D. 29 - The name “principle”

Division of the text

After having considered innascibility, which is a person’s property, though not a personal property, here he considers the other notion, one that is neither a person’s property—since it does not belong to only one person—nor a personal property—since it does not constitute a person—namely, common spiration. This is designated when one says, “the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit.” And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how the name “principle” is said of God; and because “principle” is sometimes said in reference to time, and sometimes from eternity, therefore, in the second, he shows how something can be said of God in reference to time, at for there are some things which are said of God in time. (Sent. I, 30.1(129).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows in how many ways God is called a “principle”; second, he treats the parts of the division, at and the Father is the Son’s beginning from eternity. (Sent. I, 29.2(126).1.)

And the latter is divided into two: in the first, he shows how God is said to be the principle of what is created, since this is not from eternity but from time, both because this is common to the entire Trinity, and because he is the principle by creation through an action within the created thing; in the second, he shows how he is said to be the principle of a divine person, at immediately next in the same book, he shows how the Father is called beginning in respect to the Son, and he and the Son are called beginning in respect to the Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 29.3(127).1, referring to Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 14 (CCSL 50; PL 42:920–21).)

And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he shows that the Father is called the “principle of the Son,” that he and the Son are called the “principle of the Holy Spirit” from eternity, not essentially but notionally; in the second, he shows by which notion he is called “principle,” at so he is called the beginning of the Son by the same notion by which he is Father. (Sent. I, 29.3(127).2.)

And in regard to this he does two things: first, he shows by what notion the Father is called the “principle of the Son”; second, by what notion each is called the principle of the Holy Spirit, at but the Father and the Son are the one beginning. (Sent. I, 29.4(128).1.)

In regards to this he does two things, following the two questions that he puts forward; the second begins at but if it is asked what that notion is which is there denoted by ‘beginning,’ we do not have a name for it. (Sent. I, 29.4(128).2.)

Question 1

How the name “principle” is said of God

Here four things are asked:

first, whether one person is a principle with respect to another;

second, whether “principle” is said univocally of God with respect to a divine person, and with respect to what is created;

third, whether by the same notion the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit;

fourth, if they can be called one principle of him.

Article 1

Whether one person is the principle of another

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 12, a. 2, ad 1; In III Sent., d. 11, a. 1, ad 5; ST I.33.1; On the Power of God, q. 10, a. 1, ad 8–17; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), ch. 1.) It seems that one person is not the principle of another.

Obj. 1: For the name “principle” is imposed from priority, as the name even sounds. But in the divine persons there is no prior and posterior, as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 9, q. 2, a. 1.) Therefore one person is not the principle of another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is the principle of something seems to be its cause since, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.1, 1013a17.) “cause” is said in as many ways as “principle” or “beginning” is said. But one person is not the cause of another, since within the divine persons nothing is caused. Therefore one person is not the principle of another.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one person is not the principle of another except insofar as he gives existence. But such a principle is productive or effective. Therefore, since one person is not said to be the maker or producer of another, it seems that one person is not the principle of another.

On the contrary, the text says (Sent. I, 29.1(125).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (CCSL 50; PL 42:907–8).) that the Father is the principle of the entire Godhead.

Furthermore, from whatever something takes its origin, that is its principle. But one person takes his origin from another. Therefore the one is the principle of the other.

I answer that, in order to signify the origin of the divine persons, one must use the sorts of names that befit a mode of origin. For according to Hilary, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 14 (CCSL 62; PL 10:107).) speech ought to be subject to reality. Now, we find in the origin of the divine persons that the entire essence of the one is received in the other, such that the essence of the three is numerically one, and their existence is the same.

And therefore to signify the order of such origin the name “cause” is not fitting, for two reasons. The first is that every cause is either outside the thing’s essence, as an efficient cause and an end, or part of its essence, as matter and form. The second is that every cause has an order of a principle to the existence of its effect, which is constituted by it. Now, the Father does not have the order of a principle to the Son’s existence, just as neither does he to his own existence, since the existence for both is one and the same. Whence, the Father is not the Son’s cause, but his principle.

For “principle” signifies the order of origin in an absolute way, without determining any way that is alien to the origin of the persons. For one finds some principles that are not outside the essence of what comes from the principle, like a point from which a line flows; one also finds principles that have no influence on the existence of what comes from the principle, like a terminus of departure is called the “principle of the motion,” and the morning is called the “principle of the day.” But the name “originator” adds, over and above the account of principle, the fact that he is not from anything else. And therefore only the Father is called “originator,” even though the Son is also called “principle” notionally.

Reply Obj. 1: Because the name “principle” has been imposed according to the way it is found in created things, where the principle is prior in some way to what comes from it, therefore it is imposed from priority. But nevertheless it is imposed for the sake of signifying that from which something is. Whence, even though as regards mode of signifying it does not fit the divine, just as is the case with all the other names that have been imposed by us, nonetheless as regards the reality being signified, the account of principle most properly fits there.

Reply Obj. 2: Even though the Father is called the “principle of the Son,” still he should not be called his cause, except improperly, the way Chrysostom uses the name “cause,” calling the Father the cause of the Son. (John Chrysostom, Homiliae LXXXVIII in Ioannem, hom. 2 (PG 59:244).) For “principle” is in more things than is “cause,” and “cause” is in more than “element,” as the Commentator says. (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 5, text. 1.) Whence every cause is a principle, but this cannot be converted.

Reply Obj. 3: Because making and production are always terminated at the existence of a reality, therefore the Son cannot be said to be made or produced by the Father, with whom he has one existence. Rather, he can only be said to be generated by him, on account of the origin of the person.

Article 2

Whether “principle” is said univocally of God insofar as he is called a principle of a divine person and of something created, and how it is said with priority

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.33.3.) It seems that “principle” is said univocally insofar as God is called a principle of a divine person and that of something created.

Obj. 1: For as Basil says, (Basil the Great, Homiliae et Sermones, homily 15, “De fide,” para. 2 (PG 31:467).) receiving existence from the Father is what the Son has in common with everything created, but having it by nature is proper to the Son. But the account of a principle is founded upon the origin of one thing from another, as was said before. Therefore “principle” is said univocally with respect to the divine person and what is created.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the Master uses the following division of “principle”: one principle is not from a principle, another principle is from a principle, and another principle is from both principles. Now, in this division “principle” must be taken both insofar as it signifies a reference to what is created and insofar as it signifies a reference to a person. Therefore, since this division would be wholly artless if “principle” were being said equivocally, it seems that “principle” is said univocally in each way.

On the contrary (3), for the eternal and the temporal nothing can be univocal. But a principle relative to the created is from time, whereas a principle relative to a divine person is from eternity. Therefore “principle” is being said equivocally.

Furthermore (4), the Father is the principle of the Son through generation, of the Holy Spirit through spiration, and of the created through creation. Now, these are diverse accounts of origin. Therefore it seems that “principle” is taken equivocally in these uses.

Quaestiuncula 2

Moreover, one asks how it is said with priority. For it seems to be with priority insofar as it signifies reference to the created.

Obj. 1: For the essential is prior to the notional, according to concept, and the common is prior to the proper. But to be a principle of the created is essential and common to the entire Trinity, whereas to be the principle of a divine person is notional and is proper. Therefore and so on.

On the contrary, the eternal is prior to the temporal. But “principle” is said of the person from eternity, whereas “principle” is said of the created from time. Therefore and so on.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that the judgment about “principle” is the same as that about “origin,” on which the account of a principle is founded. Now, an origin can be considered in two ways. The first is according to the common account of origin, which is something being from something else; and in this way there is one account common to the origin of the persons and the origin of created things, but not according to a commonness of univocation, but rather, one of analogy. And so it is also for the name “principle.” But it can also be considered according to the determinate mode of origin, and then there are diverse specific accounts of origin and principle. But this does not cause equivocation, since even in this way the account for each animal is different, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.2, 415a13.)

Reply Obj. 1: “Principle” is common with a commonness of analogy, not one of univocation.

Reply Obj. 2: In the division the Master is taking “principle” according to its common account, which is one, as was said in the body, and not according to the specific accounts, which differ.

Reply Sed Contra 3: Although nothing is univocal to the eternal and the temporal, nonetheless there is something common according to analogy, as has often been said.

Reply Sed Contra 4: That argument follows in reference to the specific accounts of origin, which do not cause an equivocation, as was said.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To what is further asked, one should say that the procession of created things has as its exemplar the procession of the divine persons. Whence, speaking absolutely, “principle” is said with priority in reference to the person over the reference to the created. But nonetheless one should know that in a principle, insofar as it is said in reference to the created, one must consider the orientation itself, which is temporal, and that on which this orientation is founded, the divine power and action. Yet the account of a principle is in these latter only, as it were, habitually. And thus, in considering “principle” in the second way, insofar as one speaks of the principle of the created, this is prior to being the principle of the divine person, which is founded in a personal property, in the way in which the essential is said to be prior in understanding to the notional. But this is prior only in a certain respect.

Reply Obj. 1, Sed Contra: And thereby the reply to each objection is clear.

Article 3

Whether by a single property the Father and the Son are the principle of the Holy Spirit

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel Text: ST I.36.4.) It seems that there is not a single property of the Father and Son according to which they are called the principle of the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For a property draws its unity or multiplicity from its supposits. But the Father and the Son are not one supposit. Therefore neither do they have just one property.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing the same is both a uniting and a distinguishing principle. But in the divine the notions distinguish. Therefore it seems that no notion unites the Father and the Son.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, things united in nature and property are more one than things that are united only in nature. But the Father and the Son are not more one than are the Father and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, since the Father and the Holy Spirit agree only in their nature, it seems that the Father and the Son are not united in any one property.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a property is closer to that in which it exists than to that relative to which it is spoken. But properties in one person are many from the fact that they are referred to diverse things: for example, in the Father, generation in reference to the Son, and common spiration in reference to the Holy Spirit. Therefore so much more do they become two properties if they are in two persons.

On the contrary, according to Anselm (Anselm, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 2 (PL 158:288).) the Father and the Son are one in all things wherein an opposition of relation does not distinguish them. But in common spiration the Father and the Son are not opposed. Therefore it is numerically one and the same in both of them.

I answer that the notion of the Father and the Son according to which they are called the principle of the Holy Spirit is numerically one, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 28.4(128).1.) The reason for this is that we find the distinction of realities according to some form only in two ways: in one way, insofar as something common is distinguished by several specifying accounts, like the way the account of a genus is distinguished into several species; in the other way, insofar as a specific nature is distinguished into a numerical multitude.

Now, this second mode cannot be present in the divine for two reasons. The first is because numerical multiplication of one species is not due to anything formal being added, but due to a divided material principle. For the account of a most specified species is constituted by the advent of the last constitutive form. But matter is not in the divine. The second is because a specific nature is multiplied only according to the existence that it has in diverse things, since the entire “whatness” is completed in the species. Now, in the divine there is only one existence. Whence, it cannot be that something said according to a specific account would be numerically multiplied in the divine.

Therefore it remains that whatever is in the divine either remains undistinguished and numerically one, as the nature common to the three persons, or it has a common account distinguishable according to several specific accounts, just as relation is common to the three, yet not numerically one relation, but different ones, and ones distinct according to a specific account. Therefore, since “common spiration” names a specific account of “principle” according to a specific mode of origin, it is impossible that it be but numerically one in the Father and the Son.

Reply Obj. 1: In created things supposits are distinct through their existence, and therefore their properties are distinguished also according to their existence. But in the divine supposits there is one existence. Whence neither can a property be multiplied according to existence, but only according to the specific account of a property.

Reply Obj. 2: The same thing cannot be something uniting and distinguishing in reference to the same thing. Whence common spiration distinguishes the Father from the Holy Spirit, but it unites him with the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: According to Augustine, (Sent. I, 20.2(85).1; Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 14, paras. 6–7 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:773–75).) equality and inequality are viewed according to the relations of origin. Therefore the Father is not said to be more one with the Son than with the Holy Spirit merely because the Father agrees with the Son in a certain notion, but only in having more.

Reply Obj. 4: A relative property, with respect to the existence that it has, stands more closely to its supposit than to that in reference to which it is spoken. Whence if a variation according to existence were there, it would have this from the supposits. But according to the account of relation, it is spoken of in reference to another, and therefore the specific account of relation is distinguished insofar as it is referred to different things.

Article 4

Whether the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 11, aa. 2, 4; ST I.36.4; SCG IV.25.) It seems that the Father and the Son are not one principle of the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 1: For if they are one principle, either they are the one that is the Father, or they are the one that is not the Father. If they are the one that is the Father, then the Son is the Father—which is false; but if they are the one that is not the Father, then the Father is not the Father—which again is false. Therefore in no way are they one principle.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, we say of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit that they are one Creator because they are one principle of what is created. But we do not say that the Father and the Son are one spirator. Therefore they are not one principle of the Holy Spirit.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, unity is the cause of identity. But the Father and the Son are not said to be the same principle of the Holy Spirit. Therefore neither are they one principle.

On the contrary, as was said above, the Father and the Son are one in all things wherein this is said to be from that. But the Son is the principle from a principle. Therefore the Father and the Son are one principle.

Furthermore, of one thing there is one principle. But the Holy Spirit is one. Therefore his principle is one.

I answer that, according to all who confess that the Holy Spirit proceeds from both the Father and the Son, the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. But there are diverse opinions about how this might be said.

For some say that “one” designates only a unity of proportion, since just as the Father stands to the Holy Spirit, as spirating him, so too does the Son. But this is not sufficient, since according to a unity of proportion the Father and the Son even agree in the account of a supposit, and yet we do not say they are one supposit. And therefore others say that “one” signifies a unity of nature; this view seems to be based on the authority of Anselm, who says (Anselm, On the Procession of the Holy Spirit, ch. 18 (PL 158:311–12).) that the Father and the Son spirate the Holy Spirit insofar as each of them is God. But unless they say something more, the Holy Spirit, who is not excluded from the unity of the nature, would not be excluded from the unity of “principle” spoken of notionally.

And therefore others say that “one” signifies the unity of the notion, and this seems to be fitting. For in substantive names unity or plurality is viewed according to the unity or plurality of the form being signified; whence we say “one God” on account of the unity of the divine nature. However, the form that the name “principle” signifies, insofar as it is being taken personally, is the notion or property itself, just as the name “Father” signifies the paternity. Whence the unity of the principle follows on the unity of the notion. Nonetheless it can be said, so as to save Anselm’s statement, that it signifies the unity in spirative power, which he called the divine nature under the account of such a property that is the principle of a personal action, as was said above. (In I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, aa. 2, 3.)

Reply Obj. 1: This division—either they are the one that is the Father or the one that is not the Father—is not a contradiction, so both can be false. But this is true: they are not the one that is the Father only. Rather, they are the one that is the Father and the Son, just as they are also one God, who is the Father and the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: Although they are said to be one principle of the Holy Spirit, nonetheless they are not said to be one who is spirating, or one spirator. (Aquinas seems to clarify his view in ST I.36.4, ad 7, where he states that it is better to say that the Father and the Son are “two who are spirating” (spirantes) but one “spirator” (spirator), because the latter is substantive, rather than adjectival: videtur melius dicendum quod, quia spirans adiectivum est, spirator vero substantivum, possumus dicere quod pater et filius sunt duo spirantes, propter pluralitatem suppositorum; non autem duo spiratores, propter unam spirationem. Nam adiectiva nomina habent numerum secundum supposita, substantiva vero a seipsis, secundum formam significatam; “it seems better to say that, because ‘spirating’ (spirans) is adjectival, and ‘spirator’ (spirator) is substantive, we can say that the Father and the Son are two who are spirating, on account of the plurality of supposits, but not two spirators, on account of the one spiration. For adjectival names have their number according to the supposits, whereas substantive names have it from themselves, according to the form signified.” See In I Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 4.) For distinctions of this sort are imposed from the acts, which always signify adjectivally, and in such one does not attend to a plurality of the form being signified in the plural consignification, but only to the plurality of the supposits, as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 4.)

But the account for creation and spiration are not alike. For the spiration requires in advance a distinction in supposits, whereby in a certain way it is from several supposits inasmuch as they are distinct, since it is a personal act. Creation, on the other hand, is a work of the divine essence, so it is the work of an indistinct supposit, inasmuch as by “essence” is signified that which is, as by the name “God.” Therefore just as the Father and the Son are said to be the one that is one God, so too the one that is one Creator. Yet they are not said to be the one who is creating, since the participle is adjectival.

Reply Obj. 3: It is not commonly conceded that they are the same principle, since a unity of supposit is included in the account of the articulation of “same”; this is just as even above the Master says (Sent. I, 4.2(14).4.) that God has not begotten himself God, nor another God. Yet some say that the Son and the Father are the same God and are the same principle, in that “same” is an adjective and does not posit an absolute identity, but only one relative to that to which it is joined. And according to this it can be conceded that they are the same principle.

Exposition of the text

The Father is the beginning of the whole divinity. (Sent. I, 29.1(125).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20, para. 29 (CCSL 50; PL 42:908).) This seems to be false, since “divinity” is being taken either for the divine essence or for the persons. If it is taken for the persons, then he is not the principle of the whole divinity—that is, of all the persons—since he is not the principle of his very self. If it is taken for the essence, it seems false because he is not the principle of the essence. And furthermore, “wholeness” requires some distinction in parts, whereas there is no distinction in the essence. I answer that it can be taken in either way. For if it is taken for the essence, then “whole” does not signify an integration of parts, but the perfection of a nature, and he is said to be the principle of the whole divinity not because he generates or spirates, but because by generating or spirating he communicates the divinity. In this way, the meaning of “principle of the divinity” is “principle of having the Godhead.” But in this way the Son also could be called the principle of the whole divinity, since perfect divinity is in the Holy Spirit from him—except insofar as this is not so according to every way in which it can be communicated, and not through generation. However, if it is taken for all the persons, then it is more plain, since then he is called the principle of the whole divinity insofar as in all the divine persons he himself is, as it were, the principle from which the other persons flow, just as a point is said to be the principle of the whole line, even though it is not a principle of its very self.

Or, if it is better said, of the whole deity. (Sent. I, 29.1(125).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20, para. 29 (CCSL 50; PL 42:908).) This is better insofar as “deity” is said from “God” (Deus), which signifies through itself and essentially one who has divinity. But “divinity” is said from “divine,” which is denominative, so it can also signify a participation of divinity, insofar as even the perpetuity of species is said to be divine, according to the philosophers. (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.4, 415a30; Averroes, Commentary on Aristotle’s On the Soul, bk. 2, text. 35.) Whence to designate the singularity of the excellence, the name “deity” is more congruent than “divinity.”

All natures, that is all substances, and all things which are naturally, (Sent. I, 29.2(126).3, quoting Augustine, On the Nature of the Good, para. 1 (CSEL 25:155; PL 42:551–52).) that is natural properties and activities, are from God.

The Church confesses also the Son’s origin from the beginning. (Sent. I, 29.3(127).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 6 (CCSL 62; PL 10:100).) He wishes to say that the origin of the Son is from the principle or beginning because he is from the Father. But because “beginning” can be understood even of a principle of duration, therefore to exclude a false understanding he adds, not that he is from the beginning, that is, one of duration, but that he is from the one without beginning, that is, the initiating principle, the Father. This is why he adds, not that he was born by himself, that is, from his very self. For, as will be explained below, the Son is through himself, not such that he is from himself, but from the Father. And he even adds from eternity, (Sent. I, 29.3(127).2, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 6 (CCSL 62; PL 10:100).) and so on.