D. 45 - The Will of God

Division of the text

After the Master has considered the knowledge and omnipotence of God, now he third considers his will. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers God’s will; in the second he considers the conformity of our will with his will, at it is also to be known that at times the will of a man who wills the same as what God wills to be done is evil. (Sent. I, 48.1(207).1.)

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he considers what God’s will is, and in how many ways it is spoken of; in the second, he inquires about its efficacy, at here a question arises. (Sent. I, 46.1(197).1.)

The first of these is divided into three: in the first, he considers the will as regards what it is; in the second, he considers its causality, at and so this most highly good will is the cause of all things which naturally are; (Sent. I, 45.4(193).1.) in the third, he designates the multiplicity of his will, as regards the ways of taking the word, at here, we must not pass over the fact that Sacred Scripture was accustomed to speak of God’s will in various ways. (Sent. I, 45.5(194).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows that God’s will is his own essence; in the second, he presents a contrary objection, and answers it, at and although it is the same for God to will to be, yet it is not to be said that God is all things which he wills. (Sent. I, 45.2(191).1.)

And so this most highly good will is the cause of all things which naturally are. (Sent. I, 45.4(193).1.) Here he shows that God’s will is the first cause of things. And in reference to this he does two things: first, he presents his intention; second, he proves what he proposes, at for one who seeks its cause seeks something which is greater than it. (Sent. I, 45.4(193).2.) Moreover, he proves the two things that pertain to the account of a first cause: first, that there is no other cause of God’s will; second, that it is the cause of all things, at and so the will of God . . . is the first and highest cause of all species and motions. (Sent. I, 45.4(193).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 4, n. 9 (CCSL 50; PL 42:873).)

Here, we must not pass over the fact that Sacred Scripture was accustomed to speak of God’s will in various ways. (Sent. I, 45.5(194).1.) Here he shows that the noun “will” is taken in many ways, even though there is only one will of God. And this is divided into three parts: in the first, he presents the principal and proper signification of it, according to which his good pleasure is called “God’s will”; in the second, he presents its figurative signification, according to which a sign of his will is called his “will,” at but at times, according to some figure of speech, that is called God’s will which is not his will properly speaking; (Sent. I, 45.6(195).1.) and in the third, he compares the will that is a sign with the will of good pleasure, or being well pleased, at therefore five things are set out above which are called ‘the will of God’ according to a figure of speech. (Sent. I, 45.7(196).3.)

As regards the second of these, he does two things: first, he shows that the will that is a sign is spoken of in many ways; second, he treats the diverse signs of his will that are called “God’s will,” at but although precept and prohibition and counsel are three things, yet each of them is called ‘the will of God’ because they are signs of the divine will. (Sent. I, 45.6(195).2.)

And as regards this latter, he does two things: first, he treats the three signs that pertain to doing or not doing; second, he treats of the other two, which pertain to what occurs in the present, at God’s permission and operation are also called God’s will. (Sent. I, 45.7(196).2.)

In reference to the first of these, he does three things: first, he designates the reason why these signs of the will can be called his “will”; second, he confirms that they are called his “wills,” based on an authority, at the will can be taken for God’s precept and counsel; (Sent. I, 45.6(195).3.) third, he shows the distance between these signs and his will of good pleasure, at although those three are called God’s will by virtue of the fact that they are signs of the divine will, yet it is not to be understood that God wills all to be done which he commanded to any man, or that all he prohibited not be done. (Sent. I, 45.7(196).1.)

Question 1

What the will of God is

Here four things are asked:

first, whether in God there is a will;

second, whether his will is only of his very self as object, or also of other things;

third, whether his will is the cause of the things that come to be;

fourth, on the division of his will into the will that is a sign and the will that is his good pleasure.

Article 1

Whether a will belongs to God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.19.1; I.54.2; SCG I.72, 73; IV.19; On Truth, q. 23, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 32.) It seems that will does not belong to God.

Obj. 1: For will is a certain appetite. But every appetite belongs to the imperfect; this is why Physics 1 says (Aristotle, Physics 1.9, 192a16‒24.) that matter has an appetite for form. Therefore, since in God there is no imperfection, it seems that neither is there will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the act of the will is to tend into its end, which is its object. But tending into the end does not belong to what is the ultimate end. Therefore, since God is the end of all things, it seems that a will does not belong to him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b22‒433a8; 4.10, 433a9‒b30.) a will is a moved mover, and it is moved by what is willed. But according to Boethius, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, poem 9 (CCSL 94; PL 63:758).) God gives motion to all things while remaining himself immobile; this is also why Metaphysics 9 says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7, 1072a26‒b4.) that he moves things as desired by them, and what is desired moves desire without itself being moved. Therefore it seems that will does not belong to him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher and even according to Damascene, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.9, 432b5; John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 22 (PG 94:943).) the will is in reason. But “reason” names a shadowy cognition, because it arises in the shadow of intelligence, as Isaac says in his Book of Definitions, (Isaac Israeli ben Solomon, Liber de definitionibus.) the sort of cognition that does not belong to God. Therefore it seems that neither does will belong to him.

On the contrary, there are many authorities, both of the canon of Scripture and of the saints, and these are also included in the text. (Sent. I, 45.5(194)‒6(195).3.)

Furthermore, we are conformed to God most of all according to what is the highest thing in us. But the highest thing in us seems to be the will, which is the mover of the other powers, according to Anselm; (Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, ch. 4 (PL 158:436–37).) it is also the freest thing in our nature. Therefore it seems that will should be attributed most of all to God.

Furthermore, all who confess that there is a God assert that he is the highest happiness. But happiness cannot be without delight, as is said in Ethics 1. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.8, 1098b25.) Therefore the highest delight is in God. But delight cannot be without desire and will, since delight consists in a certain satisfaction of the will. Therefore it seems that there is a will in God.

I answer that in every nature where cognition is found, there is also found will and delight. The reason for this is that everything that has a cognitive power can discern between the fitting and the repugnant, and what is apprehended as fitting must be willed or desired. And therefore in us, following our double knowledge of sensation and understanding, there is a double appetitive power: one that follows the apprehension of the intellect, which is called “will,” and the other that follows the apprehension of the senses; this latter is divided into the irascible and the concupiscible. Whence, as was shown earlier, (Above, d. 35, q. 1, a. 1.) since in God there is an intellectual cognition, there must also be in him a will and delight, according to which latter God rejoices at his one and simple activity, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 7. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.14, 1154b26.) For in every knowing nature, its perfect and natural activity is delightful.

Reply Obj. 1: Although in God there is said to be a will, still it is not conceded that there is appetite here. For, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 108, serm. 8, para. 4 (CCSL 40; PL 37:1521‒22); here Augustine uses the words desiderium and concupiscentia, not appetitus.) an appetite, properly speaking, is for a reality that is not possessed. But God possesses his whole good within himself. Whence not even in us, properly speaking is the act of the will an appetite when it has been joined to what it wills. Rather, it is a love for the reality already possessed, according to Augustine. (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 108, serm. 8, paras. 4, 5 (CCSL 40; PL 37:1521‒22).)

Reply Obj. 2: And thereby the response to this one is clear as well, for to tend into an end happens incidentally to the will insofar as it is distant from its end, whereas to have an activity as regards the end is what is essential to the will. This especially belongs to God, who loves himself and is delighted in himself.

Reply Obj. 3: A will is moved only by an end; however, the end of the divine will is its own very goodness, which is the same as the will in reality. And therefore it does not follow that God is a moved mover, properly speaking, since every mover is something other than what is moved by it. But perhaps due to this Plato asserted that the first mover “moves his very self,” insofar as he knows and loves himself, as the Commentator says in Physics 8. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 8, text. 51.) And this is said merely metaphorically, just as it is also said that the end “moves” him.

Reply Obj. 4: The gradation of appetitive powers is also according to the gradation of cognition, for to the degree that reason is over sensation, so far is reason’s will over sensation’s appetite. And to the degree that the divine intellect is over our reason, so far is his will over our will. And thereby the objection concluded that will does not belong to God: according to the mode of our will. And yet, just as our reason is called “intellect” and the divine intellect is called “reason,” as is clear in On the Divine Names, ch. 7 (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 4 (PG 3:871).) on account of their agreement in immateriality, so too even “will” is said of both as a common name.

Article 2

Whether God’s will is only of his very self

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.19.2; SCG I.75‒77; On Truth, q. 23, a. 4.) It seems that God’s will is not but of his very self.

Obj. 1: For according to the Philosopher, the will is for the end, but choice is for things that are for the sake of the end, as is said in Ethics 3. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1113b4.) But nothing else is the end of his activity except his very self. Therefore his will is only for his very self.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the will is moved by what is willed. But nothing can be moving the divine will except himself. Therefore his will is only for his very self.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the will of anything whatsoever is for what is good for it. But the existence or non-existence of everything good for a thing makes a difference in it. But the existence or non-existence of anything created makes no difference in him, in that he does not need our goods, but rather holds the whole of good within himself. Therefore it seems that his will does not extend to things that are outside him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things that are for the sake of the end are sought only on account of the end. Therefore when the end is possessed, there is no further will for the things that are for the end. But the end of all created things is the divine goodness, which is in God himself from eternity. Therefore it seems that his will does not extend to things that are outside him.

On the contrary, love consists in the act of the will. But it is said of God in Wisdom 11:24 that he loves all things that exist, and hates none of the things that he has made. Therefore his will is also for things created by him.

Furthermore, as God’s knowledge stands to the true, so stands his will to the good. But his knowledge is of all truths. Therefore his will is also of all goods.

I answer that, just as God, by knowing his own essence, knows all things that are from him, insofar as they are a certain likeness of his truth, so too even in willing or loving his own essence, he wills all things that are from him, insofar as they have a likeness with his goodness. Whence what is loved primarily by him is his own goodness alone. But other things he wills in their order to his own goodness—yet not in such a way that thereby he acquires any goodness through them, as we ourselves do when acting well as regards others, but rather such that he might bestow something of his goodness on them. And therefore liberality is, as it were, proper to his very self, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 11.) since from his activity he does not intend to provide any benefit for himself, but wishes only to pour out his goodness on others. And this is why Augustine says (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 32 (CCSL 32; PL 34:32).) that he uses us for the sake of his own goodness and our own advantage.

Reply Obj. 1: One should consider two things in the object of any power: that which is material, and that which formally completes the account of the object; this is clear in vision, since color is the visible in potency, and it does not become actually visible except through the act of light. Likewise I say that what formally completes the account of the willed is the end, from which it is the account of the good. And this is what the Philosopher means when he says that will is of the end. But things that are for the sake of the end stand as material to the object of the will, namely, such that they are willed through their order to the end, just as color is seen through the act of light.

Reply Obj. 2: What is willed as the end is what moves the will and perfects it; and in this respect nothing moves the divine will except God. But what is ordered to the end is willed by it as effected by the will and moved by it. This is clear in the will of an artisan, which is the principle of activities ordered to his end.

Reply Obj. 3: God’s will is only for what is his own good. But this does not happen the same way in our own will, which wills its own good—namely, that by which it is perfected as by an end—or that through which the end is attained. The divine will, on the other hand, wills its own good, which is himself, and what is from him, and not that through which he is helped. And therefore it is not referred to its perfection, whether what is willed by him exists or not.

Reply Obj. 4: God does not order created things to the end of his own goodness as though through them he attains his own goodness. Rather, the created things themselves, by the divine activity, acquire a certain likeness of divine goodness, which could not occur without him willing and making it so.

Article 3

Whether the causality of things should be ascribed to the divine will

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 43, q. 2, a. 1; ST I.19.4, 5, ad 2; SCG II.23; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 5; q. 3, a. 15.) It seems that the causality of things should not be ascribed to the divine will.

Obj. 1: For God’s will is only of good things. But his knowledge is the sufficient cause of all good things. Therefore it is not necessary to assert that God’s will is the cause of things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is not the cause of things except through his activity. But to be the principle of an activity pertains to a cause by reason of its power. Therefore one should say that his power is the cause of things rather than his will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a necessary effect can never come from a contingent cause. But will is a contingent cause, since it is open to each option. Therefore it cannot be the cause of necessary things. Therefore, since there are many necessary things in the world, it seems that his will is not the cause of all things.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, when one posits any sufficient cause of a reality, other causes are added superfluously for the same reality. Therefore, if God’s will is the sufficient cause of realities (for it cannot be an insufficient cause), it seems that all natural causes would be superfluous, as would all the powers of the soul, and all its infused habits—which is silly.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, anything can be demonstrated from its sufficient cause. Therefore, if God’s will is the sufficient cause of all things, it seems that the following is a sufficient demonstration for all things: why does this exist? Because God has willed it. And in this way, it would be easy to know all things, and the studies of the saints and the philosophers, who have labored to determine the reasons for the divine activities, would be totally empty—which is foolish to say.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.1, 1025b23.) the principle of all works of art is the will of the artisan. But things that exist proceed from God as works of art from their artisan, as is handed down by both the saints and the philosophers. Therefore the cause of all things that exist is God’s will.

Furthermore, Dionysius says, love draws higher things to the foresight for things that have less. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 13 (PG 3:711).) But all things that exist have emerged into existence by the divine foresight. Therefore, since love consists in an act of the will, it seems that the principle of all realities is the divine will.

I answer that a determinate work does not advance except due to a determinate agent; this is why what exists only in potency does not act, since it is open to (Or “is oriented toward.”) many things indeterminately, whereas form, which is what renders determinate the potency of matter, is said to be the principle of action. And therefore in all things of which the active power is determined to one effect, nothing is required on the side of the agent for acting beyond a complete power, as long as it is not impeded by a defect in the recipient as regards the effect coming about. This is clear in all agents acting from a necessity of nature.

However, God’s power, because it is infinite, is not more determined to this rather than to that, nor can his work receive determination from the side of his work, since he himself produces both the matter and the form. Whence there must be something else over and above the account of his power whereby his work is determined. Now, this occurs through his knowledge, which knows the proper account of the reality. But because his knowledge is open to opposite things, for it is of both good things and evils, therefore something yet more must be added wherein the account of the cause is perfected. And this is the will, which determinately takes one of the two that he knows or can do. Whence the perfect account of causality in things that do not act from a necessity of nature is found primarily in the will, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.5, 1048a10.) And this belongs to the will insofar as its object is the end, which is the cause of causes, and from which the determination of the deed is drawn, as is clear from Physics 2. (See Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 194b33; 2.9, 200a35.) And this is why the causality of realities is ascribed to the divine will.

Reply Obj. 1: The account of causality is not perfected in knowledge, as was said in the body, unless will is joined to it. Therefore the will, more than knowledge, is said to be the cause.

Reply Obj. 2: The will is the principle of activity as the first thing commanding the work, but in things that act through a will, the power is the principle of the work as executing it. And in this consists the account of power such that it is the proximate principle of the work, and not the first. And in this sense, God’s will, more than his power, is said to be the cause of realities.

Reply Obj. 3: The divine will has freedom, and this is why it belongs to it that it is open to each option; but over and above this, it has unchangeability, such that what it wills it adheres to in an immobile way from the very fact that it is asserted to be willing that thing. And things that are necessary among beings imitate this immobility, although they do not equal it. On account of this, one should not say that the divine will is a contingent cause, since contingency indicates changeability.

Reply Obj. 4: The causality of the divine will does not exclude all the proximate causes of realities, and neither is this due to an insufficiency of the will. Rather, it is due to the order of his wisdom, which planned his effects to come forth by other mediating causes, so that in this way even the dignity of causation might be communicated to created things.

Reply Obj. 5: A demonstration that gives scientific knowledge about a reality is drawn from the reality’s proximate causes. And therefore, for us to have knowledge about realities, one must seek other accounts after his will, which is the first and common cause of realities. And this is especially so because we do not fully know his will, such that we might see in it the proper account of a reality, as he himself sees, who knows all things in himself.

Article 4

Whether God’s will is distinguished into the will that is his good pleasure and the will that is a sign

To the fourth, we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.19.6, ad 1.) It seems that the distinction of his will presented in the text (Sent. I, 45.5(194)‒6(195).3. Here Lombard divides the meanings of “divine will” into God’s will truly and properly speaking, called his “good pleasure,” and the signs of his will, which he subdivides under five headings: “precept,” “prohibition,” “counsel,” “permission,” and “operation.”) is unsuitable.

Obj. 1: For just as God’s will is open to many things, so is his knowledge. But diverse signs are not assigned to his knowledge. Therefore it seems that neither should they be assigned to his will, since each of them is equally hidden.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every sign that does not correspond to what it signifies is a false sign. But sometimes what is signified does not correspond to such signs of the will posited in the text; for he permits evils that he does not will, and he even commands goods that he does not will to come about, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 45.7(196).1; the examples given are God’s instruction for Abraham to sacrifice Isaac and Christ’s instruction for the healed blind man not to tell anyone (Gen 22:2‒12 and Mark 1:44).) Therefore it seems that they are false signs, and thus they should not be designated as signs.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as one finds the good and the better, so too one finds the evil and the worse, like the venial and the mortal. But there is only one sign of these latter two things that could be done: that is, prohibition. Therefore it seems that even of good things there should be only one sign, and not two: that is, precept and counsel.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the object of the will is the good. But the occurrence of evil is not a good, as will be explained in the next Distinction. (Below, d. 46, q. 1, a. 4.) Therefore there should be no sign of the divine will relative to evil; thus, permission is superfluous.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as a sign of his will looks to diverse things, so is his will of good pleasure (Or “being well pleased.”) about diverse things. Therefore if diverse signs of his will are assigned on account of their diversity, it seems that his will of good pleasure should also be multiplied. And if not the latter, then not the former either.

I answer that some things are said of God properly, and some metaphorically. The things said of him properly are truly in him, but the things said of him metaphorically are said of him through a likeness of proportionality to some effect. For example, in Deuteronomy 4:24 he is called a fire, in that just as fire stands to the consumption of its contrary, so too God stands to the consumption of wickedness. Whence his being destructive of wickedness is his being “fire,” and the active consumption itself is his “fieriness.” And through that mode, punishment itself is said to be his “anger,” since an effect is the sign of its cause. Therefore things in reference to which a likeness is noted, whether a likeness of anger or of something else, are said to be signs of such; whence punishment is said to be a sign of his “anger.”

But I say that God can be said to will something in two ways: in one way, properly, and thus he is said to will that for which there is truly a will in him, and which pleases him; and this is the will of good pleasure. And he is also said to will something metaphorically in that he stands to it according to the mode of one willing, insofar as he commands or counsels or does something of this sort. Whence those things wherein one sees a likeness of that reality as regards God’s will are called “his will” in a metaphorical sense. And because such things are effects, they are called “signs.”

However, the reason for the diversity of these signs is as follows. These signs are assigned to the divine will insofar as it relates to human realities, over which it is provident in a special mode. Therefore a sign of the will can be taken either according to the ordination of men to the end of eternal salvation, or according to the carrying out of that order.

Now, for the attainment of the end it belongs to providence to grant two things: the things by which one advances toward its end, and the things by which one is freed from impediments. Now, just as natural things tend to their natural ends through active powers bestowed on them from divine providence, so too the human will is ordered to its end through counsels and precepts, and it is drawn back from sins, which impede the attainment of the end, by prohibitions. This is as divine providence has also bestowed horns, claws, and the like on the animals, by which they protect themselves against attackers.

However, if a sign of the will pertains to the carrying out of the order, this can occur in two ways: either insofar as it tends toward what it has been ordained for, by doing good—and in respect to this, this is a sign that it is his activity, since God works all good things in us—or even by deviating from that order, by doing evil, which deviation is also subject to providence, not as foreseen, but as ordained. And permission is in reference to this.

Or it can be taken in a better way as follows. Either a sign of the will is with reference to things present—and thus, relative to good things, it is his activity, and relative to evil things, it is his permission. Or it is in reference to future things—and thus, relative to evils, it is prohibition, and relative to the good toward which all things are bound, it is a precept. But relative to a more perfect good that not all attain, it is counsel. And they are contained in this line: he commands, and also prohibits, permits, counsels, and fulfills. (These words are not found in the text of the Master here, but it may have been a common dictum in the schools.)

Reply Obj. 1: God’s knowledge is truly and perfectly of all things, but his will is not. And therefore he is said metaphorically to “will” certain things that, simply speaking, he does not will, on account of which, what is being designated is the will that is a sign.

Reply Obj. 2: An effect that is a sign of something in one thing in its proper sense is the sign of the same thing, by way of a likeness, in another; and this is in all things that are said metaphorically. For example, punishment is a sign of anger in a man, and in God it is a sign of his will to punish, which is, through a likeness, called “anger.” And likewise, I say that to such signs corresponds something in God that, by way of likeness, is said to be his will of this reality; for example, to his precept corresponds his will of commanding and ordering the rational nature to the end, and so on for the others. Whence it is clear that these signs are not false.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as God gives diverse powers in the arrangement of natures wherein one power is nobler than another, such that thus one reality more perfectly attains the end than does another, so too even in the arrangement of men there are diverse things that order them to the end. One is given to all in common, that is, precept; and another is given to the perfect, that is, counsel. But every sin occurs in deviating from the order of the end, and therefore that every sin is to be avoided is given to all; nor is a diverse gradation of men viewed in reference to this. And on account of this, only one sign is given about this, namely, prohibition.

Reply Obj. 4: God does not will the occurrence of evils, properly speaking. But he does will something joined to them, as will be explained below. (Below, d. 46, q. 1, a. 4.) From this it follows that he permits them, and therefore the permission itself is an effect of a certain will, and it is metaphorically called his “will.”

Reply Obj. 5: The divine will, even though it is for many things that are willed, still is but one. For he wills all those things in one thing willed through itself—namely, his own goodness—just as he also knows all things by knowing his own essence.

Exposition of the text

And so it pleased the vanity of the philosophers to attribute them also to other causes. (Sent. I, 45.4(193).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 2, para. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:871).) Here he is speaking in reference to those who denied the existence of an agent cause, and asserted that the world was made by chance, and that all things come from the necessity of matter. Or he is speaking in reference to those who assert that God does not immediately act in all things, but only in one, which is the first thing created.

And so nothing but ‘God’s will is the first cause of health, illness, rewards and punishments, graces and retributions.’ (Sent. I, 45.4(193).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 3, ch. 3, para. 8 and ch. 4, para. 9 (CCSL 50; PL 42:872‒73).) Other causes are not being excluded from causality by this statement; rather, it excludes only their being the first cause.