D. 38 - Whether divine knowledge is the cause of what is known

Division of the text

Having made clear what things God’s knowledge is about, here he considers his knowledge through its relation to the very things known. This is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks whether God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known; in the second, he shows what sort of cause it is, at moreover, it is usual to ask whether God’s knowledge can be increased or diminished. (Sent. I, 39.1(175).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks about the causality of the divine knowledge; in the second, he asks about its infallibility, at but against what has been said above, . . . it is usual for some to make the following objection. (Sent. I, 38.2(174).1.)

The first of these is divided into two: in the first, he presents the question; in the second, he answers it, at and so, wishing to remove this apparent contradiction from our midst, we say that future things are not at all the cause of God’s foreknowledge. (Sent. I, 38.1(173).8.)

Regarding the first, he does three things: first, he shows by reason and by authority that God’s knowledge is the cause of the things known; second, he shows on the contrary that it is neither their cause nor is caused by them, which two he shows by two arguments at, but if this is so, then it is the cause of all evils; (Sent. I, 38.1(173).5.) third, he shows, on the authority of Origin, that God’s knowledge is caused by the things known, at and yet Origin, . . . says: ‘It is not because a thing will be that God knows it will be.’ (Sent. I, 38.1(173).7, quoting Origen, Commentaria in Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos, bk. 7, n. 8 (PG 14:1126).)

But against what has been said above, . . . it is usual for some to make the following objection. (Sent. I, 38.2(174).1.) Here he asks about the infallibility of the divine knowledge; and having supposed that it is infallible based on things said before, here he resolves objections made to the contrary. Whence it is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents an objection and answers it; in the second, he objects against the solution, and then resolves even that, at but they press their question further. (Sent. I, 38.2(174).2.)

Question 1

Whether divine knowledge is the cause of what is known

Here five things are asked:

first, whether God’s knowledge is the cause of the realities;

second, whether he knows all things in a uniform way;

third, whether his knowledge is of statements;

fourth, whether it is of things that do not exist;

fifth, whether it is of contingent things.

Article 1

Whether God’s knowledge is the cause of realities

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.8; On Truth, q. 2, a. 14.) It seems that God’s knowledge is not the cause of realities.

Obj. 1: For God’s knowledge is compared, both by the saints and by the prophets, to the knowledge of an artisan. But an artisan’s knowledge is the cause of the things known as makeable through his art. Therefore it seems that God’s knowledge is the cause of the realities.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since a likeness is a certain unity in form, in every becoming like, either one of the like things must be the cause of the other, or each of them must be brought forth by one cause, since unity in effect is a sign of unity of the cause. But knowledge is a certain becoming like the thing known. Therefore either knowledge must always be the cause of the thing known, as is the case with practical knowledge; or the thing known must be the cause of the knowledge, as is the case in our speculative knowledge; or of each there must be one cause, as in the knowledge that angels have of realities. For from the same thing—that is, God—the species of realities are impressed both in the mind of the angel so that it might know them, and in matter so that they might exist. But there is no cause of God’s knowledge, which is God himself—not the thing known, nor anything else. Therefore what remains is that God’s knowledge is itself the cause of what is known.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a measure always has the account of a principle in relation to what is measured by it, as is clear from Metaphysics 10; (Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.1, 1052b15‒1053b8.) for quantity is measured by the principle of quantity, and all substances by the principle of substance. But God’s knowledge is the measure of realities; this is why Anselm (Anselm, On Truth, ch. 7 (PL 158:475).) says that each reality holds the truth when it fulfills that to which it was ordained in the divine mind. Therefore God’s knowledge is the cause of things known.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as God’s will is God himself, so is his knowledge. But God’s will is absolutely said to be the cause of all things he wills, and his goodness the cause of all good things. Therefore his knowledge ought to be called the cause of all things he knows.

On the contrary (5), the cause of certain things is God’s knowledge. But God’s knowledge is not the cause of all things God knows, because evils, which are known by God, are not from him. Therefore neither is God’s knowledge the cause of all the things he knows.

Furthermore (6), when the cause is posited, the effect is posited. But God’s knowledge was from eternity, whereas realities have not existed from eternity. Therefore God’s knowledge is not the cause of the realities.

I answer that when speaking about the divine attributes one should attend to the account of the attributes, which, because they are diverse, is of diverse things; therefore something is attributed to one that is not attributed to another, even though all of them are one reality. And so it is that the divine goodness is said to be the cause of good things, the divine life the cause of living things, and so on. Therefore if we take the accounts of the diverse attributes, certain attributes—like power, will, and knowledge—are found to have a relation not only to their possessor, but even to something as to their object. However, some are related only to their possessor, like life, goodness, and such. And all of these have one mode of causality, namely, through the common mode of an efficient exemplar, just as we say that all good things are from the first Good, and all living things are from the first Living thing. But the ones that are said through a relation to their object have also another mode of causality in reference to those objects, such as the will with reference to the things willed. And it is in this way that we are asking here about the causality of divine knowledge.

For it is certain that his knowledge is a cause through the mode of efficient cause and exemplar of all knowledge, but the doubt is about whether it is also the cause of the things known that are the object of his knowledge. Therefore one must note that “knowledge,” according to the account of knowledge, does not signify any causality; otherwise all knowledge would be a cause. But insofar as it is the knowledge of an artisan bringing about a reality, in this way it does have the account of a cause relative to the reality brought about through the art. Whence, just as the causality of the artisan is through his art, in the same way one should consider the causality of the divine knowledge.

Therefore there is the following progression in the production of a work of art: first, the artisan’s knowledge presents the end; second, his will intends that end; and third, the will commands the act through which the work is brought forth, upon which work the artisan’s knowledge places the conceived form. Whence the knowledge is related as presenting the end, the will as directing the act, and as forming the work brought about. And therefore it is certain that whatever happens in the effect due to a falling away from the form of the art or from the end is not traced back to the artisan’s knowledge as to a cause. It is also clear that the principal aspect of causality depends on the will, which commands the act.

Whence it is clear that evil, which is a deviation from the form and from the end, is not caused by God’s knowledge; rather, it has causality only in reference to good things, insofar as they attain the form of the divine art, and its end. Yet this is not such that in reference to these things the divine knowledge indicates the perfect account of causality, except insofar as it is joined to the will. This is why in the text it says (Sent. I, 38.1(173).8.) that knowledge of one pleased by what he knows is the cause of realities. On account of this Avicenna also says (Avicenna, Liber de intelligentiis, ch. 1. De intelligentiis is thought to be not actually written by Avicenna and has been attributed to Dominic Gundisalvi (Gundissalinus), though it clearly contains Avicennian influence. See Étienne Gilson, “Avicenne en Occident au Moyen Age,” Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age 36 (1969), 89–121.) that insofar as God knows his own essence, and loves and wills it as the principle of realities that he wills that he be the principle of, realities flow from him.

Reply Obj. 1: An artisan’s knowledge is not the cause of a defect that arises in the artwork, even if it were to be foreknown by him; and neither is it even the complete cause of the artwork, unless one add the will, as the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 9. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.3, 1046b30‒1047a5; 9.5, 1048a10‒15.) And so it is for the knowledge of God as well.

Reply Obj. 2: Evils are not known by God through their likeness, but through the likeness of good things, as was said before. (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 2.) And therefore it does not follow that he is the cause only of good things.

Reply Obj. 3: Insofar as God’s knowledge is as an exemplar of realities through the mode of an art, so it is said to be their measure. Whence just as evils fall away from participating in the form of the art, so too they fall away from the rectitude of the measure. And on account of this Augustine even defines evil (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, para. 4 (PL 42:553).) as the privation of mode, insofar as it falls away from the measure, of species, insofar as it falls away from imitating the exemplar, and of order, insofar as it falls away from the end.

Reply Obj. 4: The will holds the complete account of the cause insofar as its object is the end according to the account of the good, which is the cause of causes. Whence too it holds the command over the other powers, and therefore the absolute will of God is said to be the cause of realities. However, the object does not stand to knowledge as it does to will, as was said in the body of the article, nor is knowledge related to the known as life is related to the living; for what has knowledge is not thereby called “known,” whereas what has life is thereby called “alive.” Whence it is clear that the argument does not conclude.

Reply Sed Contra 5: We concede the fifth argument.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Just as created things do not go out from God by a necessity of nature, or a natural power, so too neither do they do so by a necessity of knowledge. Rather, they do so through the freedom of his will, wherein the account of causality is completed. And therefore it is not the case that whenever he has known something, he created it, but whenever he has willed it.

Article 2

Whether God’s knowledge is uniformly about the realities known

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 39, q. 1, a. 1; d. 41, a. 5; ST I.14.15; On Truth, q. 2, a. 5, ad 11; a. 13.) It seems that God’s knowledge is not uniformly about the realities known.

Obj. 1: For all knowledge that is about things otherwise than they are, is false. But God’s knowledge is the truest knowledge. Therefore, since not all realities have one mode, it seems that it is not uniformly about all things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Epistulae, letter 147, “To Paulina” (De videndo Deum), para. 38 (CSEL 44:313; PL 33:614).) one way of knowing is knowing a reality through one’s essence, and another is to do so through a likeness of oneself. But God knows his very self through his own essence, but he knows created things through their likenesses that exist in him. Therefore he does not know himself and created things in a uniform way.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as was held earlier, (In I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 2.) God knows good things through themselves, but evils through another. But this makes a diverse mode of cognition. Therefore he does not know all things in a uniform way.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:867).) God knows realities in the same way as how he passes on existence to those realities. But according to Augustine, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:30).) he created man and horse by different accounts. Therefore he knows them by different accounts, and thus the knowledge of God is not about all things in a uniform way.

On the contrary, Dionysius in the same chapter says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:870).) that he knows matter in an immaterial way, and many things in a united way, and so on. Therefore it seems that it is of all things in a uniform way.

Furthermore, the mode of knowledge is viewed chiefly according to the account of its middle, from a difference in which one can have opinion or knowledge about the same thing. But God knows all things by one middle—his own essence, as Dionysius says in that same chapter. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 7, para. 2 (PG 3:870).) Therefore it is of all things uniformly.

I answer that in any cognition whatsoever one can consider two modes: the mode of the reality known, and the mode of the knower. Indeed, the mode of the reality known is not the mode of the cognition, whereas the mode of the knower is, as Boethius says. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prop. 4 (CCSL 94; PL 63:848).) This is clear from the fact that by sensation one can have cognition of a reality along with its material conditions, since sensation is a power in matter, while a cognition of the same thing, without the appendages of matter, is in the intellect, which is immaterial.

The reason for this is that cognition does not occur except insofar as the known is in the knower. Now, each thing is in something through the mode of the latter, not through its own mode, as is clear from the Book of Causes, (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 10.) so cognition must occur according to the mode of the knower. Therefore, because the highest unity is in the divine intellect, its cognition is uniform relative to all things, for all things are one in him. Therefore, when one asks whether God knows all things in a uniform way, we must make a distinction: for the adverb (“In a uniform way” translates the adverb uniformiter.) can signify the mode of the act of cognition—and then it is true; or it can signify the mode of the object—and then it is false. For God knows not only the reality, but the reality’s proper mode; whence he knows the diverse modes present in the diverse things. And one should say something similar for all such questions.

Reply Obj. 1: When we say, “knowledge that is of a thing otherwise than it is, is false,” there are two possible meanings. For the adverb “otherwise” can designate the mode of the knowledge itself, and then the claim is false; for true knowledge about material realities is itself immaterial. Or it can designate the mode of the things known, and then it is true. Whence it does not conclude to what is proposed.

Reply Obj. 2: God’s essence, whereby God knows his very self, is also the likeness whereby he knows all created things. Thus, through the same middle he knows both himself and other things. Whence the unity is found on the side of the knower, but the diversity on the side of the things known; for one of the things known—that is, God himself—stands to the middle as identical with it, but the others—created things themselves—stand to it as imitations.

Reply Obj. 3: Likewise, God by the same middle—his essence—knows both good and evil things. But the goods, which imitate the middle, are related to it in a different way than are evils, which deviate from it.

Reply Obj. 4: The one divine essence is that through which existence is passed on to all things and through which he knows all things, as Dionysius says. But the difference of the accounts is due to the diversity of their relations, which is itself viewed according to the diversity of the realities.

Article 3

Whether God’s knowledge is about statements

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 41, a. 5; ST I.14.14; SCG I.58, 59; On Truth, q. 2, a. 7.) It seems that God’s knowledge is not about statements.

Obj. 1: For God’s knowledge is about realities through the ideas of them. But an idea is a likeness of an uncomposed reality. Therefore it seems that God does not have knowledge of complex things, or things expressible in statements.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as is said in On the Soul 3, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430a27‒b29.) when the intellect understands an affirmation or negation, a certain composition of concepts arises. But in the divine intellect there is no composition. Therefore it does not know things expressible in statements.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, as it is also said in the same passage, (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430b1.) time is blended with the activity whereby the intellect affirms or negates something; this is why every statement signifies with time. But the divine intellect is wholly free from time. Therefore it is not about things stated.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the divine intellect is the truest, and with it no falsity can be blended. But falsity is blended with one of the intellect’s two activities—namely, that by which it affirms or negates something—but not with the other—that by which it beholds the whatness of a reality, as is said in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430a28.) Therefore it seems that this latter activity should be attributed to God, not the first, by which things that can be stated are known.

On the contrary, our knowledge is not only about real things, but is also about statements. Therefore, if God’s knowledge were not about statements, it would be less perfect than ours.

Furthermore, whatever God foretells, he knows. But through the prophets he has foretold many statements, like the virgin going to give birth (Isa 7:14). Therefore he knows things that can be stated.

I answer that, according to Avicenna’s opinion, and from Algazel’s statements, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 8, cc. 6–7; Algazel, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, problems 6, 13.) it seems to follow that God does not know things that can be stated, and especially in singular realities. For they assert that he knows singulars only universally—that is, insofar as they are within their universal causes—and not particularly—that is, in the nature of their particularity. Whence they grant that he knows this and that individual, but not that he knows this individual to exist now and to not exist later, just as if someone were to know an eclipse that is going to happen tomorrow in its universal causes, yet he would not know whether it exists or does not exist now, unless he were to see it with his senses.

But it was shown (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1.) that God has not only this sort of cognition about particulars, but even perfect cognition, insofar as he knows them in their particularity according to all the individual conditions that are in them. Therefore one should say that God knows not only the realities themselves, but even things that can be stated and are complex. Yet he does this with a simple cognition, through his own mode, which is clear as follows.

For in a reality there are two elements, the reality’s whatness and its existence, to which correspond two activities of the intellect. The philosophers call one of them “formation,” whereby the intellect apprehends the whatnesses of realities, and which is also called the “understanding of indivisibles” by the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.6, 430a26.) The other embraces the existence of the reality by composing an affirmation, since even the existence of a reality composed from matter and form, from which it receives cognition, consists in a certain composition of form with matter, or of an accident with its subject.

Likewise even in God himself one can consider his nature and his existence, and just as his nature is the cause and exemplar of every nature, so too his existence is the cause and exemplar of every existence. Whence, just as by knowing his own essence he knows every reality, so too by knowing his own existence he knows the existence of every reality whatsoever. And thus, he knows all things that can be stated, whereby existence is signified—yet not by diverse activities or by composition, but in a simple way. For his existence is nothing other than his essence, nor does composition follow from them, and just as he knows the good and the evil through the same thing, so too he knows affirmations and negations through the same thing.

Reply Obj. 1: The form existing in an artisan’s mind is different from the idea of a reality that is in the divine mind. For that form in the mind of the artisan is not the cause of the whole that is in the artwork, but only of its form. And therefore the artisan does not know this existing house, and the other things that follow its nature through the form of the art, unless he receives it by the senses. But the idea that is in the divine mind is the cause of all of what is in the reality. Whence through the idea he knows not only the reality’s nature, but even this reality existing in such and such a time, and all the conditions that follow on the reality, whether on the side of its matter or on the side of its form.

Reply Obj. 2: The divine existence itself, which is simple, is the exemplar of every composite existence in a created thing. And therefore through his own simple existence he knows, without a composition or division of concepts, every existence or non-existence that belongs to a reality. But our intellect, whose cognition arises from realities, which latter have a composite existence, does not apprehend that existence except by composing and dividing. And it is of such an intellect that the Philosopher is speaking.

Reply Obj. 3: Time is blended with our intellect’s activity of composing and dividing by two causes: both on its own part, since it receives knowledge from the continuous and time, that is, from sensation and imagination; and on the part of the things understood, which exist in time. Now, in the activity of the divine intellect time is present only on the side of the things understood, since just as it determinately knows different realities, so too it knows time. Whence it knows this reality to exist at this or that time, but on the side of the intellect itself, no time or any other succession is present. For he knows temporal things in a non-temporal way.

Reply Obj. 4: Falsity is not blended with the activity of our intellect whereby it looks upon the whatnesses of realities, except incidentally insofar as the cognition of the whatness depends on the cognition of an affirmation; this happens in composite whatnesses, and not in simple ones, as is said in Metaphysics 9. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.10, 1051b1‒1052a4.) And so too falsity cannot enter into the activity of the divine intellect, neither in comprehending the natures of realities, nor in comprehending things that can be stated. For it knows each of them by the same activity, and through one and the same simple nature, as is clear from things said in the previous article.

Article 4

Whether God’s knowledge can be about non-beings

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 14, a. 2, qa. 2; ST I.14.9; SCG I.66; On Truth, q. 2, a. 8.) It seems that God’s knowledge cannot be about non-beings.

Obj. 1: For “knowledge” indicates a reference to the knowable thing. But the things that signify a reference to the created are said of God only when created things exist: names like “Lord,” “Creator,” and the like. Therefore it seems that God cannot be said to know any realities except when they exist.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, knowledge is only of truths, as is said in the Posterior Analytics. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 71b21, b25‒32.) But the true and being are convertible. Therefore it is only of beings.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, God’s knowledge is the measure of the things known. But things that do not exist are not commensurate with anything. Therefore God’s knowledge is not of them.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the first thing falling within the apprehension of the intellect is being, as Avicenna says. (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 6.) But no cognitive power is capable of anything unless the account of the first object is presupposed, just as vision sees nothing without light. Therefore neither can any intellect know things other than beings.

On the contrary, whatever is chosen without error is known. But according to Augustine, (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, sermon 26, para. 4 (CCSL 41; PL 38:173).) things that do not exist are chosen; yet the one who chooses, that is, God, does not err. Therefore it seems that he has awareness of things that do not exist.

Furthermore, as the knowable stands to our knowledge, as prior to it, so too God’s knowledge stands to things that are knowable, as prior to them. But there are some knowables of which we do not have knowledge, as the Philosopher teaches. (Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.33, 88b30.) Therefore God’s knowledge can also be of things that do not exist.

I answer that whatever is known must in some way exist, at least in the knower himself; this is why Avicenna even says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 6.) that nothing can be stated about what is wholly a non-being. Whence the way some things stand toward existence, so too they stand to the divine cognition. Now, the existence of a reality can be considered in three ways: either insofar as it exists in its own proper nature, having been brought forth from its own principles; or insofar as it exists within the power of some cause; or insofar as it exists in the apprehension of some knower.

Therefore God knows from eternity those things that have existence in their own nature, according to whatever time, both by apprehending their nature, and by seeing them exist, not merely in his cognition or the power of some cause, but even in the nature’s existence. This is clear because with an existing reality God knows the very existence that it has in its proper nature. However, if from eternity he knew only the existence that is in his cognition or in the power of its cause, his cognition would progress through successive time periods; and such things God is said to know by a “knowledge of vision.” However, he knows those realities whose existence is at no time in their proper nature to exist in the power of their cause—either the power of a creature that falls short, like evils, or in his own active power, like good things. He also knows them to exist in his own cognition, insofar as he knows that he knows them, and that he can make them, insofar as they are good, or that they can happen on account of some failure of the creature, insofar as they are evil. And this mode of cognition is named his “knowledge of simple understanding,” insofar as through this mode he knows the reality’s simple nature itself, which can exist; yet the simple existence itself is not known, of which, properly speaking, he has vision, but only in a certain respect, as was said.

Reply Obj. 1: All relations that are founded on some actual activity going forth into created things can belong to God only from time, with created things existing. But the relation implied in knowledge, power, and will is not founded on any activity actually proceeding into a created thing. And therefore the case is not similar.

Reply Obj. 2: Insofar as non-beings hold truth, so too does God know them. For what will exist after a thousand years God does not know to exist now, since it is not true that it exists now. Rather, he knows that they are going to exist at the time when it will be true that they exist. Likewise, things that neither exist, nor will exist, nor did exist he knows to exist in his own knowledge, and in the power of their causes, insofar as it is true that they exist in this way.

Reply Obj. 3: What does not exist is not known by God as actually commensurate with his knowledge, but as able to be commensurate with it; and this is enough for knowledge to be true.

Reply Obj. 4: Whatever is known is known as a being, either in its own proper nature, or as in its cause, or as in a certain cognition. And in this way also all beings that God knows exist.

Article 5

Whether God’s knowledge is about contingent things

To the fifth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.14.13; I.86.4; SCG I.67; On Truth, q. 2, a. 12; Disputed Questions on Evil, q. 16, a. 7; Quodl. XI, q. 3; Compendium theologiae, ch. 133; Commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione, lect. 14.) It seems that God’s knowledge is not of contingent things.

Obj. 1: For God’s knowledge is the cause of all knowable goods. But every necessary cause brings about a necessary effect, for when the cause is posited, necessarily its effect is posited, unless the cause is deficient for the lesser part, as is a natural cause. Therefore, since God’s knowledge is not deficient, it seems that what it causes is necessary; so it is not of contingent things.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, knowledge is only of truths. But among a pair of future contingents, neither is determinately true, as the Philosopher proves. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 9, 18a28‒19b2.) Therefore it seems that the divine knowledge cannot be about them.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, if it is about contingent things, let it be posited that God knows Socrates is running; then the argument is as follows: either it is possible that Socrates not be running, or it is impossible. (Mandonnet notes that the following argument is thoroughly obscure in the manuscripts. In Mandonnet’s own judgment, the passage should be explained as follows: either it is possible for Socrates to not run or it is not possible. But it is not possible for him to not run; therefore by equivalence, it is necessary that he run.) If it is impossible that he not be running, then from its equivalence it is necessary that he be running—and then we would have what was proposed: God’s knowledge is only of necessary things. But if it is possible that he not be running, then let his not running be posited, for when one posits what is possible, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.13, 32a20.) nothing incongruous follows. But it was also posited that God knows Socrates is running. Therefore he knows as existing what is not existing. Now, all such knowledge is false. Therefore God’s knowledge will be false—which is impossible. Therefore what remains is that Socrates not running was not merely possible, but necessary.

Obj. 4: One might say that it is necessary by a necessity of consequence, not by a necessity of the consequent—that is, it is by a conditioned necessity, namely, with the condition “if it be foreknown,” and not by an absolute necessity.

On the contrary, in every conditional statement, if the antecedent is absolutely necessary, the consequent is absolutely necessary; for the consequent always follows the antecedent, and only the necessary follows on the necessary, as also the false never follows on the truth, although the converse does occur, as is proved in the Posterior Analytics 1. (See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.6, 74b5‒75a36.) But in the conditional statement, “Socrates is running, if this has been foreknown by God,” the antecedent is necessary absolutely, both because everything past is necessary, and because everything eternal is necessary absolutely. Therefore Socrates running is necessary absolutely, so it seems that his knowledge is only of necessary things.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, in Prior Analytics, (Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.16, 35b24‒35.) from a necessary major premise and a minor that is present in it, a necessary conclusion follows. Therefore, everything known by God necessarily is true, and this thing is known by God. Therefore it is necessarily true—and thus, the same conclusion as before.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, one might say the following: “it is necessary that what is known by God be true” is of two sorts, since it can be about the thing said, and thus it is composed and true, or it can be about the reality, and thus it is divided and false. For this statement is necessary—“what is known by God is true”—but this reality that is being asserted to be known by God does not necessarily occur, since it occurs contingently.

On the contrary, this distinction holds only among separable forms, without which the subject is able to exist, but not among forms that are inseparable from their subject. Whence no one makes the following distinction: “it is possible for a white swan to be black.” For whiteness is separated from a swan only according to account and understanding, so whatever cannot coexist with the white also cannot coexist with the swan. But within what is called “known” is implied a certain concomitant subject, since what is once known by God cannot be not known by him. Therefore that distinction is not applicable in the proposed matter.

Obj. 7: You might say that the contingent, when it is still in the future, is able not to be, but not because of what is asserted as present or past, and in this way God has cognition of it.

On the contrary, all knowledge concerning something present that it did not concern when that thing was still in the future, receives the addition according to the succession of the time periods. But God’s knowledge receives no addition from realities, nor is there in it any succession according to time periods. Therefore, if he does not know future contingents as future, his knowledge is in no way about contingent things as present or past.

On the contrary, things that are subject to free decision are contingent to the greatest degree. But God has knowledge of such things; otherwise he would not render unto each according to his works. Therefore his knowledge is about contingent things.

Furthermore, above it was held that God’s knowledge is about all things. But not all things happen from necessity, as is clear with regard to sensation itself, and has been proved by philosophers, (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.2‒3, 1026b30‒1027b13.) and is supposed in our faith. Therefore God’s knowledge is not only of necessary things, but even of contingent things.

I answer that, on account of these sorts of difficulties, some philosophers have denied that God has knowledge of particular contingent things, thinking about the divine intellect according to the mode of our intellect. And this is why they have erred. However, it has been shown earlier (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 1.) that the divine intellect is not impeded from knowing particulars by reason of their particularity, which is due to matter, as our intellect is impeded. Therefore now it remains to inquire whether it might be impeded by reason of contingency; for contingency appears to escape divine cognition for two reasons.

The first is on account of the order of a cause to its effect. For of a necessary and unchangeable cause the effect is necessary. Whence, since God’s knowledge is the cause of realities and is unchangeable, it does not seem that it can be of contingent things. The second is on account of the order of knowledge to the thing known. For because knowledge is cognition that is certain, from the account of certitude—even with causality set aside—it requires a certitude and determination in the thing known, which contingency excludes. And that knowledge, from the account of its certitude, requires determination in the thing known, is clear in our knowledge, which is not the cause of realities, and in God’s knowledge in reference to evils.

But neither of these removes knowledge of contingent things from God. And this can be admitted clearly enough about the first argument. For whenever there are many ordered causes, the last effect does not follow the first cause in necessity and contingency, but rather the nearest cause. For the power of the first cause is received in the second according to the mode of the second cause. For that last effect does not proceed from the first cause except insofar as the power of the first cause is received in the second cause. This is clear in the flowering of a tree, the remote cause of which is the motion of the sun, but the proximate cause is the plant’s generative power. However, the flowering can be impeded by an impediment in the generative power, even though the sun’s motion is invariable. So too God’s knowledge is the invariable cause of all things, but his effects are produced by him through the activities of secondary causes; and therefore by the mediation of necessary secondary causes he produces necessary effects, like the sun’s motion and such, but by the mediation of contingent secondary causes he produces contingent effects.

But there yet remains a greater doubt about the second argument. For a necessary first cause can be simultaneous with a defect in the secondary cause, just as the sun’s motion can be simultaneous with the sterility of the tree, whereas God’s knowledge cannot stand simultaneously with a defect in a secondary cause. For it cannot be that God knows that this thing is about to follow a path and, at the same time, this thing is deviating from the path; and this is on account of the certitude of the knowledge, and not on account of its causality. For one must find, for any knowledge to be certain, some certitude in the thing known.

Therefore, one must note that before the reality exists it does not have existence except in its causes. But there are some causes from which the effect follows necessarily, and these cannot be impeded. And in such causes the effect has a certain and determinate existence, so much so that it can be demonstratively known there, like the rising of the sun, and eclipses, and such. However, there are some causes from which the effects follow for the most part, yet they fail in the lesser part. Whence in such causes effects that are going to occur do not hold absolute certainty, but only some certainty, to the degree that the causes are more determined to one thing than to another. And therefore through such causes one can take a conjectural knowledge about future things, which will be more certain to the degree that their causes are more determined to one thing—for example, the physician’s knowledge about future health and death, and the astronomer’s knowledge about future winds and rains.

But there are some causes that are oriented to either possibility. And in such causes the effects that are going to occur have no certainty or determination, and therefore they cannot be in any way known by the contingency toward either outcome in their causes. But when they are already brought about in the nature of things, then they have a determinate existence in their very selves. And therefore when they exist in act, they are known with certitude, as is clear with someone who sees Socrates running, since when Socrates is running, Socrates running is necessary; and he can have certain cognition of this.

Therefore I say that the divine intellect beholds from eternity each and every contingent thing, not only insofar as it is in its own causes, but insofar as it is in its own determinate existence. For unless this be so, when along with the reality existing he would see the reality itself insofar as it exists in its own determinate existence, he would know the reality in a different way after it exists than he did before it came to exist; and then something would be added to his knowledge based on how the realities occur. It is also clear that God from eternity sees not only his order to the reality, from whose power the reality was going to occur, but was beholding even the reality’s very existence.

Boethius teaches clearly how this occurs, at the end of the Consolation. (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:858).) For every cognition is according to the mode of the knower, as has been said. Therefore, since God is eternal, his cognition must have the mode of eternity, which is to be whole simultaneously, without succession. Whence just as even though time is successive, still his eternity is present to all times, it being one and the same and indivisible as an instantaneous now, so too his cognition beholds all temporal things, even though they succeed each other, as present to himself. Nor is any of these temporal things future relative to him; rather, one is future relative to another. Whence according to Boethius this is better called “providence,” rather than “foresight,” (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:860).) since God sees all distant things not as something of the future, but as present to one act of beholding, as though from the watchtower of eternity. Nevertheless it can be called “foreknowledge,” insofar as he knows what is future for us, but not for himself.

To make this more clear, let us show it with examples. Let there be five men who successively, in five hours, see five contingent deeds. Therefore I can say that these five men see these successive contingent things, as present to them. However, if it be posited that these five acts of knowing were one act, then it could be said that there would be one cognition, as present, of all those successive things known. Therefore, since God by one eternal—not successive—beholding sees all times, he sees all contingent things in diverse times as present from eternity, not only as things having existence within his own cognition. For God did not know from eternity in the realities only that he knows them, which is their existence in his knowledge; rather, from eternity he also sees, and will see, by one act of beholding, the individual time periods, and this reality existing in this time, and its failing in that time. Nor does he see only this reality as future relative to a previous time, and past relative to a future time; rather, he sees that time in which it is present, and the reality to be in this time. This nonetheless cannot happen in our intellect, the act of which is successive, according to diverse time periods. And thus it is clear that nothing prevents God from having certain knowledge of each contingent thing, since his beholding is referred to the contingent reality insofar as it is presently in act when its existence is already determinate, and it can be known with certitude.

Reply Obj. 1: An effect does not draw necessity from the first cause, but only from the proximate cause, as was said in the body of the article. And therefore the argument does not follow.

Reply Obj. 2: A future contingent is not determinately true before it occurs, since it does not have a determinate cause. And therefore our intellect cannot have certain knowledge about it, as our intellect is in determinate time, and successively. But when it is in act, it is determinately true, and therefore it can be known with certainty by the cognition that is present to that act; this is clear even for bodily vision. And because the divine cognition is measured by eternity, which is present, remaining the same for all time, therefore it sees each contingent thing insofar as it is in its own act.

Reply Obj. 3: The act of divine cognition passes over the contingent, even if for us it is about to exist, just as our vision passes over it while it exists. And because the being that exists when it exists is necessary, which nonetheless absolutely speaking is not necessary, therefore it is said that considered in itself it is contingent, but relative to God’s knowledge it is necessary. For it is referred to it only insofar as it is in actual existence, and therefore it is like if I myself were to see Socrates presently running, which of course in itself is contingent, but relative to my sight is necessary. Whence it is a sound distinction that it is necessary by a necessity of consequence, and not one of the consequent, or by a conditioned necessity, not an absolute one.

Reply Obj. 4: One can respond to this argument in many ways. For some say that this antecedent—namely, that this is foreknown by God—is not necessary. And if one objects that it is a statement about the past, so it is necessary, they respond that this has an impediment in past things that signify a reference to the future. Whence, when it is said that this “was going to occur,” even though the statement is about the past, still, because it depends on the future, it is not necessary. For what was at a certain time going to be, is able to not be going to be; for someone who is about to come may not come, as is said in On Generation and Corruption 2. (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.11, 337b1‒9.) But that instance is nothing, since even though what was going to be is able not to be going to be—when impeded by causes that were determined to their effect for the most part—yet it is not able not to have been going to be; for it will always be true to say, “this at a certain time was going to be.” Similarly it is not relevant to the proposed matter, for when it is called “foreknown,” there is indicated not only an order to the future, but also a certain act that is signified as past.

And this is why others say—as the Master appears to say in the text (Sent. I, 38.2(174).2.)—that this antecedent is not necessary. For “foreknown,” although as a word it consignifies past time, yet signifies a divine act of knowing, for which there is no past. And therefore just as God cannot foreknow, so too he cannot have foreknown. But the Master does not even resolve this, since even though the divine act holds no necessity of coercion, still it does hold the necessity of immobility, speaking about intrinsic acts, like willing, understanding, and the like. Whence it is not contingently able not to be, if it is posited as existing. And because the consequent cannot be posited as not being, then even with the antecedent posited as not being, the consequent will be incapable of being posited as not being. But it is certain that the antecedent is posited as being, for it is determinately true that God now knows something that is going to be; thus it follows that the consequent cannot be posited not to be, even absolutely taken—and much less that it is able not to be contingently.

And therefore others say that this antecedent is contingent, because two things are designated there: the divine act, which is immutable, and the order to what is going to be, which is changeable by the changeableness of the reality. And therefore the whole thing should be judged to be contingent on account of the second only. For this man being white is contingent, even though being a man is necessary. But this too does not seem to resolve the doubt. For when God is said to have foreknown something, that order to what is going to be is being designated there as the object upon which the act goes. For the meaning of “he foreknew” is that he knew this is going to be. However, when a statement is posited as the matter of some act, as a statement, it must be taken materially, and not insofar as it is referred to the signification of the reality; for example, when one says, “I know that this man is running.” But those things that are so taken make no difference of contingency or necessity in the proposition—both because the truth and necessity of a proposition depend on the principal verb, in which the composition is understood; and also because the statement asserted in this way is not taken as true or (Mandonnet here reads et, “and,” rather than vel, “or,” but the context of the text here implies “or” rather than “and.”) false, or as necessary or contingent, but only as some statement. Whence the necessity or contingency of these two propositions—when I say, “Socrates is running,” and I say, “the sun is moving”—is equal, even if one grant that making the statement itself is necessary. And thus, if one asserts that the indicated order to what is going to be is changeable, nothing is impeded by the necessity of the antecedent.

Whence others say that this antecedent is necessary, yet the consequent is not necessary. For the maxim in the objection is understood only in those conditional statements wherein the antecedent is the proximate cause of the consequent. But not even this fully resolves it. For that rule is not proved by the Philosopher (See Aristotle, Prior Analytics 1.15, 33b25‒35b22.) by reason of causality, but by reason of consequence, according to which the necessary follows from the necessary, whether it be a cause or an effect.

And therefore one should say something different: that the antecedent is necessary absolutely, both from the immobility of the act, and even from its order to the thing known. For this reality is not posited as subject to the divine knowledge except while it is in act, insofar as it has determination and certitude. For it itself necessarily is while it is. And therefore a similar necessity should be inserted within the consequent—namely, so that this itself, the fact that Socrates is running, is taken insofar as it is in act; and in this way it has determination and necessity. Whence it is clear that if “Socrates running” is taken insofar as it follows from the antecedent, it does hold necessity; for it follows from the antecedent only insofar as it stands under the divine knowledge, to which it is subject as considered as present in its own actual existence. Whence also one should take the consequent this way, in which mode it is clear that the consequent is necessary. For it is necessary that Socrates is running while he is running.

Reply Obj. 5: The statement, “everything known by God necessarily is so,” has two aspects, in that it can be about the statement or about the reality. And if it is taken as about the statement, then it is true; but if about the reality, then it is false. And likewise its conclusion has two aspects. The reason for this distinction is that this statement can be taken according to the condition by which it is subject to the divine knowledge—and this is insofar as it has actual determinate existence, and in this way holds necessity—or the reality can be taken without any condition—and in this way it is not necessary. For in this way it can be considered insofar as it exists in its causes before it actually exists, and there it does not hold necessity; nor there does God know it as going to be, for God does not know a contingent effect to be determined in its cause, since then his knowledge would be false, since it is not determined in its cause.

Reply Obj. 6: Even though this reference to the reality is inseparable insofar as it reaches the reality, still it reaches it only insofar as it is considered as present in actual existence. And therefore this distinction can apply insofar as that reality is considered as falling under that reference or as not doing so. For example, Socrates’s running is subject to the certitude of the divine knowledge insofar as it is actual; and it did not always have this, since at a certain time it was only potential, and insofar as it was only this, it was incapable of being subject to the divine knowledge. For if God has seen the cause itself, like Socrates, and has not seen the effect immediately in its own existence, as we know future things, he would never be able to know it. And therefore it is clear that this distinction—that it can be about the reality or about the statement—is sound.

Reply Obj. 7: God knows not only things that are present to us, but things that are past and future for us; yet the divine sight falls upon all such things insofar as they are present in their own time periods. Whence it does not follow that God at a certain time knows any reality that at a certain other time he did not know.

Exposition of the text

Because it will be, it is known by God before it happens. (Sent. I, 38.1(173).8, quoting Origen, Commentaria in Epistolam B. Pauli ad Romanos, bk. 7, n. 8, on Romans 8:30 (PG 14:1126).) Here is denoted the cause of the consequence, not of being.

For he foreknew the sins were theirs, not his own. (Sent. I, 38.1(173).9, quoting Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 53, para. 4 (CCSL 36; PL 35:1176).) This is as if one were to say that, if his foreknowledge of their sins forced them to sin, then they themselves did not sin, since they were coerced. But God himself is not a coercer.