D. 24 - Names signifying unity and plurality in the divine

Division of the text

After laying out the division of the divine names, and having shown that some names in the divine are predicated in the plural and others only in the singular, now the Master makes an inquiry about the names signifying the unity and plurality—how they are to be taken in God. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the very names signifying unity and plurality according to themselves; in the second, he shows how terms signifying plurality can be added to the name “person” at moreover, . . . we must consider. (Sent. I, 25.1(102).1.)

The first part is divided into three parts: in the first, he presents the question; in the second, he answers it, at if we consider diligently the aforementioned words of our authorities; (Sent. I, 24.1(101).2.) third, he resolves an objection, at here it is not to be passed over that, although it was said above that God is not to be confessed to be either single or manifold, . . . Isidore seems to think the contrary. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).11.)

If we consider diligently the aforementioned words of our authorities, . . . the use of these words seems to have been introduced more to remove and exclude from the simplicity of the divinity what is not there. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).2.) Here he answers the question, and does three things regarding it: first, he presents a summary of the answer in a general way; second, he specifies it as regards names signifying the unity, at for when we say one God, a multitude of gods is excluded; (Sent. I, 24.1(101).3.) third, he does so as regards names signifying the plurality, at so also, when we say three persons, by the term three we do not posit a numerical quantity in God. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).6.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows what the name “one” signifies when it is joined to an essential term; second, what it signifies when it is joined to a personal term, at similarly, when it is said ‘the Father is one’ . . . the reason for the statement is this: that there are not many Fathers. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).4.)

So also, when we say three persons, by the term three we do not posit a numerical quantity in God. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).6.) Here he shows what, in the divine, the names pertaining to plurality signify; and regarding this, he does three things: for some names pertain to plurality by signifying plurality itself, whose signification he expresses first; but some signify that which is a principle of plurality, like distinction and division, whose signification he expresses second, at and when we say ‘the persons are distinct’ or ‘there is a distinction among the persons,’ we exclude confusion and mixing; (Sent. I, 24.1(101).8.) moreover, a certain name, as it were, contains the plurality, the name “Trinity,” which is a collective name of the persons, the signification of which he explains third, at but when the term ‘Trinity’ is said, it seems that what is signified is the same as when we say ‘three persons.’ (Sent. I, 24.1(101).10.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he explains the names that signify plurality in a general way, like the name “several”; second, he explains the names that signify plurality in a specific way, at so also when we say ‘discrete persons,’ . . . we reach the same understanding. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).9; the Silano translation reads different instead of discrete.)

Here in the first, he first explains the name pertaining to the threeness of the persons; second, he explains a name pertaining to their twoness, at similarly, when we say ‘Father and Son are two,’ we do not posit a quality of duality there. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).7.)

And when we say ‘the persons are distinct’ or ‘there is a distinction among the persons,’ we exclude confusion and mixing. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).8.) Here he explains the names signifying that which is a principle of plurality. And first he explains the name “distinction”; second, the name “discrete,” at so also when we say ‘discrete persons,’ . . . we reach the same understanding. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).9.)

Here two questions are asked:

the first, about the names signifying unity and plurality in the divine; (Q. 1.)

the second, about names signifying things that are connected to plurality. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Names signifying unity and plurality

As regards the first, four things are asked:

first, whether unity is in the divine, such that it can be said truly that God is one;

second, whether any number is there;

third, if it is there, whether names signifying unity and plurality would predicate something affirmatively in God, or only by removing something, as is said in the text;

fourth, if they do posit something in some way, what they would signify, whether the essence or a notion.

Article 1

Whether God can be called one

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 1; In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.11.3; I.103.3; SCG I.42; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 6; Compendium theologiae, ch. 15; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 13, lect. 2, 3; Commentary on the Metaphysics bk. 8, lect. 12; bk. 12, lect. 10.) It seems that God cannot be called one.

Obj. 1: For the determinate principle of any genus is found only in things that have the nature of that genus, just as soul is found only in living things. But unity is in the genus of quantity, as its principle, just as a point is. Therefore, since there is no quantity in God, it seems that neither is there unity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Boethius, (Boethius, De institutione arithmetica, bk. 1, ch. 7 (CCSL 94A; PL 63:1085).) the unit (Unitas, grammatically speaking, is an abstract noun, so “unity” or “oneness” is often the best translation. However, the corresponding concrete noun/adjective unitus is not translated as “one” or “unit,” since it commonly means “what has been united” from many. Hence unitas, in arithmetical contexts, is best translated concretely as “unit,” from which follows the ambiguity and apparent equivocation of the English in this objection.) is potentially every number, whence all the attributes of numbers are found virtually in the unit. But in God there is no potency to the multitude of number. Therefore it seems that unity is not there.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing can be called “one” except what is bounded in itself, and distinct from others; this is why unity follows on the act of form bounding a thing. But God cannot be said to be bounded in himself, since a thing is bounded only if boundaries enclose its essence—which does not fit God. Therefore it seems that he could not be called “one.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is one can be counted along with another. But God cannot be counted with anything created. This is first because what is created and God do not belong together in any “one,” since this “one” would then be prior to both, nor are things counted together unless they belong together in some respect, like when we say, “two men,” or “two horses.” The second reason is because what is counted along with another is part of the resulting plurality, and is exceeded by it—which does not fit God. Therefore God cannot be called “one.”

On the contrary, Deuteronomy 6:4 says, hear, O Israel: the Lord your God is one God. (RSV: one Lord.)

Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b15‒27.) that by which all things of any genus are measured is the “one” of that genus. But God is the first thing by which all substances are measured, as the Commentator says. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 7.) Therefore it seems that he is the “one” in the genus of substance.

I answer that God is one in the highest way and most truly. For insofar as something stands to non-division, so too does it stand to unity, for according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016a33.) being is called “one” in that it is not divided. And therefore things that are undivided through themselves are more truly one than things that are undivided incidentally, like white and Socrates, which are one incidentally. And among the things that are one through themselves, those are more truly one that are undivided simply speaking than are those that are undivided in some respect, whether of genus, or species, or proportion. Whence also they are not called “one” simply speaking, but either “one in genus,” or “in species,” or “in proportion.” And what is, simply speaking, undivided is called “one,” simply speaking, and this is what is numerically one.

But in such things there is also a certain gradation. For there is something that, although it is actually undivided, it is still divisible, potentially—either by a division of quantity, or an essential division, or in both ways. What is divisible by a division of quantity is, for example, what is one by continuity; what is so by an essential division is, for example, in things composed of form and matter, or from existence and what exists; what is so by both is, for example, in natural bodies. And that some of these are not actually divided is due to something in them, beyond the nature of composition or division, as is clear in the body of the heavens and the like; such things, although they are not actually divisible, are still divisible in the intellect.

But there is also something that is indivisible both in act and potency, and such is manifold. For there is something that has in its own account something besides the account of non-divisibility, for example, a point, which besides its non-division also brings in position. And there is something that brings in nothing else, but is its own indivisibility itself, for example, the unity that is the principle of number; and still, this inheres in something that is not itself unity, that is, its subject. Whence it is clear that what is truly and in the highest way one is what has no composition of parts, no continuity of dimension, no variation of accidents, inhering in nothing, as Boethius concludes. (Pseudo-Boethius (it is actually Dominic Gundisalvi), De unitate et uno (PL 63:1075).) And thereby its unity is the principle of every unity and the measure of every reality. For what is the maximum is the principle in any genus, just as the maximally hot is of everything hot, as is said in Metaphysics 2, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b25.) and what is simplest is the measure in any genus, as is said in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b15‒1053a14.)

Reply Obj. 1: “One” is spoken of in two ways, for there is the one that is convertible with being, and the one that is the principle of number. When speaking of the one that is convertible with being, this is not determined to the genus of quantity; rather, it is found in all beings. And just as God is a being not by some existence that is not himself, so too he is one not by some unity that is not himself, but is so by his own essence; and therefore he is maximally one. However, when speaking about the one that is the principle of number, this cannot be transferred into divine predication as regards its genus, which is quantity, but only as regards its difference, which pertains to perfection, as indivisibility and the first account of measuring, or something of this sort.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, c. 980‒1037 AD), Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt), bk. 3, ch. 5. Avicenna’s Metaphysics is itself a section of the larger work, The Book of Healing (al-Shifa’).) the unity and number that the arithmetician considers are not the unity and multitude that are found in all beings; rather, he considers unity and number only insofar as they are found in material things, insofar as plurality is caused by the division of the continuous. For due to this are found all those attributes that arithmeticians demonstrate in numbers, like multiplication, addition, and the like, which are founded on the infinite division of the continuous. This is why there is infinity in number, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206b3‒19; 3.7, 207b1‒15.) and therefore also every number is potentially a sort of unit. Nonetheless, one should understand that every number is indeed in God according to potency—not indeed by a passive potency, but by an active one, insofar as he, as the cause of all things, has within himself in advance the number of all things, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 6 (PG 3:819).) insofar as all things are said to be in him as in an efficient and exemplar principle. But this is not how the objection proceeds.

Reply Obj. 3: God is something determinate in himself; otherwise the conditions of other beings could not be denied of him. Nor is he called a determinate being because he is bounded by some terminus, but rather because, through the excellence of his own existence, which is the most simple, not admitting of addition, he is distinct from all other things.

Reply Obj. 4: Although God and the created do not belong together in any one respect, according to any mode of belonging, nonetheless one must consider a commonness of analogy between God and the created, insofar as created things imitate him to the extent that they can. Whence in some way he can be counted along with other things, as when we say that God and the angel are two realities; yet this is not done simply speaking, and properly, the way that created things are counted with each other, which belong together in some univocally one aspect. And from this it does not follow that God is a part of something, or that God and the angel are something more than God, but only that they are several things.

Article 2

Whether there is number in God

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.30.1, ad 4.) It seems that there is no number in God.

Obj. 1: For as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) that in which there is no number is the truly one, and he is speaking of God, who is one in the highest way. Therefore it seems that there is no number in him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Isidore, (Although Isidore does offer an etymology for numerus, through the word nummus, “coin,” he does not offer the etymology that Aquinas records here; see Isidore, The Etymologies, bk. 3, ch. 3, para. 1 (PL 82:155).) “number” (numerus) is said as though it were “the parting of the one” (unius meros), that is, its division. But in God there is no division. Therefore neither is there number.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, where number is found, so are the attributes of number. But addition, multitude, and such, which are attributes of number, are not found in God. Therefore neither is number.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a number is a multitude measured by the one, as is said in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b21.) But God is the measure that is not measured, but rather the one measuring all things. Therefore it seems that number does not befit God.

On the contrary, 1 John 5:8 says, there are three who give testimony in heaven: the Father, the Word, and the Holy Spirit; and these three are one. (RSV reads significantly differently, because of disputed manuscripts: here are three witnesses, the Spirit, the water, and the blood; and these three agree.) But “three” signifies a number. Therefore it seems that number is there.

Furthermore, wherever there is distinction or discreteness, some number is there. But we say the divine persons are discrete or distinct. Therefore number is in the divine persons.

I answer that, just as the account of unity consists in non-division, so too the account of number or multitude consists in division or some distinction. Whence the things we find divided simply speaking we say are many simply speaking, and the things we find divided in some respect we say are many in some respect. Now, division simply speaking is viewed either according to essence, or form, or according to quantity, that is, matter; thus, things that differ according to essence we say are many things, like man and rock, and likewise the two parts of a line already divided we call two lines. However, division merely in a certain respect is what we attend to in reference to a thing’s properties, for example, when we say a white man is other than, and distinct from, himself when he was black. This is even more a division in a certain respect in things wherein we are attending to a diversity of relations that are only according to account, for example, a point, if it were said to be many insofar as it is the beginning of several lines.

Therefore one needs to understand that in the divine there is no number simply speaking, which is by the division of essence or of quantity, but there is a sort of number, that is, a number of relations—yet not of relations existing in God according to account only, but relations really subsisting in him. Whence the number of the divine persons is a middle between a number that is a number simply speaking and a number that is only in account, just as a point is said to be manifold only according to account. For there is less of the account of number in the number of the persons than in number simply speaking, and more than in a number that is only according to account.

However, if we compare the number of the persons to the number of absolute properties that are in created things, they will stand as the exceeding and the exceeded. For if the account of distinction is attended to, a greater distinction is found in the absolute properties of created things than in the divine persons; for color and flavor are distinguished according to different accidental existences, whereas in the divine persons the existence of the three persons is one and the same. But if the perfection of the distinction is considered, then the number of the persons exceeds, since the relations in the divine are subsisting persons. Whence on the number of the relations follows the number of the persons, whereas this is not so for the number of properties in created things, since their properties are not subsistent, but merely inhere in them.

Reply Obj. 1: Boethius is speaking about essential unity, and no number falls within the essence, but only in the persons, which number is not even a number absolutely speaking, but a sort of number.

Reply Obj. 2: Although division is not properly in God, nonetheless distinction is there in the persons, which is enough for the account of the sort of number that is posited to be in God.

Reply Obj. 3: Addition and such are attributes of number that follow on the division of the continuous, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 5.) And it is certain that this sort of number is not in God.

Reply Obj. 4: In absolute number, the plurality holds a certain composition and addition that is less precise than the one that is its principle; and therefore not merely as regards its concept, but even as regards its reality the measurability of such a multitude is through the unit. But in the number of the relations or persons, there is no order of precision or composition in the reality, so the number in God is not a measured multitude—except perhaps merely according to how it is taken by the intellect, which composes even things that are not composed, insofar as it understands things diverse from them; for it also forms affirmative propositions in the divine.

Article 3

Whether unity and number assert or take away something in the divine

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.30.3; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 7; Quodl. X, q. 1, a. 1.) It seems that “unity” and “number” do assert something in the divine, and they do not merely signify by taking something away.

Obj. 1: For if anything is removed by “one,” it can only be plurality; likewise, if anything is removed by “plurality,” it can only be unity. Therefore if each is said by way of removal, then each will be only a removal of a removal. But the privation of a privation is nothing, except according to thought, which can in this way be multiplied infinitely, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 6.) Therefore, according to this, number and unity would not really be in God, but only in the account of one understanding him; and then we could not speak of there being several persons, unless we mean several in notion—which seems heretical.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every privation or negation is defined through an assertion of what is negated. Therefore, if “unity” deprives something of multitude or number, then number or multitude falls within the definition of unity.

Additionally, since “multitude” is said through a removal of unity, unity must be asserted in its definition. And then the definition will be circular, which cannot be, since then the same thing will be prior and posterior, more known and less known.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if “one” is said according to negation, it will be said through the negation of division, just as the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016b3.) that the one is what is not divided. But division seems to have multitude in its conception, since everything divided is multiple. Therefore multitude falls within the definition of unity, nor can multitude ever be defined unless unity is admitted into its definition. Therefore it will be circular, as before.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a privation never constitutes a possession, nor vice versa, and likewise, neither does affirmation a negation, nor do contraries constitute each other. But a multitude is constituted from units. Therefore it seems that the unit would not take away multitude, nor vice versa.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whatever is said of God and the created is in God in a nobler way than in the created. But number and unity are in created things not only by way of a removal, but also by way of something positive. For number is a certain species of quantity, and the unit is its principle, and they even stand to each other as measure to measured. Therefore, since it is nobler to exist than not to exist, it seems that they predicate something in God in a positive way.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054a20‒25.) one is opposed to multitude just as privation is opposed to possession. But “privation” does not predicate something positively, so then neither does “one.” But a number is constituted from units. Therefore neither does “number” predicate something positively.

Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016b3.) that a thing is called “one” from the fact that it is not divided. But this is only a negation. Therefore it seems that “one” predicates nothing positively, and for the same reason neither does a “number” constituted from units.

I answer that a divergence of opinion is found about what unity is, both among the philosophers and among the masters. For Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 6.) that the one that is convertible with being is the same thing as the one that is the principle of number, and the multitude that is number is the same thing as the multitude that divides being. And thus, he intends that both “one” and “multitude” add something positive over and above the things to which they are joined, such that in the one is understood not only existence as in a subject, but existence as what is contained in its own concept.

Whence the one is a certain existence that is not divided. And such existence does not signify what is the existence of substance, since then unity and number would not be found in accidents. Nor is it even the existence common to substance and accident, since then some number would be found that would not be an accident. Rather, he says that it is the existence of an accident, and through that existence supervening after the complete existence of substance, it is called “one substance,” just as through the existence of whiteness it is said to be a “white substance.” And thereby he proves that number is only an accident. And according to this, “unity” indicates an accidental intention, and from the gathering of such intentions a number is brought about, which is a species of quantity.

And certain theologians, following this position, say that “unity” and “number” are carried over into divine predication not according to the existence of an accident, or of quantity, but according to the proper account of unity or number. And thus, they predicate something in God in a positive way, just as “knowledge,” “goodness,” and the other things that are said in this way of God.

Other philosophers—namely, Aristotle and Averroes (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a10‒14 ; 10.1, 1052a29‒b30; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 2, text. 7‒8.)—say that the one and the many that divide being are not the same as the one that is the principle of number and the many that is the species of quantity. And this is reasonable. For it is unfitting that something contained under something lower be the specific difference (The differentiating marks, or “differences,” that divide a genus into its species are called “specific” or “species-making” differences. Thus, rational and irrational divide the genus animal into man and beast. The genus animal itself is a species of a higher genus, the living (or organism), and this itself is a species of the still higher genus, substance. Each such genus has its own pair of specific differences. See d. 25, q. 1, a. 1.) of something higher, just as rational is not the specific difference of substance. Whence neither can multitude, which is under quantity, be the difference of being, simply speaking. Therefore they say that the one that is convertible with being adds nothing positive to what it is joined to, by the fact that a thing is not said to be one through some added disposition; for then one would go to infinity, if this disposition would also be one through some other unity, since it too is one. This is why they say that the one contains in its concept common being, and adds the account of privation or negation of something over and above being, that is, of non-division. Whence, being and one are convertible just as things that are the same in reality are, and they differ only through account, insofar as one adds the negation over and above being.

Hence if the account of the one is considered in reference to what it adds to being, it indicates only negation. And for the same reason, multitude does not add something over and above the many things except a certain account, that is, that of division. For just as it is called “one” from the fact that it is not divided, so too things are called “many” from the fact that they are divided. However, the first account of division—according to which anything is distinguished from anything else—occurs in affirmation and negation; and therefore “multitude” indicates a negation in its account insofar as there are many things, of which one is not the other. And negation of this sort of division, taken in this way in the account of multitude, is indicated in the account of the one. And so taken, one and many are the first differences of being, insofar as being is divided into the one and the many, and into act and potency. Whence, taken this way, they are not determined to any genus, and thus this multitude, taken this way, is not a number that is a species of quantity, nor is this one, so taken, the one that is the principle of number.

According to the philosophers mentioned—Aristotle, Averroes, and Avicenna (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016b18‒29; Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics*, bk. 5, text. 12; Avicenna*, Metaphysics*, bk. 3, ch. 5.)*—the one as the principle of number does assert something additional to existence, namely, the existence of a measure, the account of which is found primarily in the unit, and derivatively in other numbers, and then in continuous quantities, and lastly, the name is transferred to all the other genera, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052a15‒b1; 1053b4.)

But certain ones take a position intermediate between these two, agreeing with Aristotle inasmuch as the one that is convertible with being does not add something positively over and above that to which it is joined, but also with Avicenna inasmuch as he says that the one as the principle of number and the one as convertible with being are the same thing, and differ only in account. And so, according to them, it adds something positive to that to which it is joined.

However, their reason for why the one differs in the two ways only according to reason is as follows. For because the one follows the act of the distinguishing form due to the fact that form gives existence, the one is convertible with being; however, from the second act of form, which is to distinguish from others, it is the principle of number, and it is counted in the genus of accident, since this distinction according to account follows on complete existence. But this argument cannot stand, since if the unity that is the principle of number is said according to the account of privation, then it will not be anything except within the soul; and thus also neither is the number of which it is the principle. Whence it could not be a species in any genus.

Therefore the difference between the two opinions is that the first does not distinguish between the one and many insofar as they are in the genus of quantity, and the one and many insofar as they are first differences of being, whereas the second opinion does make this distinction, as was said a little above. And this is why I believe it is more true.

Therefore I say, following this, that number and unity insofar as they are in the genus of quantity are found only in things wherein is found the commensuration of quantity. Whence they are found only in things that possess continuous quantity. This is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 206b4‒19; 3.7, 207b2‒15.) that we know number by the division of the continuous; and this number is only the subject of arithmetic, as Avicenna also says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 5.) Whence such number and unity does not enter into the divine predication, but only the one and many insofar as they are of those other things that follow universally upon being; and terms of this sort add nothing according to account in the divine over and above that of which they are said, except merely the account of negation, as the Master says in the text. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).2‒4.)

Reply Obj. 1: Negation is in a multitude insofar as one reality is distinguished from another through a negation; this is why in a multitude there is real negation or privation insofar as one reality is said not to be another. And the negation brought in by the account of unity negates such a distinction through negation. Whence I say that such negation wherein the account of unity is perfected is not but a negation of reason only. For every relation a being has toward negation or toward non-being is only a relation of reason. Whence the relation by which a being is referred to non-being is not but in reason only; likewise the privation whereby a non-being is negated of being is in reason only, as is a privation of a privation, or a negation of a negation. And thus it is clear that we do not assert distinction within the divine persons according to reason only, since we say that one person is really not the other.

Reply Obj. 2: As is clear from things said in the body, “one” does not bring in negation except in reason. Whence, according to reality, it stands closer to affirmation than does “multitude,” which brings in a real negation according to which reality is distinguished from reality. And therefore in the intellect the one is prior to multitude, even though according to sensation or imagination the opposite is the case, as the Philosopher says; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054a27.) for in this latter way composite things are prior to simples, and the divided to the undivided. And therefore multitude does not fall within the definition of the one; rather, what is prior in concept to unity does. For the first thing that falls within the apprehension of the intellect is being and non-being, and this is enough for the definition of the one, insofar as we understand the one to be being, wherein there is not the distinction by being and non-being; and these latter, that is, things distinguished by being and non-being, do not have the account of multitude except after the intellect attributes to each of them the intention of unity. And thereby he defines multitude as what is from the ones, of which one is not the other. And in this way unity falls in the definition of multitude, but not vice versa.

Reply Obj. 3: This is the true definition of the one: the one is being that is not divided. However, Avicenna (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 6.) endeavors to disprove this for the reason given above. For division is of two sorts, the first of which is division according to quantity; and such division follows on the account of multitude, in that the account of number, insofar as it is a species of quantity, follows the account of multitude commonly taken insofar as it adds the account of a measure. This is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b21.) that a number is a multitude measured by a one, and that the concept of the division of the continuous follows on the account of number. For an account of division, quantity, and measure, according to the Commentator (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 1.) is found in discrete quantity before being found in continuous quantity, and such division is not placed within the definition of the one that is convertible with being. But there is also another division, according to form or essence, insofar as one reality is divided from another through its form. And this division is found primarily in affirmation and negation, which, according to concept, precedes the account of the one, as was said. (Above, ad 1.) And thus it is clear that there will be no circular definition.

Reply Obj. 4: The “one” is said in two ways, what is the principle of number and what is convertible with being. When speaking of the one that is the principle of number, as was said in the body, it does assert something additional over and above the being that is called one, namely, it asserts the account of a measure. Whence this one can be considered in two ways: either insofar as it exists, or according to what follows on its concept, that is, a certain relation.

If it be considered in the second way, then it is opposed to numerical multitude in a relative way, as a principle is opposed to what comes from it, a point to a line, a part to a whole, and more properly, as a measure to what it measures. If it be considered in the first way, then this can also be considered in two ways. For one way is that the one itself will be considered with precision—namely, what is only the unit—and then it will hold a distinct opposition of a measure for the other numbers; for every number, according to the whatness of its own species, has a specific account of measure, just as opposed species are distinct. And this opposition is traced back to contrariety as a principle. For the distinct species are distinguished by contrary differences whereby the genus is first divided, as is proved in Metaphysics 10. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054b23‒32.) Or the one will be considered without precision, and in this way unity holds no opposition to number, but rather is constitutive of it.

However, if we are speaking about the one that is convertible with being, then “one” holds an account of privation, as was said in the body, in reference to the division that is preserved in multitude. And in this way it is opposed to multitude, just as privation is opposed to possession, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.3, 1054a20‒25.) Whence even the equal is opposed to the great and the small, as a privation of them. Nor is the one the privation of the multitude that it constitutes, but rather of the multitude that is denied as being in the very thing called “one.” For the one does not, from its own account, remove every division; rather, whatever division might be removed is enough for its account. This is why it is possible for the one to be part of a multitude, and that a multitude is itself in a certain way said to be one—that is, insofar as it is something that is not divided, at least according to the aggregating concept, just as not even evil is wholly devoid of good, since not every good is taken away by an evil.

Reply Obj. 5: Numerical multitude, which is a species of quantity, asserts something within created things. Now, this is not transferred to the divine, except perhaps according to an account of distinction, which it has from the account of multitude simply speaking. However, the multitude that divides being does not add a positive accident over and above being, but only an account of distinction, insofar as one being is not another. And so it is even in the divine.

Article 4

Whether one and number signify the essence

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.30.3, ad 1–3.) It seems that such expressions would signify the divine essence.

Obj. 1: For whatever in the divine is said in reference to itself, is said substantially, and signifies the essence. But these expressions, according to their names, are not referred to another, but are said in reference to itself. Therefore they are essential names.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Boethius, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 4 (PL 64:1252‒53).) all the categories, besides toward-something, (That is, the category of relation.) when they enter into the divine predication, become substance. But number and unity seem to pertain to quantity. Therefore they are essential.

Obj. 3: You might say that they signify the essence when joined to an essential term, as when one says, “one God,” or a notion when joined to a personal term, as when one says, “one Father.”

On the contrary, whatever things are not said according to one account are said equivocally. But the account of personal unity is not the same as that of essential unity, just as the account of essential distinction is not the same as that of personal distinction. Therefore it seems that they are said of them equivocally.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, “one” pertains to essence, which is why we say that the Father and the Son are one on account of the unity of the essence. But since a multitude is constituted from a one, to whatever genus the signification of “one” pertains, so does the signification of “multitude.” Therefore it seems that even all names signifying distinction or plurality would signify the essence.

On the contrary, whatever is said essentially is predicated of the individual persons. But the numerical terms are not predicated of the Father, for one cannot say that the Father is “two” or “three.” Therefore it seems that they do not signify the essence, and thus neither does “one,” which is the principle of plurality.

I answer that, as is clear from things said in the previous article, in the divine there is no unity or multitude except insofar as “one” and “many” divide common being. And in this way, as was said, they do not add anything over and above the being about which “unity” or “multitude” is being said, except according to account. Whence, just as being stands to absolutes and relatives, and similarly does distinction and non-distinction, which are added according to account to being, so too does the one and many. And therefore, insofar as they are joined to diverse things, they signify the essence or a personal notion. For the essential unity is the divine essence itself insofar as it is undivided, and the personal unity of the Father is the unity of property insofar as it is not divided. Likewise, the multitude or plurality of the persons is the persons themselves insofar as they are distinct. And because no distinction of essences is present here, therefore neither is there any essential plurality.

Reply Obj. 1: Expressions of this sort, according to the account that they add to the things of which they are said, do not assert a relation or anything at all. And therefore, according to the names that are imposed from such account, they are not referred to another. But as far as that about which the account is asserted, they can import both the absolute and the relative.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said, (Above, a. 2.) plurality does not enter into the divine predication on the side of the multitude that is a species of quantity. And therefore that argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 3: The account of unity asserts undivided being simply speaking, whence it abstracts from every mode of distinction. This is why “one person” and “one essence” are said according to one common account, even though the account is not one in species. Whence it does not follow from this that “one” is being predicated equivocally.

Reply Obj. 4: Just as “being” said absolutely is understood of substance, so “one” said absolutely, when made substantive insofar as it is signified in the neuter gender, indicates unity absolutely and signifies the unity of the substance. But such unity does not constitute a number of persons, though it would constitute a number of essences, if there were such. On the other hand, “one” in the masculine gender does not signify the unity absolutely, but rather asserts unity of the term to which it is joined, since it is an adjective. Whence it indicates a unity befitting that term. And therefore when one says, “one God,” he signifies the essential unity, whereas when he says, “one Father,” he signifies the personal unity. And this latter unity constitutes the number of the persons, which pertains to relation.

Reply Sed Contra: The response to the contrary objection is clear.

Question 2

Names connected with plurality

Next, one asks about the names that are connected with plurality. About this two things are asked:

first, concerning names that stand to plurality as a principle;

second, concerning the name “Trinity,” which follows on plurality as though it were a collective noun. (Note that nomen is both “name” and, in linguistic and grammatical contexts, “noun,” although it can also include adjectives.)

Article 1

Whether there is diversity in God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 1; d. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2; ST I.31.2; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 8.) It seems that there is diversity in God.

Obj. 1: For just as the one in substance constitutes being the same, so multitude in substance constitutes diversity. But Hilary says (Hilary, On Synods, ch. 29 (PL 10:503).) that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are indeed three in substance and one in consonance. Therefore diversity is here.

Obj. 2: Just as a thing is called “one” from the fact that it is not divided, so they are called “many” or “more than one” from the fact that they are divided. But the Father and the Son are more than one. Therefore it seems that division is here.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, “alien” (alienum) is named from “other” (alio), but the Son is someone other than the Father, so he can also be called “alien.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that he can be called “singular,” since “singular” signifies something pointed out that subsists in a common nature. But the Father is this way; this is why Damascene said above (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, prol.; John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1002).) that he stands as an individual. Therefore it seems that he can be called “singular.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that he could be called “unique,” based on the song the Church sings: proclaim with favor the triune and unique God. (From the hymn for the dedication of a church, “Urbs Jerusalem beata.”)

Obj. 6: Furthermore, it seems that discreteness cannot be here. For discreteness is a certain difference of quantity, whereas there is no quantity in God. Therefore neither is there discreteness.

Obj. 7: And one asks generally, what names of this sort could be granted in the divine?

I answer that there were two heresies about the faith in the Trinity: that of Arius, who introduced a plurality of essences, and that of Sabellius, who took away the plurality of the persons—neither of which the Catholic faith concedes. And therefore it is necessary to concede things that are opposed to both heresies, and to deny things that are consonant with each of them.

Whence, against Arius the Church asserts four things. The first is the unity of the essence, based on which it confesses that God is one, and denies diversity in God. The second is the simplicity of the divine essence, and thereby it confesses his simplicity and denies him multiplicity and division—which posit the account of whole and part, which are opposed to simplicity—and likewise separation. Third, it asserts likeness in the nature of the Godhead, insofar as it is signified as a certain form; and therefore it preaches the Son as like the Father, and denies that he is alien to him, since “alien” signifies what is foreign to the nature of something. Fourth, it asserts an undivided power and magnitude of the three persons, and therefore it asserts that they are equal and denies that they are disparate or unequal.

Similarly, the Church asserts four things against Sabellius. The first is the divine nature’s communion in the several supposits, which is why it preaches a plurality and excludes singularity. Second, it asserts that this plurality is not merely one of reason, but even of reality, since they are three realities; this is why it preaches a discreteness and excludes uniqueness. Third, it asserts that in these personal realities is an order of origin; and therefore it preaches discreteness that indicates a certain order, and excludes confusion. Fourth, it asserts that the three persons are united in a certain fellowship of love, who is the Holy Spirit; and therefore it preaches consonance, as is clear from Hilary, (Hilary, On Synods, ch. 29 (PL 10:503).) and it excludes solitude.

Reply Obj. 1: The “one” in substance, insofar as it signifies essence, constitutes being the same; and likewise “multitude,” in the substance that is essence, constitutes the diverse. But when Hilary says that they are three in substance, he is taking “substance” for the hypostasis, and not for the essence.

Reply Obj. 2: Where there is number simply speaking, there is division, either by essence or by quantity. But such number is not present in the divine, but a sort of number, as has been said, (See q. 1, a. 2.) and a distinction of relations is enough for such a number.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the Son is indeed said to be other than the Father, still he is not called “alien,” since this rings of a foreignness of nature. For “alien” is denominated from an alienation of the nature, not from an alienation of the supposit.

Reply Obj. 4: A divine person cannot be properly called “singular,” since the singular is that whose essence is incommunicable. But the Father’s essence is not incommunicable.

Reply Obj. 5: For the reason said, God cannot be called “unique”; and if this way of speaking is found, then “unique” is being taken improperly for “one.” And thus, all authorities who speak this way should be glossed, in which something of the aforesaid is posited.

Reply Obj. 6: Discreteness is not preserved in the divine as regards the account of quantity, but only as regards the account of order.

Reply Obj. 7: The response is clear from what was already said.

Article 2

Whether the name “Trinity” is an essential name

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.31.1.) It seems that “Trinity” is an essential name.

Obj. 1: For whatever is not referred to another is essential. But “Trinity,” according to its own name, is such. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is predicated of the individual persons, and of all of them together in the singular, not in the plural, is essential. But the name “Trinity” seems to be this way, since “Trinity” is said as “the three’s unity” (trium unitas), and such unity signifies the divine essence. Whence, since one can say, “the Father is the essence” and “is the unity of the essence,” one can also say that he “is the three’s unity”—and thus, that he is the Trinity; and likewise one can say this of the Son and the Holy Spirit. And these three are one Trinity and not several Trinities. Therefore it seems that it is essential.

Obj. 3: You might say that it is not essential because it is a collective name of the persons.

On the contrary, according to Bernard, (Bernard of Clairvaux, On Consideration, bk. 5, ch. 8, para. 19 (PL 182:799).) among all unities the unity of the Trinity holds the pinnacle. But among all unities, what a collective name indicates is the least. Therefore it seems that it is not collective, and thus in no way does it signify a relation.

On the contrary, Boethius says (See Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 6 (PL 64:1255).) that the very name “Trinity” pertains to relation, so it is not essential.

I answer that, in the name “Trinity” a certain unity and number is being indicated, but in the divine, “unity” is said in two ways: the essential unity, and the personal unity. Whence some say that the name “Trinity” indicates the personal unity, and according to them “Trinity” is interpreted as though it were “thrice unity,” because three personal unities are there. And according to this, it signifies relation absolutely. Others say that the unity indicated is the essential unity, and according to them “Trinity” is interpreted as “the unity of the three”; this is also how Isidore explains it in the text. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).11, quoting Isidore, The Etymologies, bk. 7, ch. 4 (PL 82:271).) Whence this also seems to be more fitting, since by “Trinity” we name God “threefold,” and he cannot be called “thrice one,” since when God is called “one” his essential unity is being signified. And according to this, “Trinity” signifies both the unity of the essence and the distinction of the persons.

Reply Obj. 1: As far as that for which the name is imposed for signifying, “Trinity” does not signify relation, but number; this is why, according to the name, it is not referred to another. But as far as that about which that number is being asserted, in the divine it does signify the relations themselves, which are counted only in the divine. And it does not add anything according to reality, except according to the account of negation, as has been said. (Above, q. 1, a. 3.) And that “Trinity” be toward-something befits it not as a trinity, but as the divine Trinity. Whence it holds relation implicitly.

Reply Obj. 2: “The Father is the Trinity” is false. For the name “Trinity,” on account of its mode of signifying, as signified in the abstract, signifies directly the unity of the essence, and obliquely the number of the persons, as regards the name’s etymology, inasmuch as “Trinity” says “unity of three.” Nonetheless, as regards the name’s imposition, the opposite is the case. For the name has been imposed for signification from the very number that is brought in with the name. This is why, as regards the true signification of the name, the same thing is being signified when one says “Trinity” as if one were saying, “three persons of one essence,” as the Master explains. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).10.) Whence it is clear that the Father cannot be called the Trinity. And likewise, when one says “God is threefold” one is signifying that he holds three persons in one essence; whence “God” supposes thereby either the essence or the indistinct supposit.

Reply Obj. 3: The name “Trinity” has a certain likeness with a collective noun, yet it is not truly a collective noun. For in a collective noun there are two things to consider: the multitude of the things collected, which are simply speaking divided in essence, and that in which they are being collected, which is the lowest unity. But in the name “Trinity” the opposite is the case. For that in which the three persons are being collected is the greatest unity, the unity of the divine essence, and the persons who are being collected have the least of the account of a real multitude; yet there is a certain likeness insofar as it is a certain number, and a certain unity for each of them; this is why the Master said earlier (Sent. I, 22.3(92).1.) that it is “as though” it were a collective noun.

Exposition of the text

There is neither number nor quantity there. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).1.) Through this it is clear that the Master intends that “unity” and “multitude” do not predicate something added to the realities to which they are joined except insofar as they are in the genus of quantity; and they are not predicated of God in this mode.

Let us make man in our image and likeness. (Sent. I, 24.1(101).5, quoting Genesis 1:26.) This was explained above in Distinction 2. (In I Sent., d. 2, exposition of the text.)