D. 40 - Predestination

Division of the text

Having considered God’s knowledge in common, here he specifically considers predestination. And it is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers what predestination is; (Note that Aquinas has Distinction 40 beginning in what the Silano text indicates is the final paragraph of Distinction 39: Sent. I, 39.4(178).4.) in the second, he considers its causality, namely, whether it is the first cause, or does it have another, at but if ‘we seek a deserving of obduracy and mercy, we find the deserving of obduracy; but we do not find a deserving of mercy.’ (Sent. I, 41.1(181).1, quoting Augustine, Epistolae, letter 194, “To the Priest Sixtus,” ch. 3, para. 14 (CSEL 57:187; PL 33:879).)

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he considers predestination; in the second, he considers reprobation, at predestination is the preparation of grace. . . . Conversely, reprobation is to be understood as the foreknowledge of the iniquity of some. (Sent. I, 40.2(180).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he shows what predestination is, and of whom it is; in the second, he considers the certitude of predestination, at it seems that none of the predestined may be damned. (Sent. I, 40.1(179).1.)

Concerning the latter, he does three things: first, he explains the certitude of predestination; second, he presents an objection to the contrary, at but some . . . object to this; (Sent. I, 40.1(179).2.) third, he presents his response, at we respond to them. (Sent. I, 40.1(179).3.)

As regards the last, he also does three things: first, he answers the first objection; second, he objects against this response, at and yet they continue to press; (Sent. I, 40.1(179).4.) and third, he resolves their objection, at on the solution to the question, I would prefer to hear others than to teach. (Sent. I, 40.1(179).5.)

Here there are two questions:

the first is about predestination; (Qq. 1–3; Sent. I, 40.1(179)‒3(181).)

the second about reprobation. (Q. 4; Sent. I, 40.4(182).)

As regards the first, three things are asked:

first, what is predestination; (Q. 1.)

second, to whom does it belong; (Q. 2.)

third, what is its certitude. (Q. 3.)

Question 1

What predestination is

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether predestination is within the creature, or only in God;

second, what in God does it name.

Article 1

Whether predestination is something within the predestined

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.23.2.) It seems that predestination is something in the predestined reality.

Obj. 1: For every action of itself implies a passion. But when one says, “God predestines,” the verb signifies the divine act. Therefore it seems that there corresponds to it some passion within the creature, which is passively called “predestination,” just as was said about “creation,” for one finds a creation that is an action and creation that is a passion.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, every denomination arises according to some inhering form, just as we are called “qualified” according to a quality. But something is being denominated by predestination when it is called “predestined.” Therefore it seems that predestination is something within it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, comparison is made between things of one genus. But in a Gloss on John 1 it is said, it was better for Nathaniel to know the two natures in Christ than to have been predestined. (See Glossa ordinaria, at John 1:47–51, 5.1050–52 (PL 114:363); Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 8, ch. 1 (PL 35:1445–49).) Therefore, since the knowledge of the natures, to which predestination is being compared, posits something in him, it seems that predestination is something in the one predestined.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing eternal is defined through something temporal. But predestination is defined through the temporal, for it is said that it is the preparation for grace in the present and for glory in the future. Therefore it is not eternal. But every action that is said of God in a temporal way places some actual effect in the created, like ruling, governing, and such. Therefore it seems that predestination is also something in the predestined.

On the contrary, they are not chosen unless they have been predestined. But those who do not exist are chosen, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Sermones ad populum, serm. 26, para. 4 (CCSL 41:351; PL 38:173).) Therefore it seems that predestination is of non-beings. But something cannot exist in a non-being. Therefore predestination is not something in the predestined.

Furthermore, above the Master said (Sent. I, 35.6(155).2.) that predestination is a species of divine knowledge. But knowledge is nothing in the thing known, but only something in the knower. Therefore it seems that predestination posits nothing in the one predestined.

I answer that “to posit something in something else” can be understood in two ways. Either the very thing signified by the name is being said to be in the thing, as “whiteness” posits something in the white thing; and then I say that “predestination” does not posit anything in the one predestined, but only something in the one predestining him. Or it can be understood such that some existence in the one follows on what is signified in the other; for example, “paternity” posits something in the son even though, according to its own existence, it is only in the father, but it is said “to posit something in the son” insofar as a certain existence in the son follows on paternity.

But this happens in two ways: either because that existence is simultaneously a result in the other, just as paternity results in filiation, or not necessarily simultaneously but either before or after, as what is heard posits some impact sounding either simultaneously or before. And in this latter way I say that “predestination” posits something in the one predestined. For on this activity of God there follows the effect of predestination occurring in the one predestined, not always when the predestination occurs, but at a certain time. And this effect is grace and glory.

Reply Obj. 1: As the Philosopher treats actions, (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 9.8, 1050a5‒b7.) some go outward into exterior matter, on which they bring about some effect, as is clear in natural actions, like when fire heats wood, and in actions pertaining to art, like when a builder makes a house out of materials. And in such things the action is received, in what comes to be, through the manner of a passion, insofar as a motion is in what is moved as in a subject. And therefore in such things one finds the action really in the agent, and really in the patient. But there are some actions that do not go outward into exterior matter such that they produce any effect in it, as is clear in vision, which, since it is the action of the one seeing, brings about no effect really in the thing seen. And such actions, which are properly called “activities,” are only in those performing them. Whence a passion cannot be inferred relative to an action received from an exterior reality, insofar as it is in itself, but only insofar as it is in the one performing it; for although the eye sees the stone, still the stone is not seen except insofar as it is in the eye through a likeness of it.

Therefore, according to this, I say that creation is the sort of action that results in an exterior effect. Whence “creation,” taken passively, must be something in the created reality, just as heating must be in the thing heated. But since “predestination” names an activity of the will and intellect existing only in the one performing it, just as vision is in the one who sees and contemplation in the one contemplating, predestination, if taken passively, will not be something in the one predestined, insofar as it is considered in itself; rather, only insofar as it is in the one predestining him is it in the one predestined, according to its likeness, whereby it is known there, just as the known is also in the knower. From which it is also clear that predestination is not named through any passion existing in it, but through the activity of the one predestining, just as also a reality is denominated as “seen” through the activity of the one seeing it.

Reply Obj. 2: And thus the solution to the second objection is clear. In all absolute things a thing is denominated by what is present in it, but in relative things sometimes a thing is denominated by what is in it, like “father” from paternity, which is really in him; but sometimes it is denominated by what is only in the other thing. This is as what happens when in the one the relation is something real and in the other it is only something according to reason. This is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a27‒b1.) that the knowable is said to be relative, not because it itself is referred, but because something else is referred to it. And thus it is evident that predestination, as a reality, is nothing but what is in the divine intellect.

Reply Obj. 3: That comparison is not being considered absolutely about Nathaniel’s knowledge of the two natures in Christ versus his predestination, but of that knowledge together with his predestination versus predestination together with the status of the Old Law. For the predestination stands with both. This is why the Gloss says, it is better for Nathaniel to know the two natures in Christ than to have been predestined and remain under the shadow of the law and death, (See Glossa ordinaria, at John 1:47–51, 5.1050–52 (PL 114:363); Augustine, Tractates on the Gospel of John, tract. 8, ch. 1 (PL 35:1445–49).) as if to say, “it is better to have been predestined and to have the grace of the New Covenant, than to have been predestined and not to have the grace of the New Covenant.” For predestination runs through both covenants.

Reply Obj. 4: The temporal is not placed within the definition of the eternal in a direct way, as though denoting the substance of the eternal; but nothing prevents that it be placed there in an oblique way, so that it may signify the reference of the eternal to the temporal. And in this way grace and glory are placed in the definition of predestination.

Article 2

Whether predestination pertains to knowledge

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 2; ST I.23.1; I.24.1; SCG III.163; On Truth, q. 6, a. 1; q. 7, aa. 1, 4; Commentary on Romans, ch. 1, lect. 3; Commentary on Philippians, ch. 4, lect. 1; Commentary on Hebrews, ch. 12, lect. 4.) It seems that predestination pertains to his knowledge.

Obj. 1: For, as is said in the text, (Sent. I, 40.1(179).5.) predestination cannot exist without foreknowledge. But “foreknowledge” names knowledge with an order to things to come. Therefore predestination pertains to his knowledge.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, it seems that it pertains to his will. For Augustine says (See Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 3 (PL 44:964).) that predestination is the intent to show mercy. But to intend is an act of the will, since it seems to be the same thing as determining an end. Therefore it seems that predestination pertains to the will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems to pertain to his power. For to prepare is an act of power. But predestination is the preparation for God’s blessings, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 39.4(178).4, quoting Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 10 (PL 44:974).) Therefore and so on.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that it is the same thing as his providence or plan. For something’s direction to the end is called its “predestination.” But order into the end pertains to his providence or plan. Therefore it seems so does predestination.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems to be the same thing as the book of life. For the soul’s life exists through grace and glory. But predestination is the preparation for grace in the present, and for glory in the future, according to the definition given by the Master. (Sent. I, 40.2(180).1.) Therefore it pertains to the book of life.

I answer that predestination includes providence in its concept, and adds something to it. Now, it adds at least three things, and the first is on the side of the very ones predestined. For because God’s providence is with respect to all things, and in a way specifically with respect to things that have will, predestination includes providence in itself according to that specific way by which it is over men and things that have will.

Second, it adds something on the side of the end itself, and of things that are held as moving one forward to the end. For because providence respects the order of each and every good to every end whatsoever, predestination is only with respect to those things that are elevated above the capacity of nature, like glory, which occurs in the perfect enjoyment of God, and grace, which moves one toward it. Whence Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 30 (PL 94:969‒72).) that predestination is for things that are not within us.

Third, it adds something on the side of the very one predestining us, from whose side it appears to add two elements. First, providence is a certain art of the governance of realities, which art, according to the account of its name, can be preserved merely in contemplation, whereas predestination indicates providence insofar as it has been ordered by the will to the execution of the work. And therefore it is defined through both intent and preparation. Second, it adds the foreknowledge of deviation on the side of what is foreseen. Whence something can deviate from the order of providence as regards what was intended; for example, God wills all men to be saved even though not all are saved, but this is not from the order of predestination. For “predestination” signifies the divine intention about someone’s salvation along with his foreknowledge that he will be saved. And this is why it is said that it is foreknowledge and preparation.

Reply Obj. 1: The solution here is clear because not only foreknowledge is in its definition.

Reply Obj. 2: An intent does not simply name an act of the will; rather, it presupposes an act of knowledge presenting the end toward which the will tends.

Reply Obj. 3: The preparation that is placed in the definition of predestination is not understood only according to its execution in the work, but according to the intent of the divine will.

Reply Obj. 4: Predestination is a certain mode of providence, but it adds certain specifying things over and above it, as was said in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 5: “The book of life” is spoken of metaphorically. For just as something is written in a book due to which the truth about a reality is understood in it, so too within the intellect likenesses of realities are written out, through which the realities are known. This is why the potential intellect, before understanding, is compared to a tablet on which nothing has been written, in On the Soul 3. (Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 430a1.) Therefore when the book of life is spoken of as being in God, “life” can be taken either on the side of God’s understanding—and then the foreknowledge about created things is being called the “book of life,” since that which has been made was life in him (John 1:3)—or on the side of the reality known—and then the foreknowledge of the life that is in conformity with God is being called the “book of life.”

However, this latter is of two sorts: the life of grace and the life of glory, which latter reaches perfect conformity. Whence the life of such a one is represented in the book of divine foreknowledge, and is said to be written in the book of life simply speaking, whereas the life only of grace is known there, and is said to be written there in a qualified sense, that is, as regards present justice. And in a certain way even those opposed to these things (that is, to grace and glory) are said to be written there, insofar as they are known through this. In this way, then, it is clear that the book of life is a middle between foreknowledge, as commonly taken, and predestination. For foreknowledge is of all things in common, but the book of life is his knowledge only of grace or glory, but predestination is not merely of grace, but of grace along with glory. Whence no one is said to be predestined in reference to present righteousness, as he is said to be written in the book of life; and over and above this, predestination adds the intent of his will.

Question 2

To whom being predestined belongs

Article 1

To whom being predestined belongs

Next, it is asked to whom predestination belongs. And it seems it belongs only to those who exist.

Obj. 1: For “predestination” signifies a certain sending. But only what exists is sent. Therefore predestination is only of what is.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what does not exist cannot be prepared for something. But predestination is a certain preparation. Therefore it seems that it is not of non-beings.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that it is not concerned with angels. For, according to Augustine, (See Augustine, On the Predestination of the Saints, ch. 3 (PL 44:964).) predestination is the intent to show mercy. But the angels were never in misery. Therefore, since mercy looks to misery, as Bernard says, (Bernard of Clairvaux, Letter 12 (PL 182:114).) it seems that to be predestined does not befit them.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it seems that it is not concerned with the blessed, who are in glory. For what is at its ultimate end cannot be directed to another. But the blessed are at their ultimate end. Therefore being predestined does not befit them.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems predestination is not about the Son of God either. For predestination indicates something that comes before, like foreknowledge. But nothing comes before the Son of God, as he is eternal. Therefore being predestined does not befit the Son of God.

On the contrary (6), it seems that predestination is over all men. For God, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) is oriented equally toward all things. Therefore, if he prepares grace for some, he does so for all. But predestination is a preparation for grace. Therefore if he predestines some, he predestines all.

Furthermore (7), just as we are directed in the good of grace by God, so too in the good of nature, for our every good is from him. But the good of nature is bestowed on all, both the good and the evil, as is said in Matthew 5:45. Therefore, since predestination is one’s direction to the end, and an end is a good, it seems that predestination pertains to all men.

I answer that predestination is said to be of certain things in two ways: either as of the end, and of things conducive to the end—and in this way it is said to be of grace and glory; or it is of those who attain the end—and in this way it is of all those who reach glory through God’s grace. Moreover, each of these can be taken from the name “predestination,” wherein the act of destination is coupled with the prefix “pre-” through an added composition.

Now, “to destine” signifies someone’s direction toward something, like that of a messenger. “To destine” is also spoken of in another way, as is found in 2 Maccabees 6:20: Eleazar destined to refuse illicit things, even for the natural love of life; (RSV: as men ought to go who have the courage to refuse things that it is not right to taste, even for the natural love of life.) but this usage seems derivative from the first, for what is decided upon is directed to the execution of the deed. Now, a thing is properly said to be directed to something else when it does not have within itself that whereby it might go to the latter. And therefore, properly speaking, predestination is to things that a man cannot reach based on things natural to him, that is, to grace and glory. This is why Damascene says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 2, ch. 30 (PL 94:969‒72).) that predestination is of things that are not within us. And therefore whatever cannot attain grace and glory is not predestined, but only those who are going to attain glory through grace are called “predestined.”

But the prefix “pre-” indicates coming before, or precedence, and that belongs to diverse things in diverse ways. For the precedence of eternity relative to nature is found in the predestination of man, as is that of nature to grace, and of grace to glory. However, in the angel one finds the precedence of eternity relative to nature, and that of nature to grace—according to those who assert that the angels were created only with their natural attributes—but (according to them) not that of grace to glory, by a precedence of duration. However, according to others, who assert that the angels were created in grace, there is found no durational precedence of nature to grace, but there is a precedence of grace to glory. However, in Christ there is found no precedence of eternity to the person, but only to the second of the two natures, nor is there one of nature to grace, or of grace to glory, as regards fruition, but only as regards the soul’s inability to suffer and the dowries of the body. And thus, predestination belongs to diverse things in diverse ways.

Reply Obj. 1: Those who do not exist nor will exist are not predestined; but those who will exist, even though they do not exist now, whom God knows with a knowledge of vision, are predestined. And although they themselves are not being actually directed to something, as though existing in their own proper nature, still they are pre-directed to their end, insofar as they are in God’s foreknowledge.

Reply Obj. 2: There are two sorts of preparation: one is of matter, insofar as it is disposed to receiving form—and in this way only what exists is prepared; and the other is the preparation of an agent, so that it might be an agent. And this latter is like what occurs in natural things, insofar as an agent acquires a disposition through which it acts; so too it is in an artisan, insofar as he conceives the form of his artwork, and is intent on executing it in action. And this latter preparation is in God, even with respect to future things.

Reply Obj. 3: That definition is given of predestination insofar as it looks to the state of present misery, and not of it absolutely. Or it can be said that “to show mercy” is taken here not for the removal of misery previously possessed, but for the bestowal of the things without which one would experience misery—and especially the things that are bestowed only by a gratuitous will.

Reply Obj. 4: The “predestined” can be taken in two ways: either as a participle, insofar as it consignifies past time—and in this way, those who are in the heavenly fatherland are predestined, since what once was in the past will always be in the past; or it can be taken another way, as a noun. And in this way, the blessed cannot be called “predestined,” properly speaking—except insofar as they are directed to the continuation of beatitude, which nonetheless is not said properly, since beatitude has no extension of succession.

Reply Obj. 5: Although no precedence can be designated relative to the person of the Son of God absolutely speaking, nonetheless it can be designated relative to his human nature, or to the person insofar as he subsists in that nature. But this will be studied better in Book III. (In III Sent., d. 2, a. 3.)

Reply Sed Contra 6: Even though God in his very self is oriented equally to all things, nonetheless all things are not equally oriented to him. And therefore grace is not prepared for all things equally.

Reply Sed Contra 7: Predestination is properly speaking of things that are elevated above the capacities of nature, as was said in the body of the article, and therefore it is not necessary that predestination belong to all who receive natural goods from God, but only of those for whom grace and glory are prepared.

Question 3

Whether predestination is certain

Article 1

Whether predestination is certain

Next, he asks about predestination’s certitude, and it seems that it is not certain. (Parallel texts: ST I.23.6; On Truth, q. 6, a. 3; Quodl. XI, q. 3, a. 1; Quodl. XII, q. 3, aa. 1, 2.)

Obj. 1: For Revelation 3:11 says, hold fast what you have, so that no one may seize your crown. This is understood to be either about the crown of present righteousness or about the crown of glory. But it is not about the crown of present righteousness, since the grace that someone has is destroyed when he sins, nor does it pass from subject to subject. Therefore it is understood to be about the crown of glory. But glory does not belong to someone in the state of the earthly path unless because he has been predestined to it. Therefore it seems that one can receive what has been predestined to someone else, and therefore predestination does not have certitude.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Gregory says (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 25, ch. 8 (CCSL 143B; PL 75:331).) that when some fall, others take their places. But a place of glory cannot be spoken of for them except insofar as it has been predestined for them. Therefore the same thing as before.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a Psalm says, let them be blotted out of the book of the living (Ps 69:28 [68:29]). But one cannot be blotted out of a book in which one has not been written. Therefore, since predestination is the book of life, as was said, (Above, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5.) it seems that something can fall away from predestination, and thus it will not be certain.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, there can be no certitude of things that are determined neither in themselves nor in their causes. But the motions of free decision, which is a cause open to both options, are determined neither in themselves nor in their causes before they occur. Therefore, since the effect of predestination is fulfilled in motions of free decision, which are meritorious actions, it seems that predestination has no certitude.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, every certain knowledge, when posited, necessarily concludes to what it knows. But what is eternal, since it is for all time, can at any time be posited. Therefore, since predestination is eternal, someone can be posited as predestined before he is saved. Therefore one can conclude “this man will be saved,” as something true. But if a future contingent were true, then it would occur of necessity, as the Philosopher proves. (Aristotle, On Interpretation 9, 18a34‒b15.) Therefore it would follow that this man would necessarily be saved, and even that he could not not be saved. And thus, free decision would be destroyed—which is impossible. And the impossible follows only from the impossible. Therefore it seems impossible that predestination have certitude, since the other things are proved to be possible.

On the contrary, predestination in its account includes foreknowledge. But God himself has certain knowledge of all the things that he knows, as was shown above. (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 3.) Therefore it seems that predestination is certain.

I answer that some have said that God does not know future contingents except insofar as they exist, that is, knowing them to be contingent, just as he knows necessary things to be necessary. But Boethius disproves this, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 5, prose. 5 (CCSL 94; PL 63:858).) since from this it would follow that God would know no more about the future salvation of men than would man, who also knows that it is contingent.

Whence others have said that predestination has certitude in such a way that the number of those to be saved is certain with God, meaning the number whereby we number things—that is, a hundred will be saved, or a thousand, and so on. However, they say the number, taken materially, is not certain—that is, in reference to the supposits, since such men are able both to be saved and to not be saved. But this is to attribute imperfect knowledge to God. For if he knows how many will be saved, and not which ones, then his knowledge is imperfect and only universal. However, if he also knows which ones, this must be certain, since his knowledge cannot be uncertain just as it cannot fail.

And therefore one should say that the number of the predestined, taken in both ways—that is, both formally and materially—is certain to God, but uncertain to us. Nevertheless this certitude imposes no necessity on those to be saved, which is clear from things that have been said. For in its own concept predestination includes foreknowledge and providence regarding the salvation of all. But providence, as was said, even though it is over all things, still does not happen to all things with necessity, but according to the condition of proximate causes, the natures and order of which providence and predestination upholds. Foreknowledge also does not impose any necessity on realities, neither insofar as it is a cause—since it is the first cause, and the effect does not have the condition of this, but of the proximate cause—nor by reason of its adequacy to the reality known, which is required for the account of truth and the certitude of knowledge. For this adequacy of God’s knowledge to the reality is considered not insofar as it exists in its causes, wherein it exists as only a future possibility, but rather in reference to the reality itself, insofar as it has a determinate existence, as present and not future; and this was explained earlier. (Above, d. 38, q. 1, a. 5.) And thus it is clear that the certitude of predestination imposes no necessity on the ones who are going to be saved.

Reply Obj. 1: This can be explained in either manner. For if it is understood of the crown of present righteousness, someone else is said to take his crown when his works done in charity, which benefit himself and others insofar as the spirit of charity makes for the saints’ common merits, cease to benefit him for meriting eternal life because he himself sins—while their fruition remains in them who persevere in grace. However, this is not such that numerically the same grace in one man comes to be in someone else when he himself sins. And this passage can be explained similarly if it is understood to be about the crown of future glory. For the saints existing in the heavenly fatherland rejoice over all the merits of the saints who are in the world. Whence when someone who had many merits beforehand sins, the joy over those merits will remain in the blessed into eternity, which joy the one committing the sin has lost; but this is not such that the glory that was predestined to one might be given to another. Yet it says, so that no one may seize your crown, not so as to exclude the certitude of predestination, but to show the freedom of one’s decision.

Reply Obj. 2: Gregory’s statement is not understood to be about the place that is predestined for the saints, but about the place that they hold in the Church through the state of present righteousness. For the Church never abandons those in a state of grace; whence although some are sinners, others are called by the Lord to grace.

Reply Obj. 3: Predestination is the book of life insofar as something is said to be written in it not merely as regards present righteousness, but even as regards future glory. And in this sense, in no way can someone be said to be blotted out from the book of life. But what is written there only as regards present righteousness is said to be blotted out—not by a change made on the side of the book, such that something that was in it is no longer in it, but on the side of the one who is said to be written in the book; this is insofar as he himself changes from a state of present righteousness. And in this way, his life is not being represented as present but as past.

Reply Obj. 4: A future contingent, like the motion of free decision, even though it is not determined in its cause, is nonetheless determined in its own existence insofar as it is in act. And in this way it is subject to the certitude of foreknowledge, as was said above about future contingents. (Above, d. 38, q. 1. a. 5.)

Reply Obj. 5: What is measured by eternity is simultaneous with every time, yet in such a way that it is not measured by any of them. And therefore the act of divine foreknowledge cannot be posited as existing now, as though it were measured by the present time, such that it might have the order of present to future as regards what it knows; rather, as regards every time and as regards everything it knows, it has the order of the present to the present. Whence when one says, “God foreknows this thing,” it is not understood that this thing is in the future relative to the divine knowledge, but relative to this time in which it is being uttered. And therefore one must free verbs and participles of this sort from a determination of time, when said of God, so that they might consignify the now of eternity, and not that of time. Otherwise an error would inevitably follow.

Question 4

Reprobation

Next, one asks about reprobation. And as regards this, two things are asked:

first, what is it;

second, whether God is the cause of the obduracy and blindness that in some way correspond to reprobation.

Article 1

Whether reprobation adds something over and above foreknowledge

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.23.3; SCG III.163; Commentary on Romans, ch. 9, lect. 2.) It seems that reprobation adds nothing over and above foreknowledge.

Obj. 1: For reprobation is of evil men. But of them God has only knowledge of simple awareness, as was held above. (Above, d. 38, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore reprobation adds nothing over and above foreknowledge.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what adds something over and above what is common does not appropriate the common name to itself—just as what is convertible with a thing, but does not indicate its substance, appropriates the name “property” to itself, for this does not add anything as “definition” adds something. But reprobation appropriates the name “foreknowledge” to itself, for we say in common that the evil are foreknown, but the good predestined. Therefore it seems that reprobation adds nothing over and above foreknowledge.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the Master above presented (Sent. I, 35.6(155).2.) the accounts of the things that add something over and above foreknowledge and knowledge, such as plan, providence, and so on. Therefore, since he made no mention of reprobation there, it seems that it adds nothing over and above foreknowledge.

On the contrary, foreknowledge is of all, both the good and the bad. But reprobation is only of those who are going to be damned. Therefore, it adds something over and above the account of foreknowledge.

Furthermore, reprobation is opposed to approbation. But “approbation” signifies something in the will. Therefore, since opposites belong to the same thing, it seems that reprobation posits something in the will and not only in foreknowledge.

I answer that “reprobation” adds, over and above foreknowledge, the account of providence. For divine providence is commonly over all things, yet in a certain specific and privileged way it is over those things wherein one finds will, through which they have the capacity for eternal glory. And therefore a certain specific mode of divine providence attends to the order of this nature to its end of glory, according to the bestowal upon them of things that move them toward that end. And because it is from the condition of that nature that it can fall short of attaining the end, therefore through divine providence it has been ordained that such a failure results in the good of justice, when punishment is applied to guilt. And therefore just as divine providence relative to a good man himself, which occurs through the attainment of grace and glory along with foreknowledge of the outcome, is called “predestination,” so too the opposite divine providence relative to a bad man, along with the foreknowledge of the falling away, is called “reprobation.”

And because the good is subject to providence as caused and ordered by it, so it is said that predestination is the cause of the grace and glory toward which it is ordered. But because evil is not subject to providence as intended or caused, but only as foreknown and ordained, this is why reprobation is only the foreknowledge of fault, and not its cause, whereas it is both the foreknowledge and cause of the punishment, whereby the fault is ordered.

Reply Obj. 1: God has a knowledge of simple awareness that evils will occur; but he also has a knowledge of approbation that they will be ordered, and the name “reprobation” indicates this.

Reply Obj. 2: “Reprobation” does not add anything on the side of the reprobate over and above foreknowledge since it causes nothing in him whereby he becomes evil. And therefore it appropriates the common name “foreknowledge” to itself. Yet it does add something on the side of God, who reproves him, namely, the willing of the order of punishment for the fault. Whence also in the abstract it does not appropriate the common name to itself, as it does in the concrete; whence the reprobate is more called “foreknown” than is reprobation called “foreknowledge.”

Reply Obj. 3: Reprobation is opposed to predestination, so by opposition it is given as understood when predestination is posited.

Article 2

Whether God is the cause of obduracy

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In II Sent., d. 37, q. 2, a. 1; ST I-II.79.3; SCG III.162; On Truth, q. 24, a. 10; Commentary on Matthew, ch. 13, lect. 1.) It seems that God is the cause of the obduracy and blindness.

Obj. 1: It seems so because of what is said in 2 Corinthians 4:4: the god of this world has blinded the minds of the unbelievers, which one Gloss explains (Glossa ordinaria, at 2 Corinthians 4:4, 6.382 (PL 114:556).) as being about the true God. Therefore it seems that he is the cause of obduracy and blindness.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, blindness and obduracy are certain punishments. But every just punishment is also from God. Therefore blindness and obduracy are from God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2, 72a13; 1.13, 78b16‒21.) if an affirmation is the cause of an affirmation, a negation is also the cause of a negation. But the divine willing is the cause of someone having a grace, that is, because he wills it. Therefore it seems that God’s not willing it is the cause due to which that person would not have grace. But the latter is that person’s obduracy. Therefore one should take the cause of obduracy as being on the side of God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 2.3, 195a13.) the one who, by being present, is the cause of the ship’s well-being, that is, the pilot, is also the cause of its danger through his absence. But God is the cause of grace through his being present in the soul. Therefore through his absence he is the cause of its obduracy.

On the contrary, the saints in common—Dionysius, Augustine, and Anselm—say (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694); Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 35, para. 4 (CCSL 38; PL 36:343); Anselm, De concordia praescientiae et praedestinationis et gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio, q. 1, ch. 3 (PL 158:511–12).) that the cause of a person not having grace is that he himself did not want to receive it, not that God did not want to give it. For he offers his light to all even though it is not received by all, just as neither is the light of the sun by the blind. But obduracy is itself the lack of grace. Therefore the cause of obduracy is not on the side of God.

Furthermore, no one is guilty or punished for what he does not cause. But a man is punished and is guilty for his obduracy, or for his lack of grace. Therefore he is the cause of this.

I answer that “obduracy” sometimes signifies the act of a will that is obstinate in evil, to which it steadfastly clings. And in this sense, it is certain that God is not the cause of obstinacy, but rather the man is, just as neither is he the cause of any act of sin insofar as it is deformed. However, sometimes “obduracy” signifies the very privation of grace, which is also called “blindness,” since grace is a certain light of the soul and a certain perfection making it capable of the good. Now, one can lack grace on two accounts: because he does not want to receive it, and because God does not infuse it within him, or does not want to infuse it within him. But there is an order of these two, such that the second is only on the supposition of the first. For because God has wished only the good, he does not wish such a one to lack grace except insofar as it is good. But that such a one lack grace is not good simply speaking, and therefore, absolutely considered, this is not willed by God. Nonetheless it is good that he lack grace if he does not wish to have it, or if he negligently prepares himself to have it, because God is just and in this manner it is willed by God.

Therefore it is clear that the first cause of this falling away is on the side of the man who lacks grace, but there is no cause of this falling away on the side of God except on the supposition of the cause on the side of the man. And in this way one finds that God is sometimes said to be the cause of blindness or obduracy, not by his hurling malice at such a one, but by his not imparting the grace, which is up to him. For if grace is not necessarily imparted, it is up to him also that it not be imparted, so he is in a certain way a cause of its not being imparted.

Reply Obj. 1: The response here is clear. Nonetheless, some say that God is the cause of the obduracy the way nature is the cause of rest. This is explicitly false, since natural rest is the end of a natural motion, and is intended through itself by the nature, and this cannot be said here.

Reply Obj. 2: To make one obdurate is said to be a punishment insofar as it signifies a falling away that has already been set in order. And thus, it is traced back to the divine causality not by reason of the falling away, but by reason of the order that exists.

Reply Obj. 3: An effect does not follow except with the concurrence of all its causes, but the negation of the effect follows on the failure of just one. Therefore I say that the cause of grace as an agent cause is God himself, and receiving it is the soul itself in the manner of its subject and matter. And because the cause of a form being induced is not the matter or subject, unless such subject brings forth an accident from its principles—and grace is not that sort of accident—, the soul is not therefore said to be, simply speaking, the cause of grace, but only its receiver, whereas God is its cause. Nor is it necessary that every falling away happen on the side of the agent; rather, it can happen on the side of the receiver, and this is how it is in the proposed matter.

Reply Obj. 4: God, as he is in himself, is absent to nothing. But man absents himself from God’s presence, just as one can close his eyes from present light. And therefore what is brought in as similar is not similar.

Exposition of the text

An understanding of the implicit condition reveals truth in the statement and impossibility in reality. (Sent. I, 40.1(179).3.) This can be explained as follows. Let us take two statements, one of which is true—“Peter can be damned”—and the other false—“Peter cannot be damned.” If one joins a condition that is implicitly understood in the participle “predestined,” the understanding of this condition renders the statement that before was false now true. For if Peter has been predestined, “Peter cannot be damned” is true. It would also make an impossibility in the statement that before was true, for “Peter can be damned” is impossible if he has been predestined; yet this would be such that the impossibility would be referred to the necessity of consequence.

They do not at all grant it in the actions or operations of God and men. (Sent. I, 40.1(179).5.) They name the “operations of God” alone what he carries out without the mediation of anything created, like his understanding, willing, and the like; and such operations are measured by eternity, and not by time, so they do not follow the necessity of the past, but rather endure in the freedom of the present. Yet they do so in such a way that his immobility is not taken away. For God cannot now will something and later not will it; rather, his eternal willing is always in the freedom of his will. And therefore from the truth of his predestination there follows no necessity on the side of the predestination, just as none follows on the side of the one predestined. For God is able both to predestine and not to predestine. However, the “operations of God and men” name things that are carried out by God by the mediation of a created thing, or in a created thing. And because they are measured by time, on the side of the created thing, therefore they pass into the past and acquire necessity.

So the effect of eternal reprobation seems to be in some way obduracy. (Sent. I, 40.2(180).2.) This he adds because it should not be conceded simply speaking that reprobation is the cause of obduracy, but only of its permission and ordination, as was said in the body of the article.