D. 41 - Causality of predestination

Division of the text

Here the Master considers the causality of predestination and reprobation, excluding the error of those who assigned the cause of each as being on our side. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that the cause of both is not on our side; in the second, he shows that God’s knowledge is never diminished, at moreover, it needs to be considered whether all things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and knew and foreknows and foreknew. (Sent. I, 41.3(183).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents the truth; in the second, he excludes an error, at but some have held the opinion that God elected Jacob because he foreknew that he would be such as to believe in him. (Sent. I, 41.2(182).1.)

And this latter is divided into two parts: in the first, he excludes the error of those who asserted that our deeds, insofar as they are foreknown by God, cause both predestination and reprobation; in the second, he excludes the error of those who asserted that our previous deeds, even in the nature of things, are the causes of predestination and reprobation, at but many people, seeking to plumb the depths . . . became lost in vain tales. (Sent. I, 41.2(182).6, quoting Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 165, ch. 5, para. 6 (CCSL 41B:301; PL 38:905).)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he presents the opinion that the authority of Augustine seems to uphold, and the Master presents along with this opinion an authority from Augustine where he retracted it; in the second, he presents the objection of those making this error based on another authority, but which he also says was retracted, even though some try to resolve this with an inadequate solution, at but these words seem to be opposed to what Augustine says. (Sent. I, 41.2(182).3.)

Moreover, it needs to be considered whether all things which God once knows or foreknows, he always knows and knew and foreknows and foreknew. (Sent. I, 41.3(183).1.) Here he manifests the unchangeability of the divine knowledge. And as regards this, he does two things: first, he presents the question; second, he answers it, at we answer first regarding foreknowledge. (Sent. I, 41.3(183).2.)

As regards the latter, he does two things: first he considers the question in reference to foreknowledge; second, as regards knowledge, at but we say otherwise concerning knowledge. (Sent. I, 41.3(183).3.)

In this latter he does three things: first, he answers the question; second, he presents an objection to the contrary, at but the following objection is made to this; (Sent. I, 41.3(183).4.) third, he resolves this as well, at but to this we say. (Sent. I, 41.3(183).4.)

Question 1

The causality of predestination

Here five things are asked:

first, whether the choosing belongs to God from eternity;

second, about the order of predestination to that choosing;

third, whether foreknowledge of one’s merits is the cause of predestination and reprobation;

fourth, whether predestination is aided by the merits and prayers of the saints;

fifth, whether God knows now everything that he once knew.

Article 1

Whether choice is in God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.19.10; I.2.4; SCG I.88; On Truth, q. 24, a. 3; On Evil, q. 16, a. 5.) It seems that choice is not at all in God from eternity.

Obj. 1: For choice, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b11‒1113a8; 3.2, 1112a13‒17.) follows on deliberation as its conclusion. But deliberation, as he says in the same place, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.3, 1112b23.) is a certain inquiry. Therefore, since inquisitive cognition does not belong to God, it seems that choice does not belong to God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, choice indicates a certain discrimination. But God stands equally toward all things, since, as Dionysius says, for just as the sun, without reasoning it out or making a previous choice, diffuses its rays on all bodies, so does the divine goodness on all created things. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, choice requires a multitude from which one chooses. But from eternity all things were but one in God. Therefore it seems that choice is not eternal. But whatever is in God is eternal. Therefore choice indicates nothing in God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, prior to the act of choosing, something is understood to exist in the reality that is being chosen. But nothing exists in the created prior to the divine act. Therefore it seems that choice does not belong to God.

On the contrary, in Ephesians 1:4 it is said, he chose us in him before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy. Therefore it seems that choice belongs to God.

I answer that “choice” indicates a certain segregation. Now, this segregation can only be of things that have a certain intermingling or fittingness; therefore there can be no choice of what is in itself determinate and discrete. And this is why choosing, as is said in Ethics 3, (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b27.) is not of the ultimate end, which is naturally determined for each thing, but only of things that are for that end, to which one can make his way through several means in different ways—although some are more fitting, and these are the ones chosen. However, this segregation can occur merely in the conception of the doer, or it can also occur in the execution of the deed.

From these things we can take three aspects of choice when said of God. The first is that choice does not belong to God with respect to his very self, for choice is not of the end, but only of things that are for the sake of the end. A second can be taken based on those who are chosen when chosen by God, namely, that they are chosen from those who are naturally suited to participate in the same end. Whence it is not said that the men who are chosen for glory are chosen from irrational creatures, but from human beings, who are naturally suited to attain glory. The third thing that can be taken is that choice is in one way eternal, and in another way temporal. For if choice is taken insofar as it is in the plan of God himself, then it is eternal, since from eternity he wished to segregate the good from the evil, for the sake of glory. However, if it is taken insofar as it is in the execution of the deed, then it is temporal. An example is when someone is segregated from original or actual fault for the sake of grace, or from a common state for an office of being set above others, and so on for other things that are conferred by divine gift on certain ones specifically.

Reply Obj. 1: It happens to a choice that it follows on inquiry only because it occurs in a nature of the sort that does not have knowledge without inquiry about the things that are for the end, as is the case with us. But this in no way belongs to God, who has certain knowledge of all things.

Reply Obj. 2: Although he in himself stands equally toward all things, nonetheless all things do not have the same suitability for receiving the bestowal of his goodness; and he has knowledge and ordination of this diversity, and this is why choice befits him. Moreover, what Dionysius says about his comparison of the divine goodness to the sun should be understood to be a likeness related to the universality of its communication to created things, not one related to his lack of choice. For just as the sun holds back none of its rays, so too neither does God hold back the gifts of his goodness, but they are not found in all in the same way. And God is aware of this diversity and ordains it, which does not befit the bodily sun.

Reply Obj. 3: From eternity God knew not only the existence of the realities that they at that point had in him, but also the existence that they were going to have in their own proper natures, insofar as they do not have the united existence; rather, they are at a great distance (Presumably, Aquinas means that they are a great distance both from God and from each other.) with respect to participating in the divine goodness. And thus choice belongs to him from eternity.

Reply Obj. 4: Nothing exists in reality prior to the act of creation, and therefore things that are brought to existence are not properly said to be chosen. But for the divine act whereby he justifies and glorifies, the nature does preexist, either in its own proper existence or in the divine knowledge.

Article 2

Whether choice precedes predestination according to account

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.23.4; On Truth, q. 6, a. 2; Commentary on Romans, ch. 9, lect. 2.) It seems that choice does not precede predestination according to account.

Obj. 1: For choice adds something over and above foreknowledge; otherwise choice would be even of evils. Now, it adds the act of the will, as is clear from the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.2, 1111b4‒30; 1112a13‒17; 3.5, 1111b31‒35; 6.2, 1139a21‒30.) Therefore, since predestination adds nothing over and above foreknowledge besides the willing of salvation for certain ones, it seems that choice does not precede predestination according to its account; rather, it is the same thing as it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, choice presupposes a diversity among the things from which one chooses. But the diversity that is in men as regards attaining the end is due to an effect of predestination, that is, through grace. Therefore it seems that choice would in fact come after predestination according to its account.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a calling follows on predestination, as is said in Romans 8:30: those whom he predestined he also called. But this calling seems to be the same thing as choosing, since what is chosen for something in some way seems to be called to it. Therefore it seems that the choosing follows on the predestination.

On the contrary, love (dilectio) presupposes choice (electio), as the name itself shows. But predestination follows on love, since good things are prepared only for those who are loved. Therefore it seems that predestination follows on the choice.

I answer that predestination and choice add something over and above God’s foreknowledge, just as his plan and providence do; thus, it should be understood that, just as his plan and providence bear on all things in common, so too his choice and predestination bear only on men. Whence just as providence adds something over and above the plan, so too predestination adds something over and above the choosing.

This is sufficiently clear from things that were said earlier. (Above, d. 40, q. 1, a. 2.) For it was said that the divine plan is viewed in the ordination of the parts of the universe to each other and to the end, insofar as one nature is put ahead of another due to the order of divine wisdom. It is similar in choice. For the divine ordination by which certain ones are put ahead of others for the attainment of beatitude is called “choice.” However, providence is viewed in the bestowal of things through which realities attain their end, and in their arriving at the end. Similarly, predestination is viewed in the goods of grace and the goods of glory being prepared for those chosen, by which goods they are placed at the end. And it is clear that this also follows the common way of speaking. For just as we say things are planned, but one provides for both the things themselves and even the things that are bestowed on them, ordering them to the end, so too choosing is properly speaking of men, but predestining is both of men and even of things that are bestowed on them. For one does not say that grace is chosen for a man, but one does say that grace is predestined for a man.

Reply Obj. 1: Choice is not the act of the will absolutely, but within an order according to an ordering intellect, as the Philosopher implies in the same passage. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, 1111b31‒1112a5; 6.2, 1139a21‒30.) However, “predestination” signifies the act of the will absolutely, which follows on that order. For the divine choice is that whereby certain ones, from the order of his wisdom, are ordered to the end that is beatitude, but predestination is insofar as the things that lead to the end are prepared for them. And therefore just as the will ordering one to the end precedes the act of the will preparing things that lead to the end, so choice precedes predestination.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine choice does not require in advance a diversity of grace, since that follows on the choice; but it does require in advance a diversity of natures within divine knowledge, and it causes the diversity of grace, just as the divine plan causes the diversity of natures.

Reply Obj. 3: A calling is always temporal, because it asserts the leading of one thing to something else. And therefore in creation there is a certain calling to existence, and no eternal choosing corresponds to this, as has been said; (Above, d. 39, q. 2, a. 1.) whence it is said in Romans 4:17 that he calls into existence the things that do not exist. There is also a certain temporal calling to grace, to which corresponds a temporal and eternal choosing. However, this calling is either interior, through the infusion of grace, or exterior, through the voice of a preacher. Now, the interior calling and temporal choosing for grace are always simultaneous, but they differ according to account. For “choice,” insofar as it signifies a segregation, looks to the terminus from which one begins, whereas “calling” looks more to the terminus to which one is going. However, the interior calling differs from justification according to its account, since the calling pertains to the motion of the nature advancing toward grace, whereas justification looks to the existence consequent upon the terminus of the motion, insofar as grace makes one be just. But how love stands to choice and predestination pertains to Book III, where we treat the love whereby God loves what is created. (In III Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 2.)

Article 3

Whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination

Next it is asked whether the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of predestination. (Parallel texts: ST I.23.5; SCG III.163; On Truth, q. 6, a. 2; Commentary on John, ch. 15, lect. 3; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 3; ch. 8, lect. 6; ch. 9, lect. 3; Commentary on Ephesians, ch. 1, lect. 1, 4.) And it appears that this is the case.

Obj. 1: It appears that this is the case, first, because of Ambrose’s Gloss on Romans 9, where he proposes the following words in the person of God, I will give grace to the one whom, after wandering, I know is going to return to me with his whole heart. (Ambrose, Commentaria in epistolam ad Romanos, ch. 9, verse 15 (PL 17:136).) But the plan for giving grace is called “predestination.” Therefore it seems that it presupposes the foreknowledge of merits.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God’s will predestining someone cannot be unjust. But it pertains to distributive justice that unequal things are distributed to unequal receivers. But men are not unequal as regards receiving grace, except through certain deeds of theirs, or those of others, since from their nature all of them have the capacity for grace; therefore it seems that foreknowledge of their deeds is the cause of their predestination.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, there are two elements in the foreknowledge of deeds: one eternal—God’s knowledge—and one temporal—the foreknown deeds. Likewise, there are two elements in predestination: one eternal—the divine will—and one temporal—the bestowal of grace. But the eternal part that is in God’s foreknowledge is prior in account, and in a way is the cause of what is eternal in the predestination, since willing presupposes knowledge. Likewise, a temporal part is in a way the cause of the temporal part, since the deed whereby one has prepared oneself for grace is a certain cause—at least as a material disposition—for receiving grace; and the deed formed by grace is a meritorious cause of glory. Therefore it seems that the foreknowledge of one’s deeds is the cause of one’s predestination.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, predestination presupposes choice. But someone’s choice of something occurs only on account of some greater suitability for attaining the end. But this can be so only through one’s greater preparation for grace, which occurs through one’s deeds. Therefore it seems that predestination presupposes the foreknowledge of deeds.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, predestination is the will for a man’s salvation, not merely such that this is understood of God’s antecedent will—for by this will he wishes to save all men, as Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 29 (PG 94:970).)—but of his consequent will. Therefore, since his consequent will looks to merits, it seems the foreknowledge of merits is the cause of the predestination.

On the contrary, all that looks to one’s merit is in some way owed to him, and is not wholly gratuitous. But predestination is from God’s gratuitous will, which no merits can call upon, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Epistolae, letter 194, “To the Priest Sixtus,” ch. 3, para. 1 (CSEL 57:176; PL 33:874).) Therefore it seems that the foreknowledge of merits is not the cause of predestination.

Furthermore, all that is recorded in the text amounts to the same thing.

I answer that foreknowledge of merits, or of any deeds, is in no way the cause of divine predestination. This is clear if one considers that all that is within predestination belongs to its very essence. But nothing prohibits that what is an effect of predestination—that is, grace and glory, which are placed in its definition in an oblique way—hold a certain causality on the side of our deeds.

But the foreknowledge and will for the salvation of certain ones belongs to the essence of predestination. However, knowledge of their salvation is not caused by the knowledge of their deeds, since he does not come to the knowledge of an effect through its cause, but through his very self. Whence it cannot be said that he knows this thing because he knows its causes; rather, insofar as be beholds his own essence, which is the likeness of all things, he sees each and every thing within himself, both the cause and the caused. Likewise too, his will, since it is free, it is freer than any other will; it has no cause other than the end of his own will. Now, the end of his will is his own goodness, which is his very self. Whence it is said commonly that God wills this thing on account of his own goodness, not because he knew this thing or because he made this thing.

Nevertheless, the effect of his will—namely, the very thing willed as ordered to his own goodness—can proceed from some cause that God has foreknown from eternity. And this order of cause to effect God wills, and he wills that the effect exists because the cause exists. However, he does not do this in such a way that the causality is referred to his will, but to the thing willed. And thus this cause of the thing willed, not of the willing of it, is said to be a certain reason for that will on the side of the effect. But this cause in certain things has the complete account of a cause, but sometimes is only a disposition.

So too, our deeds stand in diverse ways to the double effect of predestination. For a meritorious deed formed by grace is the meritorious cause of glory, but a good deed preceding grace is not a meritorious cause of it, but only a certain disposition to it. Whence it is clear that predestination does not have a cause, but it does have a reason on the side of the effect, according to which it is said to be rational and just.

Reply Obj. 1: In these words of Ambrose it is not being signified that our deed is the cause of the divine will, nor even that it is the cause of the very giving of grace, but only that it is a certain disposition. Thus, it is understood not to be about a deed that follows on grace, which has its power of meriting due to the grace, and is neither a cause of grace, nor the disposition to it. Rather, it is about a preceding deed, which is the disposition to grace. For God plans to infuse grace in someone whom he foreknows he is going to prepare for grace; yet he does this not on account of that preparation, which is not a sufficient cause of grace or of the end of his will, but on account of his own goodness. Nonetheless, he wants this one to have grace because he has prepared himself for it—according to the manner of speaking in which one says that “he did himself a favor (This use of the word gratia, “grace,” does not transfer well into English, but gratia can also be rendered as “favor” or “gratitude.”) because he has prepared himself,” such that the conjunction “because” denotes a disposition and not a cause. But in reference to the act of willing, one cannot designate either a disposition or a cause, for God has not willed it because that one prepared himself, but only because he is good.

Reply Obj. 2: Even in the just man, the cause eliciting the act of willing is the end of the will. But on the side of the effect, he takes the cause from the deed of men, which makes for a discrimination among them. So if one were to ask a just judge, “why do you wish to give more to this one than to that one?,” if he wished to offer a cause of his will, he would say, “on account of the good of justice, which shines forth in this deed.” But if he wished to assign the cause of the deed, he would say, “because of the fact that he is more worthy.”

But nevertheless one should note that predestination, with respect to its secondary effect—that is, with respect to glory—has the account of distributive justice. And therefore we can say that God gives this one glory and not that one because the former merited it and the latter did not; and likewise, he wishes that this one would have it and not that one because the former is worthy of it and the latter is not. But with respect to its first effect—that is, grace—it has the account more of liberality than of justice. For grace is given gratuitously, and is not rendered to merits. Whence, on the side of the recipient one cannot assign a cause why he is worthy of grace, but only a certain disposition.

Reply Obj. 3: The foreknowledge is not a cause of the will, because the will is free. For that which I know I am able not to will. And therefore that argument does not follow, since the cause eliciting the act of the will is only its end.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine choice requires a diversity in those chosen, yet not one that is the cause of the choosing will—indeed, quite the opposite. For in this way his plan causes the diversity of things in their natures.

Reply Obj. 5: In the idea of predestination there is included the consequent will, which looks to deeds not as the cause of the will, but as the meritorious cause of glory, and as the preparation for grace.

Article 4

Whether predestination is aided by any human deed

Fourth, it is asked whether predestination is aided by any human deed. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 17, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 3; ST I.23.8; On Truth, q. 6, a. 6.) And it appears that it is not.

Obj. 1: For a cause that through itself brings forth its effect without the aid of another is more perfect than one that is aided to bring forth its effect. But predestination is the most perfect cause. Therefore it is not aided by anything for its effect.

Obj. 2: If the effect remains regardless of whether a thing is posited or removed, that thing does not seem to aid the attainment of the effect. But due to someone’s being posited as predestined, he will be saved, regardless of whether anyone prays for him or not, for predestination cannot be nullified. Therefore it seems that altogether nothing helps one toward his salvation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the effect of predestination is grace and glory, each of which is from God alone. Therefore nothing else helps one attain the effect of predestination.

On the contrary, Gregory says in the Dialogue (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PL 77:188).) that predestination is aided by the prayers of the saints. He proves this through what is said in Genesis 25:21, that Isaac prayed for his wife Rebecca, because she was sterile, and the Lord gave her conception; and yet Jacob, who was born from this conception, had been predestined to life.

Furthermore, if predestination is not aided by our deeds, then it is not necessary to pray for anyone that he be saved, and for the same reason, not even for oneself. Nor is it necessary to do any good deed, and thus the divine law, which induces us to do good, is pointless. Even natural powers and the gratuitous habits will be in vain, so it is not necessary that we do anything for the attainment of the end—all of which are incongruous. Therefore predestination is aided by the prayers of the saints.

I answer that this question depends on things said in the previous article. For predestination is aided in the same way as it has a cause. Whence, just as it was said that predestination, insofar as it is the divine act that is to will or to know, does not have any cause on our side, so too neither on that side does it receive any assistance. For God performs his act of willing without the cooperation of anything created.

But the effect of predestination receives assistance in the way that it also has a cause. Whence in this respect, every cause by the intervening activity of which the effect of predestination is completed is said to aid the predestination. This happens either through the mode of a meritorious cause—either as condign, as if someone who has grace merits eternal life by his own act, or as congruent, as someone praying for someone else merits for him the first grace, or even by urging him to the good, whence 1 Corinthians 3:9 says, we are God’s fellow workers—or through the mode of a disposition, as when someone prepares himself for having grace, or even by a natural activity, just as the motion of the heavens and all natural causes assist predestination insofar as, by means of their function, the generation and sustenance of the chosen is perfected.

Reply Obj. 1: This assistance is not on account of some need in the predestination, but so that the order, which the divine wisdom establishes, might be upheld—that is, so that the effect proceeds from the first cause by the mediation of secondary causes.

Reply Obj. 2: Something false is presupposed in the argument. For if Stephen had not prayed for his persecutors, perhaps Paul would not have been saved, just as if someone were not to perform meritorious deeds, he would not receive the crown that was predestined for him. Nevertheless, predestination cannot be frustrated, since it has been foreknown by God that this one will be saved by that cause and with this order. Whence just as this one not being saved is incompatible with his predestination, so too it is incompatible with his predestination for Stephen not to have prayed for him, even though each of these things in itself is able not to be.

Reply Obj. 3: The infusing cause of grace is God alone, but the disposition toward grace can be due to the very same one who receives the grace. But congruous merit of grace can even be from someone else who is just, whereas even condign merit of grace for others can be from Christ the man himself, whose merits have had efficacy over the whole of human nature, because he is the head of the Church.

Article 5

Whether whatever God knew once, he knows now

Fifth, it is asked whether whatever God knew at one time he knows now. (Parallel texts: above, d. 38, a. 2; d. 39, q. 1, aa. 1, 2; ST I.14.15; On Truth, q. 2, a. 5, ad 11; a. 13.) It seems that this is so.

Obj. 1: For God’s knowledge, as has been said, is invariable. But all knowledge that ceases to exist about a thing that it before was about is varying. Therefore it seems that whatever God knew once, he knows now.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything known by God is either received as a certain reality, or as a statement signifying an existing reality. But God knew any reality he knows now, since it is one and the same reality that is now present and before was going to be, and tomorrow will be past; and likewise, it seems to be one truth expressible in a statement, since the truth of a statement is traced back to the truth of the reality as to its cause. Therefore it seems that whatever God knew once, he knows now, whether it be a reality or a statement.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, consignification stands closer to diction than to speech. But a diverse mode of signifying does not impede the unity of a noun; whence the grammarians say that albus, alba, and album (These are the Latin words for “white” in the masculine, feminine, and neuter grammatical genders, respectively; the gender of a word is part of its “consignification” or, broadly speaking, its “mode of signification,” as distinct from its direct or fundamental signification, its dictionary meaning. Roughly speaking, the word’s stem indicates its signification, but its ending indicates its consignification. In this case, the words all signify the color white itself, but each of them also consignifies a gender. Tense is also a part of a word’s (specifically, a verb’s) consignification, indicating a different “mode” or manner of signifying the action: the time when it occurs relative to the present. (Note also that albus, -a, -um is an adjective, not a noun, but medieval grammarians treated adjectives as a special sort of noun, or nomen, “name.”)) are one noun, and likewise for others. Therefore, since these statements, “Socrates runs,” and “Socrates ran,” are related to one instance but uttered at diverse times, differing only through a diverse consignification of time, they seem to be one statement; thus the same thing as before follows.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, either the unity of the time pertains to the unity of the statement, or it does not. If it does pertain to it, then when the spoken statements refer to one time, it seems that they are one statement. However, if it does not pertain to it, then, because the spoken statements are distinguished only through diverse consignifications of time, it seems that they are one statement.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, a statement is also a certain reality of reason. But God knew any reality that he knows. Therefore from this it also seems to follow that whatever statement God knew, he knows.

On the contrary, everything true is known by God. But at one time it was true that Christ was going to die. Therefore it was known by God.

Furthermore, whatever is known by God is true. Therefore, since now it is not true that Christ is going to die, it is not known by God. Therefore it is not the case that whatever God knew, he knows.

Furthermore, you might say that there is a figure of speech in the progression of the argument, since “what” he knows is being changed into “when” he knows it.

On the contrary, even with the solution posited, the same difficulty remains. For the proposition will be changed and one will say that not just any statement God knew, he knows, as was concluded. Rather, the statement is something known. Therefore it is not the case that whatever God knew, he knows.

I answer that, as was said earlier, (Above, d. 38, q. 1, a. 3.) God’s knowledge is not only about realities, but even about statements. Therefore if God’s knowledge is referred to realities, in this way there is no doubt that every reality that God has known, he knows now; and it is in this way that the Master’s solution in the text (Sent. I, 41.3(183).4.) proceeds best. For one and the same reality is being signified when it is uttered at diverse times, such as “Socrates runs,” and “Socrates ran”—the reality being Socrates’ running. However, if it is referred to the statements, then there have been two opinions about this.

For some have said that the unity of the statement follows on the unity of the reality signified, even though it is uttered with diverse consignifications of time. And according to this it follows that once a statement is true, it always was true, and is true; and in this way, once it is known by God, it will always be known by him. But this position is expressly contrary to things said by the Philosopher, in the Categories, (Aristotle, Categories 10, 13b14‒35; 11, 14a7‒14.) who says that the same proposition, “Socrates is sitting,” which before was true when Socrates was sitting, becomes false when he rises. And furthermore, if the statement has its unity from the unity of the reality, for the same reason it has diversity from the latter’s diversity. And thus, the statement, “Socrates runs,” when uttered at diverse times, would not be one, nor would any name signifying diverse realities be one. And thus, both equivocation and univocation would be destroyed, each of which requires the unity of a name that belongs to several things.

Whence it is conceded by all nowadays that “Socrates runs” and “Socrates ran” are two diverse statements, even if they are referred to the same running. And according to this, one should make a distinction about the statement. For either it can be taken insofar as it is a certain reality of reason, as it were, materially—and in this way, any statement he knew, he knows; for he always knows the statement “Socrates runs” has such and such a nature and such and such parts. Or it can be taken as signifying, insofar as through it a reality’s existence is being designated along with its conditions, which are given to be understood from the verb’s consignification. And in this way not every statement he knew, he knows. For he knew the statement, “Christ is being crucified,” to be true while he was being crucified, but he does not know it to be true now, but to have been true.

Reply Obj. 1: This does not happen due to any change made in God’s knowledge, but in the reality itself. For when we say, “God foreknew that Christ was going to die,” reference to the future is being designated, so when it ceases to belong to the future, God no longer foreknows it, yet without any change being brought about in his foreknowledge. And in the same way, when one says, “God knew Christ was going to die,” reference to the future is being designated in the participle. (Namely, the future participle morituram, “going to die.”) Whence, by the reality passing into the past, the reference does not stay the same, so when it has been removed, God does not know the reality as existing under that reference. This is why there is no variation in the knowledge of the one who looks upon all things by a single act of beholding, whereas the reference and nature of the reality does vary. For as was said above, (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 3.) in relative predications it happens that a change occurs when one of the extremes changes, even while the other remains invariable.

Reply Obj. 2: Although the statement’s truth is caused by the reality’s existence, still it is not necessary that the statement has its unity on account of the unity of the reality, but only that it has its truth therefrom. However, it has its unity and diversity from things that constituted it essentially, that is, from its parts. Whence since the parts of these statements, “Socrates runs,” and “Socrates ran,” are diverse, they are diverse statements.

Reply Obj. 3: A diverse mode of signifying also makes a diverse noun. But the grammarian does not say it is the same noun because it is one simply speaking, for “albus,” “alba,” and “album” are different vocal sounds, and when the genus is multiplied, which is “vocal sound,” the species must be multiplied, which is “noun”; so where there are multiple vocal sounds, there are also multiple nouns. Rather, they are said to be one noun because they pertain to the same root for declension.

Reply Obj. 4: The time signified is outside the essence of the statement, and therefore a statement does not conceive its unity or diversity from it; but it does conceive it from time as consignified. For on account of diverse consignifications of time there are diverse endings for the verbs, and diverse vocal sounds. Whence there are also diverse statements.

Reply Obj. 5: The argument follows if one takes the statement insofar as it is a certain reality; but in this way it is not relevant to what is proposed.

Exposition of the text

But this is frivolous. (Sent. I, 41.2(182).5.) He says this inasmuch as that interpretation is too strained, (Reading extorta for exorta.) to the point that they are being called worthy of grace because they are not as unworthy as others.

Similarly, the ancient fathers of the Old Testament believed that Christ would be born and would die, but we believe that he has already been born and died. (Sent. I, 41.3(183).4.) The diversity of the statements does not impede the unity of the reality being believed. For either the object of the faith is the reality and not the statement, as some say, or it is also the statement insofar as it abstracts from every difference of time; and the determined time is not of the substance of the faith, but accrues to the faith insofar as it is made determinate through teaching, insofar as faith comes from hearing.