D. 33 - How the properties are compared to the essence and the person

Division of the text

After the Master has considered the essence, the persons, and their properties, here he determines comparisons of these with respect to each other. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows how the properties are related to the essence and the person; in the second, he shows how the persons are related to the essence, at to what has been said above must be added. (Sent. I, 34.1(145).1.)

The first of these is divided in two: in the first, he shows the truth; in the second, he excludes an error, at but some deny this. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).6.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he presents the question; in the second, he answers it, at no one dares to deny that the properties are in the persons. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).1.)

And regarding the latter he does three things: first, he shows that the properties are in the persons, which was not asserted in the question; second, he shows that the properties are the persons, at with many testimonies of the Saints, we have shown above that the persons are distinguished and determined by the properties; (Sent. I, 33.1(143).1; Peter Lombard is himself referring back to distinctions 26 and 27.) third, he shows that the properties are the divine essence, at in discussing the simplicity of the deity, above, . . . we have shown clearly that that which God has in himself is wholly God. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).3; Peter Lombard is himself referring back to Sent. I, 8.8(28).) He shows each of these things in two ways: by reason and by authority. And each reason is taken from the divine simplicity, which is not compatible either with there being something in God other than himself—and thus the property that is in the person is not other than him—or with the possessor being other than what is possessed. And in this way he shows that the essence, or God, is not something other than the property that he has.

But some deny this. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).6.) Here he excludes an error, and about this he does two things: first, he presents the false position; second, he presents the position’s reasons, and resolves them, at for if the persons are the properties, they say, then the persons are not differentiated by them. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).7.)

And regarding this latter, he does two things: first, he brings in their proofs that are taken from reason; second, he brings in proofs taken from authorities, at and yet . . . they still do not desist, but strive to defend their opinion even by the authorities of the Saints. (Sent. I, 34.2(144).2.)

As regards the first, he does three things: first, he brings in an argument by which it is proved that the properties existing in the persons are not the persons; second, he brings in an argument to prove that the properties are not the essence, at but they also add; (Sent. I, 34.1(143).8.) third, he presents an argument to prove that a property is not in the essence, at but the malice of the heretics . . . does not stop there. (Sent. I, 34.1(143).9.) And this latter is divided into three: in the first, he presents their proof; second, he presents his own response, at resisting their boldness and making provision for their ignorance, we will dare to say something on this matter; (Sent. I, 34.1(143).10.) third, he brings in a question against this response, and excludes it, at but perhaps you might ask, as these properties cannot be in persons without determining them, how they can be in the divine essence without determining it. (Sent. I, 34.2(144).1.)

Question 1

How the properties are compared to the essence and the person

Here five things are asked:

first, whether the properties are the divine essence;

second, whether they are the persons themselves;

third, whether they are in the persons and the essence;

fourth, whether essential and personal adjectives can be predicated of the properties;

fifth, whether there can be contrary opinions about the notions without any sin.

Article 1

Whether the personal properties are the divine essence

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.28.2; SCG IV.14; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 2; Quodl. IV, q. 1; Compendium theologiae, cc. 54, 66, 67.) It seems that the relations themselves are not the divine essence.

Obj. 1: For the things said relatively in God are either relatives according to being or only according to speech. But the properties are not such only according to speech, since then one would fall into the heresy of Sabellius, as was explained earlier in Hilary’s note. (Above, d. 31, exposition of the text.) Therefore they are relatives according to being. But the being of such relations, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Categories 7, 6a37 and b7.) is to be oriented toward another. Therefore, since the being of the divine essence is not to orient toward another, but is an absolute being, it seems that it is not the same as the relation that is being toward another.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever things are the same in reality, wherever one finds the one, one also finds the other, nor can there be an exception. But the paternity is not in everything in which one finds the divine essence, since the divine essence is in the Son, in whom is no paternity. Therefore the divine essence is not the same thing as the paternity, and for the same reason neither is any other property.

Obj. 3: You might say that they are the same thing in reality, but they differ in account.

On the contrary, that account is either something in the reality, or it is nothing in the reality.

If it is nothing, then, since the distinction is only according to the relations, the distinction of the persons will not be according to a reality; rather, it will be only according to account, or understanding.

But if it is something in the reality, it is certain that whatever is really in God, God or the divine essence has. But in God what possesses and what is possessed are the same thing, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).3.) Therefore the divine essence is the account of paternity, just as it is the very reality that is paternity. Therefore they are not merely the same thing in reality, but even in account, if they are asserted to be really the same.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if they are the same in reality but differ only in account, then the property or relation does not add to the essence anything but a certain account. But, likewise, relations that are said in reference to time assert of the divine essence certain orientations according to account. Therefore it seems that these relations whereby the persons are distinguished are no more in God than are those that are said of God from time. But the latter are placed alongside him, and not as inhering in him; otherwise they could not accrue to him without some change happening in God himself. Therefore it seems that these relations that distinguish the persons are also alongside him and are not the divine essence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as the account of paternity is different from that of the essence, so too the account of the essence is different from that of the divine goodness. Therefore, if on account of this Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, cc. 4–6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:941–46); Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 68, sermon 1, para. 5 (CCSL 39; PL 36:844–46).) that God is Father by one thing, and by something else is God, then for the same reason one should say that by one thing he is God and by another he is good. But he does not say this—in fact, he asserts the contrary. Therefore it seems that when he says that by one thing he is the Father and by something else he is God, he does not intend to distinguish them only according to account, but even according reality. And thus, it seems that paternity, by which he is the Father, is not the divine essence, by which he is God.

On the contrary, God is the only thing that should be adored with the adoration of latria. But the properties of the persons should be adored, as is sung in the preface: property in persons, unity in essence, and equality in majesty be adored. (From the Preface of the Mass of the Most Holy Trinity.) Therefore it seems that the properties themselves are also either something in reality or nothing. If nothing, since the persons are distinguished only by their properties, then the persons are not distinct from each other according to reality, which is the heresy of Sabellius. But if they are something in reality, that something that they are is either the divine essence or something else. If they are the divine essence, then the proposed position is held. If something else, it is in the person whose property it is. But in the person is also the essence. Therefore in the person there are different things, so he is composite. But there is no composition in God, as has been proved. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 1.) Therefore the divine person is not God, and thus the Father is not God, nor is the Son God—which exceeds even the error of Arius. Therefore the properties must be the divine essence.

I answer that it should be simply confessed that the properties are the divine essence. For the error that is touched on in the text is said to have been that of Porretanus, (That is, Gilbert of Poitiers.) who later at the Council of Rheims retracted it.

For, as was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.) there are two things in a relation: the reference of the relation whereby it is referred to another, in which consists the account of relation; and further, the very being of the relation, which it has insofar as it is founded in some reality—whether quantity, or essence, or something like this. Porretanus had considered the divine relations according to the reference wherein consists the account of relation, due to which it does not have it that it assert any inhering reality. This is also why there are even found certain relations that assert nothing really in the thing, as was also said earlier, and on account of which he said they are “placed alongside” or “exteriorly affixed” to the essence. (See above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.) For properly speaking those relations are said to be exteriorly affixed and placed alongside when they do not properly speaking have a foundation in the reality, as long as they accrue to it from the bearing of the other to the reality of which they are said. An example would be the right side of the column, which is said of it from the fact that a man has it to his left; and of this sort are also the relations whereby God is referred to created things.

But the relations distinguishing the persons cannot be of this sort, since they will be founded on something that is truly in the reality, that is, in the communion of the nature. And therefore they are real relations possessing a being founded in the nature of the reality. But this is the nature of the divine simplicity: that in it there cannot be but one existence, nor within it does the existence, that which it is, and that by which it is, differ. Therefore the being of the paternity cannot be something other than the being of the essence; and because the being of the essence is the essence itself, and the being of the paternity is the paternity itself, one concludes of necessity that the paternity itself is, according to reality, the essence itself. Whence it makes no composition with it. But because there remains there a true reference pertaining to the relations, which reference does not pertain to the account of the essence, due to that reference the relation is able to distinguish, even though the essence is not being distinguished, the concept of which is not such a reference that possesses opposition and consequently causes distinction.

And thus one should say that the properties and the essence are the same thing in reality, but they differ in account. However, in other real relations existing in created things the being of the relation is something other than that of the related substance. And therefore the former relations are said to be-in, and insofar as they are-in they make a composition of accident with subject. But this does not befit the divine relations, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 1: These relations are toward-something not only according to speech, but even according to being. But one should note that “being” is said in three ways. In one way, the very “whatness” or nature of a thing is said to be, just as it is said that a definition is a statement signifying what is to be; for a definition signifies the “whatness” of a thing. In another way, the very act of the essence is said to be; for example, to live, which is the being of living things, is the act of the soul—not the second act, which is its activity, but the first act. In a third way, what signifies the truth of the composition in propositions is said to be, insofar as “is” signifies the copula; and according to this, it exists in the intellect combining and dividing things as regards its completion, but it is founded in the being of reality that is the act of the essence, as was said above about “truth.” (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1.)

Therefore I say that, when it is said that those things are toward-something, the being of which is to orient toward another, this should be understood of the being that is the “whatness” of the thing, which is signified in the definition. For the very nature of relation, whereby it is constituted in that genus, is to be referred to another. And it should not be understood of the being that is the act of the essence, for a relation has this latter being from the things that cause it within the subject, insofar as the being is not referred to another, but to the subject, like with any accident. And thus I say that it is not necessary that the being of the divine essence orient toward another, since that being wherein the paternity and the essence are united is signified as the being that is the act of the essence; but they are not united in the being that the definition of the thing signifies, since the account of paternity, by which it is referred to another, is other than the account of the essence.

Reply Obj. 2: If any two things are the same thing, insofar as they are the same whatever the one is found in, there one finds the other as well. However, the paternity and the divine essence are the same thing in being, and therefore just as the being of the essence is in the Son, so too the being of the paternity is in the Son, since in the divine there is only one being. But the paternity has something wherein it is not united with the essence—that is, the account of paternity, which is other than the account of the essence. Whence according to that account, a reference can be in the Father that is not in the Son, but it can distinguish the Father from the Son. Whence in the argument one falls into the fallacy of the accident.

Nor in such matters is there a need to ask for something similar; for in no created reality is there found something like the divine simplicity, where what possesses is that by which it is possessed. For all like things that could be brought in—whether points or differences existing in a genus—have more unlikeness with God than likeness. And therefore they lead the intellect away from the truth more than they lead to it. For, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) in things that are without matter, one must not be led toward the imagination, since this gets in the way most of all in divine matters.

Reply Obj. 3: That response is good, but one should note that “account,” or “reason,” (Because “account” does not have the range of meanings that ratio does in Latin, we here provide a double translation of the word to partly supplement for this ambiguity.) is taken in two ways. For sometimes “account” signifies what is in the one thinking it, that is, the very act of reason, or the power that is reason. But sometimes “account” is the name of the intention, either insofar as it signifies the definition of a thing, inasmuch as the account is the definition, or insofar as an argument is called an “account,” or “reason.” Therefore I say that when it is said that the account of paternity is other than the account of essence in the divine, “account” is not being taken insofar as it is only in the one thinking it, but insofar as it is the name of the intention, and it signifies the definition of the thing. For although in the divine there can be no definition, nor genus, nor difference, nor composition, nonetheless if one understands here the thing being defined, the definition of paternity will be other than the definition of the essence.

Now, in all intentions it is commonly true that the intentions themselves are not in the real things, but in the soul alone; but they do have something in the reality corresponding to them, namely the nature to which the intellect attributes such intentions. For example, the intention of a genus is not in a donkey, but the animal nature is, and to it the intellect attributes this intention.

And thus also the accounts themselves, which we say are different from each other in the divine, are not in the reality; but there is in the account something corresponding to it, and which is founded in reality—that is, the truth of that reality to which such an intention is being attributed. For this is in God. This is why diverse accounts can belong here, and it does not follow, therefore, that God is those accounts, but only that he has them. For what is being said—that in God the one who possesses and what is possessed is the same thing—should be understood of the things that are had through the mode of realities, but not of those that are had through the mode of intentions.

This is just as we cannot say that God is a name, even though he has a name, but we can say that God is goodness, since he has goodness. Similarly, he is paternity, since he has paternity, but it does not follow that he is an account, even though he has an account.

Reply Obj. 4: Those accounts of relations that are said of God from time do not have any real existence in God in which they are founded, as do the relations of the persons. And therefore there is no likeness for both.

Reply Obj. 5: Knowledge is not divided against substance except from its genus, insofar as it is a quality. Whence it is said that this is immediate: “no quality is a substance,” whereas this is mediated: “no knowledge is a substance.” And so it is for all the other genera. But it was said above (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.) that no common account of any category remains in the divine except relation. And therefore what is said to be toward-something in the divine has an account different than the account of substance, and a different mode of predicating divided against substance—whereas knowledge, goodness, and such, which are in different genera and are said of God, do not have the account of a common genus whereby they are divided against substance; rather, in place of that common account of quality or quantity, the account of substance enters in.

Whence the account of knowledge is said to be different than that of substance in the divine—not as though it is divided against the account of substance—but rather the way the account of a species is different than the account of its genus, insofar as it adds the account of a difference over and above the account of the genus.

Whence in this way, in the divine, the account of knowledge is other than the account of substance, just as in created things the account of knowledge is other than the account of quality—which is not simply speaking other. And therefore, just as it is said in created things that by the same thing one has a quality and is a knower, so in the divine it is said that by the same thing he is substance and Father. For relation, which through itself is divided against substance, according to the account of its genus and its mode of signifying is preserved in the divine.

Article 2

Whether the properties are the persons

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1; ST I.40.1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 67.) It seems that the properties are not the persons.

Obj. 1: For if things are the same in reality, then when one is multiplied, the other is as well. Therefore, if the properties are the persons, then there are as many persons as properties. But there are five properties, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 23, q. 1, a. 3.) Therefore there are five persons—which is false.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is called “threefold” on account of the Trinity of persons. Therefore, if the properties or notions are the persons, it seems that he should be called “fivefold” on account of the five notions. And for the same reason, the Father should be called “threefold” and the Son “twofold.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:911).) everything that is referred to something is something, aside from the fact that it is spoken of as toward another. For example, a denarius is something, aside from the fact that it is called a “wage.” But the Father is referred to another, that is, the Son. Therefore besides the relation, one finds something there that stands under the relation. Now, this is the hypostasis, or person. Therefore it seems that the properties are not the persons.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing seems to have been distinguished from its very self. But the properties do distinguish the persons, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 8 (PG 94:823).) Therefore the properties are not the persons.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, everything concrete adds something over and above what is abstract, just as white adds something to whiteness. But the divine persons signify in the concrete, as Father and Son, whereas the properties signify in the abstract. Therefore the properties are not the persons.

On the contrary, as Hilary says, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 40 (CCSL 62; PL 10:234).) the Son is nothing but the Son. But “Son” signifies a relation. Therefore it seems that the whole that is the Son is the relation of filiation, and thus, his essence and hypostasis will be the relation.

Furthermore, every form is a principle of that whose form it is, as regards something of its being. Therefore if the paternity whereby the Father is formally the Father is something other than the Father himself, it will be a principle of the Father, and prior to him—which is incongruous. Therefore paternity is not other than the Father, and for the same reason, neither is any property other than the person.

I answer that there are three opinions about this matter. For the followers of Porretanus (That is, Gilbert of Poitiers.) have said that the properties are in the persons as alongside them, and are not the persons themselves. But this cannot be so, since either a property is something in the reality—and then, if it is not the person in which it exists, there must be composition there—or it is nothing in the reality—and then there will be no distinction of persons in the reality.

And therefore others say, as Praepositinus said, that the properties are the persons themselves according to reality, and they are not distinct from the persons, even according to account, nor in any other way. Whence he said that in the divine there is only the essence and the persons, and he denied that there are properties. But when “paternity” is spoken of, the abstract is being taken in place of the concrete, as when we say, “I beseech your beneficence,” meaning “I beseech that you be benign.” And the properties are even said to be adored in this way. And he said that the persons, since they are most simple, are distinct by their very selves. But for two reasons this too cannot stand: first, because we find in one person several properties and relations, insofar as he is referred to different persons; second, because something is attributed to a property that is not attributed to a person, like distinguishing, whereas the persons are what are distinguished. And therefore the properties must differ from the person according to mode of signifying. Nor would a diverse mode of signifying hold the truth—but would be empty—unless there were a different account of property and person, to which something in the reality corresponds, as was said above. (Above, a. 1.)

And therefore we say that the properties and the persons are the same in reality, but they differ in account, as was said also about the properties and the essence. But there is this difference: the account of a property and that of an essence differ as do the accounts of diverse genera, as was said; but the account of a property and that of a person differ as do the accounts of the abstract and the concrete for things taken in the same genus. Now, for created things, there are two things to consider in the concrete: composition and perfection. For what is signified concretely is signified as existing through itself, like “man” or “white.” Likewise, there are two things to consider in the abstract: simplicity and imperfection. For what is signified in the abstract is signified through the mode of form, to which do not belong activity or subsisting in oneself, but in another. Whence it is clear that, as is also the case with other things said of God, neither account wholly befits the divine. Based on this, it is proved in the Book of Causes (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 6.) that nothing is said of God properly—neither the abstract, on account of its imperfection, nor the concrete, on account of its composition. But in a certain respect each is said truly: the concrete, on account of its perfection, and the abstract, on account of its simplicity.

Reply Obj. 1: The properties are the same in reality with the persons as regards being, but the persons are not distinguished according to their being. Whence it does not follow that the multitude of persons follows the multitude of the properties. For the distinction of the persons is only according to relative opposition; whence insofar as the relative opposition in the properties can vary, a distinction in the persons follows—and if one considers it carefully, this cannot come to a number greater than three. And therefore the opposed relations are the persons, and they are two persons just as they are two relations; but the non-opposed relations that are in the same person are indeed two relations, or properties, but they are not two persons, but rather one person.

Reply Obj. 2: Relations are signified through the mode of forms or qualities in the divine. But the number of the properties or forms does not put a number simply speaking in the realities themselves; rather, the number of the supposits does. For example, Socrates is not called “threefold” on account of the fact that he has three properties; and so too the Father is not called “threefold” on account of the three notions. But God is called “threefold” on account of the three person, or three supposits.

Reply Obj. 3: What Augustine said earlier has truth in both the divine and the created, but in diverse ways. For what is said to be toward-something in created things stands under this relation as a subject to its accident, and therefore they are different. But what is said to be toward-something in the divine is the relation itself, since in God the essence and what has the essence, which is the person, and the very property distinguishing the person are not different things in reality but only according to account.

Reply Obj. 4: A property is signified through the mode of form, and distinguishing belongs to form. Therefore the properties distinguish the persons. And this is with respect to the mode of signifying, which is founded in the true account of property. Therefore it cannot be concluded from this that there is any diversity according to reality.

Reply Obj. 5: In the divine, the abstract and the concrete do not differ according to any reality, but according to account, as was said in the body. Whence the property differs from the person the way Godhead differs from God, which is only according to account.

Article 3

Whether the properties are in the essence or in the persons

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the properties are neither in the essence nor in the persons.

Obj. 1: For if things are the same according to reality, the one of them cannot be in the other, because the propositions are transitive; (That is, if A is in B, and B is in A, then “by transitivity,” A would be in A as well.) whence according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Physics 4.3, 210a25‒b18.) nothing is in its very self, except incidentally. But the properties are the same in reality with the essence and the persons. Therefore they are not in the essence or the persons.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything in which a relation exists is itself referred, and everything that is referred, in the divine, is distinguished by a relation. Therefore, since the essence is not distinguished, it seems that the relation is not in the essence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, although relations are consequent upon motion and some change, no relation can exist in what neither motion or change can occur within. But in the divine there can be no motion or change. Therefore neither are the relations in either the essence or in the divine persons.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything that is in something is in it in some mode. But none of the modes wherein the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Physics 4.3, 210a14‒24.) one thing is in another can fit the properties being in the persons. Therefore it seems the properties are neither in the essence nor in the persons.

On the contrary, in the preface noted above, we say, property in the persons . . . be adored. (Above, a. 1, sed contra.)

Furthermore, what is denominated from any form must have it within itself. But the persons are denominated from the properties, for he is called “Father” from his paternity. Therefore it seems that the properties are in the persons.

I answer that the properties are in the essence and in the persons, but in diverse ways. For they are in the essence through the reality being identical with it, and not as in a supposit, whereas they are in the persons as in a supposit. But this too is in a different way, insofar as something is called the “supposit of something” in two ways: either as a supposit of the nature whereby it is constituted, as humanity is in Socrates, and in this way the personal properties are in the persons; or as what accrues to the supposit after the latter is constituted in existence, as whiteness is in Socrates, and in this way, according to our understanding, the non-personal properties, like innascibility and common spiration, are in the persons. Yet this latter is not such that the supposit is something other than what is in them according to reality; rather, they differ only according to the account of the concrete and the abstract, as was said in the previous article.

Reply Obj. 1: This response is clear, because the one is said to be in the other due to the fact that the properties are distinct in account and the same in reality with the essence and the persons.

Reply Obj. 2: Whatever a relation is present in as in a supposit is itself referred, just as whatever thing whiteness is present in as in a supposit is itself white. Now, in the divine nature or divine essence the relative property is not present as in a supposit, but rather it is there through a total real identity with it. Whence the relation cannot be predicated concretely of the essence, so that one might say that the essence is referred, but it can be predicated with a predication designating identification, so that one might say that the essence is the relation. And therefore it is not necessary that the essence be distinguished. This is just as even in created things paternity is in Socrates as in a supposit, so Socrates is called a “father,” but his humanity is not predicated, even that whereby his paternity can be said to exist—not of course according to a real identity with him, as is the case with the divine, but according to its belonging in the one supposit, which is Socrates, wherein is both humanity and paternity.

Reply Obj. 3: The fact that a relation follows on a motion happens to a relation insofar as it is not eternal; whence, if some relations are eternal, they do not follow on any motion. For example, if the world be asserted to be eternal, one can designate in the heavens some body equal to another, or double or according to some other proportion, and yet these relations do not follow on any motion or change, since in the heavens there is no motion with respect to quantity. And likewise, since the relations by which the persons are distinguished are from eternity, they must not follow on any motion; rather, in place of motion they follow in some way on the communication and reception of the divine nature.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Hilary, (Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 19 (CCSL 62; PL 10:38).) there is no comparison of earthly things with divine, so none of the modes the Philosopher enumerates suffices to explicate how, in the divine, something is said to be in something, and this is especially so for the mode by which the properties are said to be in the essence. For in created things one does not find things of diverse genera coming together in an identity of reality, as relation and substance come together in the divine, by reason of which the one is said to be in the other, that is, the paternity in the essence, as in something preexisting according to the understanding. And that manner wherein the non-personal properties are in the persons holds something like the mode wherein form is in matter, that is, an incidental form in its subject. But that manner wherein the personal properties are in the persons holds something similar with the mode wherein differences are in their species, or a common nature in what is under it. However, in all these things the dissimilarity is found to be greater than the likeness.

Article 4

Whether the essential adjectives can be predicated of the properties

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that the essential adjectives may be predicated of the properties.

Obj. 1: For if things are the same according to the reality, whatever is said of the one seems to be said of the other; otherwise both an affirmation and a negation of the same thing could be true, since the negation is said of what the affirmation is not said. But the properties are God himself, as was proved. (Above, a. 2.) Therefore the essential adjectives, which are predicated of the divine essence, also should be predicated of the properties.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the judgment of like things is the same. But some essential adjectives are predicated of the properties, such as “immeasurable,” “uncreated,” and so on. Therefore it seems that so are all the others.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that even the notional, that is, personal, adjectives are predicated of the properties, since the congruence of the personal adjectives with the properties is greater than that of the essential adjectives. But some essentials are predicated of the properties, as was said before. (Above, d. 22, q. 2, a. 1.) Therefore much more are all the personal ones, so that one might say, “the paternity is generating,” or “innascible”; and so on for the others.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Boethius, (Boethius, Commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, bk. 2, ch. 14.) no proposition is more true than one in which the same thing is predicated of itself. But all say that in the Father the paternity and the power to beget are the same thing. Therefore it is said truly that the paternity begets.

On the contrary, just as the property is the same in reality with the persons, so too is the essence, although each differs in account. But by reason of this identity it does not follow that the notional adjectives are predicated of the essence, because of the diverse mode of signifying which causes a diversity of supposition. For one does not say that “the essence is begotten.” Therefore it seems that for the same reason one should not say that “the filiation is begotten.”

I answer that, as was said above, (Above, a. 2.) the property, the person, and the essence do not differ according to reality, but only according to account and the diverse mode of signifying. Whence one should make distinctions with the adjectives. For all those that predicate a condition of the reality, in an absolute way, are predicated commonly of the property, the person, and the essence, and such; this is especially so if they are negative adjectives, like “uncreated” and the like. But whichever express a mode of signifying wherein these three are distinguished, they are not predicated of them commonly.

Nonetheless there is also the following diversity in these. For some adjectives indicate that mode of signifying in the thing signified primarily, like the name “common” indicates the mode of the essence by signifying it, and similarly the name “distinct” indicates the mode of the person, and the name “distinguishing” indicates the mode of a property. And therefore if their predications be swapped, so that one were to say, “distinct essence,” or “common property,” or the like, then the proposition will be false, and not merely improper.

However, some adjectives indicate that mode not by signifying it, but give the understanding of it from its mode of signifying, like things that they signify through the mode of an act, since acts belong to supposits. Whence such cannot be attributed properly except to the persons, which are the supposits of the divine nature, but not to the property or essence, which are signified through the mode of form. This is why “the paternity begets” is not said properly, nor is “the paternity creates”; likewise even adjectives that signify in the concrete give one the understanding of the mode of the persons. This is also why “the paternity is wise” and the like are not proper, nor is “the paternity is Father,” if the word “Father” is taken adjectivally, nor is “the paternity is innascible.”

Reply Obj. 1: Even though they are the same according to reality, still they differ according to account. And therefore something can be said of the one that is not said properly of the other.

Reply Obj. 2: Those negative adjectives do not give the understanding of any determinate mode that pertains properly to the essence or the person. Rather, they signify conditions that can follow on either of them according to their mode of signifying.

Reply Obj. 3: The personal adjectives do not fit more with the properties than with the essentials, as regards the mode of signifying through a name, even though they do fit more as regards the account of the genus. For the personal adjectives and properties signify toward-something, so for the same reason they cannot be predicated of the properties, as not essential. Yet the essential adjectives are predicated more properly of the divine essence itself than are the personal adjectives of the properties; for a property is signified as a certain account of a person, so according to its mode of signifying it is more distant from the perfection of a supposit than is the essence, which signifies the entire existence of the supposit, although it is signified in a different mode. Yet the personal adjectives cannot be predicated of the essence wholly, on account of the distinction that they signify, which is opposed to the mode of essence.

Reply Obj. 4: “To beget” signifies the same thing in reality as “paternity,” but they differ in mode of signifying. For “to beget” signifies as going forth from the supposit, and because “paternity” is not signified as a supposit, “to generate” cannot be predicated of it.

Article 5

Whether there can be contrary opinions about the notions without sin

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.32.4.) It seems that there cannot be contrary opinions about the notions without sin.

Obj. 1: For as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 3 (CCSL 50; PL 42:822).) nowhere does one err in a more dangerous way than in the matter of the Trinity. But there cannot be contrary opinions about the notions without someone erring. Therefore, since such error concerns the matter of the Trinity, it seems that it is most dangerous.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, of two contradictory things, one of them must be false. But some say that there are no properties, and others say there is an infinity of them, and some say there are five, and some say they are the essence, and some say they are not—which are opposed as contradictory. Therefore it seems that on either side a lie intervenes. But according to Augustine, (Augustine, On Lying, ch. 21, para. 43 (CSEL 41:465; PL 40:516).) of all lies the gravest is one that concerns the divine. Therefore it seems that such opposition cannot occur without sin.

Obj. 3: You might say that they are excused on account of the fact that nothing is passed on about the notions in Sacred Scripture, so it has been licit for each one to opine as he has wanted.

On the contrary, “Sacred Scripture” names either the canon of the Bible or the statements of the holy fathers. If it names the canon of the Bible, just as it makes no mention of the notions, so too it makes no mention of the persons. Therefore for the same reason it would be licit to deny the persons, or to have diverse opinions about the number of the persons—which nonetheless would be judged heretical. If it names the statements of the holy fathers, then on the contrary, they are found to expressly make mention of the properties, as is clear in the many authorities cited. Therefore it seems that they altogether cannot be excused.

On the contrary, every sin is a sin either of faith or of morals. But one does not fall into a sin of morals because of such disagreement, since that sin concerns actions; but neither is it a sin of faith, since no article of the faith is being denied. Therefore it seems that it occurs without sin.

I answer that there can be contrary opinions about something in two ways: either such that it pertains to the religion of faith, or such that it does not so pertain. And if it is not about things pertaining to the faith, on the assertion or denial of which nothing unbefitting the faith would follow, there is no sin, except perhaps incidentally—that is, a sin of presumption in one who asserts too firmly what is doubtful, or a lie, or vainglory, or one of many other kinds; for there is an infinity of incidental causes, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 197a17; Metaphysics 2.2, 994a17.)

However, if the disagreement is about things that do pertain to the faith, this also can happen in two ways: for either it is about things that are expressly contained in the articles of the faith, which all are obligated to know—and about such the disagreement is not without sin in either of the two, whether it be a sin of simple error or of heresy, if it is stubbornly adhered to—or it is about things from which follows something unbefitting and even contrary to the faith, even if it is neither expressed nor determined in the faith. In this latter case—before giving it thorough treatment whereby it becomes known that something unfitting to the faith follows—one can opine either side, especially if it is not stubbornly adhered to.

But when the truth has been thoroughly treated, and what follows has been seen, the judgment about them is the same as that about the ones that have been determined in the faith, for the one follows on the other. For example, if someone simple and ignorant of Scripture were to believe that Jacob was the father of Isaac—on which it follows that Scripture is false, which is expressly contrary to the faith—before he might be shown that this follows, his opinion can be without any sin. But when he has been shown that it follows that Scripture is false, if still he stubbornly persists in the opinion, he would need to be judged a heretic.

So it is for the notions as well, about which nothing is expressly determined in the faith. Yet no error about the persons and the faith follows from an error about the notions. For example, if the relations be asserted to be only alongside God, it follows that either there is composition in God or the distinction is not real, but is only according to account—which belongs to the Sabellian impiety. And therefore Porretanus, (That is, Gilbert of Poitiers.) who first asserted this, later, having seen what follows from it, retracted it. So too those who deny the properties do not wholly assert that they do not exist; rather, they implicitly assert them to be in the persons, and to be the persons. But if they were to wholly deny them, that would be heretical; and likewise, stubbornly to defend the claim that the relations are only alongside God would be heretical, and this is why the view’s proponents are called heretics in the text. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).9.)

Reply Obj. 1–3: And thereby the response to the objections is clear.

Exposition of the text

Moreover, with many testimonies of the Saints, we have shown above that the persons are distinguished and determined by the properties. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).1.) Here he is proving that these properties are the persons. The argument is as follows: properties distinguish the persons; but the persons have been distinct from eternity; therefore the properties are from eternity. But nothing is eternal unless it is in God. Therefore the properties are in the persons. Now, whatever is in the persons is the persons themselves; otherwise there would be composition in a person. Therefore and so on.

In discussing the simplicity of the deity, above, . . . we have shown clearly that that which God has in himself is wholly God. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).3.) Here he is proving that the properties are the divine essence. His reasoning is as follows: in God, what has is the same as what is had; but God has the properties, which are in God, as has been proved; (Above, a. 2.) therefore the properties themselves are God, or the divine essence.

For if the persons are the properties, they say, then the persons are not differentiated by them. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).7.) This is the first of their arguments, whereby they show the properties are not the persons. It is as follows: what distinguishes is not what is distinguished; but the properties distinguish the persons; therefore and so on. And to this he responds by destroying the major premise, since the persons are distinguished by their very selves.

But they also add. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).8.) Here he presents the second of their arguments, whereby they prove that the property is not the essence. It is as follows: it is impossible that the same thing both unite and distinguish; but the persons are united in the essence, and distinguished in the properties; therefore and so on. He does not resolve this, but excuses himself from the solution on account of the difficulty of the matter. Nevertheless, how one should respond to it was stated in the first article.

But the malice of the heretics . . . does not stop there. (Sent. I, 33.1(143).9.) Here he presents their third argument, whereby they prove the properties are not in the essence. It is as follows: in whatever the paternity is, that is the Father and is the begetter; and in whatever the filiation is, that is the Son and is the begotten. Therefore, if the paternity and the filiation are in the essence, then the essence will be the Father or begetter and the Son or begotten. But the essence is one and the same reality. Therefore the same reality will be begetter and begotten, or Father and Son—which is the heresy of Sabellius insofar as the Father would be the same as the Son’s very self. To this one should respond that they are in the essence without determining it, and therefore the adjectives that concretely predicate the properties are not predicated of the essence.

But perhaps you might ask. (Sent. I, 33.2(144).1.) Here he presents a fourth argument, which is opposed to the last response. It is as follows: where the cause is the same, the effect is the same; but the properties determine the persons, since they are in the persons; therefore they will also determine the essence, if they are in the essence. And to this he does not respond, but excuses himself on account of the difficulty of the matter. Nonetheless how one should respond to it was stated in the third article.

And yet . . . they still do not desist, but strive to defend their opinion even by the authorities of the Saints. (Sent. I, 33.2(144).2.) Here he brings in the authorities on their behalf, wherein Augustine seems to say (Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 68, sermon 1, para. 5 (CCSL 39; PL 36:845).) that that by which he is God is not that by which he is the Father; and thus, since he is the Father by his paternity, and God by his essence, then his paternity will not be his essence. And to all such things one responds as follows: when it is said, “that by which he is God is not that by which he is the Father,” this is twofold.

For the negation can include the [grammatical] order, as it were, of formal cause, which is indicated in the phrase “by which”; and then it is true, but it does not argue in their favor. For the sense is “he is not God by that by which he is the Father,” meaning, by the paternity by which he is denominated “God.”

Or the negation can be included by the order, such that this order remains affirmative; and then this is false, and in this sense it supports them. For the sense of “not that by which he is the Father is he God” is that that by which the Father is is not that by which God is said to be—and this is false. For the paternity by which he is denominated “Father” is the Godhead by which he is denominated “God,” even though he is not denominated “God” by his paternity; this is on account of the diverse account each word has.