D. 39 - How divine knowledge is the cause of what is known

Division of the text

Here he shows in what manner the divine knowledge is the cause. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks whether it is invariable; in the second, whether it is universal, at as to what was said above, . . . it seems to be contradicted by what Jerome says. (Sent. I, 39.4(178).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he presents the question, and objects against its veracity; in the second, he considers it, at to which we say that God’s knowledge is entirely unchangeable. (Sent. I, 39.1(175).2.) And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he considers it by conceding the things that posit a variation on the side of the things known, and not on the side of the knowledge; in the second, he considers it by denying the things that indicate variation on the side of the knowledge, at here some make the following objection. (Sent. I, 39.2(176).1.)

And regarding this latter he does two things: first, he denies the things that simply speaking should be denied; second, he asserts the opinion of some who concede certain expressions that appear to signify a variation in his knowledge, yet they deflect them toward the variation of the things known, at also, it is said by some that God can know more things than he knows. (Sent. I, 39.3(177).1.)

As to what was said above, . . . it seems to be contradicted by what Jerome says. (Sent. I, 39.4(178).1.) Here he is asking whether God’s foreknowledge or providence is the universal cause of all things. And about this he does three things: first, he presents an objection; second, he considers it, at and we know that Jerome’s statement is made in the sense; (Sent. I, 39.4(178).2.) third, he recapitulates, at and so God knows simultaneously and unchangeably all things. (Sent. I, 39.4(178).3.)

Here there are two questions:

first, about the invariability of the divine knowledge; (Q. 1.)

second, about the universality of its providence. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The invariability of the divine knowledge

As regards the first, three things are asked:

first, whether God is able not to know what he knows;

second, whether he is able to know what he does not know, or more things than he does know;

third, whether God knows an infinity of things.

Article 1

Whether God is able not to know what he does know

As regards the first, we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 38, a. 2; below, d. 41, a. 5; ST I.14.15; On Truth, q. 2, a. 5, ad 11; a. 13.) It seems that God is not able not to know what he knows.

Obj. 1: For according to Augustine, Jerome, and the Philosopher, (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee, bk. 26, para. 4 (CSEL 25:732; PL 42:481); Jerome, Epistulae, letter 22, “To Eustochius” (De custod. virginitatis), para. 5 (CSEL 54:149; PL 22:397); Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b10, quoting Agathon.) God cannot make what is past not have been. But when one says, “this was known by God,” it is signified as past. Therefore it cannot be unknown to God.

Obj. 2: If you say that the past is dependent on the what-is-going-to-be, this is no help, as was said before, (Above, d. 37, q. 1, a. 3.) since in the participle “going-to-be” there is indicated not only an order to what-is-going-to-be, but also a certain act as well.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is so is necessarily so when it is so, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, De interpretatione 1.9, 19a23–24.) But God’s knowing is only a being in act, since it is measured by eternity, wherein there is no past or succession. Therefore it seems that it is not able not to be, and thus, God is not able not to know what he does know.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.9, 335a34.) everything eternal is necessary. But God’s knowing anything at all is eternal. Therefore it is necessary; and therefore, equivalently, it cannot not be.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, his knowing is his very existence. But the latter cannot not be. Therefore he cannot not know what he knows.

On the contrary, whatever God knows he brings about by acting. But he is able to not-bring about what he does bring about. Therefore he is able not to know what he knows.

I answer that just as the divine attributes differ according to their proper accounts, and yet are still one reality, so too the acts of the attributes follow on their accounts, and therefore to one act is attributed what does not befit another. For we say God does know a thing that he does not will, or that he does not do. Therefore this is the account of the will: that one freely bring forth his own act; for what comes to be voluntarily does not come to be necessarily, as Augustine says, so one can will and not will. But this should be understood as about the act when it is going out from the will, for after it does so it is no longer subject to the will’s agency—for one cannot not have willed what he has willed. Likewise, it is not subject to the will’s agency that it bring forth both at once, for one cannot will and not will at once. And this should be understood as not only about the immediate act of the will itself, but about all acts commanded by the will, like thinking, speaking, and such.

Therefore, since the act of the divine will is always in act, and not progressive into what is going to be but is always, as it were, coming forth from the will, therefore the divine will’s freedom with respect to its very act endures. Whence it can be said that God is able not to will this, yet it is not possible that he simultaneously have willed and have not willed it, or now he has willed it and later did not will it—taking “later” and “now” on the side of the will, because it is not able to be changeable. And because it was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, a. 1.) regarding the act of the divine knowledge insofar as it is a cause of his activity as informing it, that it is commanded by the will, therefore it can be conceded that God in this way is able not to foreknow. Nevertheless it cannot be that he simultaneously foreknows and does not foreknow, or that he now foreknows and later does not foreknow—speaking of foreknowledge only on the side of the knowledge, such that the force of the account of the future would not come to pass; for what now is the future later will be the present, and then it will not be foreknown, but known.

And therefore one should say that, following the Master’s distinction, (Sent. I, 39.1(175).3.) if it is taken conjunctively, God is not able not to know what he does know; but if it is taken disjunctively, then in this way it is within his power to know and not to know, and this freedom is demonstrated when one says that God is able not to know this.

Reply Obj. 1: The act of the divine knowledge never passes into the past, but always remains in act. And therefore it always remains within the freedom of his will.

Reply Obj. 2: The solution the objector refutes is indeed invalid.

Reply Obj. 3: What is so is necessarily so while it is so, but still absolutely speaking it is not necessarily so. And so too God’s knowing is necessary when he knows, but his knowing is not necessary except by a necessity of immobility, and this latter does not exclude the freedom of his will. And this freedom is what is being signified when one says that God is able not to know or not to will this thing.

Reply Obj. 4: Everything eternal is necessary by a necessity of immobility, which does not exclude the freedom of the will, as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 5: Although his to-be and his to-know are the same according to reality, still his knowing follows his will as commanded by it, but his being does not. And therefore his being is not subject to the freedom of his will, the way his knowing that brings about creation is.

Article 2

Whether God is able to know something that he does not know

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not able to know something he does not already know.

Obj. 1: For God knows existing things only through an idea. But there cannot be any idea in existence itself that does not exist; for, because an idea is the form of a reality existing within God, it cannot be understood that some form might accrue to God without a change in him. Therefore he is not able to know things he does not know.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, knowledge is really referred to the knowable, and it depends on it. But if that on which a thing depends changes, it too changes. Therefore it seems that if something could be known by God that is not now known by him, then his knowledge could change.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, quantity of knowledge is viewed according to the quantity of the things it knows, as the quantity of a power is viewed according to the quantity of its objects. Therefore a growth of knowledge follows on a plurality of knowable things. But if he could know something that he does not know, he could know more things than he does know. Therefore his knowledge could grow—which is impossible. Therefore the same thing follows.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, above it was said (Above, d. 38, q. 1, a. 4.) that God knows not only the things that are, but also things that are not. Now, besides these there can be nothing else, since there is no middle between being and non-being. Therefore he is not able to know anything other than the things he knows.

On the contrary, God is able to bring about what he does not bring about. But whatever he brings about he brings about through his own knowledge. Therefore he is able to know something other than the things he knows.

I answer that God is said to know something in two ways: either with a knowledge of vision, insofar as he sees realities that are or will be or were, not only in the power of their causes, but even in their own proper existence; or with a knowledge of simple understanding, insofar as he knows things that at no time exist as being in the power of their causes. Therefore, in speaking about this latter, God is not able to know anything other than the things that he does know; for nothing is able to exist other than the things that exist and can exist. However, in speaking of his knowledge of vision—which is what the Master is talking about—in this way he is able to see something other than the things he sees, insofar as he is able to give existence in its proper nature to a thing that has existence only within his power.

Nevertheless, if he were to bring this thing into existence, he would have foreknown it from eternity. And therefore one should make the same distinction as before in the previous article. For if it is understood conjunctively, then God is not able to know what he does not know, since these two things—that God might know something that he did not know from eternity—cannot be put together. However, if it is understood disjunctively, then it is true, and the power of his freedom is being designated, as was said in the previous article, and not the changeability of his knowledge or will.

Reply Obj. 1: The idea whereby God knows is according to its essence one, and is distinguished only through its reference to diverse things. Whence were some other reality posited, there would not be any addition of form, but only of reference.

Or it could be said, and better, that just as he knows his very knowing as subject to the freedom of his will, so too he knows his idea insofar as the act of divine knowledge is completed at it; this is like how the knowledge of the artisan is completed at the form of the artwork that he thinks out. And therefore the account of the idea is like that of the act of knowing. For just as one cannot assert that there be an act of knowing in him and that it did not exist before, so too it cannot be designated that there be an idea in him and that it did not exist before. Yet relative to both, the freedom of his will can be designated.

Reply Obj. 2: Our knowledge depends on what is knowable, whereas the knowable depends on God’s knowledge. Whence, just as our knowledge varies even though the knowable remains immobile, so the knowable changes even though God’s knowledge does not change.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in some way it is conceded that God is able to know something other than the things that he knows, still it seems that one cannot concede that he is able to know more things than he knows. For when one says “more,” a comparison to something preexisting is being designated along with what did not exist. And this cannot be in such a way that these two things are true simultaneously: before he did not know it, and now he knows it; nor is he able to know it. And thus it is clear that when one says, “he can know more things,” this pertains in some way to the composite sense. This is why the Master does not, simply speaking, concede it, but only records the opinion. (Sent. I, 39.3(177).1.) And likewise one should not concede that something is being added to his knowledge, nor anything of this sort that constitutes the understanding of the composite sense. Yet if it were conceded, it would not therefore follow that his knowledge could grow. For he knows many and few things through one and the same thing, which is the first and essential object of his knowledge: namely, his own essence, which is the likeness of the realities.

Reply Obj. 4: The things that do not exist God does not know with his knowledge of vision, and here we are speaking only of this.

Article 3

Whether God knows an infinity of things

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.12; SCG I.69; On Truth, q. 2, a. 9; q. 20, a. 4, ad 1; Quodl. III, q. 2, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 133.) It seems that God knows an infinity of things.

Obj. 1: For knowledge is counted according to the things known. But Psalm 147 [146]:5 says, his understanding is beyond measure. Therefore he knows an infinity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God does not know some species of numbers in a different way than others. But he knows some with actual and determinate knowledge, whichever ones any man knows. Therefore, since the species of numbers are infinite, it seems that he determinately knows an infinity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, particulars are infinite. But God knows all particulars, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore he knows an infinity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, his power is infinite, and it is said to be of an infinity of things simply speaking. But he can do nothing except through his knowledge. Therefore it seems that his knowledge is of an infinity of things simply speaking.

On the contrary (5), whatever is known is comprehended perfectly by knowledge. But whatever is comprehended is bounded by the comprehension of understanding, as Augustine says, and as does the Philosopher. (Augustine, Epistulae, letter 147, “To Paulina” (De videndo Deum), ch. 9, para. 21 (CSEL 44:295; PL 33:606); Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.2, 994b18‒31.) Therefore, since the infinite cannot be bounded, it seems that it can be known perfectly by no intellect.

Furthermore (6), we might say that, although it is infinite in itself, still when compared to the infinite divine intellect, it is finite.

On the contrary, what is said of something in diverse ways in reference to diverse things is in the genus of relation; for based on this the Philosopher proves (Aristotle, Categories 6, 5b30‒6a10; 7, 6b30.) that great and small are relative. Therefore whatever is predicated of something in an absolute way, to whatever it might be compared, belongs to itself. But to be infinite is an absolute predicate. Therefore what is infinite in itself cannot be called finite merely relative to anything.

Furthermore (7), the infinite is infinite to the finite, since it cannot be traversed by it. But just as the infinite is not traversed by the finite, neither is it traversed by the infinite, as is proved in Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics 6.7, 237b23‒238b22.) Therefore the infinite is finite relative neither to the finite nor even to the infinite.

Furthermore (8), whatever is known actually is actually in the knower. But an infinity of things cannot be actual. Therefore an infinity cannot be known.

I answer that the infinite can be taken in two ways. The first is intensively infinite, according to the mode of continuous quantity; and in this way God does not know the actually infinite, since an infinite continuous quantity neither exists nor can it exist—unless he is said to know the infinite insofar as he knows his very self, who is infinite. The other way the infinite can be taken is according to discrete quantity; and in this way one should say that, by his knowledge of simple understanding, God knows an infinity of things that are within his power—not only an infinity of individuals, but even an infinity of species. For he could have created an infinity of other species, and he knows he is capable of them. However, when speaking of his knowledge of vision, insofar as he sees realities not only as they are within himself, but even each of them in its own proper existence, in this way his knowledge is not of an infinity of things. (Mandonnet notes that this is true if one accepts the view that the “knowledge of vision” is of complete and subsisting beings. But if one says that the knowledge of vision is of all beings, whether complete and subsisting or accidental, then “we must claim that God knows infinitely many things even by His knowledge of vision,” necesse est dicere quod Deus etiam scientia visionis sciat infinita, as Aquinas asserts in ST I.14.12.)

However, this is not due to some failing in his knowledge, but from a failing of the realities, which are not infinitely numbered according to all time. Whence if one were to posit that the world always existed and will never end, as philosophers have asserted, his knowledge would be of an infinity of things, even by seeing individuals in their own proper existence. This cannot happen with our knowledge, since it cannot know individuals properly except through certain forms received from them. Whence it must understand one thing after another, as is clear from things said earlier. (Above, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1.) And thus, if it understood an infinity of things, it would follow that it could count an infinity of things—which is impossible. Nonetheless our intellect can in a certain way understand an infinity of things, insofar as it understands a universal form that is in potency to an infinity of individuals. Whence the immateriality of the intellect is proved by philosophers, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a12‒27.) based on the fact that in a certain way it has infinite power, which in no way can belong to a power existing in matter.

However, the divine intellect by one thing, which is his essence, understands all things that are or can be, not only with a universal knowledge, but even with a proper and determinate knowledge, as is clear from things said before. (Above, d. 35, q. 1, a. 3.) Whence it is not necessary that it know diverse realities by any traversal of them; rather, by one gaze he sees all things. And on account of this, nothing prevents the divine knowledge from being of an infinity of things.

Reply Obj. 1: There is said to be no number of God’s knowledge on account of its infinite power in comprehending, and not on account of the infinity of the things known by the determinate knowledge of vision, through which realities are known in their own proper nature.

Reply Obj. 2: God knows certain species of number even with a knowledge of vision, but not all of them. For assuming that there was a beginning and an end of the world, there is a certain species of number that realities existing over the succession of times will not exceed. Yet he knows all realities with his knowledge of simple understanding.

Reply Obj. 3: The number of particulars is not infinite simply speaking unless one supposes the eternity of the world—which is against the faith.

Reply Obj. 4: A potency relates to a possible being as its object, the account of which does not depend on actual existence. Whence if an infinity of things is not asserted to be brought to act by the succession of time, still the potency is said to be for an infinity of things, simply speaking. Now, the object of knowledge is the true, which is convertible with being. Whence knowledge cannot be said to be simply speaking of things that do not have actual existence at some time, but only in a certain respect, just as in a certain respect they are said to be within the power of their cause.

Reply Sed Contra 5: An intellect discursively thinking through a reality cannot comprehend an infinite reality, since it would bound it by numbering its parts. But God’s knowledge is non-discursive and uniformly of one and of many, of both things finite and thing infinite.

Reply Sed Contra 6: We concede the sixth argument.

Reply Sed Contra 7: The divine intellect does not understand a reality by traversing it. Whence the objection does not follow.

Reply Sed Contra 8: All the things that God knows are one in him, and they are not distinguished except through their diverse references. However, it is not unfitting that the relations that follow on the activity of the intellect be infinite, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 10.)

Question 2

Divine providence

Next, we ask about divine providence. And regarding this, two things are asked:

first, what is it;

second, whether it pertains to all things.

Article 1

Whether providence pertains to knowledge

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.22.1; On Truth, q. 5, aa. 1, 2.) It seems that providence pertains to his knowledge.

Obj. 1: For, as Boethius says, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:858).) “providence” is said of God because he sees what is distant (porro videt), as though from the watchtower of eternity. But that seems to pertain to knowledge. Therefore it seems so does providence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems to pertain to omnipotence. For Wisdom 14:3 says, it is thy providence, O Father, that steers the course of all things. (RSV omits all things.) But steering pertains to power, as is noted in Hebrews 1:3, upholding the universe by his word of power. Therefore it seems also that providence pertains to omnipotence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems to pertain to his will. For, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 29 (PG 94:963).) providence is the divine will according to which all things receive guidance to the fitting end. And such seems expressly to pertain to the will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems the same as the plan. For, as Boethius says, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:814).) providence is the reason or type established in the highest principle of all things whereby he plans out all things. But to plan things out belongs to a plan. Therefore it seems that the divine plan and divine providence are the same thing.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that it is the same thing as fate. For something’s relation to diverse things does not make its essence diverse. But fate and providence differ only in their relation to diverse things; for Boethius says (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:816).) that the manner in which realities are brought about is called “providence” when referred to the divine knowledge, but “fate” when referred to the very realities that are brought about. Therefore it seems that providence and fate are not essentially different things.

I answer that these three things—plan, knowledge, and providence—are related to each other by way of addition.

For because God has knowledge of created realities that is, as it were, practical, his knowledge should be considered according to the mode of the artisan’s knowledge. Therefore one must note that an artisan, by conceiving in advance his artwork, considers primarily the end; only then does he consider the order of the reality that he intends to make to that end, and also the order of the parts to each other, like that the foundation will be under the walls, and the walls under the roof; and this order of the parts to each other is further ordered to the end of the house. Third, he must consider things that promote the attainment of the end, even such that he might remove things that can impede the end; whence he thinks through things that supplement the house by the addition of certain shrubs, windows, and the like, by which the house is suitable for habitation.

This is why this thinking through is named with the name “knowledge,” by reason only of the cognition and not by reason of any activity. Whence also it belongs to the end and things ordered to the end. But by reason of the order thought out in the thing to be accomplished, it is given the name “plan.” For “plan” signifies a certain order, so the plan is said to be the ordination of the generation. But by reason of the things that promote the end it is called “providence”; for he is called “provident” who makes good conjectures about things that contribute to the end, and even about things that can impede it.

Whence in God as well it is called “knowledge” insofar as he has cognition both of his very self and of the things that he does. But it is called the “plan” by reason of the double order that he places in realities—that of one reality to another reality, insofar as they help each other to attain the ultimate end, and also of the whole universe to God himself; this is as the Philosopher also asserts, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.10, 1075a15.) where he even proposes an example of the order of the parts of an army both toward each other and to the good of the general. However, it is called “providence” insofar as to the realities so ordered he adds things that preserve the order, and repels disorder from all things.

Reply Obj. 1: Providence and a plan considered in diverse ways pertain to knowledge, will, and power. This is clear as follows from the likeness mentioned. For any artisan can have a knowledge of artwork that is merely speculative, without intending to make it; and in this way his providence and plan pertain only to knowledge. However, insofar as he further orders it to the work with the design of executing it, it pertains to knowledge and will. Moreover, insofar as he executes the knowledge in the work, in this way it pertains to the knowledge, will, and power whereby it was brought about. So it is in God as well. It is also clear that, if taken in the first two modes, they are eternal, but taken in the third mode, they are from time. And the very execution of providence is called “governance.”

Reply Obj. 2–4: Whereby the solution to these is clear. For providence includes a plan, and adds to it; on account of that he is even said to plan things through providence.

Reply Obj. 5: Providence and fate do differ essentially. For the form of a house is one thing insofar as it is in the artisan’s mind, where it has the name “art,” and essentially something else insofar as it is in the stones and wood, where it is called “artwork.” In just the same way the type of the governance of realities has one existence in the divine mind, where it is called “providence,” and a different one in the secondary causes to which belongs the duty of fulfilling the divine governance, due to which things it is called “fate,” from “I declare, you declare” (for, faris).

Or it is so named because it is a certain utterance (effatum) of the divine ordination, just as a vocalized word is a certain utterance of an interior concept; or because due to a consideration of these causes, the ancients had a custom of making assertions (fari) about future realities, as was done especially from the consideration of the motions of the heavens.

Article 2

Whether providence is over all things

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.22.2; I.103.5; SCG III.64, 75, 94; On Truth, q. 5, aa. 2‒7; Compendium theologiae, cc. 123, 130, 132; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 3, lect. 1.) It seems that providence is not over all things.

Obj. 1: For removing things that impede the end pertains to providence. But a thing is called evil through its deviation from order to the end. Therefore, since there are many evils in the universe, it seems that not all things are subject to divine providence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing that occurs by chance is provided for; for the unexpected outcome of a thing is called “chance,” and according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 196b30; 2.6, 197b19.) it is among things that act for the sake of something, when it happens outside what was intended. But many things in the world occur by chance, as the Philosopher proves; (Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 196b10‒18; Metaphysics 6.2, 1027a18.) otherwise all things would happen by necessity, unless certain causes were to fail on occasion, which brings in chance. Therefore not all things are provided for by God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that is provided for is ordered to one thing. But free decision is not ordered to one thing; rather, it is open toward each option. Therefore things that are from free decision are not subject to divine providence.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is provided for attains its end for the most part, unless the providence makes a mistake. But evil, which occurs according to a deviation from the end, is found to occur for the most part. Therefore the universe is not ruled by providence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, ordering is proper to providence. But many things in the universe happen in a disordered way, both in natural things, as when summers are rainy and winters are dry, and among men, as when the just are punished by the wicked, who overflow with prosperity, and the like. Therefore it seems that the universe is not ruled by providence.

Obj. 6: Habakkuk 1:14 says, you make men like the fish of the sea, like crawling things that have no ruler. And he says this while wondering about the things that appear to happen without order among men. Therefore it seems that God’s providence does not extend to the beasts.

On the contrary, it is said in Wisdom 12:13 that he has care over all things. (RSV instead reads neither is there any god besides thee, whose care is for all men, but the RSV notes that “all men” could also be translated “all things”; the Vulgate, however, reads omnia, which can only be translated as “all things.”) But in the name “care” or “solicitude,” providence is being signified. Therefore his providence extends to all things.

I answer that this question has been blown about by all the wise, and therefore one must see the positions of the diverse thinkers, so that one might avoid the errors, and so that we might hold to the path of truth.

Therefore one should note first that some have asserted that there is providence over no reality, but all things happen by chance. This was the position of Democritus and almost all the ancient natural scientists, who denied agent causality and posited only material causality. But this position has been quite effectively disproved even by the philosophers themselves.

Others have asserted that providence is over certain realities, but not over all. And this is divided into two paths. For there is a certain position that God’s providence extends only to species, and not to individuals, except ones that are necessary. They asserted that what deviates from its own course is not subject to the laws of providence, and therefore things that frequently fall away from the ordered course are not provided for, things like corruptible and generable particulars. And this opinion is imposed on Aristotle, even though it cannot be held expressly from his own words; but his Commentator expressly asserts this opinion in Metaphysics 11. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 52.) For he says that it is not appropriate that the divine goodness have care over individuals, except insofar as they share in a common nature, like how a spider knows how to make a web, and the like. But this opinion expressly takes away God’s judgment over the deeds of men.

This is why there was another position, that God has providence over all the things mentioned, and even over individual men not merely insofar as they share in a species, but even according to their particular acts. Rabbi Moses asserts this, (Moses Maimonides, Guide for the Perplexed, part 3, ch. 18.) and assigns as a reason that the intellectual nature is found even in a particular man; through it he comprehends in his own intellect the form of the species as species. For the intellect attributes the intention of universality to the apprehended nature, which intention the nature does not have outside the soul in the realities themselves. And this is why the individual man is not abandoned by the providence that is over the species—and especially because he has something in common with the enduring substances, which providence also stands over through itself and according to the individuals; this is as regards the nobler part of man, which is his intellect.

But because the divine knowledge is equally of singulars and universals, as was said earlier, (Above, d. 35, q. 1, a. 5.) and it belongs to the one who is most of all good to order all things to the end insofar as their natures are apt for it, it does not seem fitting that providence not be over all individual things as well. And further, this is explicitly opposed to the Lord’s statement in Matthew 10:29, when he says not one sparrow falls to the earth without the heavenly Father’s consent, that is, without his providence.

The position of others is that God has providence over all things. But some of these say that his providence is over all things equally, and they necessarily fall into three errors. For some, thinking that providence is simultaneously over good and evil things, because these two cannot be intended by one agent, have been forced to assert that there are two gods—one of which provides for good things, and the other for evils, following the heresy of the Manicheans. And this position has been sufficiently disproved by the saints and philosophers; for evil has no efficient cause, nor can it be intended.

Others, thinking that providence is similarly over contingent and necessary things, have been forced to deny free decision and contingency, asserting that all things that are subject to providence arise from necessity, which is clearly false, based on sensation. Still others, thinking providence is similarly over rational and irrational beings, have been forced to assert that nothing bad happens that is not provided as a punishment or as an occasion of a greater reward, even for the beasts. Whence they assert that it is a sin to kill a beast just as it is to kill a man. This certain heretics of our time seem to think.

But because all these things are foreign to the faith, therefore one should say simply speaking that all things are subject to providence, but not in the same way. But how this is so should be seen. For it has been said that providence supposes a plan that determines the order in realities preserved in a gradation of diverse natures. Therefore, since it does not belong to providence to destroy the order of realities, the effect of providence is fulfilled in realities in a way that is suitable to the reality, insofar as the latter is naturally apt to attain the end. For as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 33 (PG 3:734).) providence does not destroy reality’s natures, but preserves them. And therefore it so institutes certain realities that, according to their own condition, they attain the end through the principle that is nature alone, as in all irrational things, whereas in other things he adds, over and above this, another principle, which is will.

However, in the ones that attain their end through a principle that is nature, one finds a certain gradation. For the nature of certain realities cannot be impeded from attaining its own effect; and this is a higher grade, as is found in the heavenly bodies, whereby in them nothing happens unintended by God due to their failure. On account of this Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, ch. 6.) that above the orb of the moon there is no evil, speaking about natural evil. But there is another grade of nature that can be impeded and can fail, as is found in the nature of generable and corruptible things. And even though such a nature is inferior in goodness, still it too is good, and it is better that each grade exists together than that only either of them exists alone. However, if God had conferred on this nature that it never would fail, it would right away not be this nature, but another; and in this way both natures would not exist, which would detract from the perfection of the universe. Whence, he established this nature while foreknowing the possibility of failure, which is an evil of the nature, but without intending it. Rather, he provided for it such that, if evil were to happen, due to a defect of some nature, it would be ordered to the good, just as we see that the corruption of one is the generation of the other. And this mode of providence extends even to the brute animals, which act more by an instinct of their nature than by choice of a will. And therefore the evil that happens among them is counterbalanced by the good of a nature but not by the good of reward, as when the death of a fly is the meal of a spider.

But in the nobler creatures there is found another principle besides nature, the will; to the degree that this is closer to God, so much freer it is from the necessity of natural causes, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 2 (CCSL 94; PL 63:834).) And therefore from its own condition it follows that it could hold fast to the right order by holding fast to the end, and it could also fall away from it. Now, if it were inevitable that it hold fast to the end, the condition of its own nature would be thereby taken away from it by divine providence, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 33 (PG 3:734).) And this is why it has been instituted by God in such a way that it can also fail, yet such that it would be within its power that it fail or not fail; but this was not possible in the failure of a natural principle. And such failures of their wills occurring outside the intention of providence God foreknew, and he ordered them to not merely a good of nature, but even to a good of a like genus, such as the good of justice—which is shown when a fault is put in order through punishment—and to the good of the will of others who, through the formers’ iniquity, are either directed away from these sins, or grow in merits or glory. And this happens in many other ways, which human reason is not sufficient to explicate.

Whence it is clear that good and evil are subject to divine providence: but the evil as foreknown and ordered but not intended by God, and the good as indeed intended; but the necessary in such a way that it cannot fail, and the contingent in such a way that it can fail; and the voluntary in such a way that it might have a punishment or a reward, or it might be ordered toward someone’s reward or punishment; but the natural in such a way that it would attain its natural end, if it is good, and it would enter into some other nature’s good, if it is evil.

Reply Obj. 1: It belongs to providence to direct each and every thing to its end and to remove impediments; yet even while such a nature is preserved as directed to the end, evils occur due to the condition of this fallible nature, and not due to divine intention, which orders those very evils to the good.

Reply Obj. 2: Effects follow on the condition of their nearest cause; therefore, even though something is provided for by God, it is said to occur by chance if it happens outside the nature of the one bringing it about, or by luck if it happens outside the intention of an agent acting deliberately.

Reply Obj. 3: Free decision is ordered through itself to one thing—that is, to the good—in such a way that it can fall away from it and that this is within its very self. For if it were to tend inevitably to one thing, the account of the will would be taken away in this nature.

Reply Obj. 4: “Evil” can be taken either in natural realities or in voluntary ones. If it is taken in natural things, it is certain that evil is for the less part. This is clear, first, as regards supposits, since an evil of nature occurs only in the sphere of generable and corruptible things, which sphere is small in quantity in comparison to that of the heavenly bodies, wherein there can be no evil, because they are incorruptible and their motions cannot have any disorder, since they are always in the same mode. This is also clear when one considers the very same thing, since natural causes attain their effects for the most part, and fail for the less part, and evil arises from the latter. But even in voluntary evils, as regards their number, evil is found to occur in the angelic nature for the less part, since far more of them remained than fell, and perhaps even more than all the damned together, demons and men.

But in the human nature the good appears to be for the less part, and the reason for this can be assigned in two ways. One is on account of the corruption of human nature due to original sin, which God both foresaw and preordained, just like other evils; but he did not prohibit that nature from remaining in its freedom—with that taken away, the account of that nature would perish.

The other reason can be drawn from the very nature of the human condition. For one finds three grades in natural things: there is something that has only actual existence, and in this no defect of existing can arise, as with heavenly bodies; moreover, there is something that exists only in potency, as the first matter, and this always has a defect unless it be removed by some agent reducing it to act; and there is also something that has act mixed with privation, and this, on account of the act directing its activity, acts rightly for the most part, but defects for the less part, as is clear in the nature of generable and corruptible things. Therefore so it is in intellectual beings. For a certain intellectual nature is complete act, without any mixture with privation or potency; and nothing can come forth from this that is not rectified, as is clear for God. There is also a certain nature with which potency is mixed, but still it has in its nature a certain act directing it in its activity, as is so with the angels; and therefore such a nature falls away from rectitude for the lesser part. But in the human nature, the secondary perfections whereby its actions are directed are not innate, but acquired or infused. This is why the Commentator (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, text. 14.) compares the human potential intellect to prime matter, and the Philosopher (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 430a1.) compares it to a tablet on which nothing has been written.

And this is why the human nature itself, considered in itself, is equally and indifferently oriented to all things that are to be understood or done. And because evil happens in manifold ways, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 30 (PG 3:730).) and the good in only one, this is why human nature for the most part bends toward evil. For so considered, the human nature is not yet a perfect agent, except as regards its natural activities; rather, it is a perfect agent as regards all its own actions only when it is perfected by its secondary perfections, which are the virtues. And therefore when it is determined through its secondary perfection, whether infused or acquired, then it is determined to one thing, either to what it tends toward for the most part, as in the state of the earthly path, or always, as in the state of the heavenly fatherland. This is why Cicero compares virtue to nature, saying that it is a voluntary habit in accord with reason in the mode of a nature. (See Cicero, On Invention, bk. 2, ch. 53, para. 159; Paradoxa Stoicorum ad M. Brutum, paradox 3, para. 22.) And therefore a will perfected by the virtue of justice orients itself to just actions the way that fire does to downward motion. And thereby it is also clear that the order of providence is preserved more in good things than in evils.

Reply Obj. 5: Whatever is in the world is an ordered whole, even though the account of the order is not apparent to us in some things—and especially in voluntary things, since sometimes good things happen to those who are evil, and sometimes evil things too, and likewise with those who are good. But the reason for this order is known by God, just as a physician knows why he would sometimes give hot things to the sick and sometimes cold things, and likewise with those who are healthy; and as Boethius says, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:818).) one ignorant of the art is astonished.

Nonetheless, such disorder, if one considers it carefully, is found not to occur in the things toward which human actions are ordered through themselves, and the things that are in themselves good or evil for man. For a good action always has joined to it a reward of goodness in the perfection of virtue, which is the human good, and also in the attainment of beatitude, toward which human actions are ordered; and the contrary is the case for those who are evil. But such mixture seems to occur in those goods that are outside man, or which are not his good insofar as he is a man, like bodily goods and the goods of nature, although such a mixing is nonetheless always ordered to what is man’s good through itself, that is, a good of grace or of glory, according to the Apostle: in everything God works for good with those who love him (Rom 8:28), or for the sake of manifesting divine justice. For often the impious prosper in this life, so that in the Judgment the verdict against them might be more manifestly apparent.

Reply Obj. 6: It is implied in that authority that providence is not over beasts and over men in the same way; and this is true, as is clear from things said in the body of the article.