D. 25 - The name “person” when signified in the plural

Division of the text

Having considered in Distinction 24 names that signify unity and plurality in the divine, next the Master considers how it can occur, as regards the name of these expressions, that it admits of addition and is consignified in the plural—that is, the name “person”: what it signifies when it is signified in the plural. Therefore this part is divided into two: in the first he asks whether, just as the name “person” signifies the essence when uttered in the singular, so too when it is consignified in the plural; in the second he presents the solution to this question, at it seems to some that essence is signified by the term ‘person.’ (Sent. I, 25.1(102).5.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he presents the question; second, he presents arguments on either side, at for person, as Augustine says above, is said in respect to self. (Sent. I, 25.1(102).2.) Now his question, as it were, leads to two incongruities. For because “person” in the singular signifies the essence, as was said above, therefore in the plural it either signifies the essence or it does not. If it signifies the essence, then to say several “persons” is no different than to say several essences; but if it does not, then the name “person” is equivocal in the singular and the plural, which seems unusual.

For person . . . is said in respect to self. (Sent. I, 25.1(102).2.) Here he presents arguments on either side, namely, that it would signify the essence both in the plural and in the singular. For he proves that in the singular it would signify the essence from the things said above, and that it would also in the plural signify the essence he proves with two arguments. The first is from Augustine and is as follows: when we say “three persons” we signify what is common to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. But nothing is common to them except their essence. Therefore the essence is being signified by the name “person” taken in the plural. He presents the second at it can also be shown in another way that essence is signified there by the name ‘person’; (Sent. I, 25.1(102).4.) “what?” asks for the essence, but when people ask, “three what?” the response is “persons,” in the plural. Therefore it signifies the essence in the plural.

It seems to some that essence is signified by the term ‘person.’ (Sent. I, 25.1(102).5.) Here he resolves the question. About this he does two things: first, he presents the solution that some offer, and he refutes it; second, he presents his own solution, at and so it is to be known that this term person can bear many meanings. (Sent. I, 25.2(103).1.) Their solution was that the name “person” in the plural would signify the essence, yet it would not follow that there were three essences, but that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three who possess that commonality that is the essence. And they similarly explain the saying that “the person of the Father is one, and that of the Son another;” that is, the Father is someone other than the Son, each of whom is a person. But the Master introduces a different manner of speaking that they cannot explain this way. For Augustine says that the Son is someone other than the Father in person, or personally.

And so it is to be known that this term person can bear many meanings. (Sent. I, 25.2(103).1.) Here he presents his own solution: and first, he presents the solution; second, based on the solution he draws a certain conclusion, as an epilogue, at from what has been said above, it can be gathered that the term person in the Trinity has a threefold meaning. (Sent. I, 25.3(104).5.)

As regards the first he does two things: first, he explains what the name “person” signifies when it is uttered in the plural, with the numerical term joined to it; second, he explains what it signifies when a partitive term is joined to it, at now let us examine whether it is for the same reason and cause that it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. (Sent. I, 25.3(104).1.)

First, he presents the explanation; second, he answers arguments made to the contrary, at and this meaning is supported by the words of Augustine set out above. (Sent. I, 25.2(103).3.) Therefore the Master says, when presenting his solution, that even though the name “person” signifies the essence when in the singular, it signifies hypostasis when in the plural. Thus, the sense of “three persons” is three hypostases. And he confirms this with the authority of Augustine.

And this meaning is supported by the words of Augustine set out above. (Sent. I, 25.2(103).3.) Here he is responding to objections made to the contrary, and as regards this he does two things: first, he answers the objections; second, he removes a certain doubt, at and do not become concerned that we have said ‘three things.’ (Sent. I, 25.2(103).5.)

The first is divided into two, according to the two arguments. He resolves the second at but as to that which they say, . . . we say as follows. (Sent. I, 25.2(103).4.)

Now let us examine whether it is for the same reason and cause that it is said: the person of the Father is one, of the Son another, of the Holy Spirit another. (Sent. I, 25.3(104).1.) Here he explains the signification of “person” when it is joined to a partitive term like “another.” Now, this happens in two ways: either such that a distinction of person is being indicated, as when one says, “he is another person, etc.”—and he says that in this case it signifies hypostasis; or such that “person” designates the account of distinction, as when one says, “he is another by person, or personally, etc.”—and he says that in this case it signifies a personal property, although each can be signified in either way.

From what has been said above, it can be gathered that the term person in the Trinity has a threefold meaning. (Sent. I, 25.3(104).5.) Here he concludes that the name “person” is said in three ways, and he confirms this with the authority of John Damascene and other saints.

Question 1

The name “person” when signified in the plural

Here four things are asked:

first, about the definition of “person”;

second, whether it is found in God and in created things univocally;

third, about its commonness as regards the divine persons;

fourth, whether the three persons are three realities or three beings.

Article 1

Whether Boethius’s definition of person is apt

To the first we proceed as follows, (Parallel texts: ST I.29.1; 2; 3, ad 2; 4; III.2.2; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 2; Disputed Question on the Union of the Incarnate Word, a. 1.) and the definition of “person” laid out by Boethius is: a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1344).) It seems that this definition is not apt.

Obj. 1: For a definition should be convertible with what it defines. But the account of “person” is found in God and the angels, whereas this definition of “person” does not fit the divine persons, as the Master says later. (Sent. III, 10.1(29).4; cf. In III Sent., d. 10, exposition of the text.) Therefore it seems the definition is not apt.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as a definition stands to a reality, so do a definition’s parts stand to the reality’s parts. But a definition signifies the defined reality, so the definition’s parts signify the parts of the reality. But in the divine, a person is simple and has no parts. Therefore such a definition does not suit it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, what is predicated of something directly should not be placed in its definition obliquely. But an intellectual nature is predicated of “person” directly, for we say that Socrates is a certain intellectual, or rational, nature. Therefore it seems that of a rational nature is badly said.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the proper difference of a genus is not found outside that genus. But “rational” is a proper difference of “animal,” and therefore is found only in animals. But “person” is found in angels and God, who are not contained in the genus of animal. Therefore “rational” should not be placed in the definition of “person.”

Obj. 5: Furthermore, in the designations of both Boethius and Cicero, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343–45); Cicero, On Invention, bk. 2, ch. 50, para. 151.) “person” is coordinate with “essence,” “subsistence,” and “substance.” But in God the nature and the essence are the same. Therefore it would have been better to say “of a rational essence,” rather than “rational nature.”

Obj. 6: Furthermore, the principle of individuation is matter. But in some cases a person can be found wherein there is no matter, at least in God. Therefore “individual” should not be placed in the definition of “person.”

Obj. 7: Furthermore, in the usage of the Latins, “substance” is equivocal as regards “essence” and “hypostasis.” Therefore when one says that a person is an individual substance, “substance” is being used either for the essence or for the hypostasis. If it stands for the hypostasis, then since a hypostasis is a particular or individual substance, it seems that it is superfluous to add individual. If it stands for the essence, since the individuation is being placed on the subject, which individuation in the divine is through a distinction of property, it would follow that the property would distinguish the essence. And further, since with the thing defined being multiplied, the definition is multiplied, it follows that the several persons are several essences—which is incongruous.

Obj. 8: Furthermore, “person” is the name of either substance or accident. But it cannot be said that it is the name of an accident, since “substance” is placed directly in its definition; and this is clear even from Boethius, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343–45).) who separates “person” from the genus of accidents. Therefore it names substance. But accidents are not placed in the definition of a substance. Therefore, since “individual” names an accident, because it names a certain intention, as does the name “genus” and “species,” it seems that it is incongruous to put it in the definition of “person,” as though it were the difference of the substance.

I answer that, as was said above, (Above, d. 24, q. 2, a. 2.) the name “person,” according to the way it is commonly taken, is not the name of an intention, the way the names “singular,” or “genus,” or “species” are. Rather, it names a reality to which is attached a certain intention, that is, the intention of the particular, and within a determinate nature, that is, the intellectual or rational. And therefore three things are placed in the definition of “person”: the genus of that reality, which is signified by the name “person” when it says substance; the difference whereby it is contracted to the determinate nature in which the reality that is a person is placed, when it says of a rational nature; and there is also posited something pertaining to that intention under which the name “person” signifies its reality—for it does not signify the rational substance absolutely, but insofar as the intention of the particular is understood—and therefore it adds individual.

Reply Obj. 1: The things placed in that definition can be considered in two ways: either strictly according to what is proper to the words—and in this way, as will become clear, it does not fit the divine persons, as the Master says—or broadly, and in this way it fits a person placed in whatever intellectual nature. And Boethius takes it in this latter way; this is why he even looks into the definition of person for the sake of showing how there is one person in Christ, in whom it is certain there is only the uncreated divine person.

Reply Obj. 2: According to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 4, text. 28.) a definition can be considered in two ways: either according to what is signified through the definition, or according to the intention of definition.

If it be considered in the first way, then what is signified by the definition and the thing defined are the same thing; this is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.7, 1012a25.) that the account that the name signifies is the definition. And thus the definition and the defined are the same, and in this way the things placed directly in the definition are not the definition’s parts, that is, parts of the reality signified through the definition, just as they are not parts of the thing being defined.

For if, when one says “rational mortal animal,” “animal” would be part of man, then it would not be predicated of the whole man, since no integral part is predicated of its whole. Whence “animal” signifies the whole man, and so does “rational” and “mortal.” And therefore man is not said to be composed of animal, rational, and mortal; rather, he is said to be a rational mortal animal.

But the genus signifies the whole as undesignated, and the difference does so as designating it, and the definition does so as designated, as do the species as well, which differentiate the genus. For example, “body” as a part of an animal is different from “body” as the genus of animal, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 5.) For the account of body consists in the fact that it belongs to such a nature that three dimensions can be designated in it.

But if by the name “body” one signifies a reality of this sort, namely, that in it three dimensions can be signified, under the condition that another perfection that completes it might supervene in a nobler account, such as the soul, then “body” is the part of the animal; and in this way it is not predicated of the animal.

But if by the name “body” is signified a reality having such a nature, due to any form whatsoever perfecting it, such that three dimensions can be designated in it, then “body” is the genus, and it signifies the whole. For whatever specific form is taken, there will not occur anything beyond the fact that the account of body was the precondition; but this was still done indistinctly, in that it is not determined whether it has the aforesaid account due to this form or that.

But when it is called “ensouled,” the form whereby it receives such account is being designated, even though it also receives something more from the soul than the account of body. And thereby the difference is the one designating, and so the species will be the one designated.

But it is true that in composites the genus and the difference, even though they are not parts of the reality, nonetheless they flow from its parts. For the genus flows from the matter, even though it is not the matter, and the difference flows from the form, even though the form is not the difference; rather, the form is its principle. And in this way a composite definition manifests a real composition.

However, in simple things, especially in God, the comprehension in the definition is not traced back to any composition in the reality, but only a composition according to account, which is founded on the truth of the reality, just as if someone were to say, when defining God, that he is the divine intellectual substance, or something like this, each of such names which one might say in the definition, it would have a true signification in God, and the signification of one part would not be the signification of the other. And yet the diversity of the significations would not be founded on any diversity in the reality. And this is why, just as the intellect enunciates the existence of a simple reality through a composition affirming many names, while in the reality there is still no composition, so too it designates the “whatness” of a simple reality, in which there is no composition, through many names—presupposed to which there is in the reality a plurality of accounts, not a real diversity. And according to this, the things placed in the definition of a divine person are not of greater simplicity as regards the reality they signify than the person itself, but only according to account.

However, if the definition be considered according to its own intention, then the definition is not the thing defined, but something that leads one to know it. And in this way also the definition is composed of many intentions, none of which is predicated of it, nor vice versa, since the intention of a genus is not the intention of a definition. Rather, this is only according to the intellect that comes to these intentions. And in this way it is not incongruous to place whole and part in the divine according to the activity of the intellect, just as it is also the case in a proposition formed about God that the subject is a part of the whole proposition.

Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from things said before, (See q. 23, a. 1.) an essence or nature can be signified in two ways: either as a part, as is signified in the name “humanity”—and in this way the nature or essence cannot be predicated directly of a person, just as “humanity” is not predicated of Socrates; or as a whole, as is signified in the name “man”—and in this way it is predicated of a person, for we do say that Socrates is a man. However, here the name is being taken according to the first mode, insofar as it is a principle of the difference, and not the difference itself—as is rationality, which is not placed directly in the definition of man, but only obliquely, as if one were to say that man is the animal possessing rationality, or something of this sort. However, the nature designated in composite realities holds also the real difference as regards “person,” namely, insofar as a certain addition is made to the nature as to the demonstrated matter, through which the common nature of the genus or difference is individuated. But in simple things, and especially in God, since no real addition can occur, there is no real difference of the nature as so signified as regards “person”; rather, addition is made only as regards the mode of signifying, on account of which it falls obliquely within the definition of a divine person.

Reply Obj. 4: “Rational” is said in two ways. For sometimes it is taken strictly and properly, insofar as “reason” signifies a certain darkening of the intellectual nature, as Isaac says (Isaac Israeli ben Solomon (c. 855‒955 AD), Liber de definitionibus.) that “reason” arises within the shadow of intelligence. This is clear from the fact that the truth is not presented to it right away; rather, it finds it discursively through inquiry. And in this sense, “rational” is the difference of “animal,” and it does not fit God or angels. But sometimes it is taken for any condition of a power that is not impressed within matter, and in this way it does belong to God, angels, and man. So too Gregory names (Gregory the Great, Homiliae in evangelia, bk. 1, hom. 10, para. 1 (CCSL 141A).) an angel a “rational animal,” and even Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 15, para. 3 (PG 3:330).) that the sensible and the rational are in angels more eminently than in us, and he even counts “reason” among the divine names. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy*, cc. 1‒2 (PG 3:119–47).)* And this is how Boethius is taking it.

Reply Obj. 5: According to Boethius, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 1 (PL 64:1342).) in one way “nature” is said as any specific difference informing anything whatsoever. And therefore the name “nature” does not name the essence absolutely, but insofar as it is determined to some genus or some species. And therefore, because “person” names a subsisting substance only in a determinate genus, that is, an intellectual nature, therefore he more appropriately put “nature” in the definition, rather than “essence.”

Reply Obj. 6: In individuation, insofar as it is in composite things, there are two things to consider: first, indeed, the cause of the individuation, which is matter—and in this respect it is not translatable to the divine; and second, the account of individuation, which is the account of incommunicability, insofar as something one and the same is not divided into many, nor is it predicated of many, nor is it divisible; and this does befit God. This is also why Richard, in place of “individual,” places “incommunicable.” (Richard of Saint Victor, On the Trinity, bk. 2, ch. 12 (PL 196:907).
)

Reply Obj. 7: “Substance” is said in four ways. In one way, substance is the same thing as essence; and in this way substance is found in all genera, as is essence. This is being signified when one asks, “what is whiteness?” and one answers, “a color.” In another way it signifies an individual in the genus of substance, which is also called “first substance,” or “hypostasis.” In a third way, “second substance” is said. In a fourth way, “substance” is said commonly, insofar as it abstracts from first and second substance; and this is how it is being taken here. And by “individual,” as by a difference, it is being drawn to standing for first substance; this is just as, when one says “rational mortal animal,” “animal” signifies the nature of animal insofar as it is abstracted from all its species, and by the added difference it is drawn to a determinate species.

Yet some say that substance is being taken for hypostasis, and that there is a threefold incommunicability of the account of “person”: that by which the community of a universal is taken away; that by which the community of a particular, which it has in the definition of the whole, is taken away; and that by which is taken away the community of something assumable that can be joined to a higher reality, insofar as we say that the human nature in Christ is not a person. And the name “hypostasis” takes away the account of the universal and the particular, and the addition of “individual” takes away the communicability of the assumable.

But the first account is better, since this latter one cannot be drawn out of the signification of the words. And further, the objection would still stand regarding how “substance” is being taken in the definition of “hypostasis,” when we say that a hypostasis is an individual substance.

Reply Obj. 8: As is clear from things said in the body, “person” does not name an intention, but a reality to which that intention accrues. And therefore it does not name an accident, but rather a substance. Nor is “individual” the difference of substance, since the particular does not add any difference over and above the species. But nevertheless the particular becomes individual through some essential principle, which in composite things is indeed matter, and in divine things is the distinguishing relation. And because essential principles are unknown to us, we frequently place in definitions something accidental for the sake of signifying something essential. And thus, even the name “individual,” which is the name of an accident, is placed here to designate the substantial principle through which there is individuation.

Nonetheless, one should know that other definitions are given of “person.” One is that of Richard, who, correcting Boethius’s definition according to the way it is said of God, defines “person” as: a person is the incommunicable existence of the divine nature. (Richard of Saint Victor, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 18 (PL 196:907).) For “rational,” “individual,” and “substance” do not properly speaking befit the divine, as far as the common usage of these names. Another is given by the masters, as follows: a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to nobility. And this reduces, as it were, to the same thing—except that this is taken in its comparison with a distinguishing property, and under which stands “person,” and Boethius’s definition is taken in comparison to the nature, to each of which “person” is related.

Article 2

Whether “person” is said univocally of God and created things

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.29.3; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 3.) It seems that “person” is not said univocally of God and created things.

Obj. 1: For however different certain things are, they can agree univocally in some negation; for example, to be “not a stone” belongs to God and man univocally. But the account of “person” consists in negation, for it is an “individual” (Or, “non-divided.”) substance. Therefore it seems that it is said univocally of God and created things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is predicated of certain things according to one name and one account belongs to them univocally. But the name “person” and its assigned definition belongs to God and the creature, as is clear from Boethius. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 4 (PL 64:1344).) Therefore it seems that it is said univocally of them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it is not said univocally, then it is said either equivocally or analogically. But it is not said equivocally, since all the things that are placed in the definition are not said equivocally of God and creatures, as is clear from things said in the previous article. Nor is it said analogically, since nothing said analogically of God and creatures is in the creature with priority over its being in God, as is the case with the name “person,” which has been carried over from created things to divine. Therefore “person” is said univocally of God and created things.

On the contrary (4), nothing can be said univocally of things that do not agree in one most general genus. But God, since he is in no genus, does not agree with a created thing in genus, species, or accident, since he cannot be a subject, as Boethius proves, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) and so on. Therefore neither “person” nor anything else is said univocally of God and created things.

Furthermore (5), “person” signifies something distinct in a certain nature. But the account of distinction is not the same in the divine, angels, and men. For in the divine, distinction occurs only through relations of origin, whereas in angels it occurs through absolute properties, and in men it occurs in both ways, as Richard says. (Richard of Saint Victor, On the Trinity, bk. 4, cc. 13, 14 (PL 196:908‒9).) Therefore “person” is said equivocally of them.

I answer that “person” is said of God and created things neither univocally nor equivocally, but according to analogy. And as regards the reality signified, it is in God with priority over created things, whereas as regards the mode of signifying, the opposite is the case—as it is with all names that are said analogically of God and created things.

Reply Obj. 1: Although according to the account of the name, “individual” brings in a certain negation, nonetheless this negation is founded on some reality—namely, on the definition of a certain distinguishing principle—wherein God and the creature are not spoken of univocally. Further, in the definition of “person” not only is the name “individual” placed, but so is “substance,” and others that cannot belong univocally to God and created things—unless perhaps one were to say that “person” is the name of the accident, that is, of the intention, and not the name of the reality, and that “substance” is placed in the definition of “person” as a subject is placed in the definition of an accident, like when one says, “the snub” is the “curved nose.” But this is contrary to Boethius’s intention, who is hunting for the difference of “person” through a division of substance.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Philosopher, (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003a33‒b15; 1004a22‒33.) nothing prevents the accounts of certain things from not being univocal. Whence, just as the name “person” is not said univocally but analogically of God and created things, so too is its definition.

Reply Obj. 3: The name “person,” as regards the reality being signified, is with priority and more truly in God than it is in created things. But as regards the mode of signifying and the imposition of the name, it belongs to created things in a more familiar way.

Reply Sed Contra 4: We concede the fourth argument.

Reply Sed Contra 5: The account of “person” brings in distinction in a common way, so it is abstracted from every mode of distinction. And therefore there can be analogically one account in things that are distinguished in diverse ways.

Article 3

Whether “person” is said commonly in the Trinity

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.30.4; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 3, ad 11.) It seems that “person” is not common in the Trinity.

Obj. 1: For whatever belongs commonly to the three persons signifies the essence, and is predicated in the singular, as with “wisdom,” “goodness,” and such; nor are the persons distinguished in it. But “person” is predicated in the Trinity in the plural, and the Father and the Son are distinguished in their person. Therefore “person” is not common in the Trinity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything common that belongs to the account of anything stands as a universal. Therefore if “person” is common to the Father and the Son, and is not outside the account of each, since otherwise it would be an accident, it seems to be universal. But a universal whole is not in the divine. Therefore “person” is not common.

Obj. 3: You might say that it is common according to account, but not according to a reality.

On the contrary, not even in the universal is there numerically the same account, such that the humanity in diverse particulars would be the same; rather, they are the same only according to account. Therefore it seems that this would not prevent the account of the universal.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, what of itself has the account of the incommunicable cannot be called “common,” since these are opposites. But “person” has the account of the incommunicable; therefore it cannot be called common. Therefore it seems that it cannot be common.

On the contrary, Augustine says otherwise in the text. (Sent. I, 25.1(102).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:940); see also Sent. I, 23.2(96).3.)

Furthermore, nothing can be counted with something else except in virtue of what is common to both.

I answer that there are two sorts of community: a community of reality, and one of account. And I call it a “community of reality” when something numerically one and the same belongs to several. And this community of nature is not but in the divine persons, nor is there any such community in the Trinity except that of the essence, and of things that pertain to the essence, like the attributes, the activities, the negations, and the essential relations. However, a community of account is that according to which “person” is said to be common in the Trinity.

However, this is assigned in diverse ways by diverse people. For some say that it is common according to an account of negation, in that “individual,” which signifies a negation, falls into the definition of “person.” Whence they say that such community of account, which is only through a negation, does not make a universal. But this does not seem sufficient, since from its own account “person” signifies not only negation, but also a certain assertion.

This is why others say that the community is according to an account of proportion, as we say that just as the ruler stands in the city, so does the sailor in the ship; in this way, they say, “person” is common to the Father and the Son. For just as the Father stands as subsisting to the divine nature, so too does the Son. But others say that it is a community of intention, just as one says that color and animal come together in the intention of “genus.” But these two claims reduce to the same thing, since a community of intentions is only according to the proportion of the common to the proper, or vice versa.

And this also seems insufficient, since “person” names not only the intention or relation of something subsisting toward a common nature, as does the name “supposit,” or “particular,” or the like, but it more names that reality to which this intention accrues. Whence, in the divine, the community of “person” cannot be according to the community of such relationship or intention; rather, such a community is that by which the name “supposit” is common to the three persons.

And therefore one should explain it differently, saying that besides these communities there is also a community of account founded in the reality. But an account founded in a real thing is of two sorts, since something is common, like the account of animal, and something is specific, like the account of man. So too in the divine, since relation is really there, the common account of relation is there. Moreover, since paternity is really there, the specific account of paternity is really there, so relation is common to paternity and filiation as the common account in the specific account. Yet it does not follow from this that relation is a universal as regards paternity and filiation, since every universal is in its inferiors in different existences, whereas in the divine there is only one existence. Whence the existence of relation in the paternity and the filiation is the same. This is why the common account in the divine cannot be distinguished through existence, but only through the specific account. And this is also why nothing one according to the specific account can be numerically multiplied in the divine.

Thus, about “person” I say that in the divine, “person” signifies commonly the account of a distinct thing subsisting in that nature, and “father” signifies the relation of the thing distinct by a specific account, subsisting in the common nature; and likewise with “son.” And thereby it is clear that “person” is not common to the Father and the Son according to a reality, for there is not numerically one person for both of them, the way there is numerically one essence. Rather, it is one the way having a common account is common to things that have specific and proper accounts wherein they are distinguished. Yet this is not a universal, since it is not in the Father and the Son according to different existences.

Reply Obj. 1: “Person” is not common by a community of reality, as with essence. And therefore although it does not differ from the essence according to reality, nonetheless it does not signify through the mode of essence. And likewise, when one says that the Father is distinguished from the Son “in person,” it is not understood that there is a distinction in the common account of “person,” but only in the specific account that is the account of the Father.

Reply Obj. 2: “Person” is not of the account of “Father,” if it is being taken properly. For in the divine there is no definition properly speaking, just as neither is there genus and species. Nonetheless, if one does not attend to the force of the word, then it should be said that person is of the account of “Father,” yet not according to a different existence in the Father and the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby the solution is clear.

Reply Obj. 4: Although a person is incommunicable, nothing prevents the intention of “person” being common. For example, Socrates is incommunicable, and yet the account or intention of the individual is common, just as, on the contrary, the intention of a genus is designated as particular when it is contracted to this genus. Likewise, the account of “person” as person, even though it does not name an intention, still is common inasmuch as it does not signify a specific account of distinction, but a general one; this is just as the vague individual, like “some man,” is in a certain way common, insofar as it does not signify this or another account of individuation, but individuation only in common.

Article 4

Whether the three persons can be called three realities

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.29.1, 3; I.30.1.) It seems that the three persons cannot be called three beings, or three realities.

Obj. 1: For whatever is predicated absolutely in the divine is predicated of the three in the singular. But “being” and “reality” are said absolutely. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as there is one Godhead of the Father and the Son, so is there one existence and one “whatness.” But “one existence” and “one whatness” is not said unless God is one. Therefore for the same reason the three persons should not be called “three beings” or “three realities,” since the name “being” (ens) is drawn from existence (esse), and the name “reality” from whatness, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 4, ch. 5.)

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Father and the Son are distinguished only by relations. But relation, as regards the reference by which it distinguishes, does not place something in its subject. Therefore it seems that, because they are distinguished by relations, they cannot be called three “beings,” or three “realities.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 2 (PG 94:791).) that the three persons do not differ by reality, but are distinguished by account and cognition. But whatever things are distinguished only by account are not three realities. Therefore and so on.

On the contrary, Augustine says, the realities that one should enjoy are the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. (Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, bk. 1, ch. 5 (CCSL 32; PL 34:21).) Therefore and so on.

Furthermore, whatever things are distinguished really are multiple realities. But the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are really distinguished. Therefore and so on. Proof of the middle premise: just as the account of wisdom is in God, so really is the account of paternity. But on account of the real account of wisdom, God is said to be wise really. Therefore also by the same argument he will be said to be a Father really, and therefore related really, and therefore distinct really; for these things follow on each other through themselves.

I answer that, according to Avicenna, as was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 4, ch. 5.) the names “being” and “reality” differ insofar as there are two things to consider in a reality: its “whatness” and account, and its existence. And the name “reality” is drawn from its “whatness.” And because a whatness can have existence, both in the individual that exists outside the soul and within the soul, insofar as it is apprehended by the intellect, therefore the name “reality” is oriented toward both: toward what exists in the soul insofar as “reality” (res) is derived from “I judge/you judge” (reor/reris), and toward what exists outside the soul insofar as “reality” is said as though it were something judged (ratum) and made firm in the nature.

But the name “being” is drawn from a reality’s existence. And therefore, since the existence of the three persons is one and the same, if “being” is taken substantively, it cannot be predicated in the plural of the three persons. For the form from which it is imposed, existence, is itself not multiple in them. However, if it is taken as a participle and adjectivally, then it can be predicated in the plural. For things of this sort receive their number from the supposits, and not from the form signified, as has been said. (Above, d. 22, q. 1, a. 1.)

But the whatness or form from which the name “reality” is taken in the divine is considered in two ways. It may be as the absolute form, as the essence or Godhead, and such, which are not multiple in the divine; whence even the name “reality,” which is drawn from this form, would not be predicated in the plural, but in the singular, such that the Father and the Son are said to be “one reality.” And there is also in the divine a certain relative form, like paternity, that, according to the account existing not only within the intellect but also outside it, is other than filiation. Whence insofar as the name “reality” is drawn from this relation, “reality” would be predicated in the plural, insofar as there are many such relative forms there. And according to this, we say that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are “three realities,” not only within the soul, but also outside the soul, realities having a firmness in the nature.

Reply Obj. 1: The name “being” is in no way taken from any relation, but from the existence, which is simply absolute in the divine. And therefore it is not predicated in the plural due to its form, but due to the supposit, insofar as it is an adjective or participle. But the name “reality” is imposed from whatness or form, which can be both absolute and related, and therefore it can be predicated in the plural, even though according to the name it is not referred to another. For the absolute and the related are incidental to the account of a reality, just as being rational and irrational are incidental to animal.

Reply Obj. 2: Although there is one existence just as there is one Godhead, still “being” is adjectival and “God” is substantive, so the account is not the same. However, if by “whatness” is understood not only the absolute account, but the account or intention of whatever thing, whether substance or accident or relation, then in the divine, although there is one absolute whatness, yet there are many accounts of real relations. And in this way in a certain manner there are several whatnesses—although this cannot be conceded properly speaking, since whatness, essence, and definition are simply speaking only of substances, as the Philosopher proves. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 7.4, 1029b13‒1030a26.) And this is why the name “reality” can be predicated in the plural and the singular.

Reply Obj. 3: Although relation does not place anything absolute from that reference, still it really places the account of relation in God. And therefore due to this he can be called a “reality,” and from several opposite relations he can be called “several realities.”

Reply Obj. 4: Our response to Damascene’s statement is above. (In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1.)

Exposition of the text

It seems to some that essence is signified by the term ‘person.’ (Sent. I, 25.1(102).5.) This opinion is erroneous, since if “essence” and “person” were to signify wholly the same thing, both as regards mode of signifying and as regards the reality signified, then just as we say “three persons,” so too would we have to say “three essences”; and if the latter is false, then so is the former. For just as they expound “three persons” as three who have something common, which is being a person, so too can we expound “three essences” as three who have something common, which is the essence. Nor can it be said that this statement is needed because of the insistent demand of the heretics, since no necessity should force us to say what is false. And moreover, when that necessity ceases, so that manner of speaking should cease.

But by some need, as Augustine said above, this noun is used in a metaphorical sense, so that we may say in the plural ‘three persons.’ (Sent. I, 25.2(103).2.) It seems that what he is saying here amounts to nothing, for, since the plural is only for a multiplied singular, there cannot be a different existence signified in the singular than what is signified in the plural. But one should say to this that in the account of the name “person” one signifies the hypostasis both in the singular and in the plural, but on account of the real identity of the hypostasis and essence in the divine, “person” can be used for the essence in the singular, but not in the plural, since that is repugnant to the unity of the essence. This is why the distinction that the Master asserts attends more to the use of the name than to its diverse significations.

And so Augustine, differentiating the reasons for the aforesaid, says that ‘the three persons are one essence or of the same essence.’ (Sent. I, 25.2(103).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:945).) The reason for this is that the essence and the person can be considered insofar as, in the divine, they are the same in reality, and thus we call the three persons one essence, and also insofar as they differ in account, and thus we say they are of the same essence, but not from the same essence. For this preposition “from” denotes the bearing of an efficient or material cause, whereas in the genitive, (The phrase translated as “of the same” is just one word in Latin (eiusdem) expressed in the grammatical case called “genitive.”) the bearing of any cause whatsoever can be understood. And because the essence stands to the person through the mode of a formal cause, therefore the persons are said to be of one essence, and not from one essence.

So that here a property of the person is to be understood by the term person. (Sent. I, 25.3(104).3.) This is not said in reference to a property of the signification, but in reference to the identity of the reality. For in God the distinguishing property and the distinguished person are the same; and therefore the name “person” can stand for the property, and in these expressions this way of taking the name “person” is commonly interchangeable with it. But when we say, “the person is other,” or “the persons are several,” “person” is being signified as numbered and distinct, and therefore it is fittingly taken for the hypostasis. But when one says, “he is other in person,” or “in plurality,” the account of the distinction is being signified, and this is more fittingly suited to the personal property.

There is no manner of degree in the Trinity. (Sent. I, 25.3(104).6; Lombard believes he is quoting Jerome, but in fact it is Pelagius, Libellum fidei ad Innocentium papam, para. 3 (PL 45:1716); see Augustine, Sermones de diversis, sermon 236, para. 2 (PL 39:2181).) Against this, Augustine says that the Father and the Son do not differ in substance, but only in degree. (See Pseudo-Augustine, Quaestiones ex utroque mixtim, q. 122 (PL 35:2369). In fact, however, Augustine denies that such differences can exist in the Trinity: ordo autem, gradus, affectus, qui invenitur in creaturae disparilitate et infirmitate, nullus est in illa coaeterna et aequali et impassibili Trinitate; “the difference in order, degree, and will, which is found in unequal and weak creatures, is not to be found at all in that coeternal, equal and unchangeable Trinity” (Augustine, Answer to an Arian Sermon, ch. 33, para. 31 (PL 42:705).) Furthermore, “sub-” (“under”) denotes degree, but a sub-authority is said to be in the Son. Therefore and so on. To this one should say that since “degree” imports an order of dignity and being “under” and being “above,” one cannot concede that there is, properly, degree in the divine. Whence on Exodus 20:26, you shall not go up by degrees to my altar, (RSV reads steps instead of degrees.) a Gloss says, he who ascends to the altar by degrees makes the Son lesser, and the Father greater. (See Glossa interlinearis, at Exodus 20:26 (in Glossa ordinaria 1.679–80); cf. Quodvultdeus, Sermon 5, “De cantico novo,” ch. 7 (PL 40:684).) But Augustine takes “degree” broadly, to mean order, the way that “cause” can be taken to mean a principle; however, one does not find the saints asserting a “sub-authority” in the Son, so it is not found to be said properly.