alone is also called ‘born or begotten Wisdom.’ (Sent. I, 28.6(123).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows how the Father is called “unbegotten”; second, he presents a question based on the things said, at moreover, . . . it is usual to ask whether it is different or the same to be father and son. (Sent. I, 28.5(122).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows how the name “unbegotten” is taken by the saints; second, he shows how they also sometimes leave it unsaid, at but it is not fitting to pass over in silence that the Arians strove to prove that the Father is of one substance, the Son of another because one is called unbegotten. (Sent. I, 28.4(121).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows how the Father is called “unbegotten”; second, he shows what the Father’s notion is that the name “unbegotten” designates, at but if you wish to know what the property is according to which the Father is called unbegotten, listen to Hilary. (Sent. I, 28.3(120).1.)

As regards the first, he does three things: first, he explains the signification of “unbegotten”; second, he presents a manifestation of the explanation, at this is to be made clear by examples; (Sent. I, 28.1(118).2.) third, he excludes a certain doubt, about the solution of which he recounts the opinions of diverse men, at it is therefore usual to ask whether, as the Father alone is called unbegotten, he alone ought to be called non-begotten. (Sent. I, 28.2(119).1.)

It is also to be known that, just as the Son alone is called ‘Word’ or ‘image,’ so he alone is also called ‘born or begotten Wisdom.’ (Sent. I, 28.6(123).1.) Here he shows how the Son is called “begotten Wisdom.” And as regards this, he does two things: first, he shows the signification of the expression; second, he excludes a doubt from the things said, at beware, reader, how you understand. (Sent. I, 28.6(123).2.)

In this second he does two things, following the two doubts that he removes. The second begins at it is also necessary to understand that, although it has been said above that image . . . is said relatively of the Son, yet sometimes it is found to be said according to substance. (Sent. I, 28.7(124).1.) Each of these is clear by itself in the text.

Here there are two questions.

The first is about innascibility; (Q. 1.)

the second, about image. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Innascibility

As regards the first, two questions are asked:

first, whether innascibility is a notion or property of the Father;

second, whether it is a personal property of him.

However, whether innascibility or unbegotten befit the Holy Spirit has been treated earlier. (In I Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 1.)

Article 1

Whether innascibility is a property of the Father

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 13, a. 3; ST I.33.4; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), ch. 8.) It seems that innascibility is not a notion or property of the Father.

Obj. 1: For, as is held in the text, when the Father is called “unbegotten,” one is showing not what he is, but what he is not. (Sent. I, 28.1(118).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:915).) But a negation cannot be a sufficient principle to make something known. Therefore, since what is called a “notion” is a principle of knowing a person, it seems that “unbegotten” does not signify any notion of the Father.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, if being unbegotten is a property of the Father, then this will be insofar as it is understood either negatively or privatively. But it is not insofar as it is understood negatively, since then whatever is not generated belongs to him, and then innascibility belongs to the essence and the Holy Spirit. But similarly it is not understood privatively, since a privation always asserts an imperfection in that to which it belongs, since a privation belongs to what is naturally apt to have what it lacks. Therefore it seems that being unbegotten in no way is a notion or property of the Father.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, since the divine persons are distinct only through relations, nothing can be a divine person’s property or notion that is not in the genus of relation. But unbegotten is not in the genus of relation. Therefore it is not the notion of a divine person. Proof of the middle premise: just as the lower stands to the higher, so does the negation of the higher stand to the negation of the lower, and vice versa. For just as “man” is in fewer things than is “animal,” so too the negation of “animal” is predicated of fewer things than is the negation of “man.” But “generation,” insofar as it signifies a relation, is common to fewer things than is relation itself. Therefore the negation of “generation” is more common than is “non-relation,” and so the former is predicated of the latter, and is preserved with it, as the common is preserved with the proper. Therefore “unbegotten,” since it is preserved with whatever is not a relation, is not in the genus of relation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, “unbegotten” belongs to the Father insofar as he is the principle. But he is not the principle only through his generation, but also through his spiration. Therefore it seems that he should not be made known through a negation of generation, but through a negation of procession, which is common to both; thus he would be called “incapable-of-procession.” Or else he should be made known according to the specific account of each procession, such that as he is called “unbegotten,” so too he called “unspiratable.”

On the contrary, this is said by Hilary in the text. (Sent. I, 28.3(120).1, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 33 (CCSL 62; PL 10:120).)

Furthermore, that by which one person is distinguished from the other persons is a notion or property of him. But “unbegotten” befits the Father alone, as was shown earlier. (In I Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 4.) Therefore it is a notion or property of the Father.

I answer that, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:906–9).) the Father is the principle of the whole divinity; this is why Dionysius also says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 1 (PG 3:635).) that in the Father is font-like Godhead. Whence, if in the divine persons there were an order that were to assert a prior and posterior, the Father would be the first principle. But because there is no such order there, in place of a first we speak of a “principle not from a principle.” Whence the Father can be made known in two ways: either insofar as he is not from a principle, and then he is made known through the notion of innascibility; or insofar as he is a principle—and then, because “principle” is spoken in reference to an emanation from it, he is made known by two notions according to the two modes of emanation in the divine: paternity, insofar as he is a principle through generation, and common spiration, insofar as he is a principle of the Holy Spirit through the spiration of love. And thereby it is clear that there are three notions of the Father in total.

Reply Obj. 1: An expression is said to assert something in two ways: either such that what it asserts is of its concept as something of its very essence, like “man” asserts “animal”; or because it presupposes something as that on which it is founded, even though it is not of its essence, like every accident asserts substance. Therefore I say that the name “unbegotten” does not assert anything that constitutes his concept; for this could only be if it were to assert some account of a principle, whether common or specific, whereas no other notion can befit the Father, and in whatever way it be said, “innascibility” will not add to the number of notions along with “paternity,” since the common and the proper do not make a number. Rather, it asserts something that it presupposes as that on which it is founded. And due to this, some have said that “unbegotten” asserts something, and others that it asserts nothing.

But even though it asserts nothing that belongs constitutively to the concept of the Father, it still does not follow that it could not be a notion. For if something’s account consists in removal, it is best made certain through a negation, like blindness and such. And the account of what is first, or what is not from a principle, is of this sort, since the first is that before which there is nothing.

Reply Obj. 2: “Unbegotten” does not imply an absolute negation, but in a certain way a privation. For every negation that is in some determinate subject can be called a “privation.” Whence in the Metaphysics, it is said (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.22, 1022b23‒1023a5.) that a privation is a negation in a subject or substance. Whence I say that this negation implied by “unbegotten” is understood as founded on the account of a principle insofar as it is a notion of the Father. And in this way it belongs to neither the essence nor the Holy Spirit, to either of which it does not belong to be the principle by origin of any divine person. Nor does it belong even to the Son, to whom the opposite affirmation belongs.

But from this it does not follow that in the Father there is some imperfection. For although a privation is always of what a thing is naturally apt to have, still this is possible in three ways, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5: (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.22, 1022b23‒1023a55.) either when it does not have what is naturally apt to be had by something, as a foot is said not to have sight; or when it does not have what is naturally apt to be had by something of its own genus, even though it is not had by it itself, nor by any of its own species, as a mole does not have sight; or when it does not have what it is naturally apt to have, and when and where and according to the other conditions. In this last way “privation” is said properly, and it indicates an imperfection; and in this way nothing is said privatively in God. But in the other two ways it can be said of God. But as regards the first way, “unbegotten” can be said of both the essence and the Holy Spirit, as Jerome took it above; (Sent. I, 13.4(44).3; the source is rather Bishop Syagrius, Regulae definitionum contra haereticos prolatae, n. 8.) whereas in the second, it is said only of the Father, since he is a principle notionally, and he does not have the passive generation that the Son has, who is also a principle notionally.

Reply Obj. 3: Something is contained in a genus in two ways: either through itself and properly, as a species, and things that admit of the predication of the genus; or through a reduction (Or “tracing back.”) to it, as are the principles of the genus, such as matter and form to substance, and the unity and the point to quantity, even though neither of these is a quantity. So too no negation or privation is in a genus through itself, since it has no “whatness” or being; rather, it is traced back to the genus of its affirmation, insofar as being is understood in non-being, and an affirmation in a negation, as the Philosopher says. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003b6–10.) For every privation is known through possession, and removal through positing. And thus, even non-relation is in the genus of relation, even though the things about which this negation is said are not in that genus.

Reply Obj. 4: In his being called “unbegotten,” being from another is, simply speaking, thereby removed from the Father, and not only being from another in some determinate way. But the reason why he would be named through a negation of a specific procession, that is, generation, can be assigned in three ways. One is because the procession of the Holy Spirit according to the order of nature presupposes the generation of the Son. And therefore, since when one negates the prior, one thereby removes the posterior, on the removal of generation from the font principle, the removal of the procession through the mode of love follows. A second is that through his being called “unbegotten,” insofar as it is a notion of the Father, every mode of following on generation is thereby taken away; for it belongs to the Father as the principle of generation that in no way would he follow upon the generation. Now, something follows on the generation, according to the understanding, in three ways: either as the one begotten, as the Son, or as received through the generation, as the divine essence, or as the one proceeding from the one generated, as the Holy Spirit. Whence “unbegotten” in the way spoken of belongs to none of these. A third reason can be that the negation of “unbegotten” would be founded on the account of a principle, as was said in the body of the article. But although the Father is a principle of each divine procession, still only the account through which he is the principle of the generation is a personal property, one constituting the person of the Father, that is, paternity. And therefore also through the negation of generation this same person is more fittingly and more properly made known.

Article 2

Whether innascibility is a personal property of the Father

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.32.3; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 8, ad 21, ad 27; q. 10, a. 5, ad 12.) It seems that innascibility is a personal property of the Father.

Obj. 1: For just as paternity belongs only to the Father, so does innascibility. But paternity is his personal property. Therefore so is innascibility.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “person” signifies something distinct by a property pertaining to dignity. But innascibility appears more to pertain to dignity than does paternity, since paternity is communicated even to created things, but innascibility is not. Therefore innascibility is a personal property even more than paternity is.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a person can be understood only if something constituting him in his own personhood is understood. But, as it says in the text, (Sent. I, 28.1(118).1.) “unbegotten” can be understood even if the Father is not understood. Therefore innascibility must constitute the person of the Father, and thus it seems that it is a personal property.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the principle of a personal activity seems to be a personal property, since an agent’s proper activity is from his own proper form. But innascibility is the principle of generation in the Father; for it is said that the Father generates because he is unbegotten; this is why he seeks delight in the company of the Son. Therefore it seems that innascibility is a personal property.

On the contrary, whatever is said in a positive way is not constituted only by negation or privation. But “Father” names something in a positive way. Therefore the person of the Father is not constituted through innascibility, since it posits nothing in its own concept.

I answer that, just as in lower things whatever follows on perfected existence is not constitutive of that reality, so too in the divine whatever presupposes, according to its concept, something whereby a person is constituted cannot itself be constitutive of the person. This is why common spiration cannot be a personal property, because it presupposes the active and passive generation within the Father and the Son, whereby those persons are constituted. Likewise innascibility, because it posits a negation, which is founded on the account of a principle, as was said in the previous article, presupposes in its concept the account of the principle on which it is founded—that is, paternity. And therefore it cannot constitute the person of the Father, nor can it be a personal property.

Reply Obj. 1: From the fact that it belongs to the Father alone, one can prove that it is a property of the Father—but one cannot thereby prove that it is a personal property, unless it were to constitute the person of the Father according to a likeness with a constitutive difference.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever a negation has of dignity, it has from the affirmation on which it is founded. And therefore innascibility, which is founded on such a paternity, pertains to dignity as the dignity of such paternity. And just as innascibility is not communicated to any creature, so too neither is such paternity—that is, one that is not from another principle—even though paternity absolutely speaking is communicated to created things.

Reply Obj. 3: Having removed paternity through one’s intellect, the hypostasis of the Father does not remain; and what is said in the text—that being unbegotten does remain—should be understood in reference to the common accounts of being unbegotten and being a Father. For these are found separately in diverse things, whereas the property of the Father is not posited in reference to each. Nevertheless, even with paternity removed, unbegotten does remain in God, but not as a personal property or notion of some person, but as an attribute of the essence, like immeasurable and uncreated.

Reply Obj. 4: Innascibility is not the principle of the generation in the Father as though it were the form eliciting this action, but only as though it were placing a certain condition on the generation. For just as we see in alterations that the first alteration is what the unaltered altering agent brings about, and from the fact that it is not altered the alteration that it accomplishes is the first, so too the first generation belongs to the ungenerated generator. Whence it has that condition—that it is the first generation—from the fact that the generator is ungenerated. But the formal principle that is, as it were, eliciting the generation is the form of the Father, which is paternity, just as heat is the principle of heating that is in what is hot.

Question 2

Image

Next one asks about image. And three things are asked about this:

first, what an image is;

second, whether in the divine it is said essentially or personally;

third, if it is said personally, whether it belongs to the Son alone.

Article 1

Whether this definition of image is congruent: an image is the non-differing species of a reality that it images

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.35.1, ad 2; I.93.1, ad 3.) Hilary’s definition is proposed as follows: an image is the non-differing species of a reality that it images. (Hilary, On Synods, ch. 13 (PL 10:490).) But this seems incongruent.

Obj. 1: For something is an image in virtue of an imitation in externals. But a species is not among the externals of the thing; indeed, it signifies the intrinsic “whatness.” Therefore it is badly placed in the definition of image.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a thing is properly called an “image” when it exists for the imitation of something else. But the non-differing species of two things is not for the imitation of one of them; rather, it is that wherein one sees the imitation. Therefore an image should not be called a “species” but something “having a species.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there cannot be a lack of difference between things that are infinitely distant. But a created thing is an image of God, yet it is infinitely distant from him. Therefore “non-differing” is mistakenly placed in the definition of “image.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, there should be no circle in definitions. But a circle follows from this definition, for it defines image through the reality that it images, and what it images cannot be defined except through image. Therefore it seems that he defines it badly.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, equality and likeness belong to the account of an image, as is clear from his other definition, which is an image is the unseparated and united likeness of a reality, being made equal to that reality. (Hilary, On Synods, ch. 13 (PL 10:490).) Therefore, since nothing is placed in the aforesaid definition pertaining to equality and likeness, it seems that it is lacking.

I answer that the account of an image consists in imitation, from which the name is even taken. For an image (imago) is said as if to say “the made-imitation” (imitago). (“Made-imitation” is an approximation of imitago, which does not seem to be a real word but rather, a contraction of imitatio and ago, which would mean, “I make an imitation.” Aquinas’s account of the word’s origin is correct insofar as imitatio and imago are thought to have the same root in Proto-Indo-European.) However, two things should be considered about the account of imitation: that in which the imitation exists, and that which is being imitated.

Now, that with respect to which it is an imitation is a certain quality, or a form signified through the mode of quality. This is why likeness belongs to the account of an image. Nor is this enough; rather, there must be a certain equality in that quality, whether according to quality or according to proportion. Whence it is clear that, in a small image, the proportion of its parts to each other is equal to that in the large thing of which it is the image. And therefore being equal is in its definition. It is also required that that quality is an express and proximate sign of the nature and its species; whence we do not say that one who imitates someone in his whiteness is the image of him, but rather one who imitates him in shape, which is a proximate and express sign of the thing’s species and nature. For we see among the animals that there are diverse shapes of the diverse species.

But on the side of the things doing the imitating, two things must be considered: the relation of equality and likeness, which is founded in that one thing in which they imitate each other; and even further, the order. For what is posterior, made according to the likeness of the other, is called the “image,” whereas that which is prior, according to the likeness of which the other is made, is called the “exemplar,” although in an abusive sense the one is used for the other. And this is why Hilary, to signify the order and relation of the things imitating each other, has said, an image is of a reality that it images; but to designate that in which the imitation is, he said, non-differing species.

Reply Obj. 1: The account of an image is not in the imitation of just any externals, but of those that are in some way the sign of the species and nature. And therefore he placed “species” here, rather than “quality.”

Reply Obj. 2: This definition is given through the cause. For the very species in which the imitation occurs is not that which is the image, properly speaking; rather, the non-difference of the species is the cause why it is called an “image.” Or it could be said that each of them can be called an “image”—both what is imitated and the imitation—but this is not said properly. And this is how Hilary is defining it.

Reply Obj. 3: Each thing attains the account of an image to the degree that it attains the account of non-difference; for insofar as it differs it is not an image. Yet one finds a certain gradation of perfection of an image. For sometimes one calls the “image” of something that wherein one finds some likeness to the quality of the other that designates and expresses its nature, even if that nature is not found in the one. For example, a stone is called the “image” of a man insofar as it has a like shape, but the nature, of which the shape is a sign, does not subsist in it. And in this way the image of God is in a creature, just as the image of the king is in the coin, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 9, “De decem chordis,” ch. 8 (CCSL 41:125; PL 38:82).) And this is an imperfect mode of image.

But a more perfect account is found when underlying the quality that points to a like nature is the same nature in species, just as the father’s image, that of a man, is in his son, since the latter has his likeness in shape and in the nature that the shape signifies.

But the most perfect account of an image is when we find numerically the same form and nature in the imitation and the one whom he imitates. And thus the Son is the most perfect image of the Father, since all the divine attributes, which are signified through the mode of quality, exist together with the nature itself in the Son, and not only according to species, but even according to unity in number.

Reply Obj. 4: When he says, is of a reality that it images, this is a circumlocution for the exemplar. Whence it is asserted in the force of one expression, and it is asserted fittingly in the definition of “image” as the prior is placed in the definition of the posterior, and not vice versa. For the exemplar is prior to the image. So there is no circle here.

Reply Obj. 5: By the “non-difference of species” is understood both likeness and equality, the sort required for an image. Whence these two definitions reduce to the same thing.

Article 2

Whether “image” is said essentially

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 3, q. 3, a. 1, ad 5; ST I.35.1; I.93.5, ad 4; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), ch. 10; Commentary on 1 Corinthians, ch. 2, lect. 2; Commentary on 2 Corinthians, ch. 4, lect. 2; Commentary on Colossians, ch. 1, lect. 4; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 1, lect. 2.) It seems that “image” is not said essentially.

Obj. 1: For Augustine has said, earlier, that nothing is said more absurdly than that a thing is the image of itself. (Sent. I, 27.3(115).5, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:934).) But what is said essentially in the divine is said in reference to itself. Therefore it is absurd that he would be called “image” essentially.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as was said in the previous article, from its account an image indicates an order. But in the divine there is only order of origin. Therefore, since in the divine nothing that indicates origin is said essentially, it seems that neither is “image.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the distinction of the persons cannot be proved from things that are absolute and essential, since natural reason can lead one to the essential attributes of the Trinity, but not to the distinction of persons. But above (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 4.) the distinction of the persons has been shown from the account of an image. Therefore “image” is not being said essentially.

On the contrary, Augustine and Hilary say this in the text. (Sent. I, 28.7(124).1, actually quoting Fulgentius (not Augustine), On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon, ch. 5 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:755); Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 8 (CCSL 62; PL 10:134).)

I answer that, as was said in the previous article, “image” can be said in two ways: either as that which imitates someone, or that wherein is the imitation. If “image” is said insofar as it is taken properly, as what imitates another, then the divine essence cannot be called an “image,” but an “exemplar,” whose image is what is created. For an image presupposes an order to some principle, whereas the divine essence has no principle. Nonetheless, in this way a person can be called the image of another, insofar as the person presupposes another person according to the order of nature. Whence, in this way “image,” insofar as it is said of God properly, is always personal.

However, if that wherein is the imitation is called an “image,” then the divine nature is an image, for imitation is in it in two ways: one, of a person to a person, insofar as the Son, in the divine nature that he has from the Father, imitates the Father; the other, of a creature to its Creator, insofar as what is created imitates the Creator, albeit imperfectly, according to a certain likeness of the latter’s goodness. And with respect to the first imitation, that of person to person, “image” will directly signify the essence, but will indirectly cause an understanding of the person. For in this way the image will be the same thing as the divine nature of the persons imitating each other in it. This is how Hilary is taking it, above; (Sent. I, 28.7(124).1; I, 2.4(7).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 23 (CCSL 62; PL 10:91–92); see also In I Sent., d. 2, exposition of the text.) whence he proved from the account of an image both the unity of the essence and the distinction of the persons. But as regards the second imitation, the one of a creature relative to its Creator, “image” will signify the divine essence, and will connote reference to the creature that imitates him. This is how Augustine is taking it, in the same passage; (Sent. I, 28.7(124).1, actually referring to Fulgentius, On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon, ch. 5 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:755); see also Sent. I, 2.4(7).2 and In I Sent., d. 2, exposition of the text.) whence he did not prove anything but the unity of the essence from the account of image.

Reply Obj. 1–3: Thereby the solution to the objections is clear.

Article 3

Whether the Holy Spirit can be called an image

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 3, a. 3, ad 5; In II Sent., d. 16, a. 1; ST I.35.2, ad 1, ad 2; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), ch. 10.) It seems that the Holy Spirit can be called an “image.”

Obj. 1: First, because Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 13 (PG 94:855).) that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Son.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as the Son imitates the Father through being like him in all things, so does the Holy Spirit. But this is what is required for the perfect account of image, as was said earlier. (Above, a. 1.) Therefore the Holy Spirit is the image of the Father.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, you might say that the Holy Spirit does not have the fact that he is like the Father in all things from the account of his procession, whereas the Son does have this insofar as he proceeds as begotten.

On the contrary, the procession of the Holy Spirit is not only a procession of love, but the procession of divine love. But the procession of divine love, as such, has it that it is in the fullness of the same nature. Therefore it seems that the Holy Spirit has it from his own procession that he be an image.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is said absolutely that the Holy Spirit is equal to the Father, like him, and connatural with him, even though he does not have this from the account of his procession absolutely. Therefore, since likeness, equality, and connaturality constitute the perfect account of image, it seems that the Holy Spirit must be said to be an image absolutely.

On the contrary, Hilary says (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 1 (CCSL 62; PL 10:51).) that eternity is in the Father, species in the image, and use in the reward. Therefore just as “reward,” or “gift,” is proper to the Holy Spirit, so too “image” is proper to the Son. The same is held by Augustine, above. (Sent. I, 27.6(123).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:936).)

I answer that “image,” insofar as it is said personally, belongs only to the Son, and not the Holy Spirit. The reason for this is assigned in diverse ways. For some say that, because “image” places the imitation in external things, and in the divine the notional names are, as it were, external, the Son is fittingly called the “image of the Father,” since he imitates the Father even in a certain notion, that is, in common spiration. However, the Holy Spirit, who does not have a common notion with the Father, is not so called. But this does not seem fitting for two reasons. The first is that, in the divine, names pertaining to the notions do not stand more in the manner of externals than do the essentials names, aside from the ones that follow the substance, according to Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (PG 94:838).) And therefore the imitation in them would still make the account of an image. The second is that, in the divine, one does not attend to the likeness or equality, or to unlikeness or inequality, of the divine persons in reference to a relation of origin, as is noted in the words of Augustine earlier. (Sent. I, 20.2(85).1; Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14, para. 7 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:774–75).) However, likeness and equality are required for the account of an image. (Above, a. 1.)

And therefore others say that it is impossible that of one thing there be several images immediately leading to it unless they be divided by matter; and neither on the other hand is it possible that the same thing be the image of several things. And therefore, since the image of the Father is the Son, the Holy Spirit cannot also be the image, since then there would be several images of one thing. Nor again can it be that the Holy Spirit is the image of the Father and the Son, since then the same thing would be immediately the image of several things. But this too does not seem fitting, for two reasons. First, because the Holy Spirit is referred to the Father and the Son as to one principle; whence he can be their image insofar as they are his one principle, just as a man is the image of the whole Trinity. Second, because there is no greater reason for saying there cannot be several images of one thing than for saying there cannot be several things like or equal to one thing; for this latter is fitting in the divine—that is, that several are like or equal to one; and this is not through a division of matter, but through a distinction of relations.

And therefore one should say, with others, that although the diversity of the account of the attributes is not enough for a real distinction of processions, still it is enough for their diverse namings, as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 3.) And therefore, although the Holy Spirit receives the nature by his own procession, nonetheless, because his own procession is not through the mode of nature, it is not called, nor is it, a generation; for generation is through the mode of nature. And consequently, he is not called “son.” So too I say that the Son from the account of his own procession has it that he is an image, and in this way he proceeds as a son, since he is called the “Son” from the fact that he has the nature of the Father; and in this way he proceeds as a word, since a word, as has been said, (Above, d. 27, q. 2, a. 1.) is a certain likeness in the intellect of the very reality understood. But the Holy Spirit does not have this from the account of his own procession, because he proceeds as love; and therefore, just as he is not called a “son,” even though he receives the nature of the Father by his own procession, so too neither is he called an “image,” even though he has the likeness of the Father.

Reply Obj. 1: Damascene is taking “image” broadly for any sort of likeness whatsoever.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the Holy Spirit does imitate the Father, still it is not because of the account of his own procession that he is called an “image”; and therefore he is not called an “image” just as he is not called a “son.”

Reply Obj. 3: The identity of the reality in the divine is not prejudicial to distinction according to the true account of the attributes. And therefore, although wisdom insofar as it is divine is the essence, nonetheless the proper account of wisdom remains here outside the account of essence; and likewise, the account of the will is outside the account of the nature and intellect. And on account of this, the distinction of the processions that are through the mode of will and intellect and nature remains, at least according to account. And the diversity of the accounts causes the diversity of the names. Whence those names never would come together in the same thing unless the accounts were founded in the same reality. And because the procession through the mode of the will and that of nature do not belong to the same thing in the divine, therefore neither do the names that demonstrate the proper accounts of the processions follow on each other.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the name “image” was imposed from the equality and likeness, still it was imposed for the sake of signifying the reality to which the likeness and equality belong from the mode of its production. And therefore it is not necessary that the Holy Spirit be called absolutely like and equal unless from the mode of his procession he is also properly and absolutely called an “image.”

Exposition of the text

To some, it seems that the Father alone ought to be called non-begotten. (Sent. I, 28.2(119).2.) One should be aware that each opinion says something true in some respect. For if “non-begotten” is said insofar as it signifies a negation absolutely, then it befits the Father alone, nor is it the same as “unbegotten,” which indicates negation through the mode of privation, insofar as “unbegotten” is taken properly; and the second opinion follows in this respect. However, if it signifies negation in the genus of a principle, then it is the same as “unbegotten,” and it belongs only to the Father. This is how the first opinion follows.

But if you transpose to say: it is one thing for the Father to be, another for the Son to be, the meaning is changed. (Sent. I, 28.5(122).2.) The argument of the statement is based on the fact that “to be” is said in two ways: insofar as it signifies the truth of a composition, and insofar as it signifies the act of the essence.

Therefore when one says, “it is one thing for the Father to be, another for the Son to be,” the word “to be” is the predicate of the statement. For “to be” signifies what is an accident of the essence. Whence it is false, since just as there is one essence of the Three, so also there is one existence.

However, when one says, “it is one thing for the Father to be, another for the Son to be,” such that the word “Father” is being predicated as that in which the predicate is present, then the truth of the composition is being signified. And according to this, the Father, in that he is Father, is in truth the one called “Father,” that is, by paternity and not by the essence.

And because by one thing God is called “Father,” that is, by paternity and by something else he is called “Son,” that is, by filiation, therefore it is granted that it is one thing to be the Father, and another to be the Son, insofar as the word “another” signifies an otherness of notion, and not an otherness of essence.