D. 36 - The realities that God knows

Division of the text

After the Master shows that God’s knowledge is universally of all things, and thereby realities are said to exist in God, here he asks how the things known are in God himself knowing them. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how the realities that God knows are in him; in the second, how God is in the realities: and because it has been in part shown how all things are said to be in God, it seems good to add here in what ways God is said to be in things. (Sent. I, 37.1(164).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he inquires whether all things that God knows can be said to exist in his essence—and he shows that they cannot; in the second, he inquires whether all things can be in God, at after the above, it is asked: . . . whether it is simply to be granted that evil things are in God. (Sent. I, 36.2(160).1.)

And as regards the latter, he does three things: first, he presents the question and determines it; second, he confirms that determination, at moreover, if we consider it diligently, it seems to be the same for all things to be from God and through him and in him; (Sent. I, 36.3(161).1.) third, as an epilogue, he brings to a conclusion his intention for the whole distinction, at in the above, it has been made clear that all things, namely good and evil ones, are in God’s cognition and foreknowledge. (Sent. I, 36.5(163).2; Silano reads presence instead of foreknowledge (praescientia).)

As regards the second, he does three things: first, he proves that evil things do not exist in God, since they are not from him or through him; second, he shows how these three should be distinguished: “from him,” “through him,” and “in him,” insofar as they are referred to the distinct persons, at moreover, it is to be known; (Sent. I, 36.4(162).1.) third, he distinguishes between existing “of” him from existing “from” him, at here it is also to be added. (Sent. I, 36.5(163).1.)

Here there are two questions:

the first, about the things that are known by God; (Q. 1.)

the second, about the ideas through which he knows realities. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The things that are known by God

As regards the first, three things are asked:

first, whether God knows singulars;

second, whether he knows evil things;

third, how the things that he knows are said to exist in him.

Article 1

Whether God knows singulars

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 3, q. 2, a. 3; ST I.14.11; SCG I.50, 63, 65; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 20; On Truth, q. 2, a. 5; Compendium theologiae, cc. 132, 133; Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, lect. 14.) It seems that God does not know singulars.

Obj. 1: For Boethius says (Boethius, In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda, bk. 1, ch. 11 (CSEL 48:166; PL 64:85).) that a thing is universal when understood, and particular when sensed. But in God there is no sense power, since this is a power impressed on a bodily organ—unless maybe “sensation” is taken metaphorically. Therefore it seems that the cognition of singulars does not befit God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing is known by someone except insofar as it is in the knower. But the particular effects are not in universal causes except in potency. Therefore it seems that, because the divine essence is the universal cause of all things, wherein he knows all things, therefore he would not have a proper cognition of singulars.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every cognition occurs through the knower becoming like the thing known. But the singular is singular only through matter. Therefore no power that abstracts from matter and from all its accoutrements is able to know the singular as singular. But the divine intellect is separated from matter and material conditions to the greatest degree. Therefore God does not know singulars.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as Dionysius says, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 5 (PL 3:643).) although they are diverse things, created things participate in God’s one goodness in the same way, just as several lines go forth from one center, and just as several impressions arise from one seal. But he who knows the center does not from that very fact know the lines extended from the center insofar as they are this and that line, but only in common; and it is likewise in the other example. Therefore it seems that God, by knowing his very self, does not know singulars as such.

On the contrary, Hebrews 11:6 says, whoever would draw near to God must believe that he exists and that he rewards those who seek him. But he cannot reward the actions of individual men unless he knows the actors and their actions. Therefore one must believe that God knows singulars.

Furthermore, God has a practical knowledge of realities, a knowledge that is the principle of action. But action is concerned with singulars. Therefore it seems that his knowledge is even of singulars.

I answer that without a doubt God has cognition of all things, both of universals and of singulars. Nevertheless, one should note that about this question diverse thinkers have proceeded in different ways.

For the Commentator, in Metaphysics 11, seems to have explicitly denied (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 51.) that God has cognition of particulars, except insofar as he knows his own essence, which is the principle of every existence. But since God is not only the cause of the existence of realities, but also of everything that is in these realities, it is necessary that he have cognition of realities not merely in that they exist, but even in that they exist in this way or that way.

And therefore others, namely, Avicenna and Algazel, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, cc. 6–7; Algazel (al-Ghazālī, 1058–1111 AD), The Incoherence of the Philosophers, problems 6, 13.) and their followers, have said that God knows singulars universally, and this they explain through an example. If someone were to know all the distant spheres and planets, and the time of their motions, he would foreknow every eclipse that could occur; yet he would not know this eclipse insofar as it is this eclipse, unless something be received from the senses. Rather, he would know the eclipse that would occur tomorrow in a universal way, that is, according to its universal causes. So too, they say, since all causes are traced back to God himself as to their cause, he just by knowing himself knows all the secondary causes, and by knowing those causes knows their every effect, yet only universally. And therefore they say that God does not know particulars except universally, such that, according to them, their determination would be received on the side of the things known, and not only on the side of the knower. For if that determination were received only on the side of the knower, it would undoubtedly be true that God knows particulars not with particular knowledge, as was proved above. (Above, d. 25, q. 1, a. 5.)

Nevertheless, he does know particulars according to their particularity, so that statement is also insufficient. For to know the singular in this way in the universal is not to know the proper nature of this or that singular; this is because in whatever way universals are gathered together, the singular never comes to be from them except through their being individuated by matter. And therefore even from this path it would follow that God would not have a perfect cognition about singulars. For universal causes do not lead to the cognition of particulars except insofar as the particulars participate in a common nature; and thus, from the universal causes one would not know of the particular anything but that it has such or such common nature, whether incidentally or substantially.

Therefore others, like Rabbi Moses, (Moses Maimonides (1135‒1205 AD), Guide for the Perplexed, part 3, ch. 17.) have said that God knows singulars most perfectly, and all the arguments brought in to the contrary he resolves by saying this: God’s knowledge is an equivocal cause of our knowledge, so we cannot argue to anything about God’s knowledge from the conditions of our knowledge; for just as God’s existence is incomprehensible to us, so is his knowledge. He confirms this through what is said in Isaiah 55:9: as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.

But although this is true, one must still say something more: namely, that although God’s knowledge is of a different mode from our knowledge, nonetheless we do in a certain way come to God’s knowledge through our knowledge, and in this way our knowledge is not wholly equivocal with God’s knowledge, but rather is analogous with it, as was said in the previous distinction. (Above, d. 35, q. 1, a. 4.) Therefore one must say in what respect our knowledge imitates God’s knowledge, in what way it falls short, and why it does so; and in this way one must refute the arguments.

Whence one should proceed along the path that Dionysius teaches. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:867).) For he says that, because God knows realities through his own essence, which is their cause, he knows the realities in the same way that he gives them existence. Whence if there be something among realities that is not known by him, the divine activity would have to be empty as regards it—that is, it would not be brought about by him. And from this a difficulty befalls the philosophers, from two sources. The first is due to the fact that some of them did not assert that God acts immediately in all realities, but that the first realities are from him, and by their mediation other things are produced by him. And this is why they were not able to discover how he would know the realities that are here, except in their universal causes. The second is due to the fact that some of them did not assert that matter came to be, but assert rather that God acts only by inducing form. And therefore, since matter is the principle of individuation, one could not find among them a way that God might know singulars as such.

But because we do assert that God is immediately active in all realities, and not only formal principles are from him but so is a thing’s matter, therefore through his own essence as through their cause he knows all that is in the reality, both the formal and the material elements. This is why he knows realities not only according to their universal natures, but even insofar as they are individuated through matter. This is just as a builder, if through the conceived form of the art he could produce the entire house—both as regards its matter and its form—he would know this and that house through the artform that he holds within himself. But because through his art he in fact induces only the form, his art is only a likeness of the form of the house, so through the art he cannot know this or that house, except through something received from sensation.

Reply Obj. 1: As is clear from the things said, the form through which the divine intellect understands is neither universal, since it does not admit of additions, nor singular, since it is unmarked by matter and its dispositions. But nonetheless it is the principle and perfect likeness of the whole that is in a reality, both of matter and of form, as was said. And therefore the statement—that what is universal when understood is particular when sensed—should be referred only to our knowledge, which is in the senses through a material form, and in the intellect through a universal form. And this is why we do not know particulars except through a power in which something exists as a particular, but God knows particulars neither universally nor as particulars, on the side of the knower, but he does know them universally and as particulars on the side of the reality that is known.

Reply Obj. 2: In universal causes that are not the entire cause of the reality, the particular cannot be known perfectly. But God is the universal cause of all things such that he is the perfect cause of each and every thing. And therefore by knowing himself, he knows all things perfectly.

Reply Obj. 3: Although in God there is nothing material, but his essence is only act, nonetheless that act is the cause of all things that are in reality, both of material and formal elements. Every reality and whatever is in reality imitates this act, as much as it can. And therefore the divine essence is the likeness not only of a reality’s formal elements but even of its material ones. And therefore through it, singulars, even as such, can be known.

Reply Obj. 4: All the examples that are applied from created things to God fall short, as Dionysius says in the same place. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 1 (PG 3:635).) For one does not find in created things any common cause that is the cause of all that is in a reality. For example, the seal is the cause of the shape in the wax, and not of the wax itself; and therefore through a knowledge of the seal one cannot know the impressed shape as this or that one, since it has this from matter.

Article 2

Whether God knows evils

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.10; SCG I.71; On Truth, q. 2, a. 15; Quodl. XI, q. 2.) It seems that God does not know evils.

Obj. 1: For as the Commentator says, (Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 3, text. 25.) if any intellect is always in act, it does not know privation in a complete way. But the divine intellect is always in act. Therefore, since evil is a privation, as Augustine says, (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 11 (CCSL 46; PL 40:236).) it seems that God does not know evil.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, all knowledge is either the cause of the things known, or it is caused by them. But God’s knowledge is not caused. Therefore, since he is not the cause of evils, it seems that God does not know evils.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, knowledge is the knower’s becoming like the reality known. Therefore, since what is evil as such would not become like God—indeed, evil is the very withdrawal from such likeness—it seems that God does not know what is evil.

Obj. 4: You might say that God knows evil through good.

On the contrary, to know something not through itself but through another belongs to imperfect cognition. Now, nothing imperfect should be attributed to God. Therefore God does not know evil things through good ones.

On the contrary, it says in the Psalms: O God, thou knowest my folly; the wrongs I have done are not hidden from thee (Ps 69:5 [68:6]).

Furthermore, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.5, 411a7.) that the straight is the judge of both itself and of the bent. Therefore, since the evil is the bending away from the straightness or rectitude of the good, it seems that, because he knows all good things perfectly, an awareness of evil is not absent from God.

I answer that “not knowing” is said in two ways. In one way, it is said metaphorically, according to a likeness with one who stands in ignorance. And in this way God’s very reprobation is called “not knowing,” since he excludes the evil from his own glory; this is like when someone excludes those he does not know from his secret things; and on the opposite side, God is said “to know” those of whom he approves. And in this way when God is said not to know evils, it is true. In another way, “not knowing” is said properly, to mean to lack of awareness of a reality, and on the opposite side, “knowing” is having awareness of the reality. And in this way God knows both good and evil things by knowing his own essence, just as shadows are known through knowing light, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:870).)

But one should note that a privation is known only through its opposite possession, nor is privation opposed to possession except when considered in reference to the same subject. Now, because it is impossible for the light of the divine essence to fail, no privation is opposed to it. Whence evil is not opposed to good, insofar as it is determinately in God, but perhaps it is opposed to it according to the common intention of the good. Now, what is opposed determinately to the good is what is participated in created things, that with which a defect can be mixed. Whence by the fact that God knows his own essence, he knows the things that are from him, and through them he knows their defects. However, were he to know only his own essence, he would know no evil or privation, except in common.

Reply Obj. 1: The response to this is clear, because from the fact that the Commentator asserts that he knows nothing but his own essence, it follows that he does not know evils; hence in the same place he adds that he does not know that evils exist. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 12, text. 51.) So in the same way that he knows things other than himself, he also knows their privations—not such that privations are the first thing known, since there can be no privation within his intellect, but they are things secondarily understood by him, as is clear from things said before. (Above, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: God’s knowledge is in no way caused by the reality, yet neither is it the cause of all the things that it knows; rather, it is the cause only of the things of which cognition through itself is possible—that is, of good things. However, he knows evils through the good, as was said in the body.

Reply Obj. 3: An evil is not known by God through its own likeness, but through its likeness to the good. For insofar as God knows his own essence, so does he know each and every reality, to the degree that it participates in his own goodness, and in what respect it falls short. And thus, he knows evil, since the account of evil consists in falling away.

Reply Obj. 4: To know through something else a thing that is naturally apt to be known through itself belongs to imperfect knowledge. But evil through itself neither has a cause nor does it hold the will or knowledge, but it does through the good, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, paras. 19, 20, 32 (PG 3:715).) And therefore this is perfect knowledge of evil: that it be known through the good.

Article 3

Whether the realities known by God are in God

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the realities known by God are not in God.

Obj. 1: Everything within which there is something diverse from it, is composite. Therefore, since God is the most simple, it seems that the realities that are diverse from him are not in him.

Obj. 2: You might say that they are not in him by essence, but through their likeness.

On the contrary, each and every reality is more truly where it exists through its own essence than it is where it exists through its likeness; for it does not seem to exist in the latter except in a qualified sense. Therefore if the realities exist in God only according to their likeness, it seems that they exist more truly and better in their very selves than in God—which is opposed to Augustine and Anselm. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 5, ch. 15 (CSEL 28.1:158; PL 34:332); Anselm, Monologion, ch. 34 (PL 158:189).)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a likeness corresponds to that of which it is the likeness. But not all realities have within themselves both light and life. Therefore, since life and light are in God, it seems that they are not in God by a likeness to him.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, where a thing exists according to its likeness, its proper activity is not found there; for the stone within the eye does not move downward. But Acts 17:28 says that in God we live and move and have our being. Therefore it seems that we do not exist in God only through a likeness.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the likenesses of realities existing in God’s knowledge, since they pertain to knowledge, are appropriated to the Son. But in the text (Sent. I, 36.4(162).1, quoting Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 23, para. 5 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:800).) “in him” is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, whereas “through him” is appropriated to the Son, and “from him” to the Father. Therefore it seems that realities are not said to be in God according to likeness.

On the contrary, John 1:3 says, what was made within him was life. (The choice of punctuation for the Greek or Latin text naturally affects the translation. The first clause of this verse is usually associated with the previous, and hence, RSV translates the full verse as: all things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made. In him was life (John 1:3–4).)

I answer that the preposition “in,” insofar as it is joined to diverse things, indicates diverse relations; for example, when a thing is said to be “in a whole,” or to be “in a place,” and such. Therefore one should note that to be in God’s knowledge, and to be in God, and to be in the divine essence are all different things. For “knowledge” names a certain cognition, so to be in knowledge is nothing other than to be cognized through the knowledge; and therefore all things that God knows, both good and evil, are said to be in his knowledge. But “essence” is signified through the mode of form or nature, so to be in the divine essence is nothing other than to subsist in the divine nature, or to be the same as the divine nature; and therefore created things cannot be said to be in the divine essence, but only the divine persons, properties, and attributes can. But the name “God” signifies a subsisting reality, to whom it belongs to exist and to act, so to be in God can be understood in two ways: either as what is in his very existence, and in this way created things are not in God; or as what is subject to his actions, as when we say the works over which we have mastery are “in us.” And in that way, all things that are from God are said to be in him, but not evils, which are not from him.

And thus it is clear that the three aforesaid things stand in a certain order. For whatever is in the divine essence is in God, as though pertaining to his very existence—but not vice versa. For example, the things that are subject to his action are in him, but they are not in his essence. And likewise, whatever is in God is in his knowledge—but not vice versa, as is clear about evil things.

Reply Obj. 1: Within God nothing is diverse from him, so even created things, insofar as they are in God, are not something other than God. For created things in God are the causal essence, as Anselm says, for they are in God through their likeness. However, the divine essence itself is the likeness of all things that are from God.

Reply Obj. 2: A created thing’s existence can be considered in four ways: in the first way, insofar as it exists in its own proper nature; in the second way, insofar as it exists in our knowledge; in the third way, insofar as it exists in God; in the fourth way, commonly, insofar as it abstracts from all of these.

Therefore, when one says that a created thing has a truer existence in God than in its very self, the first and third existence are being compared in relation to the fourth, for every comparison is in relation to something common. And it is said to have in God a truer existence insofar as everything that is in something is in it through the mode of what it is in, and not through its own mode. Whence it is in God through an uncreated existence, whereas it is in itself through a created existence, in which there is less of the truth of being than is found in the uncreated existence.

However, if the first existence is being compared to the second relative to the fourth, then they are found to stand as what exceeds to what is exceeded; for the existence that is in the reality’s proper nature, insofar as it is substantial, exceeds the reality’s existence in the soul, which is incidental. But the former is also exceeded by the latter insofar as it is a material existence, whereas the latter is an intellectual existence. And thus it is clear that sometimes a reality has a truer existence where it exists through its likeness than it does in its very self.

Reply Obj. 3: A reality’s likeness in the soul is considered in two ways: either insofar as it is the likeness of a reality—and thus, nothing is attributed to it except what is found in the reality; or according to the existence that it has in the soul—and thus intelligibility and universality are attributed to it. This is also clear in a bodily image, to which being made of stone belongs, on the side of that in which the image exists, but not on the side of that of which it is a likeness. Likewise I say that it belongs to the likeness of the realities that is in God to be life and light, but not insofar as it is the likeness of a reality, but insofar as it is in God. It is called “life” insofar as it is the principle of activity as regards the existence of the realities, just as the Philosopher also says (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 250b14; however, Aristotle frames this statement as a question and not explicitly as an assertion.) that the motion of the heavens is like a certain life for all things existing by nature. But insofar as it is the principle of the cognition of the realities, it is called “light.”

Or it can be explained another way, such that the likeness of the reality that is in the soul is called “life” insofar as it is as a certain form and perfection of the intellect, and “light” insofar as it is the principle of intellectual activity. And through such likeness, the realities are also said to be “life and light” in God, for they are in him just as works of art are in the artist through their likenesses being in him.

Reply Obj. 4: To be and to live and to move are not attributed to the realities existing in God according to the existence that they have in him, but rather according to the existence that they have from God in their very selves, such that “to be” would pertain to essence, “to live” to power, and “to move” to activity—or “to live” to the soul, “to move” to the body, and “to be” to both. And in this way, realities existing in their own proper nature are said to be in God, insofar as their existence is contained by God; and likewise for the others, motion and life.

Reply Obj. 5: A reality’s likeness in God is not received from the reality; rather, it is the reality’s cause. Whence whatever exists in him through its likeness exists in him as in active and conservative principle. Now, the action and conservation of realities by God is completed through his will and goodness. For among the three, that is, knowledge, power, and will, the will is closest to the activity. And therefore “in him” is appropriated to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds through the mode of the will, and to whom goodness is appropriated; for the preposition “in” indicates the relation to what contains and conserves. But “through him” is appropriated to the Son because “through” denotes a formal cause, and art, through which an artist acts, as through a form, is appropriated to the Son. However, “from him,” on account of the relation of a principle that the preposition “from” implies, is appropriated to the Father, who is the principle without a principle.

Question 2

The ideas through which God knows realities

Next, one asks about the ideas; and three things are asked about them:

first, whether ideas exist;

second, how many ideas there are;

third, whether the ideas of all things are in God.

Article 1

What the name of “idea” implies

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.5; I.44.3; On Truth, q. 3, a. 1; Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 1, lect. 15.) It seems that ideas do not exist.

Obj. 1: For the Philosopher says, to speak of exemplary ideas is empty talk, and to speak poetic metaphors. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.9, 991a21.) But we are calling the exemplars of realities “ideas.” Therefore it is empty to speak of ideas.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an agent that does not need to look to an exemplar in its own action is more perfect than one that does require an exemplar. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore for him there is no need for ideas as an exemplar according to which he might make realities; whence the Philosopher adds, in the same passage, for what need is there to look to ideas? (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.9, 991a24.)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (See Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 83, para. 10 (CCSL 39; PL 37:1064).) a reality is known better through its own essence than through its likeness. But God knows realities in the most noble way. Therefore he knows them through their essences, and not through any ideal likenesses of the realities.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every cognition that occurs through a medium seems to involve a synthesis, and to have a discourse or running-across from one thing to another. But God knows by a simple look, without discourse or synthesis. Therefore it seems that he does not know realities by mediating ideas.

On the contrary, Augustine says, he who denies there are ideas, denies there is a Son. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:29).) But the latter is heretical. Therefore so is the first.

Furthermore, the Commentator says (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 4.) that, just as all forms are in potency within first matter, so too they are in act within the first mover. But we call “ideas” nothing but the forms of realities existing within God. Therefore it is true that there are ideas.

I answer that artificial forms have two existences: one in act, insofar as they exist in matter, the other in potency, insofar as they exist in the mind of the artisan—not, of course, in a passive potency, but an active one. And in the same way, material forms as well have two existences, as the Commentator says: (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 4.) one in act, insofar as they exist in the realities, and the other in an active potency, insofar as they exist in the movers of the heavenly spheres, as he asserts it, and especially in the first mover—in place of which we ourselves say these forms are in God. Whence, among all the philosophers it is commonly said that all things are in the mind of God just as works of art are in the mind of the artisan. And therefore we call the forms of realities existing in God the “ideas,” which are operative forms. Whence Dionysius, when speaking about the ideas, says, we call the substantifying accounts of things existing in God, themselves preexisting in a uniform way, ‘ideas,’ which theology calls ‘primordial definitions’; and they are the predetermining and productive divine and good volitions for existing things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 8 (PG 3:823).)

Nevertheless through these ideas God has not merely a practical cognition of realities, but even a speculative cognition. For he knows realities not merely insofar as they go forth from him, but even insofar as they subsist in their own proper nature. For “idea” is said from eidos, which is form, so the name “idea,” as regards what is proper to the name, equally relates to practical and speculative knowledge. For a reality’s form existing in the intellect is the principle of both cognitions. For even though, according to common usage, “idea” is taken for a form that is the principle of practical cognition, insofar as we name the exemplary forms of realities their “ideas,” nonetheless such is also the principle of speculative cognition, insofar as we also name the forms of realities we contemplate “ideas.”

Reply Obj. 1: As the Commentator says, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 11, text. 4.) Plato and other ancient philosophers, as though coerced by the truth itself, stretched toward what Aristotle later said explicitly, even though they did not thoroughly reach it. And therefore Plato, asserting that there are ideas, stretched toward what Aristotle also asserted, namely, that they exist in the divine intellect. Whence the Philosopher does not intend to disprove this, but rather the mode in which Plato asserted natural forms exist through themselves without matter.

Reply Obj. 2: If God were to need to look to some exemplar outside himself, he would be an imperfect agent. But this does not happen if his own essence be asserted to be the exemplar of all realities. For by thus looking upon his own essence, he produces all things.

Reply Obj. 3: That through which one has knowledge of a reality must be united to the knower. Whence the essence of created realities, since it is separate from God, cannot be the medium of the very realities becoming known by God. Rather, he knows them by a nobler medium, that is, through his own essence. And therefore he knows them more perfectly and in a nobler mode; for nothing but his essence is the principle of his knowledge. For it would be necessary that there be something else, if he were to know realities through the realities’ essence as through a medium; for the medium of knowing is the principle of the knowledge.

Reply Obj. 4: Discursive knowledge is when one reaches the unknown based on certain things known beforehand, and not when the reality itself is apprehended through the reality’s likeness. For in this way, the eye, when it sees a stone, would have a constructive knowledge of it. And therefore, although God knows realities through a likeness that is in him as through a medium, and even though he knows even the order of realities, nonetheless he does not have discursive knowledge, since he beholds all things simultaneously.

Article 2

Whether there are several ideas

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 14, a. 2, qa. 2; ST I.15.2; I.44.3; I.47.1, ad 2; SCG I.54; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 16, ad 12–13; On Truth, q. 3, a. 2; Quodl. IV, q. 1.) It seems that there are not several ideas.

Obj. 1: For an idea is said to be a likeness through which a reality is known. But earlier it was said that God knows all things through his own essence. Therefore, since his essence is one, it seems that there is only one idea.

Obj. 2: You might say that there are several references to realities.

On the contrary, God’s relations to what is created are really in the created things, and not in God. Now, created things have not existed from eternity, so neither have God’s relations to the created. Therefore there have not been several ideas from eternity. But God does not know things that have been made in any way other than how he makes them, as is clear from the words of Augustine. (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:29).) Therefore he does not now know things through several ideas, but only through one.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as has been said, an idea stands to its reality as the form of the art in the artisan’s mind stands to the artwork. But a diversity of works of art arises from the plurality of the forms that are in an artisan’s mind, and not vice versa. Therefore it seems that neither can a diversity of realities bring about a plurality of ideas.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as “idea” is said in relation to what it is an idea of, so too “knowledge” is said in reference to the knowable. But even though God knows many things, still it is only one knowledge. Therefore there is only one idea of all the realities that he produces.

On the contrary, that in which there is no plurality cannot be consignified in the plural. But Augustine names “ideas” in the plural, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:30).) saying that ideas are the stable accounts of realities existing in the divine mind; and although they themselves neither arise nor depart, still with reference to them everything that departs or arises comes to be. Therefore there are several ideas.

Furthermore, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 8 (PG 94:1014).) difference is the cause of number. But according to Augustine, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:30).) God has created man and horse by different accounts. Therefore it seems that in God there are several ideal accounts of realities.

I answer that, since God has a proper knowledge of the singular realities, his essence must be a likeness of the singular realities, insofar as diverse realities in diverse and particular ways imitate it according to their own capacity, even though it offers its entire self as able to be imitated. But the fact that created things do not perfectly imitate it, but do so in a non-uniform way, is due to their diversity and deficiency, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 6 (PG 3:643).) Whence, because the name “idea” names the divine essence insofar as it is the exemplar imitated by the created thing, the divine essence will be the proper idea of that reality according to a determinate mode of imitation.

And because diverse created things imitate it in diverse ways, this is why it is said that the idea or account by which man is created is different from the idea by which horse is created. And from this it follows that, according to the reference to many realities that imitate the divine essence in diverse ways, there is a plurality in the ideas, even though the essence being imitated is one. For example, as is clear from things said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.) whatever there is of perfection in realities—such as to be, to live, to understand, and all such—belong as a whole to God according to one and the same indivisible account.

However, all created things, as regards existence, imitate the divine essence itself, whereas not all things do so as regards living, nor again, do those that imitate it as regards existence participate in existence in the same way, since some possess a nobler existence than do others. And from this it is brought about that the divine essence has a different reference to things that have only existence than to those that have existence and life, and likewise to things that have diverse modes of existence. And due to that, there are several ideal accounts, insofar as God understands his own essence as capable of imitation through this mode or that one. For the understood accounts or modes of imitation are the ideas, for “idea,” as is clear from things said in the previous article, names the form as understood, and not insofar as it is within the nature of the one who understands it.

Reply Obj. 1: “Idea” names not merely the essence, but the essence as capable of imitation. Whence insofar as there is a manifold capacity for imitation in the divine essence, on account of the fullness of its perfection, there is a plurality of ideas.

Reply Obj. 2: Although God’s relations to the created are really founded in the created thing, still they are in God as well, according to account and intellect. However, I am speaking not only about the human intellect, but also the angelic and divine. And therefore even though created things did not exist from eternity, still the divine intellect was from eternity understanding his own essence as capable of imitation in diverse ways by created things. And on account of this, there was a plurality of ideas in the divine intellect from eternity, and not in his very nature. For the form and life of a horse are not in God in the same way: for the form of a horse is in God only as an understood account, whereas the account of life is in God not only as something understood, but also as established in the nature of his reality.

Reply Obj. 3: Although the plurality of the ideas is viewed according to their reference to the realities, still the plurality of the realties is not the cause of the plurality of the ideas, but vice versa. For it is not because reality in diverse ways imitates the divine essence that his intellect beholds it as capable of imitation in diverse ways—but rather the converse. For the divine intellect is the cause of the realities. However, the distinction of the ideal account is according to the activity of the divine intellect, insofar as it understands his essence to be capable of imitation in diverse ways by created things.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine essence is one, and the references many. And therefore whatever names the essence alone cannot be signified in the plural, like “knowledge,” which stands more on the side of the knower, as his form. However, “account” stands more on the side of the reality, so that it can be consignified and signified in the plural; for we do speak of several accounts. However, “idea” stands, as it were, in an intermediate way, since it indicates the essence and account of imitation, which is according to the reference. And therefore, even though one finds the name “idea” consignified with plurality, as when it is presented in the plural, still it is rarely or never found signified with the addition of a numerical term, so that it might be said “how many” ideas there are. For the plurality is made explicit more by signifying than by consignifying.

Article 3

Whether in God there are ideas of all the things that he knows

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.15.3; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 5, ad 10; q. 3, a. 1, ad 13; On Truth, q. 3, aa. 3‒5; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 5, lect. 3.) It seems that in God there are not ideas of all the things that he knows.

Obj. 1: For God knows evils, but there cannot be in him an idea of evil, since “idea” implies imitation. Now, a thing is evil through the fact that it withdraws from the imitation of God. Therefore there are not ideas of all realities in God, since many things are evil.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “idea” names a form, for it is said from eidos, (Greek: εἶδος.) which is form. But there is no form of first matter, just as the first act, who is God, has no matter; otherwise neither of them would be first. Therefore there is not an idea in God for all things.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God knows not only universals, but even particulars. But there does not seem to be an idea of particulars as such, since all singulars of one species agree in form. Therefore there is not an idea for all things known by God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, an idea is only of a thing that participates in it by imitation. But accidents, since they are not subsistent through themselves, participate in nothing; rather, they themselves just are certain participations. Therefore, since accidents are known by God just as substances are, it seems that there are not ideas of all things that are known by God.

On the contrary, every knowledge occurs through some species of the thing known being in the knower. But the species of realities existing in God are called “ideas.” Therefore there is an idea of all things known by God in him.

I answer that, as is clear from the authority of Dionysius already introduced, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 5, para. 8 (PG 3:823).) an idea is said to be a reality’s likeness or account existing in God, insofar as it is productive and predeterminative of the reality itself. And therefore the way each and every thing stands to being produced by God is how it also stands to there being an idea of it in God. Now, everything that is produced by some agent through itself must, insofar as it is brought about by it, imitate it. For, as the Philosopher proves, (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 416a19‒b9; On Generation and Corruption 1.7, 323b1‒324b21.) an agent makes a thing be like itself—both in things that act by will and in things that act by necessity. Whence insofar as something is produced by God, so too does it have its likeness in him, and in this way its idea is in God, and according to this it is known by God. And therefore, since every reality is produced by God, there must be ideas of all realities in him.

Reply Obj. 1: An evil insofar as it is evil is nothing, since it is a certain privation, just as blindness is. And therefore the idea of an evil reality is indeed in God—not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it is a reality. And the evil itself is known by God through the opposed good, from which the reality underlying the privation falls short.

Reply Obj. 2: Since first matter is from God, there must be some sort of idea of it in God; and just as existence is attributed to it, so too is an idea attributed to it in God. For every existence, insofar as it is perfect, is brought forth from the divine existence as its exemplar. Now, perfect existence does not belong to matter in itself, but only insofar as it is in the composite; in itself in fact it has imperfect existence, according to the last grade of existing, which is to be in potency. And therefore it does not have the perfect account of an idea except insofar as it is in a composite, since in this way a perfected existence is conferred on it by God; considered in itself, in fact, it has an imperfect account of an idea in God. This fits the saying that the divine essence can be imitated by the composite according to perfect existence, by matter according to imperfect existence, but by privation in no way at all. And therefore the composite, according to the account of its form, has an idea in God perfectly, but matter only imperfectly, and privation in no way at all.

Reply Obj. 3: Particulars have proper ideas in God; whence the account of Peter and that of Martin are different in God, just as the account of man is different from that of horse. But nonetheless, in different ways; for the diversity of man and horse is according to form, to which “idea” corresponds perfectly, but the essential distinction of singulars of one species is according to matter, which does not perfectly have an idea. And therefore the distinction of the account corresponding to the diverse species is more perfect than is that corresponding to the diverse individuals—yet in such a way that the imperfection is referred to the realities imitating the divine essence, and not to the divine essence that is being imitated.

Reply Obj. 4: Accidents also do not have perfect existence; whence they fall short of the perfection of an idea. On account of this also Plato did not assert that there were ideas of accidents, but only of substances, as is said in Metaphysics 1. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.9, 990b31.) Nonetheless insofar as they have existence through an imitation of the divine essence, so too the divine essence is the idea of them.

And thereby all the objections become clear, and even the things said in the text.