D. 27 - The properties in connection with the names of the divine persons

Division of the text

Having asserted that there are three personal properties of the divine persons, here the Master considers the properties themselves in their connection with the persons’ names. This is divided into three parts: in the first, he shows that in all the personal names the aforesaid properties of the persons are being designated; in the second, he proposes a general rule for finding such names that designate the properties, at and here is to be noticed a general rule. (Sent. I, 27.4(116).1.)

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he shows that the aforesaid properties are being designated in the customary personal names, the name “Father,” “Son,” and “Holy Spirit”; in the second, he shows that they are also designated by the other names signifying the persons, at here it is not to be passed over. (Sent. I, 27.3(115).3.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows that the aforesaid names designate the persons’ properties; in the second, he adds an account, at for those several properties are suitable for each of the persons, (Sent. I, 27.3(115).1.) namely, the ones that determine the persons. Whence, they are understood in the names of the persons just as what determines is understood in what it determines.

The first is divided in two: in the first, he shows that the names of the persons designate the aforesaid properties; in the second, he shows that there is not wholly the same mode of signifying in the names of the properties and the names of the persons, at and yet it does not seem to us that it is entirely the same to say that something is the Father and has generated a Son. (Sent. I, 27.2(114).1.)

As regards the first, he does three things: first, he presents the question; second, he lays out an objection on the other side, at it seems that the properties which Hilary posits are not the same; (Sent. I, 27.1(113).2.) third, he presents the solution to this, at to which, without prejudice to anyone, we say. (Sent. I, 27.1(113).3.)

And here is to be noticed a general rule. (Sent. I, 27.5(117).1.) Here he lays out a rule for finding the personal names. In regard to this he does three things: first, he lays out the rule; second, he presents a question about the rule, and answers it, at here it is to be asked, when we say ‘God from God,’ ‘light from light,’ and suchlike, whether they are said according to substance; (Sent. I, 27.5(117).1.) third, from the solution he, as it were, elicits a conclusion, at and it is to be known that ‘that from that’ is said only according to the names of substance. (Sent. I, 27.5(117).3.)

Here two things are asked:

the first is about the notions or properties; (Q. 1.)

the second is about the personal names, and especially about “word.” (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The notions or properties themselves

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, how the properties differ from each other;

second, whether the properties or relations precede, according to the intellect, the personal acts, or the other way around.

Article 1

Whether the properties are distinct from each other

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that the properties are not distinct from each other.

Obj. 1: For there is no distinction in the divine except according to origin. But one property does not arise from another, since just as an essence does not generate, neither does a property. Therefore the properties are not distinct from each other.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a relation is a middle between two extremes. But between two termini there is in reality one middle, even though it is different according to account, like the road from Thebes to Athens, and then in reverse, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 3.3, 202b14.) Therefore it seems that by one relation the Father is referred to the Son and the Son to the Father, and thus at least paternity and filiation are one relation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, in the divine we find nothing distinct according to reality except through relative operation. But just as between the attributes of the essence, like goodness and wisdom, there is found no opposition, by reason of which they are predicated of each other, since the goodness is the wisdom and vice versa, so too the properties of one person have no opposition to each other. For otherwise they could not be in the same supposit. Therefore it seems that they are not many according to reality, and that one might be predicated of the other, so that one would say, “the paternity is the innascibility,” and vice versa.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the account of the Word is not more distant from the account of the Son than the account of the unbegotten is from the account of the Father. But the same notion is designated by the name “word” and the name “son,” as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 27.3(115).4.) Therefore it seems that similarly the same notion would be designated by the name “unbegotten” and the name “father”; and thus, innascibility and paternity will be one notion.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in the divine there is only one relation of one person to another person. But the relation of the Father to the Son is indicated by the names “generation” and “paternity.” Therefore it seems that all such in the divine are the same—which is contrary to what the Master says in the text. (Sent. I, 27.2(114).1.)

I answer that in the divine, as has been said earlier, (Above, d. 26, q. 1, a. 3.) there are five notions, yet there are not five realities, but only three realities: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

To understand this one needs to know that certain things within something are properly speaking multiple, and not one, if they are distinct by their own proper differences. For example, the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016a32.) that the isosceles, the triangle with two equal sides, and the isopleuros, (Greek: ἰσόπλευρος.) that is, the equilateral triangle, are distinguished by differences of triangle, and therefore we do not say they are one triangle but many. But they are not distinguished by the differences proper to figure; rather, they fall under one difference of figure, which is to have three sides, and therefore they are said to be one figure, that is, triangle. And thus, one cannot say that they are many realities unless as regards things that are distinguished through a difference of the reality.

However, in the divine, a difference of reality is only through the opposition of relation. And therefore one will not be able to say that there are multiple realities except insofar as such an opposition requires it. This is why paternity and filiation are two realities, and likewise are the Father and the Son. But paternity and common spiration are not two realities, because they are not opposed relatively, but there are only two relations, because they are distinct by differences of relation as relation. For, because relation is said in reference to another, there will be differences of relation insofar as it is directed to diverse things; and since the Father is referred to the Son by paternity, and to the Holy Spirit by common spiration, the common spiration and the paternity are two relations. And likewise there are two notions, insofar as the account wherein the Father is made known is different in the one than in the other.

Reply Obj. 1: The opposition according to origin, is according to concept in the relations of origin prior to it being in the very persons that arise from each other. For the persons are opposed only insofar as they have such relations. And therefore opposed relations are distinct in their very selves, as are constitutive differences, but the persons are distinct by the relations, just as species are by their differences.

Reply Obj. 2: Some have said, as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 10.) that numerically the same relation is in each of the extremes. But this cannot be, since one accident is not in two subjects. And therefore one should say that in each of the extremes there is one relation that differs from the other specifically in certain things, like in things named by diverse names on each side, such as paternity and filiation. But in certain others they do not differ specifically, but only numerically, such as when there is one name for each, such as in “likeness,” and “equality.” And then the relation that is in one of them as in a subject is in the other as in a terminus, and vice versa. And therefore relation, according to its own existence, insofar as it has its foundation in the reality, is not a middle, but an extreme, whereas according to its reference it is a middle. Whence it is clear that they are really distinguished.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as the essential attributes are not multiple realities, so too neither are the properties belonging to one person. Rather, they are one reality, which is that person. Nevertheless, because relation remains in the divine even according to the common account of the genus, the distinction of relation as relation also remains. And therefore one can say that there are several relations, and one relation is not predicated of another.

However, this is not the case in the essential attributes, which do not remain there according to the common account of the genus. Whence they are not distinct according to the account of something common, the account of which is in God, even if the common reality is being taken insofar as it is signified by a name of first imposition. But if the common aspect of the account is being taken—that which is signified by a name of second imposition—then it is common to all the persons that they are the attributes. And therefore, because they divide the one common aspect of the account, in this respect they are not predicated of each other. For we do not say that this attribute is that attribute, but that that attribute is other than it. But because they do not divide one common reality, therefore by reason of the divine simplicity, according to each name of first imposition they are predicated of each other. Thus one might say, “this reality is that reality,” or even by means of the proper names, such that “the divine wisdom is the divine goodness.”

Reply Obj. 4: “Word” and “son” are not distinct by a difference of relation, since each signifies the relation of the same one to the same one. And on account of this, two relations are not indicated by the names “word” and “son,” but only one; and likewise with the names “gift” and “love.” Rather, they are distinct only insofar as they have a foundation in the reality, inasmuch as one is founded on the emanation of nature, that is, “son,” and the other on the emanation of intellect, that is, “word”; in God these differ only in account. And therefore the Word and the Son differ only in account and not in relation. On the other hand, “unbegotten” and “father” are not said in reference to the same thing, and therefore it is certain that this is not one relation or notion.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as in things pertaining to the essence, the divine activity, God, and the Godhead are the same according to reality, but they are distinct only according to an account founded in the reality, so it is also in personal things. That is, the personal activity and the person and the property constituting the person are the same according to reality, but they differ only according to account and mode of signifying. Whence I say that the same account is signified by these three, “Father,” “paternity,” and “generation,” but “Father” signifies it through the mode of a hypostasis or person, “paternity” through the mode of a property, and “generation” through the mode of an activity.

Article 2

Whether the personal act precedes, according to its concept, the relation of the person

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.40.4; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 3, ad 7; q. 10, a. 3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 63.) It seems that the personal act precedes, according to its concept, the relation of the person.

Obj. 1: For “generation,” as has been said, (In I Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 1.) signifies a personal act. But the Master says in the text (Sent. I, 27.1(113).3.) that he is the Father because he has begotten. Therefore it seems that generation, according to concept, precedes the Father’s relation.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the relation of paternity and the act of generation follow on each other. Therefore either the paternity is the principle of the act that is generation—such that because he is the Father, therefore he generates—or it follows it through the mode of an effect rendered by it—such that because he generates, he is the Father. But paternity is not the principle of the act itself since, as Anselm says, (Mandonnet notes that this claim, here and in the reply to the second objection, is not found in any of Anselm’s works.) by the fact that he is God, he generates, not by the fact that he is the Father. Therefore it seems that paternity would follow the generation, according to concept.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every relation according to concept follows that on which it is founded, just as equality follows on quantity. But according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a23.) paternity and filiation are founded on an activity. Therefore paternity follows the act of generation, according to its concept.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as active generation stands to the Father, so does passive generation, or birth, stand to the Son. But filiation in no way precedes birth, according to concept; rather, it always follows on it. Therefore it seems that paternity also, according to concept, would follow active generation.

On the contrary, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981a17.) activity belongs to distinct individuals or singulars. But there is no distinction in the divine except through relation. Therefore the understanding of the relation precedes the understanding of the personal act.

Furthermore, the principle of anything’s proper act must be its proper form. But generation is the proper act of the Father. Therefore, since no form of the Father’s power is proper to him except paternity, it seems that paternity is the principle of generation in the Father, and thus it precedes, according to concept.

I answer that, according to those who say that the relations do not distinguish or constitute the persons, but only manifest what are already constituted and distinct, the relation follows on the personal acts absolutely, according to concept. But because nothing is found to distinguish the persons and constitute them except relation, according to the account of its opposition, therefore I say that the relation, insofar as it constitutes the person, precedes the activity, according to concept. Therefore, according to this, I say that the relation itself can be considered in three ways: either insofar as it is a relation, absolutely—and it is not due to this that it precedes the act, but rather it would follow it, as is clear in creatures; or insofar as it is a divine relation, which constitutes the person and is the subsisting person himself—and in this way it does precede the act, according to concept; or insofar as it is the personal act itself—and in this way they are simultaneous and the same, according to concept.

Reply Obj. 1: When the Master says that the Father is the Father because he has begotten, he is taking generation not insofar as it is signified through the mode of an act, but insofar as it is signified through the mode of a property constituting the person. And in this way, according to concept it precedes the person so constituted and so distinguished. For in this way they put generation in the place of paternity, just as in the previous distinction.

Or it could be said that he is attending to the relation as relation, and not as a divine relation constituting and distinguishing the person.

Or it could be said, and better, that saying “he is the Father because he has begotten” indicates an order not through the mode of a cause, but more through an identity of relation. This is also why he says, based on the words of Augustine, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 7 (CCSL 50; PL 42:915–16).) that the Son is the Son because he has been begotten, and he has been begotten because he is the Son.

Reply Obj. 2: As was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 7, q. 1, a. 1.) the principle of generation in the divine cannot be merely the nature, nor again merely a property, but rather the divine nature insofar as the sort of property in the Father that is paternity. This is why Anselm does not say that it is the whole Trinity that is required as the principle of the generation. For so that we might include the whole, one must say that not merely because he is God does he generate, nor merely because he is the Father, but because God is the Father.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument follows for a relation according to the account of relation taken absolutely, but the relation that is paternity has something beyond this. Since it is divine, it constitutes a person, and it itself is the person so constituted; by reason of this it precedes the activity, according to concept.

Reply Obj. 4: There is not the same account for the Father and the Son, since the form proper to the generated is in no way the principle of active or passive generation, but a consequence, and as it were a terminus. Therefore filiation in no way precedes the understanding of birth; rather, the proper form of the generator is the principle of active generation, and therefore it must precede the understanding of generation.

Question 2

The name “word”

Next one asks about “word.” And three things are asked in regard to it:

first, whether “word” is said properly in the divine;

second, whether it is said essentially, or only personally;

third, whether a reference to what is created is indicated in “word.”

Article 1

Whether “word” is said properly in the divine

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.34.2; Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 4, a. 3; On the Catholic Faith of the Greek Fathers (Contra errores Graecorum), ch. 12; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 1, lect. 2.) It seems that “word” is not said properly in the divine.

Obj. 1: For every name that signifies a bodily activity cannot belong to God except metaphorically. But “word” (verbum) is of this sort, for it is derived from the vibration (reverberatione) of the air, as Priscianus says. (Priscianus, Institutiones grammaticae, bk. 8, “De verbo.”) Therefore “word” is not said properly of God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, among all the things that are around us, a word appears to be rather transient, or among the more transient, and neither is it something subsistent. But whatever is spoken of in the divine is enduring and subsistent. Therefore it seems that “word” is not said properly of God.

Obj. 3: You might say that the word of the voice is not said of God, but rather the word of the heart.

On the contrary, Anselm, when defining this word, says that for the highest Spirit, to speak is nothing other than to behold in thought. (Anselm, Monologion, ch. 63 (PL 158:208).) But to think does not befit God, since “thought” signifies a certain discourse of an inquiring reason, and of something proceeding from one thing to another. Therefore it seems that neither a word nor speaking befit God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the word of the heart is a certain conception of the intellect. But nothing is conceived by an intellect besides the species of an intelligible reality, which it forms within itself. Therefore, since God does not know through any species, but sees himself through his own essence, and thereby knows all things, it seems that properly speaking there is no word of the intellect there.

On the contrary, John 1:1 says, in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.

Furthermore, as Augustine will say below, (Sent. III, 28.6(123).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:936).) the Word is nothing other than the wisdom begotten. But the begotten Wisdom is in God. Therefore, it seems, so is the Word.

I answer that without any doubt one should confess that God is the Word, and is properly called a “Word.” To understand this one needs to know that, as an ordinary Gloss on John says, three sorts of words are found: that of the heart, that of the voice, and what holds the image of the voice. (Glossa ordinaria, at 1 Epistle of John 1:10, 6.1380; see also Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 11 (PL 42:1071–73); Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith, bk. 1, part 3, ch. 20 (PL 176:225); De arca Noah Morali, bk. 3, ch. 16 (PL 176:678).) The need for this is that, because our speech is a certain bodily activity, the things that are required for every bodily motion must come together for it as well.

Now, for it to be the bodily motion of a man, as man—that is, what occurs through deliberation—preceding it must be a deliberation and judgment within the soul’s intellectual part. But because the intellect is concerned with universals, and activities are concerned with singulars, therefore there must be, as is said in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.11, 434a17.) a certain particular power that apprehends the particular intention of the reality that the activity concerns. And third, there must follow a certain motion in the body, through motive powers affixed to muscles and nerves. All this is such that it might, as it were, seem to be a certain syllogism of which the universal major premise is held in the intellectual part, the particular minor is held in the sensitive part, and lastly, the conclusion of the particular activity would follow through the commanded motive power. For the activity itself stands in things that can be done the way a conclusion stands in speculative matters, as is said in Metaphysics 7. (Although Mandonnet cites Metaphysics 7, it is almost certain that what is meant is: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.3, 1147a1‒b18.)

Therefore if “speech” is taken only insofar as it is in the intellectual part, then it is the word of the heart, which others also call the “word of the reality,” because it is the unmediated likeness of the reality itself; and Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 13 (PG 94:858).) that it is the natural motion of the intellect, or its light and splendor; and Augustine calls it the “word impressed on the mind.” (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:969).)

But insofar as it is in the imagination—namely, when someone imagines the vocal sounds by which the intellect is able to bring forth its concept—then this is the word that holds the voice’s image. Others call it the “word of the appearance of voice;” Damascene calls it the “word enunciated in the heart;” (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 13 (PG 94:858).) and Augustine calls it the word “thought with syllables.” (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:969).)

However, insofar as it is already in the bodily action, through the motion of the tongue and the other bodily organs, it is called the “word of the voice.” And Damascene calls it the word that is the “angel of the intellect,” (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 13 (PG 94:858).) that is, its messenger; and Augustine calls it the word “pronounced with syllables.” (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:969).)

Therefore I say that the word of the voice and the word that holds voice’s image cannot be spoken of in the divine, except metaphorically, whereas the word of the heart, which consists only in understanding, is said of God, even with priority over the others.

But nonetheless one needs to know that in the activities of the intellect there is a certain gradation. For there is first the intellect’s simple beholding in the cognition of what is intelligible, and this does not yet have the account of a word. Second, there is the ordination of that intelligible to its manifestation, either to someone else, insofar as someone speaks to another, or to one’s own self, insofar as it happens that someone even speaks to himself; and here it first receives the account of a word. Whence “word” signifies nothing other than a certain emanation from the intellect through the mode of manifesting. But one’s beholding can be of two sorts: either the beholding of the true, simply speaking, or further, insofar as the true extends into the good and fitting, and this is perfect apprehension. And therefore a word is of two sorts: that of the reality uttered that pleases—a word that spirates love—and this is a perfect word; and the word of a reality that even displeases—this is why Augustine says that the word is said to be impressed on the spirit, even though the reality might displease or please. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:969).)

Reply Obj. 1: Although the name “word” has been imposed from a bodily motion, which is the final part of our speech, nonetheless it was imposed for signifying everything that is said, whether exteriorly or interiorly. Whence, even though the name’s etymology does not befit God, still the reality signified by the name does, as frequently happens, as was said before about the name “person.” (Above, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 2: For us, the word of the voice neither endures nor subsists, but the word of our heart does endure, though it does not subsist. And therefore it is clear that although a word does not endure or subsist just from the account of being a word, nonetheless it has diverse accounts of perfection insofar as it is found in diverse things. And therefore the divine Word, inasmuch as it is divine, has it that it endures and subsists, just as it is with the divine Love, as was said before. (In I Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: Without a doubt, thought is not properly speaking in God, but Anselm used the name “thought” by way of a likeness. For just as in thought reason goes forth from one thing to another by bringing them together, so also the account of a word, as was said in the body of the article, is completed in a certain emanation and going forth from the intellect. Whence over and above the intellect’s simple beholding, “word” adds something akin to thought.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine intellect does not understand its own essence through any species essentially or really different from the essence itself. Nonetheless it understands its essence through its essence; whence the divine essence stands as what understands, and what is understood, and that by which it is understood. And insofar as it stands as what understands, thus truly and properly speaking is the account of intellect there; insofar as it stands as what is understood, the account of the understood is truly there; but insofar as it stands as that by which it is understood, the account of a word is there.

Article 2

Whether “word” is said personally and, if so, whether only the Son should be called “word”

Quaestiuncula 1

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.34.1; I-II.93.1, ad 2; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9, ad 7; On Truth, q. 4, a. 2; q. 4, a. 4, ad 4.) It seems that “word” is not said personally.

Obj. 1: For Augustine says that the word that we intend to hold in our breast is a knowledge with love. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 9, ch. 10 (CCSL 50; PL 42:969).) But “knowledge” is said essentially. Therefore so is “word.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything in the divine that can be understood without understanding the distinction of the persons is essential. But even without understanding the distinction of the persons one can still understand that the divine intellect manifests itself to itself, and manifests itself to created things. Therefore, since “word” adds over and above the account of understanding only an order toward manifestation, it seems that “word” is an essential name, the way “understanding” is.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a word is the terminus of the act that is speaking, for nothing else is spoken but a word. But each person can speak himself and can speak his essence. Therefore the essence is a word, and each person is a word; thus, “word” will be said essentially. Nor can one say that each of them speaks himself by the Word of the Father. For it is more perfect to speak by one’s own proper word than to do so by that of another. And thus, since each person speaks himself most perfectly, it seems that each speaks himself by his own word—and not by his own word that is from him himself, since then there would be more than three persons. Therefore each does so by its own word which is himself.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as was said in the previous article, “word” signifies the conception of the intellect. But the concept of the intellect is nothing other than the intelligible species formed in the intellect. Therefore in God there cannot be a word unless it be what stands through the mode of a species, and one whereby he is understood. But this principle of understanding is that wherein something is understood and that whereby it is understood. Therefore it seems that if the Son were called the “Word” only personally, then the Son would be the principle of the act of understanding in the Father—which was disproved earlier by Augustine. (Sent. I, 5.1(15).4; Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:935–36).)

On the contrary (5), Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:936).) that “word” is said in the divine in reference to the one who is called “Son” and “begotten Wisdom.” But all such latter names are said personally. Therefore it seems that “word” is as well.

Furthermore (6), Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 1 (CCSL 50; PL 42:932–36).) that, even though there are three who speak, nonetheless only one Word is there. Therefore it seems that “word” is said only personally.

Furthermore (7), as was said in the previous article, “word” signifies the order of something going forth, and the conception of the intellect, and is spoken of as relative, as it says in the text. (Sent. I, 27.3(115).5.) Now, all such seem to pertain to persons. Therefore it seems that “word” is personal.

Quaestiuncula 2

Moreover, about this one asks, if “word” is said personally, whether only the Son should be called “word.” (Parallel text: ST I.34.2.) It seems not.

Obj. 1: It seems not since just as the Son goes forth from the Father as manifesting him, so does the Holy Spirit. Therefore the account of a word belongs to each of them equally.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the intellect is, as it were, a middle between the nature, which it follows, and the will, which it precedes. But a middle pertains to each extreme. Therefore, since “word” signifies the procession of the intellect, it seems that the Son, who proceeds through the mode of the nature, is not better called a “word” than is the Spirit, who proceeds through the mode of the will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a cause is made manifest through its effect. But the divine intellect is the cause of all created things, just as the intellect of the artisan is the cause of his artifacts. Therefore all created things can be called the “word of God.”

On the contrary, Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 15, ch. 17 (CCSL 50A; PL 42:1081).) that just as in the Trinity only the Son is called the “word,” so too only the Holy Spirit is called the “gift.” Therefore just as “gift” does not belong to the Son, so neither does “word” belong to the Holy Spirit.

Response to Quaestiuncula 1

I answer that there are diverse opinions about this. For some say that “speech” is said of God in three ways: for sometimes to speak is the same as to understand, and then it is essential; but sometimes to speak is the same as to generate, and then it is notional; whereas sometimes to speak is the same as to create, and then to speak connotes a reference to what is created, and is essential. Therefore they say that a word corresponds to this act only according to the second manner of speaking, and therefore, although “to speak” is said essentially and personally, still “word” is said only personally. But this does not seem true, since it is not intelligible that something is spoken and yet is not a word. Whence as often as one is said to understand, a word must also be said.

Others said that to speak is universally nothing other than to manifest one’s intellect. Now, a man can manifest his intellect to another, like by a vocal word, or even to his very self, by the word of the heart. Thus, they say that in both ways God manifests his intellect: by establishing a creature, which is his word as though a vocal word; and by generating a Son, insofar as he manifests himself within himself, and this is the same as the word of the heart. Whence they say that the “word” said of God is always personal.

But this does not seem true, since if one asks what that word by which someone speaks to himself is, it is found to be only the conception of the intellect. Now, the conception of the intellect is either the very activity that is understanding, or it is the species understood. Whence one must be calling the “word” either the very act of understanding, or else the very species that is the likeness of the reality understood. And without each of these someone cannot understand, for each of them is that by which, formally, one understands. And therefore it is impossible that, in taking “word” this way, someone would understand except by the word of his intellect, which is either its act or the cause of its activity standing as the medium of knowing, which is the species of the reality understood. Whence, since the Father understands himself, which would not be unless the personal Word, which is the Son, were present there, it would be necessary that the Father would understand by the Son formally. And this was disproved earlier. (In I Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 1.)

And therefore one should say, with the others, that this name “word”—from the force of the expression—can be taken both personally and essentially. For it does not signify only a relation, like the names “father” or “son”; rather, it is imposed for signifying a certain absolute reality together with a reference, like the name “knowledge.” But they differ in that the relation indicated in the name “knowledge” is not a relation of origin, according to which knowledge is referred to that from which it exists, but a relation according to which it is referred to that at which it is oriented, that is, the knowable thing. On the other hand, the name “word” indicates a relation according to which it is referred to that from which it exists, that is, to the speaker.

Now, relations of this sort in the divine can be of two sorts: for some are real, the ones that require a real distinction, like paternity and filiation—since no reality can be a father and a son to its very self; and some are relations of reason only, which do not require a real distinction, but one of reason, like the relation implied in the name “activity.” For an activity has an implied reference to the agent by which it is done, but in the divine the agent and the action do not differ, except only by reason. Therefore if the relation indicated in this name “word” is a relation of reason only, then nothing prevents its being said essentially. (See ST I.34.1, where Aquinas appears to have changed his view: oportet quod nomen verbi, secundum quod proprie in divinis accipitur, non sumatur essentialiter, sed personaliter tantum, “the name ‘Word,’ insofar as it is used properly in the case of God, must be taken only as the name of a person and not as a name of the essence.”) And this seems enough for the account of a word insofar as it is transferred from us to God; for in us, as was said in the previous article, a word is nothing other than the understood species, or perhaps the very act of the intellect. And neither of these is really distinct from the divine essence. However, if it indicates a relation requiring a real distinction, it would have to be said personally, since the only real distinction in the divine is that of the persons. And this is like “love,” which according to the same distinction is said both essentially and personally, as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 1.)

But in the usage of the saints, and even commonly speaking, this name “word” in a certain respect indicates the really distinguishing relation. Hence, Augustine says (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 2 (CCSL 50; PL 42:936).) that the Word is the same as the begotten Wisdom. And therefore this question is of little merit, since it is not about the reality, but about the signification of vocal sounds, which is conventional. Whence in this the majority usage is sound, since one should use names as most people do, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Topics 2.2, 110a14–22; On Interpretation 1.4, 16b26–17a2.) whereas one should make judgments about the reality the way the wise do. For because the reality is certain, it is pointless to have a controversy about the words, as the Master says later. (Sent. III, 14.2(40).3.) But nevertheless in the divine, the things that are said should not be extended except as far as Sacred Scripture uses them.

Reply Obj. 1: “Knowledge” does not signify the entire account of a word, since “knowledge” and “wisdom” are said through the mode of resting and remaining in what they belong to. And therefore they are only ever said essentially, although they can be appropriated, whereas “word” signifies a certain emanation of the intellect, and a going forth into a manifestation of it. And therefore, because “going forth” can be understood either according to a distinct reality, insofar as the Son goes forth from the Father, or according to one of reason only, insofar as understanding comes from the divine intellect, “word” is sometimes said essentially and sometimes personally, like with “love.”

Reply Obj. 2: Without understanding the distinction of the persons, the divine intellect can yet manifest its very self, both to itself and to another. It does this to another by creating a creature or inspiring knowledge of him within a creature. It does this to himself through the mode whereby someone turns over what he understands so that it might become manifest whether what he perceives in his intellect is true or not. For this is properly to speak within the heart. On account of this it holds something like thought. Yet without understanding the distinction of the persons, there would not be there a manifestation of the principle in something really distinct from it, and existing through the mode of intellect within the same nature.

Reply Obj. 3: We concede this.

Reply Obj. 4: In no way should one concede that the Father understands due to the Son, or that he understands in the Son as in an object or species whereby he is known. For this would assert that the Son has an account of principle relative to the Father. Nonetheless, one should concede that the Father understands in the Son both himself and others insofar as he sees the Son as his likeness, and the likeness of all other things, the way a principle is seen in that of which it is the principle, even though he is also seen in his very self. For I can see a man in his image, even though I might also see him through himself. So too, although the Father sees his very self and all other things in himself, still he can also see all things in the Son—and even his very self, just as also he can see himself in his creature, insofar as the creature represents him, albeit imperfectly.

Reply Sed Contra 5: To the fifth objection, which is to the contrary, one should say that Augustine is taking “word” insofar as it signifies a real going forth and distinction from the one speaking it, and not insofar as a distinction of reason is enough for the account of a word. And therefore he is taking “word” personally.

Reply Sed Contra 6: In the divine, there is only one Word, and yet the Word there is both personal and essential, because the person is not distinct from the essence. Whence neither is it excluded by exclusive expressions.

Reply Sed Contra 7: All the things that were said (That is, the things that “word” signifies: the order of something going forth, the conception of the intellect, and being spoken of as relative.) can be taken really or according to reason, and each is enough for the account of a word. And therefore it can be said essentially and personally.

Response to Quaestiuncula 2

To what was further asked, one should say that, if “word” is taken personally, it belongs to the Son alone, and not to the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit proceeds through the mode of the will, so it is properly called “love,” and “gift,” whereas to proceed through the mode of nature or intellect belongs to the Son. And therefore he is properly called both “begotten” and “Word.”

Reply Obj. 1: For the account of a word, there is required not only the ability to manifest, since then the effect of every cause would be a word, which can be said only metaphorically. Rather, a procession of the intellect must also be understood in that word, and this does not befit the Holy Spirit.

Reply Obj. 2: The Holy Spirit proceeds from two, and therefore his procession is through the mode of the conformity of love, which is from the union of the will in the ones willing. And on account of this, he proceeds only through the mode of the will. But both the procession of the intellect and the procession of nature are from only one, (That is, the Father.) but not from the one insofar as it is united to the other, if it is a perfect agent, as is the divine agent. And therefore both modes of procession befit the person who is from only one.

Reply Obj. 3: A created thing cannot properly speaking be called a “word,” but more the “voice of the Word.” For just as a voice manifests a word, so too what is created manifests the divine art. And therefore the saints say that by one Word God has spoken everything created. Whence created things are, as it were, the voices that express the one divine Word. This is why Augustine says, all things cry out, ‘God has made me!’ (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 10, ch. 6; bk. 11, ch. 4 (CCSL 27; PL 32:783, 811).) But this is said only metaphorically.

Article 3

Whether “word” always signifies a reference to what is created

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.34.3; I.37.2, ad 3; On Truth, q. 4, a. 5; Quodl. IV, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1.) It seems that “word” always signifies a reference to what is created.

Obj. 1: For as Augustine says, he spoke and they were made—that is, he begot the Word, in whom was creation such that it might come to be. (See Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 1, ch. 2; bk. 2, cc. 6–8; bk. 3, ch. 20 (CSEL 28.1:6, 40–42, 87; PL 34:248, 267–69, 292–93).) But through this reference to what is created is indicated. Therefore it seems that “word” signifies a reference to what is created.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Augustine says, on the beginning of John, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 63 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:54).) that the Word is the active power of the Father. But a power is called active through its reference to what is created. Therefore so is the Word.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Anselm says (Anselm, Monologion, cc. 33, 34 (PL 158:209–10).) that God, by speaking himself, has spoken everything created. But by speaking he begot a Word equal to himself. Therefore it seems that the Word that is begotten from the Father asserts a reference to what is created, insofar as created things are said to be from God through his Word.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, things made by art are not known by the artisan except insofar as he turns to the form of the art within himself. Therefore it is the same thing for the artisan to turn to his art and to what he has made by the art, and to understand both. But the Word is the art of all things made by the highest artisan. Therefore it seems that the turning of the paternal intellect to his artwork would never occur except through his turning to the Word; and conversely, whenever he turns to his Word, he turns to his artwork. Therefore it seems that the Word should always be taken in reference to what is created.

On the contrary (5), nothing that signifies a reference to what is created belongs to God from eternity, like “Lord” and such. But “Word” belongs to God from eternity, since in the beginning was the Word (John 1:1). Therefore “Word” does not indicate a reference to what is created.

Furthermore (6), every name connoting an effect in a created thing signifies the divine essence. But “Word” is personal, at least sometimes. Therefore it seems that “Word” does not signify a reference to what is created.

I answer that the Word is not always spoken of with reference to the created; sometimes it is with that reference, but sometimes it is without it. This is clear as follows. For the Word, whether spoken of personally or essentially, is the conceived species in which is the likeness of both the one spoken and the one speaking, when someone is speaking himself. Now, it is certain that the divine essence, that is, the Father, holds in advance within himself the likeness of everything created, as its exemplar. Whence what is signified as the species or likeness of the Father or of divine essence, if it is the perfect likeness, will contain within itself the likeness of all things.

But even though something might be the species or likeness of another, nonetheless it is not always necessary that whenever one turns to the species he also turns to that of which it is the species or likeness. For it is possible to turn to the species or image in two ways: either insofar as it is the species of such a reality, and then turning to the reality and to the species of the reality are the same; or turning to the species insofar as it is itself some reality, and then it is not necessary that by the same turning someone turns, through his intellect, to the species of the reality and to the reality. This happens, for example, when someone considers an image insofar as it is itself a stone body, as opposed to insofar as it is a likeness of Socrates or Plato.

Therefore I say that, because God himself is the likeness and species of all realities, the two turnings of the intellect can occur in him: either absolutely, insofar as he is a certain reality; or insofar as he is the likeness of all realities. And in both ways God knows his very self, and is turned upon himself, even though he does not do this by different activities, but by the same. Whence if the Word is taken as following the beholding of the divine intellect, insofar as he beholds his very self absolutely, then the “Word” is said absolutely in the divine, without reference to what is created, and this whether it is said essentially or personally. However, if the “Word” is taken as following the beholding of the divine intellect as turned upon itself, but insofar as it is the likeness and exemplar of all realities, then within the “Word” is taken also a reference to what is created, insofar as it is the reference of the art to the artwork; and in this way, the name “art” properly befits the Word. Nevertheless, if the “Word” is taken according to the order of manifestation to another, then it always signifies a reference to what is created. For such manifestation of the divine intellect exists through the bringing forth of created things.

Reply Obj. 1: Although within the Word is that whereby everything created comes to be, still the consideration of the Word and of him whose Word he is does not depend on the consideration of what is created. And therefore “Word” does not necessarily signify a reference to what is created.

Reply Obj. 2: The Word is called the active power of the Father in the manner of an art; whence, insofar as it is signified as an art, it is signified through a reference to what is created. But it is not necessarily so understood when it is signified as “Word,” as is clear of the Holy Spirit, who is himself the love by which the Father loves the Son. For this love is the paradigmatic reason (This is a relatively unusual use of ratio, here meaning something like the original or paradigm in the mind on which other things are (imperfectly) modeled. See In I Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1.) for the love that he has for what is created, which he draws into a likeness with his own love. And insofar as the love is signified absolutely with the name “love,” not by connoting any reference to what is created, but insofar as it is the reason for the things that he freely bestows on what is created, this love is signified with the name “gift,” which does indicate a reference to what is created. So it is with the name “Word” and the name “art”; for “Word” can be spoken of absolutely, but “art” is said in reference to the artwork.

Reply Obj. 3: By one and the same Word the Father has spoken himself and everything created. Yet there are different considerations of the Word insofar as through him the Father and created things are spoken. For an absolute knowledge of his very self is not lacking to God, nor even an absolute knowledge of created things, nor even a comparative knowledge such that he knows himself to be their cause; but these three cognitions do not differ really in him, but only by reason. And therefore a reference to what is created is not required for the understanding of the Word, insofar as by him the Father is understood to have spoken his very self. Rather, it is required insofar as by the Word the Father is understood to have spoken created things. And therefore the “Word” is understood both absolutely and with reference to what is created.

Reply Obj. 4: The artisan can turn to the species of the art within him in three ways. The first is insofar as it is the likeness of a reality that is to come to be through it; and in this way he turns absolutely to the real artwork, having no consideration of his art. The second way is by turning to the species itself, according to the existence it has within his soul; and in this way there is an absolute consideration of the species itself as some reality, and again he does not thereby consider the real artwork. Lastly, he can do so by comparing the one to the other, when he considers that the species within himself is the cause of the things that came to be from it. And so it is even for the divine intellect, insofar as it turns upon itself—either insofar as it is some reality, or insofar as it is only the likeness of the realities, or insofar as that reality that is the likeness is the cause of things that it makes like itself. However, such cognitions in God are simultaneous, and do not differ in reality.

Reply Sed Contra 5: “Word” does not signify a reference to what is actually created, but a reference that is, as it were, in habit, as does “gift.” And therefore both are eternal names.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Every creature brought about is common to the entire Trinity. Whence whatever signifies reference to what is created leads to the knowledge of the divine essence, as a cause is known in its effect. But because not only the essence has an order to what is created, but so does the personal procession, which is the paradigmatic reason for the procession of created things, therefore it can also be signified as something personal with reference to what is created. And thereby this name of a principle will signify the person principally, but consequently it will lead to an understanding of the divine essence. And so it is in the names “Word” and “gift.”

Exposition of the text

And so divine nature, if it is the Father, begot the Son. (Sent. I, 27.1(113).2.) This does not follow, since even though according to reality the Father and the generation are the same, still the word “generation” signifies that property as inhering to and determining that of which it is said. And therefore, because the essence is not determined by a property, one does not say that the essence generates. But “Father” signifies this same property, but as subsisting through itself, and so on account of the real identity one says that the essence is the Father.

They differ from each other. (Sent. I, 27.3(115).1.) Difference is not properly speaking in the divine, since it is opposed to likeness, just as diversity is opposed to unity. Nonetheless, here it is being taken broadly as meaning “distinction.”