D. 42 - The Power of God

Division of the text

Having considered God’s knowledge, here the Master, second, considers his power. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, the Master shows the universality of his power, insofar as he is called “omnipotent”; in the second, he excludes the error of certain ones who limit God’s power, at but there are some who, glorying in their own intellect, have attempted to encompass God’s power within a limit. (Sent. I, 43.1(187).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks why God is said to be omnipotent; in the second, he considers the question, at that God can do all things is proved by several authorities. (Sent. I, 42.1(184).1.)

And the latter is divided into two: in the first, he determines the question by holding fast to one side; in the second, he resolves the things brought in on behalf of the other side, at and yet it is handed down by some authorities that God is truly called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills. (Sent. I, 42.3(186).3.)

As regards the first, he does three things: first, he manifests the truth—that is, that God can do all things; second, he excludes three obstacles, the first of which is based on bodily acts, the second on sins, and the third on passions, at but it is asked how he may be said to be able to do all things, since we can do some things which he is not able to do; (Sent. I, 42.2(185).1.) third, based on the things said, he concludes to the perfect account of omnipotence, at to those who consider it diligently, his omnipotence appears here according to two aspects. (Sent. I, 42.3(186).1.)

And yet it is handed down by some authorities that God is truly called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills. (Sent. I, 42.3(186).2.) Here he brings in things that appear to move on to the other side of the question, namely, that he is called “omnipotent” because he can do all the things (omnia potest) he wishes to do. And this is divided into three parts: in the first, he brings in authorities in favor of this side; in the second, he answers them, at but to this, it can be said; (Sent. I, 42.3(186).3.) in the third, he points out the multiplicity of the relations, so that it might be seen how this is also proper to God, at but beware how you understand: ‘he can do whatever he wills.’ (Sent. I, 42.3(186).4.)

Here there are two questions:

the first is about God’s power according to itself; (Q. 1.)

the second, about the things subject to his power. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The power of God in itself

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether power belongs to God;

second, whether in him there is one power or many.

Article 1

Whether power belongs to God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.25.1; SCG I.16; II.7; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 1; q. 7, a. 1.) It seems that power does not belong to God.

Obj. 1: For just as first potency stands to act, so does the first act stand to power. (As one can see here, in the third objection, and in the reply to the first objection below, there are really two sorts of potentia, and thus, “power” and “potency” here both translate the same word in Latin. Consequently, some interpretative choice is unavoidable in the translation, for in English, “power” nearly always means an active ability, the potential to do something, whereas “potency” (especially in philosophical contexts) usually has the sense of a passive ability, the potential for something to be done to it or to be changed into something.) But of the first potency, which is matter, there is no act that belongs to its essence. Therefore neither is there any power of the first act, which is God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything that acts through its own essence acts by the mediation of some power; for a power is a middle between a thing’s essence and its activity. But God, since he is the first agent, acts not by anything’s participation, but through his own essence, as Dionysius says and Avicenna proves. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694); Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 7.) Therefore no power belongs to him whereby he acts.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every potency is either active or passive, according to the Philosopher. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15‒23.) But no passive potency belongs to God, since he cannot undergo anything, as is said in the text; (Sent. I, 42.3(186).1.) but neither does any active potency, since, as the Philosopher says in the same place, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15‒17.) an active potency is a principle of change within something else as something else; but God, when acting, requires no matter on which to act. Therefore it seems that in no way does potency belong to him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every power is the principle of an activity. But no activity belongs to God, unless it be his essence. Therefore, since his essence has no principle, for his essence is neither begotten nor proceeding, it seems that no power belongs to him.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, God’s power is either always joined to act or not. If the first, and every power joined to act brings about its effect whenever it exists, whereas God’s power has existed from eternity, then so too his effects—created things—exist from eternity. And that is heretical. If the second, and every power not joined to act, but joinable to it, is imperfect, and is perfected through the act, then there will be something imperfect in God. And because that is incongruous, it seems that power is wholly absent from God.

On the contrary, Luke 1:49 says, he who is mighty has done great things for me, and Psalm 89:10 [88:9] says, who is mighty as thou art, O Lord, with thy truth round about thee? (RSV reads faithfulness instead of truth.)

Furthermore, every effect is produced through the efficient cause’s power. But God is the efficient cause of things. Therefore one must posit power in him.

I answer that the name “power” was first imposed for the sake of signifying a man’s capability, inasmuch as we say some men are “powerful,” as Avicenna says; (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 4, ch. 2.) it was then extended even to natural things. However, it seems that, among men, he is powerful who can do what he wishes about other things, without impediment; and insofar as one can be impeded, in this sense his power is diminished. Now, anything’s power, whether that of a natural agent or even of a voluntary agent, is impeded insofar as it can be acted upon by something. Whence it is of the account of “power,” as regards its first imposition, to not be able to be acted upon. Whence even that which is able to not be acted upon, even if it is able to do nothing, we call “powerful”; for example, what is hard is said to have the power to not be cut.

And from this one can conclude that the perfect account of power is in God. This is both because he can do all things, which belongs to him as the first and perfect act—for nothing acts except insofar as it is a being in act—and because he is acted upon by nothing, which belongs to him as pure act without mixture of any matter—for each thing is acted upon by reason of something material in it.

Reply Obj. 1: To be the first potency does not belong to matter according to the principal signification of “potency.” For, as was said in the body of the article, “potency” (Or “power.”) was first imposed for the sake of signifying a principle of action, but second, it was extended so that even the thing that receives an agent’s action might be said to have “potency”—and this is passive potency. Thus, just as activity and action correspond to active potency, and the active potency is completed in them, so too what corresponds to passive potency as its perfection and completion is called its “act.” And on account of this, every form is called “act,” even the separated forms themselves. And what is the principle of the perfection of the whole—which principle is God—is called “the first and pure act,” to which this active power belongs most of all.

Reply Obj. 2: “Power” indicates, as was said in the reply to the first objection, the account of a principle of action. Whence whatever is the principle of acting is called a “power,” like heat and coldness and the like. And so too the divine essence itself, insofar as it is a principle of activity, is called a “power”—but not so as to mean that the power is something other than the essence in God.

Reply Obj. 3: Passive potency in no way belongs to God, but only active potency does. However, it happens that an active power requires an underlying matter on which it acts insofar as it is imperfect, not being potent over the entire substance of the reality. And this imperfection is removed from the divine power.

Or it should be said that, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 6, ch. 1.) “agent” is said in different ways for natural things and divine things. For a natural agent acts through motion, and because every motion is the act of what exists in potency, therefore matter is required as a substrate for the motion. However, a divine agent acts in such a way that it does not give existence through motion, so the active power is the principle of the activity in something else as in the effect brought about, not as in matter being changed.

Reply Obj. 4: God does not act by a mediating activity that is other than his own essence; rather, his own to-be is his own to-act, and his to-act is his own essence. Nonetheless, “essence” is signified as the principle of existing, and for the same reason “power” can be signified as the principle of acting and, beyond this, as the principle of what is brought about.

Reply Obj. 5: His activity is the same as his power in reality, and therefore his power cannot be joined to his activity. Nonetheless, an effect does not always follow just as long as the activity is present, since the activity is in a certain way ruled by the will and the ordering wisdom; whence the effect does not always follow unless with the nod of the divine will, according to the plan wherein the temporal effect follows from the eternal activity.

Article 2

Whether there is only one power in God

To the second we proceed as follows. (ST I.25.1.) It seems that there is not only one power in God.

Obj. 1: For one and the same thing cannot be proper to one and common to many. But the power for creating is common to the three persons, but to generate is proper to the Father. Therefore the powers are different.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, among us there are found certain natural acts, such as generating and the like, certain voluntary acts, such as building houses and the like, and certain animate acts, such as understanding, knowing, and the like. But in us such acts are traced back to diverse powers. Therefore, since to the stated individual acts there correspond similar acts in God—for we say he knows, creates, and generates—it seems that one must assert that there are several powers in him to which these acts trace back.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the philosophers, the separated substances are divided into intellect and will. (See Avicenna, De intelligentiis, ch. 4. See note above on the doubtful authorship of the De intelligentiis, at d. 38, q. 1, a. 1.) Now, this is not a division of diverse natures, so it is a division of diverse powers. Therefore in God there are at least two powers.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the account of power consists in its being a principle of activity. But every divine attribute is a principle of activity; for from his goodness flows every goodness, from his life flows all life, and so on, as Dionysius teaches. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) Therefore, just as we say there are many attributes, so too we should say there are many powers.

On the contrary, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 8 (CCSL 50; PL 42:916).) whatever is said in the divine in an absolute way should be predicated in the singular, not the plural. But power is contained among the absolutes. Therefore there are not many powers in God, but only one.

Furthermore, according to the Philosopher (Rather: Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 17.) in the Book of Causes, every infinite power is more unified than multiple. But the divine power is to the greatest degree infinite. Therefore it is one to the greatest degree, having no multiplicity.

I answer that in God one should, simply speaking and absolutely, say that there is only one power.

For active power, which alone is found in God, can be considered in two ways: either with regard to the power’s essence, or with regard to the actions that proceed from the power. Now, I call the “power’s essence” that which is immediately the principle of the act, in whatever genus it might be, just as heat is the principle of heating. But the principle of all the divine activities is his own essence, since he acts through his own essence. Whence, just as his essence is one in reality while possessing a certain plurality of accounts according to the diverse attributes, as was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2.) so too God’s power is one in reality, but it receives a plurality of accounts according to the diverse accounts of the attributes. For the account of power belongs to every attribute to the degree that being a principle of activity belongs to it. And because God’s activity is his essence, therefore it too is one according to reality, but is signified in diverse ways according to the diverse accounts of the diverse attributes, and according to the diversity of the effects—which are many simply speaking.

Therefore it is clear that the divine power, whether considered according to its essence or even through its relation to the divine activity, has unity insofar as it is in the one acting; but the multitude is real only in the effects that are caused by the divine activity. And therefore it is clear that one should say, absolutely speaking, that the divine power is one, but still it is of many things. For the judgment about the unity of a reality absolutely speaking should be drawn from reference to its essence, and not from reference to what is outside of it.

Reply Obj. 1: “Generative power” names the essential joined to the notional, like when one says, “God generates.” Whence that which is essential pertaining to the account of power is common to the three, like the power for existing; for by the same power the Father generates and the Son is born. But the notion of generating remains proper to the Father; this is quite clear from things said earlier. (Above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 2: The principle of existing and of acting is the same in God. Whence, just as by the same reality God is one, a being, just, and so on, so too by the same thing he performs the acts of diverse accounts, whereas we do this by diverse things.

Reply Obj. 3: In all the other separated substances the will and the intellect do not seem to be wholly the same in reality. Rather, what is in the others according to real diversity is in God according to a unity of reality and a distinction of account.

Reply Obj. 4: The attributes in God are one in reality, and are distinguished only by account; therefore the name “power,” and whatever else is the name of the reality, if it is a name of first imposition, cannot be predicated in the plural, such that the several attributes might be said to be several powers, or several goodnesses, or the like. But names of secondary imposition, like “attribute” and such, are predicated in the plural.

Question 2

Those things subject to the divine power

Next, he asks about the things that are subject to the divine power. And about this, three things are asked:

first, whether God can do whatever anything else can do;

second, whether he can do impossible things;

third, whether one should judge something to be simply speaking possible or impossible in reference to higher or lower causes.

Article 1

Whether God can do whatever anything else can do

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.25.2; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 6.) It seems that God can do whatever anything else can do.

Obj. 1: For every created power has his power as exemplar, just as everything good does as regards his goodness. But whatever is in the thing based on an exemplar is more truly and perfectly found in the first exemplar. Therefore God’s power extends to anything any created power can do.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Topics 4.5, 126a34–35.) that God, and even a zealous man, are able to do base things. But nothing is as distant from his power as is evil. Therefore it seems that he can do all the things that created things can.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it belongs to the account of the will that it have freedom as regards each option. But in God, will is found in the truest sense. Therefore he can do either good or evil.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing that belongs to praiseworthiness should be withheld from one who is great and exceedingly praiseworthy. But to be able to do evil and yet not to do it belongs to praiseworthiness, as is said in Sirach 31:10: who has had the power to transgress and did not transgress, and to do evil and did not do it? (The prior part of this verse, not quoted, reads: let it be for him a ground for boasting.) Therefore this belongs to God, so the same thing follows as before.

On the contrary, just as God cannot not be God, so he cannot be imperfect. But what is created is said to be capable of certain things by its weakness and imperfection, like being capable of suffering, dying, and the like. Therefore it seems that God cannot do all that what is created can do.

Furthermore, the highest good cannot be the cause of any evil, just as neither is what is hot to the highest degree the cause of anything cold. But God is good to the highest degree. Therefore he can do no evil. Now, the created can do this. Therefore it is not so that whatever a created thing can do, God himself can also do.

I answer that whatever there is of perfection in what is created is wholly brought forth from the perfection of the Creator as its exemplar. Yet this is in such a way that God has that perfection more perfectly than it is in what is created. And therefore the power of what is created, insofar as it falls short of representing the divine power, falls short of a perfect ability. Whence what is attributed to it insofar as it exists in such a participated grade need not be attributed to the divine power. For just as we even say the essence of a stone is produced by the divine essence as its exemplar, yet we do not say God is a stone, so too we do not say that the power to walk or to undergo things, as the proximate principle of walking or undergoing, is a power of God, such that he himself might walk or undergo things.

Nonetheless one should note that the grades of powers, like those of natures also, have been ordered by the divine plan insofar as one falls short, more so or less so, of the perfection of the divine power. And therefore one must see that, even though no proper act of these powers, determined according to their grade, belongs to the divine power as to its proximate principle, yet all the proper acts of these powers going forth from them according to the account of the order in which they have been constituted are traced back to God as to their first cause. Whence, even though we do not say God is able to walk or to be acted upon, nevertheless we do say that he creates walking and being acted upon in other things. But the acts that go forth from the determinate powers outside the account of order spoken about are in no way traced back to the causality of the divine power. For we do not say that he is able to sin, nor that he can effect the sin in others.

Reply Obj. 1: The reply to this is clear.

Reply Obj. 2: According to some, the word “base” should be taken in a material way, so that the sense is, “God can do base things, that is, the things that now are base, but were he to do them, they would not be base.”

Or it should be said that this is spoken conditionally, so that “if he were to will it,” is being understood; and the antecedent of this conditional is impossible, as is the consequent. And this is not incongruous, just as neither is this: “if one hundred were less than five, then it would also be less than ten.”

Reply Obj. 3: To be able to sin, according to Anselm and Boethius, (Anselm, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio, q. 1, ch. 1 (PL 158:489); Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 2 (CCSL 94; PL 63:836).) does not pertain to the will’s freedom; rather, it is more the condition of a deficient will, insofar as it is created from nothing. But the account of freedom comes into view in that one can do or not do this, or can do this or something else.

Reply Obj. 4: Something is praiseworthy for a lower nature that would be blameworthy in a higher nature, just as to be fierce is praiseworthy in a dog and a lion, but blameworthy in a man. So too not to sin when one can is to a man’s praise, but if one were to say it of God, it would be blasphemy.

Article 2

Whether God can do things that by nature are impossible

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3; ST I.25.3, 4; II-II.152.3, ad 3; III.13.1; SCG II.22, 25; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 3, ad 9; a. 7; q. 5, a. 3; Quodl. III, q. 1, a. 1; V, q. 2, a. 1; XII, q. 2, a. 1; Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, bk. 6, lect. 2.) It seems that God cannot do things that are by nature impossible.

Obj. 1: For, as the Commentator says, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 8, com. 4.) every alteration is due to some bodily agent. But God is an incorporeal agent. Therefore it seems that no alteration occurring in a lower created thing can be from God except by the mediation of a higher body’s motion, that of the unaltered first altering agent. But nothing impossible by nature can occur by the mediation of that motion. Therefore God can do nothing impossible by nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every impossibility or necessity found in propositions is traced back to the first principle that it is impossible to affirm and deny simultaneously, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3, 1005b13‒33; 4.8, 1012b2–13; 5.6, 1016a7–b1.) But God is said not to be able to make an affirmation and denial be true simultaneously. Therefore he can do nothing impossible by nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is impossible through itself is more impossible than what is impossible incidentally. But God cannot do what is impossible incidentally. Therefore he can do none of the things that are impossible through themselves. Proof of the middle premise: God cannot make the past not have been, as is proved by the authority of Jerome, who says that along with other things God could do, he is not able to make one who has lost virginity a virgin again; (Jerome, Epistulae, letter 22, “To Eustochius” (De custod. virginitatis), para. 5 (CSEL 54:150; PL 22:397).) and by Augustine, (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee, bk. 26, ch. 5 (CSEL 25:734; PL 42:481).) and by the Philosopher, where he commends Agathon’s saying, God lacks this alone, that he make ungenerated the things that have come to be. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b10.) But the past not having been is impossible only incidentally, since the very thing that is past, before it could come to be, was able not to be, like Socrates running. Therefore he cannot do what is impossible incidentally.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 6, ch. 14 (CSEL 28.1:189; PL 34:349).) God cannot do something contrary to the causal principles that he originally implanted in creation; also, in a certain Gloss on Romans 11 it is said (Glossa ordinaria, at Romans 11:24, 6.150 (PL 114:508).) that because God is the author of nature, he does nothing contrary to it. But things that are impossible by nature seem to be contrary to nature. Therefore God can do no such things.

On the contrary (5), he who says “all things” is excluding nothing. But in the text it is said, and proved, (Sent. I, 42, but especially 42.3(186).2.) that God can do all things. Therefore impossibilities are not excluded from his omnipotence.

Furthermore (6), Hilary says that God can do more than we ourselves can say, as is noted above; (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1, and Sent. I, 19.4(75).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 3, para. 1 (CCSL 62; PL 10:76).) this is also proved from what is said in Luke 1:37, with God no word will be impossible. (RSV: with God nothing will be impossible.) But nothing is so impossible that we cannot speak it, and it is even possible to simultaneously affirm and deny, as certain philosophers have said. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.4, 1005b35.) Therefore it seems that God can do all such things.

Furthermore (7), God and man are more distant than two contraries. But God united a human nature to a divine. Therefore much more can he make two contraries exist simultaneously in the same thing. And from that it follows that an affirmation and denial would be true simultaneously. And if this can be so, he can do all things.

Furthermore (8), just as blindness is the disposition contrary to sight, so is virginity to conception. But God made it that a virgin conceived while remaining a virgin, and became a mother. Therefore he can make it that a blind man might have sight while remaining blind. And thus, the same thing follows as before.

I answer that “to be able” indicates the middle reference between the potent and the possible, just as “to know” stands between the knower and the knowable. And therefore “to be able” can be denied in one respect on the side of the potent, and in another respect on the side of the possible.

Now, no being-able that lacks imperfection is denied of God on the side of the potent, the latter being God himself, but it is denied on the side of a being-able to do something deficient, which is not a pure being-able, but one mixed with a being-unable. For his power cannot have any deficiency. Whence it is not conceded that he can sin, or anything like this.

It is also sometimes denied that God is able to do something on the side of the possible thing itself, for what in no way can have the account of the possible; this is what we call “impossible through itself.” And one should look into why this is. Therefore one should note that every power is either for existence or non-existence, like a power for being corrupted. Whence whatever cannot have the account of a being or a non-being cannot be possible. And therefore that the same thing simultaneously exist and not exist is impossible in itself, since what is a being and not a being is neither a being nor not a being. And therefore God is said not to be able to do this, not on account of a defect of his power, but because this falls short of the account of the possible—just as he is said not to know anything false because it falls short of the account of the knowable; and consequently he is said not to be able to do anything in which a contradiction is implied. And on account of this, he cannot make the past not have been, because what is necessarily is as long as it is, and it is impossible that it not be at the time when it is, and it passes into the past along with that necessity and impossibility. This is why Augustine says, if someone says, ‘Because he is omnipotent, God might make things that occurred not have been,’ he does not see that he is saying, ‘He might make what is true, by the very fact that it is true, not be.’ (Augustine, Against Faustus the Manichee, bk. 26, ch. 5 (CSEL 25:732; PL 42:481).)

From this it further follows that he is able to do nothing in which the contrary of the predicate is in the definition of the subject, such that he could make, for example, a man not be rational, or a triangle not have three sides. For in the very thing being asserted to be a triangle one asserts the possession of three sides; whence this simultaneously has three and does not. And from this it further follows that he cannot make any opposites be simultaneously in the same thing, since within the definition of one contrary is found the privation of the other, and negation is found in the definition of a privation, as the prior in the posterior. But whatever in itself is not repugnant to the account of a being, or to the account of a non-being, this God is able to do: for example, that the heavens not exist, or that some other world exist, or infusing sight in one previously blind, and the like. For these are not impossible in themselves but only for something.

Reply Obj. 1: This could be explained such that this cannot occur according to the order of a natural activity, even though it could occur through the action of an agent above nature—unless this is contrary to his intention, who is making this claim expressly about God. And in that case, he has erred in this, nor should this authority be received, since even the philosophers have taught its contrary. For Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 2, ch. 3.) that matter is more obedient to the separated principles and their concepts than to contrary agents in nature. But whatever is the case with the others, one should hold firmly to this about God, who has not bound his own power to the heavens.

Reply Obj. 2: Insofar as something is impossible, it is traced back to that principle. Whence what is impossible through itself includes that principle within itself. And such an impossibility God himself cannot do, as is clear from things said in the body of the article. And what is impossible for anything includes the stated principle in its own order relative to that thing. This is clear when one says that it is impossible for the dead to rise; for to live is possible through itself, but there is no power in a dead body to be brought to this effect, and due to that it is impossible. Whence if a corpse were claimed to be able to live from its own power, one would be claiming the same reality has a power and lacks the power. Nor does God, when he raises the dead, do so such that the body lives through its own power for living; rather, it lives through a power that he bestows on it.

Reply Obj. 3: “The past not to have been” can be taken as impossible incidentally or as impossible through itself. For if one takes the very reality that is said to be past, like Socrates’ running, making it not to have been holds an impossibility only incidentally, its pastness being outside its account. And the very reality considered in itself is not said to be impossible for God, for he can do this, that is, make it that Socrates not run. However, if it is taken insofar as it stands under this incidental pastness, then it is impossible through itself, and God is said not to be able to do this. And this is similar for what is being spoken about: “Socrates not running while he runs” is impossible. For by reason of what is joined to it, it holds an impossibility through itself.

Reply Obj. 4: God has implanted two accounts in the first matter, namely, causal or obediential principles (Here we translate rationes as “principles,” both because such rationes seem connected only with causality here and not at all with knowledge, and for the sake of consistency with the custom of translating rationes seminales (which appears in the next sentence) as “seedlike principles.”) whereby all things are naturally apt to obey God, such that whatever might please him would come to be from them. He has also implanted seedlike principles—that is, active principles whereby natural effects are brought about; and he is sometimes said to act contrary to these in the miracles that he performs. But properly speaking, even then he does not act contrary to them, but alongside them, or above them. He acts above them when he brings about an effect to which nature can in no way reach, like the form of glory for the glorified bodies. He acts alongside them when he produces without the service of natural causes an effect that nature can bring about, like when in John 2 he converts water into wine. But he does not act contrary to them, since he does not make it that an active natural cause, while remaining the same in species, has a different essential effect, such as that a fire, while remaining a fire, might cool something, just as it cannot simultaneously be the same thing and different. But he can indeed destroy one nature and make another, remove one form from matter and induce another; for in this way fire acts contrary to the nature of air when it corrupts it.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Under the scope of “all” one can only take being or non-being. But the things that we have said God is not capable of are neither beings simply speaking nor non-beings.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The stated impossibilities, even though they can be uttered with the mouth, still cannot be conceived by the heart, as the Philosopher proves in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3, 1005b24; 4.4, 1006a21‒28; 5.11, 1018b9–1019a14.) Whence they are not properly and perfectly words.

Reply Sed Contra 7: God did not join the human nature to a divine such that they might be the same nature, or that one person would be God and man in reference to the same thing, but in reference to different things. And thus there is no doubt that he can join contraries in the same thing, since even nature does this.

Reply Sed Contra 8: There is no likeness here. For blindness is the privation of sight itself, so it includes its negation within itself; whence God cannot make something be simultaneously blind and sighted. But the negation of motherhood is not included in the account of virginity; rather, the negation of sexual coupling with a man is. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Article 3

Whether something should be judged impossible in reference to lower causes

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 4.) It seems that a thing should not be judged impossible simply speaking in reference to lower causes.

Obj. 1: For in 1 Corinthians 1:20, which says, has not God made foolish the wisdom of the world?, a Gloss says: God has made the wisdom of this world into foolishness, showing that what it judged to be impossible is possible. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Corinthians 1:20, 6.203.) But the wisdom of this world judges something impossible in reference to lower causes. Therefore it seems that it is foolish to say this.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it is certain that a lower cause cannot justify the impious, but we nonetheless do not say this justification is impossible; and likewise before the world existed we do not say it was impossible for it to be going to exist, though nature cannot make it happen. Therefore it seems that something should not be called impossible by the fact that it is impossible for a lower cause.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it is certain that to illuminate the blind and to give conception to a virgin are impossible for nature, and yet they were able to occur, and did occur. Therefore it seems that something should not be judged impossible in reference to lower causes.

On the contrary, nothing is impossible for God, as is said in Luke 1:37. Therefore, if something were called impossible and possible only in reference to higher causes, then nothing would be impossible. Therefore it seems that one should judge impossibility in reference to lower causes.

Furthermore, the necessary and the impossible are contraries. But something is not called “necessary” on account of the necessity of the first cause, as was said earlier, (Above, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5.) since then all things would be necessary. Therefore neither should the possible and the impossible be judged in reference to higher causes.

I answer that the impossible is of two sorts. For something is impossible from itself, as was said in the previous article, when it is among things that include a contradiction; and these things are judged impossible in an absolute sense, not in reference to higher or lower causes. However, something is impossible that, although in and of itself it does not have the account of the impossible, does have it in its order to something. And one should also make a distinction among these latter, for it can be called “possible” in reference to an active potency and to a passive potency; and in each way something is called “possible” and “impossible” simply speaking, through reference to its own proximate active cause or material cause, the conditions of which the effect follows, as was said before. For example, the remote matter of a statue is earth and water, its proximate matter copper and wood. But we say a statue can be made from copper, but not from earth, for only what can be brought out of the matter by one mover do we say is in potency in a thing in an absolute sense, as is said in Metaphysics 9. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.7, 1049a1‒18.)

Therefore one should say that all effects that are immediately from God himself, not through any intermediate secondary cause—for example, the creation of the world, the creation of the human soul, the glorification of the soul, and the like—should be judged possible or impossible in reference to the divine higher cause. Nonetheless some of the effects can be judged to be possible in reference to lower passive causes, the effects that have receptive causes among lower things; for example, the body stands to the soul as prepared for nature’s activity, and free decision to grace. But those effects that are naturally apt to occur due to active and passive proximate lower causes should be judged possible or impossible in reference to lower causes, as is the case with the sight of the blind and the resurrection of the dead and such. For life and sight are immediate effects of lower causes, that is, of forms united to the body.

Reply Obj. 1: The wisdom of the world is reputed foolish because it judged things that are impossible for nature to be so impossible that not even God could do them. Yet something can be called impossible simply speaking that is possible for something, just as something is called white simply speaking that is not white in reference to some part of it.

Reply Obj. 2–3: And through this, the response to the other objections is clear.

Exposition of the text

‘God could do all things at once, but reason,’ that is, his will, ‘forbade it.’ (Sent. I, 42.1(184).1, quoting Ambrosiaster, Quaestiones veteris et novi Testamenti, q. 106, para. 18 (CSEL 50:244; PL 35:2320). Lombard attributes the text to Augustine.) Not only such that he might establish all species, but even all the individuals of these species that occur in the whole of time. But reason forbade this, not because of the contrariety among the species, but because of their incompatibility. For it cannot be that God would do anything and that that would be irrational. Whence reason is oriented as determining the work, and the power as executing it.

This would not be a matter of power, but of weakness. (Sent. I, 42.2(185).2.) Dionysius says this as well, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 8, para. 6 (PG 3:894).) and presents an example when something is said to be a non-being; for this very thing is and is not. So too to be able to fall short from what is possible in a perfect way is not to be able to do something, simply speaking.

But a man or Angel, however blessed, is not powerful from himself and through himself. (Sent. I, 42.3(186).4.) Note that a man from himself, or due to himself, can do nothing good, for these prepositions “from” (Confusingly, the text reads de here, though context indicates that it should read ex.) and “due to” denote an efficient cause. Whence a man is said to be able to do something due to that due to which he has the power, for it is certain that whatever a man has of the good, he has due to another. But “through” denotes a formal cause; this is why he can do certain things through himself—that is, things that are completed by means of natural principles—but certain things not through himself—that is, things that occur through the divine power, like miracles and such. And this is also why the Son is said to do all things through himself but not from himself.