D. 37 - How God is in realities

Division of the first part of the text

Having manifested the realities that are within God, here he manifests how God is within the realities. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that God is everywhere and in all realities; in the second, he removes from God certain things that follow for created things that exist in place, at and although the divine nature is truly and essentially in every place and in every time, yet it is not moved through places or times. (Sent. I, 37.5(168).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he asserts the modes in which God is said to be in realities; in the second, he inquires into the accounts of those modes, at as to how God dwells in us, you will be able to understand it somewhat from what was said above. (Sent. I, 37.2(165).3; Silano reads dwells in the good; we have modified the translation to accord more closely with the Latin text found here.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he enumerates the modes; second, he confirms them by authorities, at lest some presume to accuse these statements of falsehood . . . they seem to me to require the support of the authorities of the Saints. (Sent. I, 37.1(164).3.)

And first he confirms the mode by which he is commonly in all created things; second, he confirms the mode by which he is specifically in the saints, at but in the saints, in whom he is by grace, he also dwells. (Sent. I, 37.2(165).1.) However, the mode wherein he is most specifically in Christ the man pertains to Book III; therefore he sets it aside here.

As to how God dwells in us, you will be able to understand it somewhat from what was said above. (Sent. I, 37.2(165).3.) Here he manifests the accounts of the stated modes. First, he does so for the mode by which he is specifically in the saints; second, he does so for the common mode by which he is in all created things, at from what is said above, it is manifest that God is everywhere in his entirety through essence. (Sent. I, 37.3(166).4.)

And as regards the first, he does two things: first, he manifests its truth; second, he excludes certain doubts, at if you ask where God dwelled before there were saints, we say that he dwelled in himself. (Sent. I, 37.3(166).1.) And there are three doubts, presented in order, as is clear in the text.

From what is said above, it is manifest that God is everywhere in his entirety through essence, and he dwells in the saints through grace. (Sent. I, 37.3(166).4.) Here he inquires about the account as regards the common mode. And about this he does three things: first, he manifests the incomprehensibility of that mode; second, he refutes the insufficient account some give, at but some people, presuming to measure immensity by their own intellect, have taught that the following is to be understood; (Sent. I, 37.3(166).5.) third, he excludes an erroneous question, at it is also usual for them to ask how God can be substantially present in all things. (Sent. I, 37.4(167).1.)

In this last, he does two things: first, he includes the objection; second, he destroys the position, at finally, let them answer what they would rather assert about God. (Sent. I, 37.4(167).3.)

Here there are two questions:

first, about how God is in all realities; (Q. 1.)

second, about how he is everywhere. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

How God is in all things

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether God is in all realities;

second about the diversity of the modes by which he is said to be “in realities.”

Article 1

Whether God is in realities

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.8.1; SCG III.68.) It seems that God is not in realities.

Obj. 1: For among causes, only those that are parts of the reality, like matter and form, are internal to it—but not the agent and the end. Now, God is not a cause of realities as entering into their constitution; for he rules all realities without being mixed with them, as is said in the Book of Causes. (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 20.) Therefore God is not in created realities.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, an agent that can bring forth an effect even when it is absent is nobler than one that can do this only through its presence. But God is the noblest agent. Now, some agents are found to act, both according to will and according to nature, that bring forth their effects even when absent—for example, the sun, while in the heavens, brings forth heat on earth through the emission of its own power, and a king, through his command, brings about many things where he himself is not present. Therefore it seems that much more so can God bring forth his effects when absent, so he need not be in the realities that he establishes.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the nobler an agent is, so much nobler an effect it can bring forth. But what is able through itself to be conserved in existence while its cause is absent is more perfect than what is incapable of this; for example, the shape in wax that remains even when the seal is removed is more perfect than is one in water, where it does not remain in the absence of what impresses itself upon it. Therefore, since God is the most perfect agent, it seems that he would have conferred on the realities that he created also the ability to be conserved in existence even in the absence of their cause. And thus, it is not required that, for the conservation of the realities, God also be in the realities.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is impossible that two agents immediately accomplish the same reality, such that each of them accomplishes it perfectly; for one action that goes out from one agent is terminated at one thing being accomplished. But individual realities have their own proper actions, as Damascene says, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 10 (PG 94:907).) by means of which they bring about their effects. Therefore it seems that God does not immediately effect whatever is brought about in realities, and thus it seems that he is not in all realities.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, some realities are demons. But it is most absurd to say that God is in the demons. Therefore God is not in all realities.

On the contrary, Jeremiah 23:24 says, do I not fill heaven and earth? says the Lord. But everything created is understood in heaven and earth, as is clear from the beginning of Genesis. Therefore God is in all created things.

Furthermore, this is also seen in Hebrews 1:3, where the Son is upholding the universe by his word of power. Now, he cannot conserve realities unless he be present to them. Therefore it seems that he is in all realities.

I answer that God is in all realities essentially, yet not in such a way that he is mixed with the realities, as though he were some part of the reality. To make this evident, one must first take note of three things.

First, note that a mover and what is moved, and a doer and what he accomplishes, must be together, as is proved in Physics 7. (Aristotle, Physics 7.2, 243a3‒245b16.) But this happens in diverse ways for bodily and spiritual things. For because a body by its own essence, which is limited on all sides by the boundaries of quantity, is determined to a certain site, it cannot occur that the moving body and the body being moved be in the same site. Whence they must be together through contact. And in this way by its own power the body changes a thing, because it is immediately joined to it, and this latter too, when changed, can change something else, and so on to some terminus. But a spiritual substance, the essence of which is wholly absolved from quantity and site, and thereby from place, is not distinct from what it moves by place or site; rather, where what is being moved is, there too is the thing moving it. This is like how the soul is in the body, and the power moving the heavens is said to be in the right side of the sphere that it moves, from which its motion begins, as is said in Physics 8. (Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 267b8.)

The second is that the existence of each and every reality, and of every part of it, is immediately from God. This is insofar as we assert, according to our faith, that nothing can create except God. However, to create is to give existence.

The third is that what is the cause of existence cannot cease its activity whereby it gives existence without the thing itself ceasing to exist. For as Avicenna says, (Avicenna, Sufficientia, bk. 1, ch. 11. The Latin title Sufficientia, itself a mistranslation of the Arabic al-Shifa’ (The Book of Healing) was the title given specifically to the section on physics in this larger work.) this is the difference between the divine agent and a natural agent: a natural agent is the cause of motion, whereas the divine agent is the cause of existence. Whence, according to him, if all natural efficient causes were removed, their effect would be removed. And therefore, were the builder to be removed, the existing house is not thereby taken away, the cause of which is the heaviness of the stones, which remains; but the coming to be of a house would be taken away, as he was its cause. And likewise, were the cause of existing to be removed, the existence is thereby taken away. Whence Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 16, ch. 37 (CCSL 143A; PL 75:1143).) that all things would fall into nothingness without the hand of the Omnipotent holding them together. Whence his activity whereby he gives existence must not be intermittent, but rather, continuous. Whence John 5:17 says, my Father is working still, and I am working.

From all these things it can obviously be gathered that God is intimate with each thing, just as the proper existence of a reality is intimate to that very reality, which could neither begin nor endure except through God’s agency, through which he is joined to his work such that he might be in it.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the divine essence is not internal to the reality as though it were a part entering into its constitution, nonetheless it is within the reality as the agent and worker of the existence of each and every reality. And this must be so in every incorporeal agent, as is clear from things said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 2: What acts while being absent is not the proximate cause of what comes to be, but only the remote cause. For the power of the sun is first and principally in the body joined to it, and from there it goes on to the last body; and this power is its light, through which it acts in the lower bodies, as Avicenna says in the same context. (Avicenna, Sufficientia, bk. 1, ch. 2.) Likewise it is clear that a king when he commands is the first cause, but the one executing his precept is the proximate and conjoined cause. However, God immediately acts in all things; whence he must be in all things.

Reply Obj. 3: As is clear from things said in the previous article, a reality’s existence cannot be conserved without the cause of its being, just as neither can motion be conserved without a moving cause. Whence, if a reality’s existence were conserved without a certain agent, that agent will not be the cause of existing, but only of coming to be, the way the seal is the cause of the shape in the wax; whence the figure remains when the seal is removed. This is also like the builder mentioned. And this is an imperfect agent, so the argument is based on false premises.

Reply Obj. 4: There cannot be two proximate causes in reference to the same activity in the same way; but in diverse ways, this can occur. This is clear as follows. For an activity is traced back to a principle in two ways: to the agent itself, and to the agent’s power, by the mediation of which the activity comes forth from the agent.

However, to the degree that an agent is more proximate and immediate, so too is its power mediated; and the power of the first agent is the most immediate. This is clear in its termini: let there be three ordered causes—A, B, and C, such that C is last—that exercise an activity. It is certain, then, that C exercises the activity through its own power; and the fact that it is able to do this through its own power is through the power of B, and further, through the power of A. Whence if one asks whence does C act?, one answers: through its own power; and if one asks, whence does C act through its own power?, one answers: through the power of B; and so on until one traces it back to the power of the first cause, into which one must resolve questions, as the Philosopher teaches in the Posterior Analytics and the Physics. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.13, 78a25; 2.8, 93a5; 2.11, 94a20; Physics 2.3, 194b16–22; 195b22–25.)

And thus it is clear that, because God is the first cause of all things, his power is most immediate to all things. But because he himself is his own power, therefore he is not only the immediate principle of the activity in all things, but is immediately acting within all things; this does not occur in other causes, even though the individual realities have their own proper activities whereby they bring forth their effects.

Reply Obj. 5: “God is in a demon” should not be granted simply speaking, due to two causes. The first is that “demon” names not only a nature, but a deformed nature, the deformity of which God is not the agent. The second is that “demon” names an intellectual nature, so when one says, “God is in a demon,” it is understood in the manner in which an intellectual nature has the capacity for him: that is, through grace. Whence too we do not say simply speaking, “God is in a sinful man,” unless one adds “insofar as he is created,” or “through God’s essence, presence, and power.” With such addition one can also say, “God is in a demon.”

Article 2

Whether God is in all things through power, presence, and essence; in the saints through grace; in Christ through existence

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.8.3.) It seems that the modes wherein God is said to be in things (The five assigned modes are: by power, by presence, by essence, (in the holy) by grace, and (in Christ) by existence; see Sent. I, 37.1(164).2.) is not fittingly assigned.

Obj. 1: For when we say God is in things, we are assigning how God relates to things. But God relates to all things in one way, even though they do not relate to him in one way, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 3, para. 1 (PG 3:679).) Therefore it seems that there should be only one mode of God being in things.

Obj. 2: You might say that these modes are divided according to the diverse relations the created has to God.

On the contrary, every effect in a created thing causes some relation of the created thing to God. But God’s effects in created things are, as it were, infinite. Therefore God will be said to be in created things in an infinity of ways, and not merely five.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the aspects according to which created things are referred to God in diverse ways are not found in all created things. But some of these modes belong to everything created, that is, by essence, presence, and power. Therefore it seems that these modes do not differ according to diverse relations of the created thing to God.

Obj. 4: You might say that the modes are distinguished according to the diverse accounts of the divine attributes.

On the contrary, his power does not differ from his essence any more than do his knowledge and will. But to be in things through essence and power constitute two of the modes. Therefore they will similarly also be divided according to all his attributes.

On the contrary, they are stated in the text (Sent. I, 37.1(164).2–5.) and confirmed by authorities.

I answer that the distinction of these modes is taken partly from the side of the created, and partly from the side of God.

It is from the side of the created insofar as it is ordered to God and joined to him in diverse ways, not only by a diversity of account, but really. For because God is said to be in realities insofar as he is linked to them in some way, wherever there is a diverse mode of joining or linking there must be a diverse mode of existing. Now, what is created is joined to God in three ways. In the first mode, according to likeness only, insofar as in a created thing there is some likeness of the divine goodness, but not that it reaches God himself according to his substance. And such a joining is found in all created things through his essence, presence, and power.

In a second mode, the creature attains God himself, considered according to his own substance, and not merely according to a likeness. And this is through an activity, when someone by faith adheres to the first truth itself, and by charity to the highest Charity itself. And in this way, there is another mode whereby God is specifically in the saints through grace.

In a third mode, the creature attains God himself not only according to his activity, but even according to his existence—not indeed the way that existence is the act of the essence, since a creature cannot enter the divine nature, but insofar as it is the act of the hypostasis or person, into the union of which a creature has been assumed. And this is the ultimate mode, in which God is in Christ through union.

Moreover, on the side of God, insofar as his essence, power, and activity are distinguished in him, there is found no diversity in reality but a diversity in account only. Now, his essence, since it exists free from everything created, is not in what is created except insofar as it is linked to it through an activity. And insofar as he acts in a reality he is said to be in the reality through his presence, insofar as one who acts must be present in some way to what he brings about. And because the activity does not leave the divine power from which it goes, therefore he is said to be in the reality through his power. And because his power is his very essence, therefore it follows that he is also in the reality through his essence.

Reply Obj. 1: If we are speaking about real unity and diversity, then God relates to realities in one way. But because realities relate to him in diverse ways, God can be signified in diverse relations to the realities, insofar as relations founded in created things yield relations in God that are diverse in account. However, if unity and distinction are considered only according to account, then in this way God is related to realities in several ways, as a knower, as powerful, and so on for others.

Reply Obj. 2: An essential division is always through differences that through themselves divide something common; for example, the footed is divided, through itself, by the two-footed and four-footed, and not through the white and the black. Likewise, I say that God’s being in created things is divided, through itself, according to the diverse modes whereby created things attain God; and this is an essential and formal division. But if the diverse effects in created things are taken through themselves, in which effects God is present through only natural effects, then there will be found only one mode of attaining to God, that by which he is in all created things in common. And therefore this division is only incidental and material, and such a division is set aside by every art.

Reply Obj. 3: Those three modes are not drawn from a diversity of the created, but from the side of God himself acting in the realities. And therefore they follow upon every created thing, and they are also presupposed in the other modes. For he in whom God exists through union, he also exists through grace, and he in whom he exists through grace, he also exists through essence, presence, and power.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine attributes are considered only according to the triple order to realities: either according to activity, or to power, or to essence. And therefore there are only three modes of God existing in realities, which three are drawn from the diverse orders of comparison of God to the realities.

Question 2

How God is everywhere

Next it is asked how God is wherever he is said to be. And about this, three things are asked:

first, whether God is everywhere;

second, whether this belongs to him alone;

third, whether this belongs to him from eternity.

Article 1

Whether God is everywhere

To the first we proceed as follows. It seems that God is not everywhere. (Parallel texts: ST I.8.2; 16.7, ad 2; 52.2; SCG III.68; Quodl. XI, q. 1, a. 1.)

Obj. 1: For to be everywhere signifies being in every place. But, as Anselm says, (Anselm, Monologion, ch. 22 (PL 158:176).) if usage were to allow it, it would be more appropriate to say that God is with every place, rather than in every place. Therefore it seems that “God is everywhere” is not said properly.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as “time” names a certain measure, so does “place.” But, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 221a6.) to be in time is to be measured by a certain part of time. Therefore to be in place signifies to be measured by place. But God is without measure. Therefore he is not in place.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one can object based on the authority of Anselm, (Anselm, Monologion, ch. 22 (PL 158:176).) who says that everything in place and time follows the laws of place and time.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as successive things stand to time, so do enduring things stand to place. But in successive things, one indivisible, and one indivisible activity, cannot be at diverse times. Therefore neither can one enduring indivisible thing be in diverse places. But God is indivisible. Therefore he is not everywhere.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, no bodily condition can belong to God, except metaphorically. But to be in a place is a condition of a natural body, so much so that place is not given even to mathematical bodies, except by way of likeness, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 323a1–a3.) Therefore much more so does being in a place, or being everywhere, not befit God, except metaphorically.

On the contrary, God is in all realities, as was said in a previous article. (Above, q. 1, a. 1.) But every place is a certain reality. Therefore God is in every place, and therefore everywhere.

I answer that to be “in” something belongs to spiritual and bodily things in diverse ways. For a body is in something as contained, the way wine is in a vessel, whereas a spiritual substance is in something as containing and conserving it. The reason for this is that by its own essence the bodily, which is limited on all sides by the boundaries of quantity, is determined to a place, and consequently its power and activity is in a place. But a spiritual substance, which is altogether free from position and quantity, has an essence that is not altogether limited by a place. Whence it is in place only through its activity, and as a consequence its power and essence is in a place.

Therefore one should say that, if “to be in this place” is being taken according to how a body is said to be in a place, then being everywhere does not belong to God, except metaphorically. For he fills a place, as does a body in a place, yet not by an interval of dimensions, but by the causality of his effects. However, if “to be in a place” is taken through the mode wherein a spiritual substance is said to be in a place, then to be in a place belongs to God most properly—and not, of course, as being measured by the place, but as giving the place the nature of locating and containing things; this is just as he is said to be in a man insofar as he gives the nature of humanity to a man. And he is said to be in every reality insofar as he gives the realities their proper existence and nature.

Reply Obj. 1–3, 5: The responses are clear for the first two and for the authority of Anselm, and even for the fifth, which objections all proceed according to the manner in which a body is said to be in a place.

Reply Obj. 4: The indivisible of succession is spoken of in two ways. Either it is what is wholly free from succession, so that “indivisible” is taken negatively, like “eternity”; and such an indivisible can be in diverse times, indeed it is in all time. For the unvaried “now” of eternity is present to all parts of time. Or it is the terminus of a succession, like an instant of time and whatever is measured by that instant. And this cannot be in several times. Likewise, the indivisible of dimension is spoken of in two ways. Either it is what is wholly free from dimension, like a spiritual substance; and being in all or several places is not unfitting for such. Or it is the terminus of a dimension, like a point; and because such is determined to a site, it cannot be in several places. And therefore, setting aside the imagination, let us not think of the indivisibility of an incorporeal substance—like God or an angel or the soul, or even that of matter—as like the indivisibility of a point. For, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Trinity, bk. 1, ch. 2 (PL 64:1250).) in intellectual things one must not be led to the imagination.

Article 2

Whether to be everywhere belongs to God alone

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, q. 3, a. 2; ST I.8.4; 52.2; 112.1; SCG IV.17; Quodl. XI, q. 1, a. 1; Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 3, lect. 1.) It seems that being everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 1: For it is heretical to assert that first matter is God, or that God is universal being, as some do assert. But the universal is everywhere and always, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.31, 88b.33.) and so is first matter, which is in every body, whereby every place is filled, since nothing is empty, as the philosophers prove. (Aristotle, Physics 4.8–9, 214b12–217b28.) Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is certain number in all the things numbered. But all the parts of the universe are numbered. Therefore a collective number is in the whole universe, and thus it is everywhere.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, De immortalitate animae, ch. 16, para. 25 (CSEL 89; PL 32:1034).) the entire soul is in each of the parts of the body. But God had been able to create only one ensouled body. Therefore its soul would have been everywhere. But what belongs to God alone is shared with nothing created. Therefore to be everywhere does not belong to God alone.

On the contrary, in the text Ambrose proves (Sent. I, 37.1(164).5, quoting Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, bk. 1, ch. 7, para. 81 (CSEL 79:48; PL 16:724).) that the Holy Spirit is God because he is everywhere. But this proof would be worthless unless being everywhere belongs to God alone. Therefore to be everywhere belongs to God alone.

I answer that to be everywhere, if it be taken through itself, belongs to God alone, nor is it communicable to anything created; but in an incidental way it can belong to something created.

Now, this incidental being-everywhere can be considered in two ways: either on the side of what is in the place, or on the side of the place. If considered on the side of what is in the place, then, because what is attributed to a thing by reason of its parts belongs to the whole incidentally or in a posterior way, it is certain that what is in diverse places according to its diverse parts is not primarily and through itself in those places; rather, it is in only one place. Whence, if there were an infinite body, it would be everywhere in an incidental way, insofar as it will be said to be where its parts are, and not through itself, since it itself would not be, through itself, where its part is.

If it be considered on the side of the place, then something can incidentally be everywhere in that there is no place that the thing is not in, but if there were many other places, it would not be everywhere; for example, if it were given that there were only one place in the universe, and one man in it. However, to be everywhere belongs to God through himself, since he himself as a whole is in each and every place, and were there an infinity of other places in existence, he would be in all of them. And this is not communicable to anything created unless being of infinite power could be communicated to it.

Reply Obj. 1–3: The response to all the objections is clear. For to be everywhere belongs to all those things incidentally, either because they are so according to their diverse parts, or because there are not more places, or because they are not in many things according to one existence, like the universal and lowest matter, which is in diverse things according to different ways of existing. Of course, a number is not in place through itself, and yet, according to what is in place, a number is not wholly in one place; rather, it is in diverse places according to its diverse parts.

Article 3

Whether to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity.

Obj. 1: This is first because of what Ambrose says, in the text: (Sent. I, 37.1(164).5, quoting Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, bk. 1, ch. 7, para. 81 (CSEL 79:48; PL 16:724).) that he is in all things and everywhere always, which is proper to the divinity. But what is always is eternal. Therefore to be everywhere belongs to God from eternity.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as “everywhere” is distributed over place, so too “always” is distributed over time. But God is always from eternity, even without times existing. Therefore he is also everywhere from eternity, even without any places existing.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Master here orders God’s existence in things in parallel with the existence of the things in God. But things were in God from eternity, for he has an eternal knowledge of things. Therefore so too God is in things, and everywhere, from eternity.

On the contrary, whatever something is in, that thing must exist, since absolutely nothing is in nothing. But neither place nor any reality has existed from eternity. Therefore neither does it belong to God to be everywhere, or in realities, from eternity.

I answer that when one says, “God is everywhere,” one indicates a certain relation of God to what is created, one founded on a certain activity whereby God is said to be in real things. Now, every relation founded on any activity going forth into created things is said of God only from time, like Lord, Creator, and the like. For such relations are actual, and require each of the extremes actually to exist. Therefore just as he is not said to act on realities from eternity, so neither is he said to exist in realities from eternity, since this designates his activity.

Reply Obj. 1: Ambrose is taking “God being everywhere always” with created things in existence. For what always exists on the side of God is that in which nothing is new, whereas defection is on the side of the created, which has not always existed. Whence he cannot be signified from eternity as being in a relation to what is created, as acting on it.

Reply Obj. 2: From the force of the word, “always” indicates a certain absence of deficiency, and eternity holds this wholeness simultaneously, whereas time divides it through the succession of diverse things. And therefore “always” can indicate the absence of deficiency that exists through continuous succession—and then it is distributed over time periods; nor does being always befit what is from eternity, since succession and time did not exist from eternity.

Or “always” can signify eternity’s absence of deficiency, and in this way being always does befit what is from eternity. But “everywhere” includes places in its account, so there is not a similar account for “everywhere” and “always”; for “where” is to be in place, and “everywhere” to be in every place.

Reply Obj. 3: Just as motion receives its account from its terminus, so too does relation. Now, when God is said to be in real things, one indicates God’s relation to created realities in reference to the divine activity’s coming forth into them, since they are not eternal, nor can the eternal be in them. But when a reality is said to be in God, one indicates the created thing’s relation to God, not in reference to its coming forth from him, but more according to the created thing’s union to its principle. And because the principle is eternal, therefore also his knowing is eternal, and the reality is in God from eternity. For God is in realities in a temporal way through the mode of the realities, but the realities are in God from eternity through the mode of God. For everything in something else is in it through the mode of the latter, not through its own mode.

Exposition of the first part of the text

In the same way, God, although he is essentially and entirely in all, is nonetheless said to be more fully in those in whom he dwells. (Sent. I, 37.2(165).2.) One asks for the reason for this difference. And one should answer that the other created things, even though they follow on the divine likeness through God’s very activity, still do not attain God himself as supposit. And therefore, although God is in them, still they themselves are not with God. But the rational creature, through grace, attains God himself, insofar as he loves and knows him; this is why he is said to be “with God,” and for the same reason he is said to have “the capacity for God,” as having the capacity for his own perfection, through the mode of an object. And on account of this he is also called “the temple of God,” and God is said “to dwell in him.”

As we understand many things about God which we are almost entirely unable to utter, so also we say many things which we are not capable of understanding. (Sent. I, 37.3(166).4, quoting John Chrysostom, In Epistolam ad Hebraeos (Mutiani scholasticis interpretatio), hom. 2, n. 1 (PG 63:244).) The reason for this difference is that a cause always exceeds its effect. Now, in some things speech causes understanding, as in things that are learned through a discipline; whence it is possible that the intellect of the learner does not reach the full power of the speech, and then it can be said that the things one hears he does not understand. And this is similar to matters that are purely of the faith, which exceed the human intellect; for faith is from hearing, according to Romans 10:14–17. However, sometimes understanding is the cause of the speech, as in matters that are known by discovery; whence in such matters understanding exceeds speech, and many things are understood that cannot be expressed well.

Not because God’s essence is strictly speaking in every place. (Sent. I, 37.3(166).5.) In this, those who have taken “being in place” in the way in which a body is in a place have erred; this is why they said that God’s essence is not properly speaking in place, but he is said to be in place by his essence insofar as every essence is from him, and insofar as he acts on them through the power of his essence. But this is not enough; rather, one must add the things noted above in the previous article.

It is also usual for them to ask how God can be substantially present in all things. (Sent. I, 37.4(167).1.) This is a foolish question. For it is not necessary that everything that touches something else be changed by what it touched unless they be things that act on and are acted on by each other mutually, as is said in On Generation and Corruption; (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 1.6, 322b25‒32.) and such are things that agree in their matter. This is why the sphere of the moon is not changed by the fire in contact with it. And therefore it is foolish to say that the divine essence is polluted by the impure realities to which it is linked in its activity.

Division of the second part of the text

Having shown that God is everywhere, here he excludes from God two things that follow upon what is created existing in place: that is, localization and motion. And this is divided into three parts: in the first part, he proposes what he intends—namely, that the divine essence neither moves nor is localized; in the second, he shows that these two things belong to everything created, at in Scripture, something is said to be local . . . in these two ways; (Sent. I, 37.6(169).1.) in the third, he proves that each of these is absent from God, at and so let us profess that the divine nature, because of its immensity, is never absent. (Sent. I, 37.9(172).1.)

The second part is divided into two: in the first of which he shows that localization belongs to everything created, either through circumscription and definition, as for a body, or through definition alone, as for a spirit. He also shows that two motions belong to a body: through time and through place—but to a spirit belongs only one, motion through time. In the second part he asks whether even motion through place might belong to a spirit, at as to change of place, however, a great debate occurs among researchers. (Sent. I, 37.7(170).2.)

About this latter he does three things: in the first, he presents the opinion of the others, and their argument; in the second, he considers that argument, at but as we said above, a thing is said to be local or circumscribable in two ways; (Sent. I, 37.7(170).3.) in the third, he presents his own opinion, and confirms it, at and so created spirits are in a place. (Sent. I, 37.8(171).1.)

And so let us profess that the divine nature, because of its immensity, is never absent. (Sent. I, 37.9(172).1.) Here he proves the two things mentioned above to not be present in God. And with regard to this, he does three things: first, he shows what is proposed, based on authorities; second, he presents an objection, and answers it, at but to this, some usually make the following objection; (Sent. I, 37.9(172).3.) third, he concludes the matters discussed, at it seems to have been already sufficiently demonstrated how all things are said to be in God and God in all things. (Sent. I, 37.9(172).4.)

Here there are two questions:

first, about the place of an angel; (Q. 3.)

second, about its motion (Q. 4.)—for the immutability of God, and how he is everywhere, has been explained above, (Above, q. 2, a. 1.) and to treat of the motion and place of bodies does not pertain to the theologian, but to the physicist.

Question 3

The place of an angel

About the first, three things are asked:

first, whether an angel is in a place;

second, whether one angel can be in many places at once;

third, whether many angels can be in one place.

Article 1

Whether an angel is in a place

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.52.1; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 19, ad 2; Quodl. I, q. 3, a. 1.) It seems that an angel is not in a place.

Obj. 1: For Boethius says, it is a common conception of the mind among all the wise that incorporeal things are not in place. (Boethius, Hebdomads, axiom (PL 64:1311B).) But angels are incorporeal and immaterial, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7, para. 1 (PL 3:206).) Therefore angels are not in a place.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a place is not appropriate for what is altogether free from position and dimension, except incidentally, as is clear with first matter. But an angel’s essence is altogether free from position and dimension, as all agree who say they are incorporeal. Therefore place is not owed to an angel except incidentally. But it is not in a place incidentally except when it has assumed a body. Therefore it seems that when it does not assume a body it is not in a place.

Obj. 3: You might say that it is in a place through its activity.

On the contrary, whatever belongs to something through something else must belong to the latter; for example, if an animal is in a place through its being a body, it must belong to a body to be in a place. But being in a place is attributed to no activity through itself. Therefore an angel cannot be in a place through its activity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if being in a place belongs to it through its activity, this is only insofar as it acts on some place. But angels do not always act on bodily things. Therefore at certain times they would be nowhere. Nor are they everywhere, since this is proper to God. (See above, q. 2, a. 2.) Therefore they are nowhere—which seems absurd.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, if an angel is in a place through its activity, then it is also definitively in the place, since its activity is defined and made determinate in reference to the place. But likewise a certain activity of God is defined in reference to a certain place, outside of which he does not exercise that activity; this is clear in his resurrection of someone who has died. Therefore it seems that even God would be definitively in a place.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, philosophers have also asserted that the activities of the intelligences are on things that are here below, and yet they have not said that an intelligence is in any place; indeed, Plato asserted that the ideas are neither under the heavens nor outside the heavens, since they are not in a place, as is said in Physics 3. (Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 203a8.) Therefore neither are angels said to be in a place through their activity.

On the contrary, it is said in the Collect, your holy angels dwell in them, they who are our guardians in peace. (From the Collect for the hour of Compline.) And Damascene also says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 13 (PG 94:851).) that where they act, there they are; and it is easy to prove this by many other authorities.

I answer that there are three opinions about this. One opinion is that of the philosophers, that the intelligences or angels are in no way in a place. For they assert that an intelligence is a certain essence stripped from matter and from all material conditions, and that an intelligence moves the sphere of the cosmos through a soul joined to that very sphere, as being desired by it. And therefore it has no linkage to the body or to a place, since it does not immediately act on that body.

But this opinion is heretical, since according to our faith, we assert that angels immediately act on us.

And therefore others say that a place is owed by God to an angel itself, even as regards its own essence, and that it is not intelligible that an angel exist unless it exist in a place. Nonetheless, they say that an angel is not in a place by circumscription, but definitively, since it is determined to some place in such a way that it is in this place such that it is not in another place. For since its essence is finite, in that it is created, it must be understood to be determined to some place.

But this is a rather shallow proof, since it is based on an equivocation on “end.” For when one says that an angel’s essence is “finite,” “end” (finis) is being taken for the end of the essence and power, the way even a definition is called a “terminus,” and not for the end of a dimension. Now, a place is called an “ending” or “finite” according to the termini of dimensive quantity. However, “end” taken in each sense holds no commensuration or proportion with the other, so it is not necessary that what is finite in essence is ended at the termini of a place.

Moreover, that a thing would be determined to some place is only insofar as it is in some mode linked to that place and not to another. But this linkage is understood either according to position and contact, or according to form, or according to some activity. Linkage according to form is as the soul is in the body—in which way an angel cannot be in a real place, since it is not the act of a body. Linkage according to determinate position is as a point is in a line that it determines—in which way an angel is not in a place, since its essence is wholly free from position. Linkage according to contact is as a body is in a place. Now, contact is spoken of in two ways: properly and metaphorically. To touch, properly speaking, is to have limits together; and it is clear that this cannot occur with an angel. However, metaphorical touch is through an action, as when something sad is said to touch us; and such touch can occur for an angel.

Therefore what is left is that an angel cannot be defined or determined to any place except through action and activity. But I am speaking of activity in a common way, insofar as an angel stands to a body contained in a place through the mode of watching over it and ministering to it, or in some mode of an agent or patient. And this is the third opinion, which asserts that an angel is in a place insofar as it is linked to some place through its activity. And this is confirmed by the authority of Gregory of Nyssa, who expressly says this; (Gregory of Nyssa, De anima (PG 45:218).) so too he adds that, because we should say, ‘it acts here,’ we speak against usage when we say, ‘it is here.’ And therefore in following this opinion—which seems the more reasonable one—I say that an angel, and every incorporeal substance, cannot be in a body, or in a place, except through its activity that causes some effect in it—whether by watching over it, or by ministering to it, or in some way acting on it, as was said—or even there is brought about in it, due to a body, what happens only in the passion of spirits, so nothing about this is relevant. But it makes an effect in a place in many ways.

For a spiritual substance cannot confer existence, of course, but it can confer something additional to existence. And thus, an angel is in a place insofar as it acts on some body in a place, or in motion, or gives some bodily light, or something else of this sort. Yet it cannot confer existence on it. Indeed, sometimes a spiritual substance, through its own activity, gives existence to a body—yet not its own existence, but another existence—and in this way God is in all created things to which he gives existence, but not his own existence.

But at other times a spiritual substance gives a body its very own existence, but this can happen in two ways, because existence is both the act of form and the act of a hypostasis. Whence a spiritual substance can confer its own existence on a bodily reality insofar as it is the act of a form, such that the form becomes that of the bodily reality itself; and in this way the soul is in the body. Or it can confer its own existence insofar as it is the act of a hypostasis, and not that of form; and in this way the human nature in Christ was taken up into the existence of the divine person, since the union was accomplished in the hypostasis, and no confusion in nature occurred.

Reply Obj. 1: “Place” names a measure, so to be in a place, properly speaking, signifies as being in a measure. And thus, to be in a place belongs to no incorporeal reality, that is, such that it is in the place; nonetheless to be in a place does belong to an incorporeal reality, not in such a way that it is in the place, but as one acting is in what it acts on, or as a form is in its matter. Whence too an angel is not said to be localized except in a certain respect, insofar as it has something like a localized reality—namely, that it be determined to this place rather than to that one.

Reply Obj. 2: To be in place precisely as in place belongs to an angel only incidentally, insofar as a body has been assumed, or the body to which it is linked in acting is in a place. But to be in a place as one acting is in what it acts on belongs to an angel even through itself, insofar as it acts through itself on the place, just as first matter is also through itself in a place, or in what has a place as its part. And so too a point through itself is in a place as a terminus, but not as having a place.

Reply Obj. 3: Not even an angel’s activity is in a place as having a place, but as the perfection of what has a place. For the activity of the agent is always the perfection of the patient as such.

Reply Obj. 4: I do not judge it unfitting that an angel can exist without a place, and not in a place, when it has no activity on a place. Nor is it unfitting that then it would be said to be nowhere or in no place, just as it is not unfitting that one might say it is colored with no color. But this is nonetheless not imaginable, since imagination does not transcend the continuous.

Reply Obj. 5: An angel is definitively in a place through its own activity, but God is not. For the activity of God himself, even if it be determined to a place insofar as it goes through with its work, still it is not determined to a place insofar as it goes forth from the one acting; for in this way he would accomplish here what he also accomplishes elsewhere. But the activity of an angel is defined to a place in both ways, since it does not accomplish elsewhere what it is accomplishing here, as will be explained in the next article.

Reply Obj. 6: What acts need not be in what it acts on or is linked to unless it acts in it immediately. Now, the philosophers asserted that the activity of an intelligence does not reach the things that are here below except by the mediation of the motion of the heavenly spheres, and it does not reach the sphere except by the mediation of the latter’s soul, which they said is in the sphere. And therefore it follows that the intelligence is wholly free from body and from place.

Article 2

Whether an angel can be in several places simultaneously

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In IV Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 2; ST I.8.2, ad 2; I.52.2; I.112.1; Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 10, ad 18.) It seems that an angel can be in several places simultaneously.

Obj. 1: For every body is more determined to a place than is an angel. But a certain body is in several places simultaneously, such as Christ’s body on multiple altars. Therefore much more so can an angel be in several places simultaneously.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, when an angel assumes a body, it is certain that it immediately moves each part of it; otherwise its motion would be disordered and unlike an animal’s motion. But an angel is wherever it immediately acts. Therefore an angel is in the individual parts of that body, and thus it seems that it is simultaneously in several places.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the empyrean heaven is appropriate to the angels according to their activity of contemplation. But when they are active here around us, they do not cease to contemplate. Therefore they are simultaneously here and in the empyrean heaven, and so are in multiple places.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every agent whose power exceeds that on which it acts can also act on something else. But an angel’s power exceeds this body on which it acts. Therefore its power can also act on another, and thus it can be in several places; but where the angel acts, there it exists.

On the contrary, Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 3 (PG 94:870).) that while they are in heaven, they are not on earth; thus, it seems that they are not in several places at once.

Furthermore, in the text it is asserted and proved (Sent. I, 37.6(169).2; 7(170).3.) that an angel is in a place in a definitive way. But what is in several places is defined or determined to no place. Therefore an angel is not in several places.

I answer that there are diverse opinions about this. For some have said that an angel can be in several places simultaneously, but not everywhere, as God can, whereas a body is only in one place. But this has been judged an error by the masters, since it would follow that an angel would be neither definitively nor circumscriptively in a place. This is why others say that an angel is in an indivisible place, since they assert that place is appropriate to an angel’s essence according to itself; whence, because its essence is indivisible, its place must be indivisible. But they fall into this error because they are unable to transcend their imagination, so that they understand something indivisible only as having a position in something continuous.

Therefore one should say that an angel is in only one place, but that place can be divisible or indivisible, and great or small, insofar as its activity is immediately terminated at something great or small. Whence, if it acts immediately on an entire house, the entire house corresponds to it as one place, such that it will be in each and every part of it; this is like how we also say that the soul is in each and every part of the body. And I say “immediately” because, were an angel to move a stone due to the motion of which many other things are moved, it would not be necessary that the angel would be anywhere but where the thing first moved is. This is clear even with a bodily mover, which necessarily touches only that which is immediately moved by it.

Moreover, this is why I say that it cannot be in several places simultaneously, because its nature is finite, and consequently its power is finite. Now, it is impossible that anything but one activity come forth from one finite power. However, an activity is one that is terminated at one thing brought about, and therefore what is brought about by an angel must be one thing on which it immediately acts. Whence, just as the soul is not simultaneously in several bodies, so neither is an angel is several places.

However, to God alone belongs being in several, and in all, places, because his power is infinite. And although his activity is one insofar as it is in his very self—which action is his very self—nonetheless, the effects of his activity are infinite, insofar he himself is the principle giving existence, and consequently the one creating all other things that are added over and above existence. Whence he is in all things not only as in one thing brought about, but as in several; for even the things whereby the realities on which he acts are distinguished from each other are from him.

Reply Obj. 1: Christ’s body is in several places neither insofar as it is a body nor insofar as it is united to the divinity. Rather, it has this by reason of the consecration and transubstantiation, insofar as the diverse pieces of bread that are transubstantiated into it are themselves in diverse places; and also because the substance of the bread turns into the body of Christ with its accidents remaining, and thereby the quantity of each bread remains, and as a consequence, the place of each as well. And the same thing would happen in whatever other piece of bread were to be transubstantiated by the divine power.

Reply Obj. 2: That entire assumed body is paired with the angel as one indivisible “location,” insofar as there is one activity in respect to it. Whence, although it is in every part of the assumed body itself, it is not necessary that it be in several places.

Reply Obj. 3: An activity is, as it were, intermediate between the one acting and what it brings about. Whence it can be considered either insofar as it goes out from the one acting, or insofar as it is terminated at what is brought about. Now, place is not appropriate to an angel’s activity insofar as it goes out from its essence, which according to itself is independent of place, but rather, according to the object at which it is terminated. And therefore no bodily place is appropriate to the angel’s contemplative activity, since the object of the contemplation is spiritual. And therefore the empyrean heaven is not necessary to the contemplation; rather, it is assigned to their contemplation as befitting it, insofar as that place has been sanctified for the glory of the blessed, just as even a church is said to be the place for an angel’s contemplation more than a marketplace is. Whence it is not necessary that, whenever it contemplates, it is in the empyrean heaven.

Reply Obj. 4: An angel’s power, even though it exceeds the thing it brings about by, as it were, an excess of continuous quantity—in that it could bring about something greater—still it does not exceed it by an excess of discrete quantity. For it can act on only one thing, whether that thing be great or small.

Article 3

Whether several angels can be in one place

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.52.3; On the Power of God, q. 3, a. 7, ad 11; a. 19, ad 1; Quodl. I, q. 3, a. 1, ad 2.) It seems that several angels can be simultaneously in one place.

Obj. 1: For a body fills a place more than does a spirit. But where a body is, there also an angel can be. Therefore much less does an angel’s being in a place impede another being there as well.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Contra epistulam Manichaei quam vocant fundamenti, ch. 16 (CSEL 25:213; PL 42:184–85); De immortalitate animae, ch. 16, para. 25 (CSEL 89; PL 32:1034).) the soul is in each and every part of the body. But the demons and the angels, even though they do not penetrate our minds, do still penetrate bodies, as the saints say. Therefore it seems that an angel and a soul can be in the same place, and for the same reason so can one angel and another.

Obj. 3: You might say that this cannot occur, lest the angels blend together.

On the contrary, blending is opposed more to a greater distinction. But a created spirit is distinct from the uncreated Spirit more than one created spirit is from another. Therefore, since they are where God himself is, without any blending thereby, within whom they run wherever they are sent, as is said in the text, (Sent. I, 37.8(171).1, quoting Bede, In Lucae evangelium expositio, bk. 1, ch. 1 (CCSL 120; PL 92:313).) it seems that two angels can be together in one place.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as an angel acts on a body, so also an angel acts on another angel, since the higher ones illuminate the lower ones, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 8 (PG 3:238).) But through the fact that one acts on a place, it is said to be in the place. Therefore, through the fact that it acts on an angel, it is said to be in that angel. And thus it seems that two angels can be in one place.

On the contrary, just as a body stands toward being circumscriptively in a place, so too an angel stands toward being definitively in a place. But two bodies are not circumscribed by the same place. Therefore neither are two angels definitively related to one place.

Furthermore, there are not two souls of one body, and yet the soul is a spiritual substance, just as an angel is. Therefore it seems that neither can two angels be in one and the same place.

I answer that “place” can be taken properly and metaphorically. The spiritual place of an angel is called a “place” metaphorically; this is God himself, who contains it, based on a likeness with place. And in this way all the angels, indeed all beings, are in one place—that is, in God, because he contains all things. But we are not speaking about place in this way now, but about “place” properly said, which is bodily place. And in this way I say, following the common opinion, that several angels cannot be simultaneously in one place.

The reason for this should be drawn from the side of the activity according to which the angel is said to be in a place. For according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 4.4, 211a11.) a thing is defined most beautifully when, through its definition, the nature of the reality is made manifest, all its consequent properties are demonstrated, and all the relevant puzzles are resolved. Therefore, following this, one should say that it is impossible that the same thing be acted upon and be moved in the same respect by diverse agents or movers, if each of them has a complete power for bringing about that effect. But this does happen when several things move a thing in the power of one mover, each of them being an incomplete mover; this is clear, for example, in those together pulling a ship. And this is because by a complete agent a patient is led to the complete act, and when this is possessed it does not remain in potency to receive anything more.

Now, one angel, acting in the power of the divine command, is of sufficient power to bring to act the whole thing that, by the divine power, is to be accomplished in any body, over and above its bodily acts, for the activities of which angels are not sent. And therefore it cannot be that the activities of two angels would come together immediately to accomplish the same thing. And therefore they cannot be in the same place, since one of them would be superfluous. Whence the philosophers, based on Aristotle, (See Metaphysics 12.8, 1073a32‒b16.) also did not attribute more than one mover to one heavenly sphere.

Reply Obj. 1: It does not impede the filling of a place that there could be several angels simultaneously in one place. But the blending of their activities, which in a way would redound to the blending of their power and essence, does.

Reply Obj. 2: The soul is in the body as a form giving existence, and as effecting its natural activities. But an angel is in a body as effecting supernatural activities, and therefore no blending together of activities would arise, since the activities are not of one account.

Reply Obj. 3: This too is clear, because God is in realities as giving existence to all, and as acting in every acting power; and therefore his activity and the activity of an angel have different accounts, so no blending follows.

Reply Obj. 4: As is said commonly, an angel illuminating an angel is not active within that angel’s essence, since it is not the cause of its existence; and the received light is not received in its existence. And therefore it is said to be active, as it were, exteriorly, in the mode of suggesting. And likewise, even though the angel’s effect is not received within the body’s existence, of which it is not the cause, nonetheless it is received within its dimensions, by reason of which the angel can be called “internal” to the body—but not to the soul or to another angel. Whence it does not follow that it is in an angel, or with the angel in one place.

Question 4

The motion of an angel

Next, we ask about an angel’s motion. And as regards this, three things are asked:

first, whether an angel moves;

second, whether in its motion it traverses what is intermediate;

third, whether its motion is in time, or in an instant.

Article 1

Whether an angel moves

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.53.1.) It seems that an angel does not move.

Obj. 1: For, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 3.2, 201b32.) motion is the act of the unperfected, since it is the act of what exists in potency as such. But an angel is perfected, and especially a blessed angel. Therefore it does not move.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever moves, moves with a certain species of motion. But when one enumerates all the species of motion and change, it is clear that none belong to an angel, except perhaps alteration and change of place. For an angel does not grow or shrink, since it is not quantified; nor is it generated and corrupted, since within it there is no contrariety, such that it might be corrupted through itself (since nothing is corrupted through itself except by reason of a contrariety), and it is subsistent through itself, such that it is not corrupted incidentally, since something corrupted incidentally is corrupted upon the corruption of what it is in as its subject. But it does not move by an alteration or a change of place. Therefore in no way does it move. However, that it would not be altered can be proved as follows. For, as the Philosopher shows, (Aristotle, Physics 7.3, 245b19‒248b27.) alteration is only in reference to sensible qualities, and the sensitive part of the soul. But these are absent from an angel, so an angel does not alter. Likewise, it seems that it does not move in place, since every local motion seems to be on account of a need. But an angel, especially a blessed one, stands in need of nothing. Therefore it does not move locally.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it moves in reference to place, then it moves from A to B, and let B be that to which it changes first. Therefore, when it is moving, either it is in A or B or both. But it is not moving when in A, since here it is beginning to move and the starting point of a motion is not a motion. Nor again is it moving when in B, since there it has already changed, but nothing is moving and has changed at the same time. Therefore while it is moving it must be simultaneously in both places. But it cannot as a whole be simultaneously in two places, as has been proved. (Above, q. 3, a. 2.) Therefore it must be partly in A and partly in B. Therefore it is divisible—which is incongruous.

Obj. 4: You might say that it is not moving in place through itself, but incidentally.

On the contrary, whatever is moving in place incidentally moves according to the motion of what it is in. But an angel is in that on which it acts. Therefore it moves incidentally according to that thing’s motion. But just as what an angel is in moves, so does what God is in. Therefore God will also move according to place—which is incongruous, since God moves neither through himself nor incidentally, as is proved in the Physics. (Aristotle, Physics 8.6, 258b15; 259b23.) Therefore also for the same reason an angel will move neither through itself nor incidentally.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the things that are explained metaphorically about God and angels should not be attributed to them simply speaking. But Dionysius explains (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 15 (PG 3:327).) the ascent and descent of the angels as being among the metaphors. Therefore it seems that local motion should not be attributed to an angel simply speaking.

On the contrary, what is proper to something belongs to it alone. But unchangeability, as was said in an earlier distinction, (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, a. 1.) is proper to God. Therefore it does not belong to an angel. Therefore it can move.

Furthermore, everything that is here and there, and not both simultaneously, moves according to place. But an angel is not simultaneously in two places, as has been shown. (Above, q. 3, a. 2.) Therefore, since one and the same angel is found in the Scriptures acting in diverse places, and so too is it found being in them (since it exists where it acts)—for example, in Luke 1:11 and 26 we read of Gabriel, who addressed Zachariah in the temple and then Mary in Nazareth—it seems that an angel moves according to place.

I answer that three sorts of motion are found attributed to an angel in what is handed down by the saints. The first motion is according to the illuminations descending from God into the angel’s mind; this is called a “motion” metaphorically. And Dionysius hands on this motion (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 8 (PG 3:703).) and distinguishes it by three species, circular, rectilinear, and oblique motion.

Now, an angel’s motion is called “circular” insofar as the intellectual light descends into the angel’s intellect by taking its origin from God; and through this light the angel’s intellect ascends to the contemplation of God. Thus this motion is from and to the same place, and is uniform, insofar as that light does not depart from the simplicity of the intellect.

However, the motion is called “rectilinear” when the angel transmits a light received from God to the lower angels, as though according to a straight line.

But its motion is called “oblique” insofar as one considers the light’s going forth from God into the angel’s mind, and then that light is reflected to the lower angels, to whom it transmits its own light, and through that light the lower angels are not led back to the higher angel as to an end, but to God. And such a motion is, as it were, composed of the rectilinear and the circular, like the motion that would occur from a bow and arrow, from one thing back to itself. For such a motion is oblique insofar as it departs from the uniformity of the received light, which is not similarly in the secondary angels the way it is in the primary ones.

The second motion is through time; Augustine points out this motion, as is noted in the text. (Sent. I, 37.6(169).1, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 26 (CCSL 28.1.265; PL 34:391).) And because time is the measure of successive things, he calls every succession a “motion through time.” Now, succession is found in the angel’s intellect; this becomes clear as follows. Every intellect that knows through diverse species cannot actually know them simultaneously, as is clear from things previously determined. (Above, d. 25, q. 1, a. 2.) But an angel’s intellect can know realities in two ways, that is, by two species: either in the contemplation of the Word, which is one likeness of all realities—and in this way it can simultaneously see many things; or through the innate or co-created species of realities, which are implanted in it—and the species of many things are themselves many, so according to those species it cannot know many things simultaneously. Whence, according to this latter mode there is succession in the angel’s intellect, and this succession is called a “motion,” taken in a broad sense.

Yet this differs from motion in its proper sense, in at least two ways. First, it is not from a potency into act, but from an act into an act. Second, it is not continuous, for a motion is continuous due to the continuity of that over which the motion occurs, as is proved in Physics 5. (Aristotle, Physics 5.4, 228a21‒b11.) But there is not any continuum between two understood species, but only succession. And this same succession is what is being called a “motion.” And a similar account can be given of the succession of affections.

The third motion is according to place, which is also in the text (Sent. I, 37.8(171).1; Bede, In Lucae evangelium expositio, bk. 1, ch. 1 (CCSL 120; PL 92:313); Ambrose, On the Holy Spirit, bk. 1, ch. 10, paras. 115–16 (CCSL 79:65; PL 16:761).) attributed to them on the authority of Ambrose and Bede. And because to move in place follows on being in place, therefore moving in place belongs to the angel in the same way as does being in place; and both of these are equivocally said, compared to bodily things. For an angel is said to be in a place insofar as it is linked to a place through its activity; and because it is not simultaneously in diverse places, the succession of such activities whereby it is said to be in diverse places is called its “motion.” Whence just as the conceptions of the intellect are related in a sequence, but without continuity, so too are its activities. Whence the local motion of the angel is not continuous; rather, its very activities related sequentially to diverse places, according to which it is said to be in them, are called its local motion.

Reply Obj. 1: Motion, taken properly, is always of what exists in potency, but sometimes the very activity of a thing, like understanding or sensing, is improperly called its “motion.” And in this case, motion is the act of the perfected, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.7, 431a7.) Now, an activity is different from a motion, as is clear from Ethics 10; (See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 10.4, 1174a15‒1175a22.) and this is how Dionysius takes “motion,” that is, for an activity, as regards the first mode of motion, which has three parts, according to him. But the other two modes of motion assert a certain imperfection in the angel, which imperfection is nonetheless not opposed to its beatitude. Now, this imperfection can be considered if it is compared to God, who simultaneously sees all things and is simultaneously everywhere by one and the same thing in his essence. In this the angel falls short of God’s perfection, and therefore it goes from place to place as regards the third mode of its motion, and from one concept to another concept as regards the second.

Reply Obj. 2: The first mode of an angel’s motion is not traced back to any species of motion. For it is called “motion” metaphorically, because it does not go from one thing to another, since the angel always remains in the reception of the divine light. But the second mode has a certain likeness with the motion of alteration.

And because it is objected that alteration is according to sensible qualities, one should answer that this is true when “undergoing,” which is included in the concept of alteration, is taken properly, insofar as it indicates a transformation, departing from substance, of matter. But insofar as “undergoing” is taken broadly for any reception whatsoever, insofar as even understanding is a certain undergoing, as is said in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429a14.) in this way there is alteration even in the intellectual activities; according to this, it is said in On the Soul 3 (Aristotle, On the Soul 2.5, 417b5‒7.) that to go from idleness to act is a new genus of alteration.

But the third mode has a likeness with local motion. Nor must this motion occur on account of the angel’s own need; rather, it could occur on account of ours—I do not mean as for the sake of its ultimate end. This is so also with the motion of the heavens, whose ultimate end is not the generation of the lower bodies, according to philosophers, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336b27‒34; On the Soul 2.4, 415b3‒5; Metaphysics 3.3, 999a14.) since nothing is for the sake of something more base than itself. Rather, its ultimate intent is becoming like God, the likeness of which follows on the fact that in its own way it becomes the cause of the lower things. So too the ultimate end of the angel acting on us is that it might attain a divine likeness, by working with God in leading lower things back to God, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 3 (PG 3:163).)

Reply Obj. 3: That argument would reach its conclusion only if the angel’s motion were asserted to be continuous, like the motion of a body. For then it would be necessary that every part of its motion be a motion, and thus it would be necessary that what is in a certain marked-off place would not be a part of the motion, but part of the motion would occur in the leaving of one place and entering another continuously connected to it. Whence it would be necessary that it would be partly in the one place and partly in the other, and then it would be moving.

But because an angel’s local motion is not asserted to be continuous, it is not necessary that part of that motion be a motion, and therefore neither is it moving while in A, nor is it moving while in B, even though A and B are its parts. Rather, their succession, which being in A and then being in B, is called its “motion.” And this is plainly clear, whether one attends to its motion either in intellect or in affect, since the very succession of affects is said to be the angel’s motion.

Reply Obj. 4: In the aforesaid way, the angel moves through itself according to place, insofar as it is also through itself in a place by acting through itself on the place. But if motion in place be taken in the mode of bodily motion, then it does not move in place except incidentally, according to the motion of an assumed body. Nor is it necessary that God move in place incidentally, since nothing moves incidentally by what it is in itself moving unless it be in it in a definitive way, such that it is not in anything else. For example, the soul moves incidentally by the whole body moving, not by only the hand moving.

Reply Obj. 5: The solution to this is also clear, since local motion, insofar as it belongs to bodies, belongs to an angel only metaphorically; but if one speaks about motion equivocally, it belongs to it properly, as was said.

Article 2

Whether an angel necessarily traverses what is between when it moves

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.53.2; Quodl. I, q. 3, a. 2.) It seems that an angel necessarily traverses what is between in its motion.

Obj. 1: For, as is said in Physics 5, (Aristotle, Physics 5.3, 226b24.) the middle is that to which what is changing comes before it changes to the final terminus. Therefore, if an angel moves from A to C and B is between, it must come to B before it comes to C, and thus it must traverse what is between.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, let an angel move from A to C and B be between; when it is in C, it has changed. But moving occurs before every having-changed, as is proved in Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics 6.1, 231b29‒232a12; 6.5, 235b6‒236a36.) Therefore it was moving before it came to C. But it was not moving when in A, since that was the angel’s indivisible place, and there is no motion in the indivisible. Therefore it must be moving in B, and thus, it must traverse what is between.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, when an angel is in A, it is not in C. Therefore, if it is later in C, then either its nature must have been newly created there in C and destroyed here in A, or it must traverse what is in between. But the first is impossible. Therefore it must traverse what is between.

Obj. 4: You might say that, because an angel is of an intellectual nature, it can go from one thing to another without traversing what is between, as its thinking can.

On the contrary, the succession of thoughts is through species, which are equally present and near to the intellect itself, and the species of the middle place is no closer than the species of an extreme. But an angel existing in one place does not have all places present to it; rather, one place is closer to it than is another. Therefore it seems that it must come to the intermediate before coming to the extreme.

On the contrary (5), in Physics 6 it is said (See Aristotle, Physics 6.10, 241a8.)—and is clear through itself—that everything moving goes through an equal place before it goes through a greater. But for an indivisible angel there is no place equal to it, except an indivisible or point-sized place. Therefore if it is moving, it must traverse a point before it traverses a line. But between two points there is an infinity of points, and it is not possible to traverse an infinity. Therefore if an angelic motion must traverse what is between, it would never get from the beginning of the line to its end, no matter how short the line is.

Furthermore (6), the account of one middle is the same as that of all middles. But it cannot traverse all, since they are infinite, as has been proved. (Above, q. 2, a. 1.) Therefore neither can it traverse some of them, and thus it seems that it would always go from place to place without traversing what is between.

I answer that there are two opinions about this matter. For some say that an angel goes from one place to another place without traversing what is between; others say that he traverses what is between in its motion. And each, I believe, says something true in some respect.

For I say that an angel can go from place to place in such a way that it traverses all things in between, and it can be that it goes from place to place without it being in any of the intermediates, and it can be that it is in some of them but not in others. The reason for this is drawn from things said before. (Above, q. 3, a. 2.) For I say that an angel’s essence according to itself is free from all place, and is not defined in respect to a place except through its activity—and this is not from its activity insofar as it goes forth from its essence, but insofar as it is terminated at what it accomplishes in the place. Whence, when it acts on this place, since it is not from itself determined and bound to that place, but in itself it stands indifferently to all places, its activity can go forth immediately from its essence to a nearby place or a remote one. Nor does its activity at a distance depend on its nearby activity. Whence insofar as it has any activity, either in all intermediate places or in some or in none, in this way it can go through all intermediates, or just some, or in none.

Reply Obj. 1: This objection is nullified if one adds what the Philosopher himself adds. (Aristotle, Physics 5.3, 226b25.) For he says that a middle is what one comes to first when changing continuously. But an angel’s motion is not continuous, as has been said. (Above, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 2: Before anything whatsoever has changed, it is moving; but nevertheless this is in an angel’s motion and in a body’s motion in diverse ways. For in a body’s motion, having changed is not part of the moving, but its terminus; hence, all the moving comes before having changed, and therefore one must presuppose that to which it is said to have changed before that in which it is moving. But in an angel’s motion, which is not continuous, having changed is one part of the motion, the last, and the first part is that from which the moving begins. And neither part is the motion; rather, their succession is. Whence moving precedes having changed, as a whole precedes its part in discrete things.

Reply Obj. 3: That argument would follow for things that are determined through their own essence to a location—which does not happen in angel. Whence its motion is only according to its activities, which are successively here and then there.

Reply Obj. 4: That account is not entirely adequate, because an angel is not said to be here and then there on account of the fact that it understands this and then that. For while being in one place it can understand something that is someplace else. But it comes close to the truth insofar as the succession of its activities follows the succession that is in its intellect.

Reply Sed Contra 5: An angel can traverse all the intermediate places, yet it is not necessary that it enumerate the infinity of points existing in the line. For that place that an angel is in is not indivisible through itself, but is sometimes divisible, as was said in the body of the article. And since no finite space is divided into an infinity of divisible parts, taken actually, it is certain that it can go through all the intermediates.

Reply Sed Contra 6: There is not the same account for all intermediates, since divisible intermediates can be taken—and these are finite, or indivisible ones—which are infinite, and cannot be traversed, if they are actually enumerated. And furthermore, the angel might have something to do in one intermediate place, and not in another. Whence it follows that it goes through one intermediate and not another.

Article 3

Whether an angel moves instantaneously

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.53.3; Quodl. IX, q. 4, a. 4; XI, q. 4.) It seems that an angel moves instantaneously.

Obj. 1: For an angel’s change with respect to place is simpler than any bodily change. But some bodily changes are instantaneous, as the Commentator says in Physics 6, (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 6, text. 68.) for example, illumination, generation, corruption, and the like. Therefore much more so is an angel’s change.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, let an angel change from A to B, such that B is the first thing to which it has changed (and moreover, what is called the first thing to which it has changed, is the place contiguous with the place where it was before). And if it changes in time, let the time in which it is changing be C. Therefore, if such time measures that motion, it must be that in the last now of the time it is at the terminus of the motion, such that it is in B. Therefore it is granted that in the entire time preceding the last now it is either only in A, or it is partly in A and partly in B. But it is not partly in both, as it is indivisible. Therefore in that time it will wholly be in A. But because every time is divisible, in any time one can take a before and after. Therefore the angel will be in A in both the before and after parts of that time, and so it is resting in A, since one can say of it that it is in A both now and before, which is to rest there. And this is incongruous. And what is more, it follows that that time in which it was asserted to be moving is not measuring its motion, but its rest. Therefore it seems that in no way does it move in time.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it is moving in time, then let it be moving from A to B in time C, as was said in the preceding. Therefore let one assert that some body, F, moves over the same space, but in a greater time, D; for an angel has a greater power than a body, and insofar as one adds to the power of the mover, so too must the motion’s time diminish, for the greater power moves a thing in a lesser time, as is said in Physics 6. (See Aristotle, Physics 6.2, 232a25‒b29.) But since every finite time has a proportion to any other finite time, let the proportion of the two times be taken—that is, that of time C, wherein the angel is moving, and time D, wherein the body is moving; let it be the ratio of three to its third, for it does not matter what it be. Let another body be taken that exceeds F itself according to a power of triple ratio, and let it be G. Then the argument proceeds as follows: the diminution of a motion’s time is according to the excess of the mover’s power; but G exceeds D by a triple ratio; therefore the time in which G moves through the same space will be less than D in a triple ratio. But this is time C, in which the angel was moving. Therefore a bodily power and an angel’s power will move in the same and equal time—even if one were to posit that the angel is moving as fast as it can. And one can take a similar argument on the side of the aptitude of the things that move, according to whose proportion the motion’s time is diminished and augmented, as is held in Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 220b25‒32.) Therefore, since this is impossible, it seems that an angel does not move in time.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every time is divisible. Therefore if an angel is moving from A to B in some time, then in the middle of that time it will be elsewhere. But it is not in A, since here was the beginning of the time, and neither is it in B, since there was the end of the time; and while it is moving it is not in the same location for two instants, as is proved in Physics 6. (See Aristotle, Physics 6.3, 234b1‒7.) Whence, since in one instant it is either in A or in B, in the other instant it cannot be in the same place. Therefore in the instant that is the middle of the time it will be in the middle space. But it does not necessarily go through the middle, as was said in the previous article. Therefore its motion is not always in time.

On the contrary (5), every motion and change has a before and after, since it has two termini, one of which follows on the other. But the number of the before and after in motion is time, as is held in Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219b1.) Therefore every motion is measured by time, and therefore, so is an angel’s motion.

Furthermore (6), let an angel move from A to B. Either it is in A and B in the same instant or in diverse instants. If in the same, then it will be in two places simultaneously, the possibility of which has been disproved, and moreover, then it would not be moving to B, since nothing moves to where it already is. However, if it is in A and B in diverse instants, then one can designate the two instants, in one of which it is in A, and let this be C, and in the other it is in B, and let that be D. Then the argument is: an angel’s motion is between D and C; but between any two instants there is an intermediate time, as is proved in Physics 6; (Aristotle, Physics 6.3, 234a7.) therefore an angel’s motion will be in time.

Furthermore (7), you might say that those two “nows” succeed each other in number without anything in between, as was said for its activities.

On the contrary, let the angel move from A into B such that in the instant C it is in A, and in instant D it is in B. Again, let it be posited that some body, G, is similarly moving from A into B, and it begins to move simultaneously with the angel, that is, at C. Then the argument proceeds as follows: the angel reaches B more quickly than does body G; therefore in instant D the body has not yet reached B, but is just before B; and let that place be R. Then the argument proceeds: G is moving from A to R, and in time CD; but space AR is divisible, so let it be divided at point H. Then the argument proceeds: that body (G) in instant C is in A, and in instant D it is in R; therefore H will be in some other instant intermediate between the two, and let that be N. Therefore in N the angel will be either in A or in B or in between; but it is not in A, since then it would be in two instants in the same location; and for the same reason it is not in B. Therefore in instant N it must be in the middle, and always proceeding in this way, one will find between any two instants whatsoever both another instant and a time. Therefore an angel’s motion must be in a continuous time.

Furthermore (8), one might say that in an angel’s motion one cannot assign a last instant wherein it is in A, since in the whole time it is in A, and it is in B at the terminus of the time; moreover, between a time and the terminus of the time one cannot assign an intermediate, just as the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251b19‒25; 8.8, 263b15‒25.) that even in natural changes, like when something moves from whiteness to blackness, one can designate two times, in the first of which it is white, and in the second it is black, and the instant that the two times touch stands with the subsequent time, whence in it, it is black; this is why one cannot find a last now in which it would be white, but only a last time in whose terminus it will not be white.

On the contrary, if one says this, then the objector says that every motion that is not always going on is a middle between two rests, one of which is at the terminus from which the motion began, and the other the terminus to which the motion occurred. But just as the instant wherein the motion is terminated stands with the subsequent rest, so too the instant from which the motion begins stands with the preceding rest. This is clear when something moves from whiteness to blackness, since just as at the end of the time that measures the motion it is black, so too at the beginning of the time it is white. Therefore it is clear from this that every rest draws to itself both the preceding now and the subsequent now.

Then I argue as follows: an angel that moves from A to B, as you say, in time CD, is at A. Therefore it rests there, since, as is proved in Physics 6, (Aristotle, Physics 6.3, 234b6.) whatever in a time is in some one location, rests there; but where something is resting in a time is also there at the terminus of the time. Therefore in D, which is the last now of the time, the angel will be still at A and not at B, as was asserted.

Furthermore, every time is caused by a motion, as is clear from Physics 4. (See Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219a2‒10.) But the angel is not moving at A, nor again does it have an order to any prior motion by the time of which its rest is measured. Therefore there is nothing in the claim that the angel is at A in the time.

I answer that, because every change has two termini that cannot be together, since every change is to what does not coincide with it, as is said in Physics 1, (Aristotle, Physics 1.5, 188b5.) in every motion or change there must be present a succession—due to the fact that two termini cannot be simultaneous. And thus there must also be time, which is the number of the before and after, in which consist the entire account of succession. But this happens in diverse ways in diverse things.

For sometimes the terminus of the motion is mediated by a principle of the motion. This can be according to a medium of dimensive quantity, as is the case in the local motion of bodies, and in the motion of growth and diminution; or it can be according to a medium of virtual quantity, the division of which is viewed according to an intensification or remission of some form, as happens in the alteration of sensible qualities. And then time through itself measures the motion itself, since it reaches the terminus successively, in that the medium is divisible.

But sometimes the terminus toward which a thing moves is not mediated by the terminus from which it moves, as is the case in those changes wherein the change is from privation to form, or vice versa, as in generation and corruption, and illumination, and in all similar things. And time must also be connected even to these changes, since it is certain that matter is not simultaneously under a form and its privation, nor is air simultaneously in light and in darkness. However, this does not occur in such a way that the departure, or transition, from one extreme to the other occurs in a time; rather, one of these extremes, that is, the first that is left behind in the change, is joined to some motion or alteration (as in generation and corruption), or to the local motion of the sun (as in illumination), and in the terminus of that motion is also the terminus of this change.

And according to this, that change is said to be sudden, or in an instant. For in the last instant of the time that measures the preceding motion, that form or privation is acquired of which none was present before. And in that instant it is said to have been generated, but not, properly speaking, to be being generated; for everything that is being generated was being generated and will be generated, as is proved in Physics 6. (Aristotle, Physics 6.1, 231b30‒a6; 6.6, 236b24‒237a10.) Whence all such instantaneous changes are termini of a certain motion, as the Commentator says about Physics 6. (Averroes, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 6, text. 55.) Now, an angel’s motion cannot be the terminus of some other motion. Whence it must be in time, and not in an instant.

But I say that that time is different from the time by which the motion of the heavens, and that of other bodies, is measured. This is proved as follows: no motion is measured by the motion of the heavens unless it is ordered according to it. Whence the philosophers also proved (See Aristotle, On the Heavens 1.8, 276a18‒21; 277b8‒12; Physics 8.9, 265b16‒266a5; Metaphysics 12.8, 1073a24‒1074a37.) that, if there be many worlds, there must be many first motions and many times. Whence, since an angel’s motion has no order relative to the motion of the heavens, and especially if its motion be said to be the succession of its activities, as was said before, (Above, a. 1.) it must not be measured by the time that is the measure of the first mobile, but by another time—the nature of which time one must take from the nature of its motion. For in time there is something that is, as it were, formal, what stands on the side of discrete quantity, that is, the number of the before and after, and something material, whereby it is continuous; for it has its continuity from the motion that time is in as in a subject and first thing measured by it, that is, the motion of the heavens, as is said in Physics 4. (Aristotle, Physics 4.14, 223b19‒23.) But that motion has its continuity from its magnitude.

Whence, an angel’s motion is not continuous, since it is not necessary that it have the conditions of the magnitude through which it traverses, as is the case in things that are naturally apt to be in place insofar as their substance is commensurate with the termini of place, that is, as is the case with bodies. Rather, its motion is through the succession of the angel’s activities, wherein there is no account of continuity, so that time is not continuous. But it is composed from the “nows” succeeding each other, such that the number of the very activities succeeding each other is said to be their motion. And however many are the activities from which the motion is composed according to diverse places, so many “nows” will there be composing the time. And this is also consonant with what the Philosopher says in Physics 6, (Aristotle, Physics 4.11, 219b24; 6.1, 231b19.) namely, that the indivisible of moving is of the same account as the time composed from “nows,” and the motion from moves, and a line from points: for even though the line through which the angel travels is continuous, still there is no continuity insofar as it is referred to the angel’s motion, which does not traverse the diverse “locations” continuously.

Reply Obj. 1: All those changes that are called instantaneous are termini of motion. This does not occur in an angel’s motion, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 2: That time in which it is moving from A to B is composed from two instants, and in one instant it is in A, and in the other in B. Whence it is not necessary that it be resting in one of them, which would be necessary if its time were continuous.

Reply Obj. 3: No ratio can be taken of the time in which a body is moving to the time in which an angel is moving, since the time wherein an angel moves is not divisible by the division of the continuous; rather, discrete things are divisible into a finite multitude of instants. However, in the time in which a body is moving there is a potential infinity of instants. Thus there is no proportion, just as neither is there of the infinite to the finite.

Reply Obj. 4: That time wherein an angel is moving is divisible into two things that are not coupled at one common terminus, since this time is not continuous. Whence it does not follow that in a middle instant it is in the middle space, since it not necessary that one take a middle instant.

But because from the other arguments to the contrary it seems to follow that its motion is in a continuous time, one should respond to them.

Reply Sed Contra 5: Therefore one should say that every motion has a before and after, but in diverse ways. For in continuous motion, the before and after are taken either with respect to two times coupled at one now, or with respect to two nows bounding one time. But in instantaneous changes, the “before” is the very time measuring the preceding motion, to which is joined the other extreme, and the “after” is the very now that measures the terminus of the motion. And therefore between the two extremes there is no middle, just as there is no middle between time and the now. However, in the angel’s motion the before and after are the two succeeding nows, between which there is no intermediate continuous time.

Reply Sed Contra 6: The fact that between the two “nows” there must be an intermediate time follows time by reason of its continuity. For this is a passion common to everything continuous. Now, it has its continuity from its motion. Whence, because the angel’s motion is not continuous, the argument does not follow.

Reply Sed Contra 7: If one posits that the angel’s motion and that of a body start simultaneously, when the angel will be in one terminus according to one instant of its own time, the body will also be in another terminus according to the other instant of its time. Now, between two instants of the time of that body there is an intermediate time, in that its motion is continuous; this is why it is possible to mark off an intermediate instant. But between the two instants of the angel’s motion there is no intermediate time, so neither need one mark off an intermediate instant here. However, one can do this if it is in three places successively, since then the time too would be composed from three nows, so one will be between. And those two instants can include all the instants of time, since even the one now and the instant include all time, and thus it is not unfitting that when an angel’s motion is in only two instants, the motion of a body is in an infinity—even though however long the motion of a body might endure, the motion of an angel endures just as long, and even though each of them is not indivisible. And moreover, it happens that, while a body is in an intermediate instant, an angel is in no place, since it is not necessary that the angel always be in a place, as has been said. (Above, q. 3, a. 1.) And thus, according to the coordination of that time, no “now” would correspond to the angel, but only aeviternity.

Reply Sed Contra 8: We concede the other arguments.

Exposition of the second part of the text

The omnipotent God, ever the same in unchangeable eternity, will, and truth, moves the spiritual creature through time. (Sent. I, 37.6(169).3, quoting Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 8, ch. 26, para. 48 (CCSL 28.1.265; PL 34:391).) The distinction of these motions, and the reason for their names, was presented in Distinction 8. (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 3, aa. 1‒3.)

We do not hold that God is diffused through everything as if by a spatial magnitude, as earth, or our light, is diffused. (Sent. I, 37.9(172).1, quoting Augustine, Epistulae, letter 187, “To Dardanus,” para. 11 (CSEL 57:90; PL 33:836).) He says this because nothing has extension in place except insofar as it is quantified, whether through itself, like bodies (whence he notes earth, that is, soil), or incidentally, like bodily qualities, such as light.

Their wisdom is one, neither larger in the larger man, nor smaller in the smaller man. (Sent. I, 37.9(172).1, quoting Augustine, Epistulae, letter 187, “To Dardanus,” para. 11 (CSEL 57:90; PL 33:836).) Wisdom can be considered in two ways: either in reference to the knowable—and then it has a unity in species, even insofar as it is in diverse possessors of it; or according to the being that it has in the knower—and then it differs numerically in the diverse knowers. Still, it is not greater or lesser according to the quantity of body, since it is not a positional form; rather, it can be greater or lesser according to the intensity of its certitude, or according to the number of the things known.