D. 35 - Divine knowledge

Division of the text

After having considered the procession of the divine persons within the unity of the essence, which is the principle and cause of created things, now, before considering created things themselves, the Master treats things in which consist the perfect account of being a principle, insofar as God is said to be the principle of created things. Now, the account of an efficient principle in things that act by a necessity of nature sufficiently consists in power and perfect virtue, upon which the effect follows unless there is some impediment on the side of the recipient. But this is not sufficient in things that act by will; indeed, over and above this, knowledge and will are required, as the Philosopher shows. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.5, 1047b35–48a24.)

And therefore this part is divided into three parts: in the first, he considers God’s knowledge; in the second, he considers God’s power at now we must treat of God’s omnipotence; (Sent. I, 42.1(184).1.) in the third, he considers God’s will at we must now say something about God’s will, so far as the weakness of our understanding allows. (Sent. I, 45.1(190).1.) Now, the reason for this ordering is that his knowledge extends to more things than his power, for it is of both good and evil, whereas his power does not extend to the latter; and his power extends to more things than does his will, since the will is only in respect of the good things that either are, or will be, or have been, whereas the power extends even to an infinity of other things that he could do.

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he considers his knowledge in common; in the second, he considers a certain species of God’s knowledge that brings in a specific difficulty: predestination, at but predestination is about the goods of salvation and about the men to be saved. (Sent. I, 39.4(178).4. In the manuscripts of the Lombard’s Sentences, this text is placed in the last paragraph of Distinction 39, but it really seems to belong to Distinction 40, as Aquinas places it here.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows what things God’s knowledge concerns; in the second, he shows in what way he stands to the realities known at and so now, returning to our purpose. (Sent. I, 38.1(173).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows that God’s knowledge is universally about all things; in the second, he shows how the things God knows are said to be within God’s knowledge at it is usual to ask here, since all things are said to be in God’s cognition . . . , whether it is to be granted that all things are in the divine essence or in God through essence. (Sent. I, 36.1(159).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows that God’s knowledge is about all things; in the second, he deduces two conclusions from this, at for that reason, all things are said to be in God, and to have been in him from eternity. (Sent. I, 36.9(158).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows the need to treat this; second, he follows out his intention, at and so it is to be known that God’s wisdom or knowledge, although it is one and simple, yet it is given several different names because of the varying states of things and their different effects. (Sent. I, 35.1(150)–6(155).2.)

And as regards this latter, he does two things: first, he shows how the divine knowledge is named in diverse ways by reason of the diverse things known; second, he shows which of these names demands that there be actually created realities, and which do not, at here it needs to be considered whether knowledge or foreknowledge or disposition or predestination could have been in God, if there had been no future things. (Sent. I, 35.7(156).1.)

And about this latter, he does two things: first, he shows which names do not belong to God if created things be removed; second, he shows which names nevertheless would befit him even if nothing were created, at but knowledge or wisdom is not only of temporal things, but also of eternal ones. (Sent. I, 35.8(157).1.)

As regards the first, he does three things: first, he manifests the truth; second, he takes up an objection to the contrary, at some make the following objection to this; (Sent. I, 35.7(156).2.) third, he presents the solution, at in regard to this, in accordance with our little share of intelligence, we say as follows. (Sent. I, 35.7(156).4.)

Question 1

Divine knowledge

Here five things are asked:

first, whether there is knowledge in God;

second, whether he has knowledge only about himself, or also about other things;

third, and if about others, whether he has a certain and proper cognition of them;

fourth, whether his knowledge is univocal with our knowledge;

fifth, whether his knowledge can be called universal or particular, or in potency or in habit, as is so with our knowledge.

Article 1

Whether knowledge befits God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.1; SCG I.44; On Truth, q. 2, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 28; Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 12, lect. 8.) It seems that knowledge does not befit God.

Obj. 1: For where there is no intellect there cannot be knowledge. But the name “intellect” does not properly belong to God; rather, in the Book of Causes it says, when God is called ‘intelligent,’ he is being named with the name of the first thing he has created, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 6.) which is an intelligence. Therefore it seems that knowledge does not properly befit God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing that presupposes something to itself, which it would be added to, is fitting to what is simplest and first. But knowledge presupposes life and essence, and it stands as something added to them, as is clear from the beginning of the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 1.) Therefore, since God is the simplest and first thing, knowledge does not befit him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, nothing that requires plurality is found in what is supremely one. But knowledge requires a certain plurality: that of the knower, the knowledge, and the knowable thing. Therefore it does not befit God, who is supremely one.

Obj. 4: You might say that in God the knowable and the knower are the same.

On the contrary, nothing can be said to be like its very self, as Hilary points out, (Hilary, On Synods, para. 13 (PL 10:413).) nor does anything receive or take its very self. But according to the philosophers, (See Aristotle, On the Soul 1.2, 404b15‒26; 1.5, 409b25‒32; 2.12, 424a18‒23; Plato, Timaeus 35a‒b.) knowledge is the knower becoming like the reality known; moreover, knowledge occurs according to the reception of the knowable within the knower. Therefore it seems that the knower and the known cannot be the same thing in God.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.6, 1140b35‒1141a8.) knowledge is of the conclusions, and understanding is of the principles. But cognition of the conclusions follows on the inquiry of reason. Therefore, since in God there is no cognition through inquiry, it seems that there cannot be, properly speaking, knowledge in God.

On the contrary, in Colossians 2:3 he is said to be the one in whom are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; and the Commentator, in Metaphysics 11, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 39.) says that life and knowledge are properly said to be in God.

Furthermore, no perfection is absent from him who is most perfect. But knowledge is the noblest perfection. Therefore knowledge cannot be absent from God, in whom are united the perfections of all the genera, as is said in Metaphysics 6. (Metaphysics 6.1, 1026a16–22; see 1.2, 983a4–10.)

I answer that, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 3 (PG 3:870).) we arrive at the knowledge of God from created things by means of three paths: through removal, through causality, and through eminence—each of which leads us to a knowledge of God.

The first way, which is through removal, is as follows: since every potency and materiality is remote from God, in that he is the first and pure act, his essence must be stripped from matter and be form alone. Now, just as the principle of being a particular is matter, so intelligibility is owed to form; whence form is the principle of cognition. This is why every form existing through itself separate from matter must be of an intellectual nature; and if it is indeed subsisting through itself, it will also be intelligent, whereas if it is not subsisting through itself, but is, as it were, a perfection of something subsisting, it will not be intelligent but a principle of understanding—just as every form not subsisting in itself does not act, but is the principle of an action, like the heat in a fire. Therefore, since God himself is unstained by any matter, and is subsisting through himself, since he is his own existence without dependence on any other, he himself must be an intelligence and a knower.

The second way, which is through causality, is as follows: for every agent has some intention and desire for an end. Now, every desire for an end is preceded by some cognition establishing the end and directing to that end the things that are for that end. But in some things this cognition is not joined to what itself has the tendency to that end, so it must be directed to it through some prior agent, as an arrow has a tendency toward a determinate place through the archer’s determination of it. And so it is in all things that act through the necessity of nature, since the activity of these things is determined though some intellect that establishes the nature. Whence the Philosopher says that a work of nature is a work of intelligence. (Aristotle, Physics 2.6, 198a13; 2.8, 199a21, b30.) But in other things such cognition is joined to the agent itself, as is clear in animals. Whence it is necessary that the first thing does not act by a necessity of nature—since then it would not be first, but rather would be directed by some prior intelligence. Therefore it must act through intellect and will, and thus it must be an intelligence and a knower.

The third way, which is through eminence, is as follows: what is found in many things more and more insofar as the many approach closer to something, must be found in that one most of all. For example, heat is in fire: to the degree that composite bodies approach closer to it, they are hotter. Now, we find that to the degree that certain things approach closer the First thing, they participate in knowledge in a nobler way; for example, men do so better than beasts, and angels better than men. Whence it must be that in God there is found the noblest knowledge.

Reply Obj. 1: Whenever knowledge or intellect or something that pertains to perfection is negated from God, one should understand that this is according to his exceeding it, not according to his lacking it. Whence Dionysius says, in God should be ordained being without mind and senseless, according to excess, and not according to a lack. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:870).) Therefore the name “intellect” to that extent is denied as belonging to God properly speaking, since he does not understand according to the mode of a creature, but more eminently.

Reply Obj. 2: There are three opinions about names that are said of God in this way. For some say that “knowledge,” “life,” and such names signify in God certain dispositions added to his essence. But this cannot be, since this would place composition within God, and possibility within his essence, relative to such dispositions—which is altogether absurd.

Therefore others have said that all such names predicate nothing in God except perhaps of his very existence, so they are said of God improperly. But they are found to be said of God for two reasons: either by reason of negation, as when one says “God is a knower” one is understanding that God is not ignorant, like a stone; or on account of a likeness based on his work, so that one says “God is a knower” because he works an effect like a knower would. This latter is like the way he is called “angry” insofar as he punishes, according to a likeness with those who are angry, but not so as to mean that there is anger in him; so too neither is there knowledge or life or anything of this sort, but only existence.

But this does not seem to be sufficient. The first reason is because every negation of a reality is founded on something existing in the reality; for example, when one says, “man is not a donkey,” the truth of the negation is founded on the nature of the man, with which the negated nature is incompatible. Whence, if ignorance is denied of God, this must be by reason of something that is in him; and thus, one must assert that the opposite of ignorance is in him. The second reason is because every act proceeds from an agent by reason of something that is in it, just as the hot is what heats, and the light is what ascends upward. Whence it must be that in one that performs an act of knowledge there is something pertaining to the account of knowledge, even though that perhaps is not suitably signified by such a name. For example, God’s punishing is an act of his very justice; nor must one then posit anger in him, since to punish is not the act of anger through itself.

And therefore one should say that all such names are said properly of God as regards the reality being signified, although not as regards the mode of signifying—and as regards that which is proper to each of their accounts, although not as regards the account of their genus, as was held earlier. (See In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, aa. 3, 5; but also d. 8, q. 1, a. 1; d. 22, q. 1, a. 2; d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.) And therefore one should say that all such names that do not signify any material or bodily disposition are truly in God, and more truly than they are in other things; and neither do they introduce any composition into him. Rather, just as such names properly belong to what is created on account of the diverse things in existence itself, so too they properly belong to God on account of his own unique and simple existence, which within itself possesses in advance their powers in a uniform way, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 8 (PG 3:823).) This is clear by way of a similitude.

If three men are posited, each of whom knows, according to his own habit, things that pertain to one science—one knows natural things, another geometrical things, and another grammatical things—and then also a fourth man is posited who has knowledge of all these things through one habit, it is certain that it could be truly said that he is a grammarian, or that the grammatical science is in him, as well as geometry and natural science. And even though in him there is only one reality according to which all these come together in him, still each of these sciences, being different according to the account of its name, names what is in him; for each of them imperfectly expresses that reality. So it is in God as well. For although existing, living, understanding, and all such things are found in the different created things according to diverse things existing in them, nonetheless in God his one simple existence holds the power and perfection of all of them.

Whence, when God is named “being,” one is expressing only what pertains to the perfection of being and not his entire perfection—and likewise when he is called “knowing,” and “willing,” and such. And thereby it is clear that all these are one thing in God according to reality, though they differ in account, which account is not only in the intellect, but is founded in the truth and perfection of the reality in him. And just as God is properly called “being,” so he is properly called “knowing” and “willing” and such. Nor is any plurality or addition or order there in reality, but in account alone.

Reply Obj. 3: Even though knowledge, a knower, and the thing known are required for the account of knowledge, still it is not required that these three differ according to reality; this is even like how it is of the account of motion that there be both a mover and a thing moved, but that the thing moved is something other than the mover cannot be known except by demonstration, before the discovery of which many thought that something can move its very self.

Therefore one should note that in every intellect what understands and what is understood are in a way the same, and in certain other ways they also differ. For the human intellect, which is sometimes in potency and sometimes in act, when understanding in potency is not the same as what is intelligible in potency, which latter is some reality existing outside the soul. But for there to be something intelligible in act, it is necessary that the intelligible in potency become actually intelligible through its species being stripped from all the appendages of matter through the power of the agent intellect. Therefore this species, which is understood in act, must perfect the intellect in potency. From the joining of these, one perfect thing is brought to be, which is the intellect in act, just as from the soul and body is brought to be one thing, the man possessing human activities. Whence, just as the soul is not something other than the man, so too the thing actually understood is not something other than the intellect actually understanding it; rather, they are the same thing—yet not such that that species becomes the substance of the intellect, or even part of it, except as a formal part, just as neither does the soul become the body.

Therefore if there be some intellect, like the divine, that is in potency toward nothing, but is wholly act and always in act, then the thing understood really differs in no way from the understanding in it; rather, they differ by consideration alone. For insofar as his essence is considered as unstained by matter, in this way it is an intelligence, as was proved in the body of the article; but insofar as his essence is considered according to how the intellect receives it without matter, in this way it is a thing understood; but insofar as the very thing understood is considered not as absent from the one understanding, but according to how it is present within its very self, thus it is in a way intelligence or knowledge. For knowledge is nothing other than the impression upon, or joining of, the thing known to the knower.

Reply Obj. 4: All these words whereby we say knowledge is a becoming-like, or an apprehending, or impression, and so on come from a consideration of the potential intellect, which knows only through a reception of some species, with respect to which it is in potency, and through which it becomes like the reality outside the soul. Whence, where there is an intellect only in act, none of these things is said properly, but only according to our mode of understanding.

Reply Obj. 5: The things that are said of God should always be understood by way of eminence, having taken away everything that can belong to imperfection. Whence one must take away from knowledge, insofar as it is in God, the discursive character of reason when it inquires, and retain its rectitude about the reality known. But because knowledge properly speaking is about composite things, and understanding is properly about the “whatness” of a reality, therefore God is called a “knower” insofar as he knows his own existence, and is called “intelligent” insofar as he knows his own nature—which nonetheless is not other than his existence, nor is it more simple. And therefore in God, to understand and to know are not different things, except according to account. Moreover, “wisdom” does not assert something numerically different from “knowledge” and “understanding,” since all wisdom is knowledge—but not vice versa, since wisdom is only the knowledge that considers the highest causes, whereby all the subsequent things are ordered and known. Whence God is properly called “wise” insofar as he knows his very self, and “intelligent” and “knowing” insofar as he knows both himself and other things.

Article 2

Whether God understands things other than himself

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.5; SCG I.48, 49; On Truth, q. 2, a. 3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 30; Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 12, lect. 11; Commentary on the Book of Causes, lect. 13.) It seems that God does not understand things other than himself.

Obj. 1: For the thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, since it makes him be in act. But every perfection exceeds what it perfects. Therefore if he were to understand anything other than himself, that thing would stand as greater than him—which is incongruous.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the nobility of their objects there is an order of nobility in the activities. This is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174b18.) that the perfect activity of happiness is relative to the noblest object of activity. But whatever is other than God is more base and imperfect than him. Therefore, if he were to understand something other than himself, this would turn his activity toward imperfection and baseness.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, things understood stand to the intellect as paintings do to the canvas; this is why the Philosopher (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 430a1.) compares the potential intellect, before it understands, to a tablet on which nothing has been written. But it is impossible that the same body be shaped by diverse shapes simultaneously, and in the same part. Therefore it is impossible that the same intellect understand several things simultaneously. Therefore, if the divine intellect understands both himself and many other things, then there would have to be succession in his understanding, which would bring him to exhaustion from the fact that he does not hold in act what he seeks—and this is incongruous.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1, 1025b1‒1026a24; On the Soul 3.8, 431b25‒27.) sciences are divided in as many ways as are realities. Therefore, if God were to understand several things, there would have to be several sciences in him. And this verges on a plurality of the divine essence, if his knowledge is his essence, as has been said.

On the contrary, Hebrews 4:13 says, before him no creature is hidden, but all are open and laid bare to the eyes of him.

Furthermore, as has been said, God knows his own essence. But he is the principle of things through his essence. Therefore he knows himself to be the principle of things. But it is impossible to know that something is a principle unless one knows in some way that of which it is the principle. For he who knows one of a pair of relatives, knows also the other, as is said in the Categories. (Aristotle, Categories 7, 6b27; 8a36‒b15.) Therefore he knows things other than himself.

I answer that, from the second path presented in the previous article, it can be shown that God knows not only himself but also other things. For since the things that act from the necessity of nature naturally tend to some end, they must be ordered to that end by some knower. Now, this is impossible unless that knower knows that reality, and its activity, and that to which it is ordered, just as the craftsman cannot make a saw unless he knows the act of cutting and the things that are to be cut, so that he might find the fitting matter and impose the form. And so too God must know those things that are ordered to him, since as they have existence from him, so too they have a natural order to the end. This is why Rabbi Moses says that David intended this reason when he said, he who formed the eye, does he not see? (Ps 94 [93]:9), as though he were saying, “when God made the eye, did he never consider the act of the eye, which is to see, and its object, which is the particular visible?”

Nevertheless one should note that the “thing understood” is spoken of in two ways, just as the “thing seen” is. For there is a first “thing seen” that is the very species of the visible reality existing in the eye’s pupil, which species is also the perfection of the one seeing, and is the principle of vision, and is the intermediate name of the visible reality. And there is a second “thing seen” that is the reality itself outside the soul. Similarly, the first “thing understood” is the very likeness of the reality, which is in the intellect; and there is a second “thing understood” that is the reality itself, which is understood through that likeness.

Therefore, if the first thing understood be considered, God understands nothing but himself, for he does not receive the species of realities through which he knows them. Rather, he knows through his own essence, which is the likeness of all realities. But if the second “thing understood” be taken, then he understands not only himself, but also other things. And according to the first mode, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.9, 1074b33–34.) that God understands only himself. And thereby the answers to the objections are easily seen.

Reply Obj. 1: What is objected first, that the thing understood is the perfection of the one who understands, is true of the first thing understood, but not for the second thing understood. For a stone, which is outside the soul, is not the perfection of the intellect, but the likeness of the stone, which is in the soul, is.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine intellect, if it were to understand base things, could become base in three ways: in one way, if it were formed by the likeness of that base thing; second, if it could not understand the noble simultaneously with that base thing; third, if it were to understand both the baser and the nobler by different activities. But all these are remote from him; whence his activity is most perfect, wherein, being one and the same, is such that he knows through it both his very self and all other things.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument holds for every intellect that knows diverse things through diverse species; and that is remote from God, who knows other things by knowing his own essence.

Reply Obj. 4: When many things are known that are known according to a single account of a medium, whether one in genus or in species, they are traced back to one general or specific science, like metaphysics and geometry. Whence, if many things known are traced back to one medium, the number of all those things will yield not but numerically one science. And therefore God’s knowledge of all realities is numerically one, since he knows all things through one most simple medium, which is his essence.

Article 3

Whether he has certain and proper knowledge of things other than himself.

To the third let us proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.6; SCG I.50; On the Power of God, q. 6, a. 1; On Truth, q. 2, a. 4; Commentary on the Book of Causes, lect. 10.) It seems that he does not have certain and proper cognition of things other than himself.

Obj. 1: For one cannot have certain cognition of a reality except through its account existing in the knower. But nothing in God and created things is of the same account. Therefore, since he does know created things only by knowing what is in his very self, it seems that he does not have proper and certain cognition about them.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, one cannot have certain cognition about a reality through its first and remote cause. But the divine essence is the first and most remote cause. Therefore, since God knows realities exclusively through his own essence, it seems that he cannot have certain cognition about realities.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, proper cognition about a reality is only through what is proper to it. But it is impossible for the same thing to be proper to many things insofar as they are many, even if something is proper to many insofar as they are one, like risible being proper to all men. Therefore, since God knows all things through one and the same thing, which is his essence, it seems that he would not have proper and certain cognition about individual realities.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, that through which one has certain knowledge about a reality can be a medium for concluding to that reality. But from the divine essence one cannot conclude to the existence of any reality, since God has existed from eternity, when no reality existed. Therefore it seems that God cannot have, through his essence, certain knowledge of realities.

On the contrary, the beginning of Metaphysics says, the knowledge that God has is divine among sciences, and the most honorable. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.2, 983a4–10.) But God has knowledge about real things. Therefore he knows realities in the most noble way, and thus, with the most certain and proper cognition.

Furthermore, what is first in any genus is the greatest within that genus, as is said in Metaphysics 2; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 2.1, 993b24–27; see 10.4, 1055a10.) for example, fire is the hottest thing, and in it heat is found primarily. But knowledge is primarily in God. Therefore whatever he knows, he knows in the noblest way, and thus it seems that he would have proper and certain knowledge of all realities.

I answer that God most certainly knows the proper natures of realities. Yet one should note that, as the Commentator says (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 2, text. 51.) in Metaphysics 2, God does not have knowledge of realities other than himself except insofar as they are beings. For because his own existence is the cause of existing for all realities, insofar as he knows his own existence, he is not ignorant of the nature of the essence found in all realities. For example, one who would know the heat of fire would not be ignorant of the nature of the heat existing in all hot things; yet he would not know the nature of this hot thing or that one, insofar as they are this or that. Thus, God through knowing his own essence, even though he knows the existence of all realities insofar as they are beings, yet does not know reality insofar as it is this or that. Nor does it follow from this, he says, that he is ignorant, just because his knowledge is not of the genus of our knowledge; so too neither can the opposite ignorance belong to him, just as one does not say that a stone either sees or is blind.

But that this position is false is apparent in two ways. The first is because he is not the cause of realities only as regards their common existence, but even as regards everything within the reality. For each reality is determined to its proper existence through secondary causes, but all secondary causes are from the first, so whatever is in a reality, whether something common or proper, must be traced back to God as to their cause. For from themselves a reality has nothing except non-existence. And thus God will know the proper nature of each and every reality.

This is disproved in a second way through what was touched on in the previous article—that it is impossible for any agent to order its effect to an end unless he know the reality’s proper work whereby it is ordered to the end. Whence, if the ordination of all realities into their end is from God, he must know the proper work of each and every reality, and the proper nature that befits such work. Nor is it an obstacle if one were also to assert that he does not immediately cause the order in each and every reality, as some philosophers (See De fluxu entis (once attributed to Avicenna), ch. 4.) have asserted, saying that from God immediately proceeds one principle, which is the first intelligence, from which proceeds a second intelligence, and the sphere of the universe, and its soul. For according to this, it is necessary that he know at least the work of his own first creature, the intelligence, and in this way he would know what things can be produced through it, and so on all the way to the last of the realities. And thus, he must know all the proper natures and proper activities of things.

Reply Obj. 1: The divine existence is denied to be of the same account of existence with our existence not because it falls short of the account of our existence, but because it exceeds it. However, to whatever degree a medium of knowledge is more perfect, so far in it is the reality more perfectly known. And therefore to the degree that his existence exceeds ours, so far does his knowledge about the existence of a reality, which he knows through his own existence, exceed ours, which is about the existence of a reality taken from the reality itself.

Reply Obj. 2: There can be certitude in no knowledge except through a tracing back to their first principles. But the fact that the first principle in geometry is insufficient for the certain knowledge of the things that follow on it, is because it is not their entire cause. Whence it is necessary that, with all the other causes joined together, one comes to apprehend them. But God himself is the perfect cause of all the things that are from him, since nothing can be received that is not from him. And therefore he knows all things perfectly through his own essence.

Reply Obj. 3: It is impossible for the same thing to be proper to several things that participate in it in the same way, and wholly, and perfectly. But although all realities participate in the divine goodness, yet no created reality imitates it perfectly, but one reality becomes like it in a way in which some other does not become like it. And therefore he himself is the proper likeness of each and every reality. This is clear in the example brought in before, (See a. 1.) about one who has a habit sufficient for many knowable things; for that habit is one likeness of each of the three habits that are found in diverse others, even insofar as one habit is distinguished from another. For it belongs with the grammatical art that through it grammatical things are known, and so on for the others. And thus it is clear that one reality can be the proper likeness of several things that do not perfectly imitate it, just as created things do not perfectly imitate the divine goodness.

Reply Obj. 4: The cause of the being of things is not only the divine existence, but also his knowledge and will, and from the latter one best concludes to the existence of a reality. For that which God wills to exist, because he has the power, and knows the thing, by the power of his essence proceeds into existence. However, these things are known to God, and so he has certain cognition about these realities.

Article 4

Whether God’s knowledge is univocal with our knowledge

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that God’s knowledge is univocal with our knowledge.

Obj. 1: For what acts according to its form produces an effect univocal with it; for example, fire through its heat induces a heat univocal with its own heat. But Origen and Dionysius say (Origen, In Epistulam Pauli ad Romanos explanationum libri, bk. 10, ch. 43 (PL 14:1292); Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 1 (PL 3:866).) that God is called “wise” insofar as he fills us with wisdom through his own wisdom. Therefore it seems that his wisdom is univocal with ours.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the measure and the measured are of one account, so to each thing there corresponds a proper measure; for liquids and solids are not measured by the same thing, as is said in Metaphysics 3. (The Latin text of the Mandonnet edition here refers to Metaphysics 3, but a better reference would be: Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.6, 333a20–35.) But God’s knowledge is the measure of our knowledge, which latter is more true to the degree that it comes closer to the former. Therefore it seems that it is univocal with our knowledge.

Obj. 3: You might say that it is not univocal from the very fact that God’s knowledge exceeds our knowledge.

On the contrary, more and less do make diverse species. But an excess of knowledge is seen from the fact that there is more and less knowing. Therefore it seems that a univocation of knowledge is not taken away by this fact.

Obj. 4: You might say, like the Commentator in Metaphysics 10, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 51.) that it is not univocal because God’s knowledge is the cause of realities, whereas our knowledge is caused by realities.

On the contrary, in us, speculative knowledge is caused by realities, but practical knowledge is the cause of realities, and yet the name “knowledge” is not said of them equivocally. Therefore so too the stated argument does not take away univocation.

On the contrary (5), there is nothing common to the eternal and the corruptible, except in name, as the Commentator says in Metaphysics 10, and as the Philosopher says as well. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 26; Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.10, 1058b35–1059a10.) But God’s knowledge is eternal, whereas ours is corruptible, as it can be lost due to forgetfulness, and can be acquired through teaching or discovery. Therefore “knowledge” belongs to both us and God by equivocation.

Furthermore (6), whenever things are spoken of univocally in something, they have a certain likeness. But of all like things there is a certain comparison, whereas comparison belongs only to things that come together in some nature. Therefore, since no created things come together with God in any common nature, since it would then be prior to both, it seems that nothing is said univocally of God and the created.

Furthermore (7), nothing said univocally can be in one thing a substance and in another an accident. But in us, knowledge is an accident, whereas in God it is substance. Therefore it is predicated equivocally.

I answer that something can be common to certain things in three ways: either univocally, or equivocally, or analogically.

Of course nothing can be said univocally of God and the created. The reason is that, because there are two things to consider in a reality—the reality’s nature or “whatness,” and its existence—in all univocal things there must be some community according to the nature’s account, and not according to existence, since one existence can belong only to one reality; whence the possession of humanity is not in two men according to the same existence. And therefore whenever the form signified by a name is the existence itself, it cannot univocally belong to several; on account of this, “being” is also not predicated univocally. And therefore, since the nature or form of all things that are said of God is his very existence, since his existence is his nature, on account of this some philosophers (See Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 5.) say that he is a being not in an essence, a knower not through knowledge, and so on for the other attributes. This is so that the essence might be understood not to be other than his existence, and likewise for the others. Therefore nothing can be said of God and created things univocally.

And therefore some say that whatever is said of God and the created is said through mere equivocation. But this cannot stand either, since in things that are merely equivocal by chance and fortune, one is not known through the other, as when the same name belongs to two men. Therefore, since one does come to a cognition of the divine knowledge through our own knowledge, it cannot be the case that “knowledge” is wholly equivocal.

And therefore one should say that “knowledge” is said analogically of God and the created, and likewise for all such words. But there are two sorts of analogy. Some are according to an agreement in some one thing that belongs to them both through priority and posteriority; and this analogy cannot exist between God and the created, just as neither can univocation. The other analogy is insofar as the one imitates the other, to the degree that it can, while not perfectly reaching it; and this is the analogy of the created in relation to God.

Reply Obj. 1: A univocal effect is produced by what acts according to form only when the receiver is proportioned to receive the entire power of the agent, or according to its same account. And so, no created thing is proportioned to receiving knowledge from God in the mode in which it is in himself, just as neither can lower bodies receive heat from the sun univocally, even though it acts through its own form.

Reply Obj. 2: God’s knowledge is not a measure coequal with our knowledge, but rather one that exceeds it. And therefore it does not follow that it is of univocally the same account with our knowledge, but rather analogically.

Reply Obj. 3: More and less does not remove univocation or unity of species, but the things that cause the more and less can make a difference of species, and thereby remove univocation. And this happens when the more and less are caused not by a diverse participation of one nature, but from a gradation of diverse natures; for example, an angel is said to be more intellectual than a man.

Reply Obj. 4: The Commentator’s argument is not sufficient through itself except insofar as it is taken in a certain matter. For the knowledge that is a cause of realities the way the divine knowledge is cannot be univocal with a knowledge caused by realities, for the reason stated.

And because the other arguments to the contrary seem to conclude that it is said wholly equivocally, therefore they require a response.

Reply Sed Contra 5: That should be understood in reference to existence, not to the reality’s intention which is predicated in common. For “body,” even insofar as this is said there, is predicated equivocally of the corruptible and the incorruptible, yet its account is the same in each, if it be considered according to the common intention of the word.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Between God and the created there is no likeness through coming together in some one common thing, but through imitation. Whence a created thing is said to be like God, but not the converse, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, para. 6 (PG 3:914).)

Reply Sed Contra 7: “Knowledge” is not predicated of God according to the account of its genus, that is, the genus of quality or of accident, but only according to the account of its difference, which pertains to its perfection, according to which it is viewed from its nature, through an imitation, as was said.

Article 5

Whether God’s knowledge is universal or particular, potential or habitual or actual

To the fifth we proceed as follows. It seems that God’s knowledge is universal.

Obj. 1: For knowledge is universal that is through universal causes. But God knows all things through the most universal cause, that is, through his own essence. Therefore his knowledge is universal to the greatest degree.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems that it is particular, for that whereby the proper nature of a reality is known is particular cognition. But God knows perfectly the proper natures of all realities. Therefore his knowledge is particular.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that it is also potential, for just as his activity extends to things that exist outside him, which are caused by his activity, so too is his knowledge; for the things that exist outside him are known by him. But God has not worked actual realities always, since they did not exist from eternity. Therefore it seems that neither should we say he has always been an actual knower, but rather, at some times he was potentially so.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that it is habitual, for just as a power is intermediate between essence and activity, so too habit is intermediate between power and act. But although in God all things are one, nonetheless we designate his essence, activity, and power. Therefore and similarly, we could designate a habit in him, so that we might say God is a knower in habit.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that his knowledge is actual, for nothing is an agent except insofar as it is actual. But God does all things through his wisdom; whence the Psalm says, in wisdom hast thou made them all (Ps 104 [103]:24). Therefore his knowledge is actual to the greatest degree.

On the contrary, things that are not of the same account are not divided by the same differences; for according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 3, 1b16.) of diverse genera the species and differences are diverse. But God’s knowledge and ours are not of the same account. Therefore, since the aforesaid are differences belonging to our knowledge, it seems that they should not be referred to the divine knowledge.

Furthermore, the Commentator also says (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 2, comm. 51.) that God’s knowledge is neither universal nor particular nor potential.

I answer that none of the things said befit the divine knowledge, except only this: that it is always existing in act. The reason for this is that the conditions of knowledge are viewed chiefly in reference to the account of its medium, and so it is for any cognition whatsoever. Now, that whereby God knows, as though by a medium, is his own essence, which cannot be called “universal,” since everything universal receives the addition of something whereby it becomes determinate, and thus it is potential and imperfect in existence. Likewise, his knowledge cannot be called “particular,” since the principle of the particular is matter, or something standing in the place of matter, which does not befit God. Likewise too, every passive or material potency has been removed from his essence, since he is pure act; whence neither does the account of habit befit him, since a habit is not the ultimate perfection—rather, the activity that perfects the habit is. And therefore his knowledge can be called neither “universal” nor “particular,” neither “in potency” nor “in habit,” but only “in act.”

Reply Obj. 1: Even though the divine essence is the universal cause of realities, nonetheless it does not follow that something can be added to it whereby it becomes a proper and perfect cause. Rather, through its very self it is the sufficient and perfect cause of each and every reality. And therefore the cognition that is through such a cause is not knowing universally, but in the proper nature of each reality.

Reply Obj. 2: Even though God knows the proper nature of each and every reality, nonetheless he does not know them through something received from the reality. For, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 1 (PG 3:866).) the divine knowledge does not admit into itself individual realities that are being known, nor is there one knowledge whereby he knows himself and another whereby he knows realities. And therefore it cannot be called “particular,” since properly speaking knowledge is particular that is received from a reality through a particular medium.

Reply Obj. 3: God does not act through an intermediate activity, but his activity is his essence. Whence just as his knowledge is always in act and not in potency, so is his activity, even though its effect does not always exist; this happens on account of the order of the disposing wisdom. And yet God is not said to have made reality from eternity, as he has known it from eternity, because “activity” is signified as going out from the agent into the thing done or made. And therefore God cannot be said to be doing anything except when something comes to be. But knowing, although it is also of external things, is still about those things insofar as they are within the knower through their likeness; this is why, according to the condition of the knower, not that of the known, God is said to have known from eternity even things that did not exist from eternity.

Reply Obj. 4: “Power” names a perfect principle of activity, and therefore we can signify an active power in God; but “habit” is only the perfection of some potency that is incomplete as regards act, but not the ultimate perfection. Whence it asserts a double imperfection: both in the potency perfected by the habit, and in the habit that is perfected by the activity. And therefore the name “habit,” properly speaking, does not befit God. And if sometimes he is called “Lord from eternity,” not in act but in habit, this is more by way of a likeness than according to proper speech. (Mandonnet notes that in virtue of this response, the response to the fifth objection is clear.)

Exposition of the text

And so it is to be known that God’s wisdom or knowledge, although it is one and simple, yet it is given several different names because of the varying states of things and their different effects. (Sent. I, 35.6(155).2.) One should consider that, in all the names here noted, one is based on an addition to another, but this is not an addition on the side of the knower, but on the side of the things known, which stand to the knower in diverse ways. For the name “knowledge,” or “wisdom,” signifies cognition in an absolute way along with the condition of certitude; whence it is in reference to both temporal and eternal things. But “providence,” or “foreknowledge,” adds the condition of duration, which can be of eternity with respect to time; and therefore it can only be in reference to temporal things, both of the good and the bad. But this disposition further adds the order of a cause to its effect in existing; whence it is of things that are to be done. “Providence” adds even something more, that is, the order of the cause conserving and ordering the end; and therefore providence pertains to governance. But “predestination” adds, over and above providence, a determinate end, so it is only in reference to those who are ordered to glory; and therefore it is said only of the good who are to be saved. However, “reprobation,” since it is in reference to the evil, adds nothing pertaining to his knowledge over and above foreknowledge; this is why he does not mention it.

Some make the following objection to this. (Sent. I, 35.7(156).2.) Here are presented three reasons that proceed, as it were, through the same path, except that the first is taken from “foreknowledge” signified abstractly, the second from “foreknowledge” signified concretely and as a verb, as when he is said “to foreknow,” and the third from “foreknowledge” signified concretely and as a name, as when he is called a “foreknower.” And the arguments are clear in the text.

And yet Creator is said relatively so as not to signify essence. (Sent. I, 35.7(156).4.) This seems to be false. For since the name is verbal, it signifies an act. But the act of creation, insofar as it is in God, is the divine essence. Therefore it signifies the essence. And to this one should say that in creation, insofar as it is a divine act, there are two things to consider: the activity itself, and its relation to the thing created. Now, the Master is taking this name “Creator” not insofar as it is derived from the activity, which is without a doubt the essence, but insofar as it is derived from the relation, which is not the essence—nor is it anything really in God, as has been said before. (Above, d. 30, q. 1, a. 2.)