D. 48 - Conformity of our will to the will of God

Division of the text

Having considered God’s will, here he considers the conformity of our will to his will. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he determines the truth; in the second, based on the truth determined, he considers certain questions, at from this follows the solution to the question. (Sent. I, 48.3(209).1.)

The first is divided into three: in the first, he shows that a man’s evil will agrees with God’s will in the same thing being willed, even when a man’s good will is tending to the contrary; in the second, he shows that God’s good will is even fulfilled through a man’s evil will, at it is also not to be passed over that at times God’s good will is fulfilled by the evil will of man; (Sent. I, 48.2(208).1.) in the third, he excludes a certain objection, at but the following objection is made to this. (Sent. I, 48.2(208).2.)

From this follows the solution to the question. (Sent. I, 48.3(209).1.) Here he proceeds, based on things determined, to the solution of two questions. The first of these is about the suffering of the head, that is, of Christ; the second is about the suffering of his members, that is, of the martyrs, at but if it is asked whether the same is to be felt about the sufferings and martyrdoms of the saints, we say that there is a distinct difference between the suffering of the head and that of the members. (Sent. I, 48.4(210).1.)

Question 1

The conformity of our will to the will of God

Here four things are asked:

first, whether man’s will can be conformed to the divine will;

second, in what is this conformity principally viewed;

third, whether all men are bound to this conformity;

fourth, whether they are bound even to a conformity in the thing willed.

Article 1

Whether the human will is not able to be conformed to the divine will

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.19.9, 10; On Truth, q. 23, a. 7.) It seems that the human will cannot be conformed to the divine.

Obj. 1: For so it is said in Isaiah 55:9, as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways. But the earth can never be conformed to the heavens. Therefore neither can the thoughts and wills of men be conformed to the divine will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, there is no conformity of things that are infinitely distant, since conformity occurs through some approximation. But God’s will is infinitely distant from the will of men; for to the degree that God is distant from man, so far is God’s will distant from man’s will, (See Augustine, Enarrationes in Psalmos, Psalm 32, serm. 1, para. 2 (CCSL 38; PL 36:277).) as is said in a Gloss on Psalm 33 [32]:1, rejoice in the Lord, O you righteous! Therefore man’s will is not conformed to the divine will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, conformity asserts an agreement of two things in one form, as the name itself shows. But whatever things agree in any one thing have something prior and simpler than themselves—that is, that in which they agree. Therefore, since nothing is simpler than and prior to the divine will, it seems that no created will can be conformed to it.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a thing is alike in form only with what is also like it in form; for conformity is a relation of things at the same level, asserting a like orientation in each of the extremes. But we do not say the divine will is alike in form to the human will. Therefore neither is the converse.

On the contrary, nothing ruled becomes rectified except through a conformity to the rule. But the divine will is the rule of the human will, and his intellect the rule of the human intellect. Therefore every rectified will is conformed to the divine will.

Furthermore, the will of anyone voluntarily obeying is conformed to the will of the one commanding him. But many obey the divine commands voluntarily. Therefore the will of many is conformed to the divine will.

I answer that conformity is an agreement in one form, and thus it is the same as the likeness that unity of quality causes, as is said in Metaphysics 5. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a12.) Whence something is conformed to God in the same way that it becomes like him.

Now, it is possible for things to be said to be “like” in two ways. Either this happens due to the fact that they participate in one form, just as two white things participate in whiteness; and in this sense, everything like must be composed from that wherein it agrees with the other like it, and from that wherein it differs from it, since likeness is only of different things, according to Boethius. (See Boethius, In Porphyrii Isagogen commentorum editio secunda, bk. 3, ch. 9 (CSEL 48:228; PL 64:111).) Whence in this sense God cannot be like anything, neither as agreeing nor as alike in form, as is frequently found said by philosophers. Or things can be like due to the fact that the one that has the form by participation imitates the one that has it essentially, just as if a white body were said to be like a separated whiteness, or a body compounded so as to be fiery is like fire itself. And this likeness that asserts a composition in the one but a simplicity in the other can belong to what is created in comparison with God in the former’s participating in goodness, wisdom, or some such thing—each of which, in God, is his essence. And in this way our will is conformed to the divine.

But one way in which this conformity of the will can be understood is as being of the very power of the will, which is given to man according to the divine will as its exemplar, which pertains to the likeness in which consists the account of an image, and is common to good men and evil. And we are not asking here about this conformity. The other way it can be understood is about the will’s act, which is also called one’s “will,” and this is the conformity about which we are asking. For in this conformity consists merit, or even demerit, in that the man is the cause of the will’s act, but not of the power. Whence this conformity belongs only to good men.

Reply Obj. 1: The Lord is speaking there in Isaiah of evil men, who are signified by “earth”; in the act of their will they withdraw from the divine likeness.

Reply Obj. 2: In things infinitely distant there cannot be conformity in the mode of equality, or even according to any agreement in something where there is participation on both sides; rather, the conformity is through the manner described in the body of the article.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby the response to the third is clear, as the objection proceeds according to the first mode of distinction in conformity described.

Reply Obj. 4: According to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 9, para. 6 (PG 3:694).) the reciprocity of likeness does not occur in causes and effects wherein the likeness is said to be through imitation. Rather, it is only in things on the same level, wherein the likeness is through a like participation in the same thing. For we do not say that the man is like his image, but vice versa. Whence one should not say that God is like or conformed to the creature, but that the creature is conformed to God, by imitating him as best as it can.

Article 2

Whether the conformity of the wills is viewed chiefly in reference to what is willed

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I-II.19.10; On Truth, q. 23, a. 8.) It seems that the conformity of wills is viewed chiefly in reference to what is being willed.

Obj. 1: For conformity is viewed according to agreement in form. But the form and perfection of the will is the very thing willed, just as the thing known is the perfection of the knower. Therefore the conformity of the wills is in reference to agreement in what is willed.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, acts are known and judged through their objects, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, On the Soul 1.1, 402b12‒16; 2.6, 418a7.) But the object of the will is what is willed. Therefore it seems that the conformity of wills is in reference to the unity in what is being willed.

Obj. 3: You might say that the object of the will is the good, and conformity is viewed in reference to this.

On the contrary, willing is only for what is good. Therefore if the conformity of will is due to the agreement in the good, it seems that all willing, even of sin, would be conformed to the divine will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the will of Christ’s killers not only coincides with the divine will in the same thing being willed, but even in the same good, that is, Christ’s suffering, which was a great good. Therefore, if the account of conformity is viewed based on this, it seems that the will of the Jews was conformed to the divine.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the account of the good is drawn from the end. But it is possible for someone acting for the sake of a good end not to be conformed to the divine will, as when one steals riches so that he might give alms to the poor. Therefore it seems that the conformity of will is also not viewed from the end.

Obj. 6: You might say that it is viewed principally in a man’s willing what God wants him to will.

On the contrary, the thing willed and willing are not the same thing, except incidentally, as when one’s willing is willed by someone else. But this is conformity to the divine will insofar as our very willing is willed by God, who wants us to will what we are willing. Therefore our willing is not conformed to the divine willing in this way, except incidentally. And thus, from all these things it seems that the conformity should be viewed in reference to what is willed.

On the contrary, two contraries, as such, are not conformed to the same thing. But the wills of two saints in reference to opposite things willed are both conformed to the divine will, since each is rectified. This is clear in the text (Sent. I, 48.4(210).2, referring to Philippians 1:23.) about certain ones who did not want Paul to die, whereas he himself did. Therefore the conformity is not in reference to what is willed.

I answer that, as was said in the previous article, here we are asking about the conformity as regards the act of the will. Now, the act of the human will can imitate the act of the divine will in two ways: either as regards the nature’s existence—and this is not how we are speaking about it here, since this belongs to the act of the will insofar as it goes out from the power, the conformity of which we are setting aside—or as regards the perfection added to it, according to which the act is said to be of this sort or that sort. And this latter is the conformity we are asking about; it being, as it were, in reference to the species of behavior.

Now, this conformity can be considered in four ways, according to the relations of the four causes. It is according to material cause when the same thing willed stands as the matter about which the act of the will is concerned; and therefore this is conformity only in a certain respect, and not simply, since to exist, simply speaking, is not from matter but from form. Or it is a conformity according to efficient cause when someone wills what God wants him to will, for God brings about this order of the will in him. Or it is a conformity according to final cause when someone orders his own deeds to the glory of God, on account of which God does all things—and conformity consists essentially in these latter two. Or it is a conformity according to formal cause insofar as someone wills from charity, just as God wills all things from charity; for the form of an act is from the habit—and the perfection of the conformity consists in this.

However, the reason for this assertion is that the essential assimilation of things is viewed in reference to that from which the species is drawn. But the species of any voluntary act is drawn from its object, which is the form of the will bringing forth the act. Now, two things come together for the object of any act: one that stands, as it were, materially, and the other that is as formal, as completing the account of the object; this is just as light and color come together for the visible. But that which stands materially as regards the object of the will is whatever the willed reality is, whereas the account of the object is completed by the account of the good. Whence due to this the act of the human will is conformed to the divine will: that it tends to the good just as the divine will does. And from this too a good act is representing the divine goodness.

And this conformity is in reference to the efficient cause, since God has ordered each and every will to the good. And God wills us to will this, insofar as our will is ordered. But this conformity includes the conformity of end, insofar as the thing willed has the account of the good based on its end, although sometimes it is also good in itself. Whence, the conformity is viewed essentially from this, but not from the very reality willed from which the act is not drawing its species. But the habit of charity does add a perfection within the goodness of the act. And therefore the perfection of conformity is viewed according to its formal cause, so that to the degree that the act of our will is more conformed to the divine will, so far is it better and more perfect.

Reply Obj. 1: What is willed is not the perfection of the will, nor is the object except insofar as it stands under the account of the good; this is just as color is not the object and perfection of sight except insofar as it stands under the act of light.

Reply Obj. 2: The response to this is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: In one who sins, reason’s will does not tend to what is good for it, but to what is good for something else—that is, for the concupiscible or irascible appetite. For a man is not said to be a man on account of the soul’s concupiscible or irascible part, but on account of reason; and this is why his will is not good. Nevertheless if the irascible appetite were to tend through itself to its own object, which is its own good, it would not be culpable, as happens with the beasts, and it would have a certain conformity to the divine will insofar as it tends to that to which God has ordered it.

Reply Obj. 4: Christ’s suffering had two aspects: that it was capable of saving the human race—and in this way, this willed reality stood under the account of the good and was willed by God and the saints; or insofar as it afflicted an innocent man—and in this way, it did not have the account of the good, and in such a way it was willed by the Jews. Whence they did not will a good simply speaking, except incidentally, whereas speaking essentially, they willed simply an evil they judged to be good, insofar as they satisfied their anger or envy.

Reply Obj. 5: Just as a natural form is in matter due to its agent, so too the form of goodness is in what is willed due to its end. And just as matter disproportionate to a form, even with the presence of the appropriate agent, never attains the form, just as a stone does not become flesh due to the digestive power, so too what is willed but disproportionate to goodness, however good the end be, never receives goodness. And such are things that are evil through themselves, like stealing and the like—unless that deformity be taken away by the divine authority, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 47, q. 1, a. 3.)

Reply Obj. 6: Everything divinely willed imitates his will insofar as it is as God wills it; yet it does not imitate it in the account of willing, and by the goodness of the will’s act. Rather, only the act of the human will tending to the good toward which it is ordered according to God’s will does this. Whence not only is conformity of our will there insofar as it is willed, but insofar as he is willing and eliciting a good act of the will.

Article 3

Whether we are not bound to a conformity with the divine will

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that we are not bound to a conformity with the divine will.

Obj. 1: For just as the rectitude of human will occurs through its conformity to the divine will, so too the rectitude of our intellect occurs through its conformity to the divine intellect. But not all are bound to the conforming of their intellect to the divine intellect; otherwise no one with a false opinion would be saved. Therefore it seems that, for a like reason, we are not bound to a conformity of will.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, no one is obligated to what is impossible for himself; otherwise sin would be necessary, not voluntary. But a will that is obstinate in sin cannot be conformed to the divine will, which is always good. Therefore it seems that such are not bound to conformity.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, whoever sins, in his very act of sinning, is not conforming his will to the divine will. Therefore, if we are all bound to conformity, it seems that whoever sins would sin in two ways: by the sin of the transgression that he is committing, and by the sin of omission whereby he does not fulfill the conformity to which he is bound. And this is false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whoever does not do what he is obligated to do sins mortally by omission. But whoever sins venially by that very act does not conform his will to the divine will. Therefore, if he is bound to this latter, he would be sinning mortally when he sins venially—which is false. Therefore so is the first assumption.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, whatever God wills to occur does occur. Therefore whatever he wills us to will we do will. But evil men do will to do good things. Therefore God does not will them to do good things. Therefore if the conformity of the human will to the divine occurs in the fact that a man wills what God wills him to will, then it seems that by sinning a man does not withdraw from conformity to his will—which is false.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, just as what is divinely willed is not known to us, so too is the end toward which his work is ordained by it. For even in natural realities often it is difficult to designate a thing’s end. But no one is held to what he does not know. Therefore we are not bound to that conformity that is on the side of the end.

Obj. 7: Furthermore, no one is bound to what is not in his own power. But having charity in us is not up to us. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to that conformity that is in the form of charity.

On the contrary, all men are bound to obeying God, and to having a rectified will. But this can happen only if we are conformed to the divine will. Therefore we are all bound to a conformity with it.

I answer that someone is, properly speaking, said to be “bound” to something when, if he does not do it, he commits a sin. Now, in all things, both natural and voluntary, a sin (In Latin, the word peccatum, like the Greek ἁμαρτία (hamartia), has a broader scope than the modern English word “sin” typically has. In Latin, the word includes any deviation from an object’s end, and hence, whenever nature or the artist falls short of the intended end (as in deformations that occur in nature or the mistakes an artist makes, as mentioned in the text), these are called “sins” (peccata). “Error” might be a more commensurate translation, but “sin” is the more commonly accepted translation and usually fits the context better.) occurs from the fact that something does not reach that to which it has been ordered, as is said in Physics 2; (Aristotle, Physics 2.8, 199a34‒b14.) this is clear in monstrosities, and in errors that occur in the activity of an art. But it occurs in natural and voluntary things in different ways, since in natural things the falling away from the order occurs from necessity, whereas in voluntary things the will itself is the cause of its own failure; for within us is the ability to fall away and to not fall away. Whence the will’s falling short from that to which it is ordered has not only the account of a sin, but even of a fault. Therefore, when it is said that conformity of will is viewed insofar as it tends, through its own act, to that to which it is ordered, it is necessary that the falling away from conformity brings about sin and fault. And therefore we are bound to a conformity of will.

But one must note that we are bound to something directly: that is, to what is through itself within our power. And in this way we are bound to a conformity whereby we will what it is congruous for us to will, and according to a rectified end. For we have the capacity, from our natural faculties, for each of these. But we also are bound to something indirectly: to have grace, which is not according to itself within our power. Rather, it is within our power to do something whereby, when done, we will have grace. And in this sense, we are bound even to that conformity that is according to the form of charity.

Reply Obj. 1: The case is not similar for the will and for the intellect, since the failure of the intellect is not within our power, as is the case with the failure of the will. For sometimes the intellect is violently coerced by arguments, as is said in Metaphysics 5, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.1, 1013a11‒23.) but the will is not. And yet in things that are necessary for salvation, we are bound to conforming our intellect to the divine intellect, as in matters that belong to faith; for in these things, if we do what is within our capacity, the divine aid will not be absent from us. And even in other matters someone would sin if he voluntarily were to fight against an understood truth, and cling to what is false.

Reply Obj. 2: As long as the will is obstinate, it cannot simultaneously be conformed to the divine will; but in the state of the earthly path, there is no one who cannot give up an obstinacy of mind, and in this way be conformed to the divine will. Yet in the damned, it is inflicted as a punishment that they can never be cured of their own obstinacy, and yet there remains in them this perpetual fault along with the punishment that will never cease. Nonetheless this is not unmerited; for they are not on the earthly path, but have come to the terminus of the path, where there is punishment.

Reply Obj. 3: The conformity of the will is common to all the commands of the natural law and the written law, whereby we are ordered to the good. Whence whoever sins against any such command sins against conformity. Nonetheless, he does not commit two sins, since the common does not assert something numerically distinct from the proper.

Reply Obj. 4: The affirmative commands do not obligate at all times, in that it is impossible for us to act at all times, as is said in On Sleep and Sleeplessness. (Aristotle, On Sleep and Sleeplessness 1, 459a1–12.) And therefore it is not necessary that we always actually conform our will to the divine; rather, it is enough that we do it always habitually, and at certain times actually. This is why one who sins venially does not commit it against conformity, but acts only outside conformity, as outside the law.

Reply Obj. 5: When it is said that conformity is viewed insofar as we will what God wills us to will, this is understood to be of the antecedent will, the effect of which is the order of our nature to the good. However, the objection treats it as being about the consequent will, so it does not follow.

Reply Obj. 6: Although we cannot know the proper end of each thing, nonetheless we can know the ultimate end, from which arises all goodness within the proximate ends—so that we might order all things to God, who made the universe for the sake of himself, as is said in Proverbs 16:4. (RSV: the Lord has made everything for its purpose, even the wicked for the day of trouble; however, the Vulgate reads propter semetipsum, “for his very self,” instead of for its purpose.)

Reply Obj. 7: The response to this is clear from what has been said.

Article 4

Whether we are bound to conformity in the thing willed

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that we are not bound to a conformity in what is willed.

Obj. 1: For no one is bound to what he does not know. But what is divinely willed is unknown to us, just as it is foreknown to him. Therefore it seems that we are not bound to this.

Obj. 2: One might say that it can be revealed to someone.

On the contrary, if someone’s damnation were revealed to him, he would not be bound to willing his own damnation; indeed, he is bound to willing his own salvation, since he is bound to loving himself from charity, and to choosing the highest good for himself. Therefore he is not bound to willing what he knows God wills.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, Christ knew his own suffering was willed by God, and yet with a certain will he did not want the suffering, as the Master says below in Book III. (See Sent. III, 17.3(49).2.) Therefore, since Christ omitted none of the things that belong to the rectitude of life, to which we all are bound, it seems that we are not bound to conformity in what is willed.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, in reference to the Blessed Virgin, it is objected that she did not will her Son’s suffering; otherwise she would not have grieved at his death, which is contrary to what is written in Luke 2:35: a sword shall pierce your own soul.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the divine will is made known to us through signs of the will. But permission, which is one of its signs, is also about the evils of fault, which we should in no way will. Therefore we are not bound to conforming our will to the divine in what is willed.

On the contrary, a Gloss on the Psalm, perverseness of heart shall be far from me (Ps 101 [100]:4), says, he who does not will what God wills has a perverse heart. (Glossa interlinearis, at Psalm 100:4 (in Glossa ordinaria 3.1206).) But all are bound to not having a perverse heart. Therefore we are bound to conforming our will to the divine will in what is willed.

Furthermore, according to Cicero, (Cicero, On Friendship, ch. 18.) it belongs to friends to will the same thing and to reject the same thing. But we are bound to being friends with God. Therefore we are bound to willing the same thing as what he wills.

I answer that God is said to will something with his antecedent will, and as regards this there is no doubt that we ought to conform our will to such a thing divinely willed; for it is this wherein our will is ordered. He is also said to will something with his consequent will, and this thing willed is not always known to us, except insofar as it is manifested by his activity. And this adds a certain account of goodness to the reality, such that it can be willed by us: because God wills it. For just as something has goodness in itself, like giving alms, and yet another account of goodness accrues to it from its end, so too a certain account of goodness accrues to it from its being willed and ordered by God. For by the very fact that something is apprehended as willed by God, it is apprehended as good. Whence, following on this apprehension, the will is bound to inclining to it; otherwise the motion of the will would not be good, nor conformed to God, if it were to flee the good, for it would not be tending to what has been ordained by God—that is, to a good—and thus, man would not be willing what God wills him to will.

Nonetheless, one must take note of the fact that, because there are diverse grades of appetite, following on the diverse apprehensions, no appetite is bound to inclining to a good whose account one does not apprehend. For example, in us there is a certain sensitive appetite consequent upon the apprehension of sensation, which is only of the good that befits the body. Whence by this appetite one desires what is delightful to the senses, but in no way any spiritual good, like knowledge. There is also a certain natural will in us by which we desire what is, according to itself, good for a man as a man; and this follows on the apprehension of reason insofar as it considers something absolutely, as a man wills knowledge, virtue, health, and the like. And there is also in us a certain deliberate will consequent on the act of reason deliberating about the end and diverse circumstances; and with respect to this we incline to what has an account of goodness from its end, or from a certain circumstance.

Therefore if there be something that has all these accounts of goodness, every appetite, if it be rectified, inclines to it. However, if it lack any of the accounts mentioned, then it is not necessary that that appetite to which such an account corresponds incline to it—but perhaps it might incline to the contrary, if perhaps it has a contrary account. For example, to sever a limb for the sake of health is grievous according to sensation, nor is it good according to itself, but is good only from its end, and therefore only a deliberate will chooses the severing, whereas the natural will and the sensitive appetite recoil from it.

And one should say something similar in the proposed matter. For if something is apprehended to be willed by God, which is manifested through a sign of his activity, the deliberate will—which follows reason, insofar as it comprehends and bestows on it this account of goodness—is bound to willing it, even though the natural will and the sensitive appetite flee from it. And in fleeing the divine will, they are conformed to it insofar as they incline to the good according to the account apprehended by that power. This is like in one who is piously sorrowful about the death of his father, or of someone beneficial within the Church.

Nonetheless, one should note that in such things, the motion of the deliberate will in sinners is corrupted; this motion totally abandons the deliberation of reason, and follows the impetus of the natural and sensitive wills, murmuring about the ordination of God. In righteous wayfarers, however, it remains integrated, albeit imperfect in two ways: on the side of their knowledge, since they do not fully know the divine will, and on the side of their affections, since they are retarded due to the lower motions of the soul. Whence in such it is enough not to be recalcitrant to the divine ordination; nor is it necessary that one experience joy over what occurs according to God’s will; even the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.9, 1117b8‒16.) that it is enough that a courageous man is not grieved before the dangers of death, though he might not rejoice at them, as is the case with the acts of the other virtues. And this is the conformity of the earthly path. But among the blessed, the motion of the will in deliberation is integrated and perfect—both on the side of knowledge, since they do fully know the divine will, and on the side of the affection, which rules every lower appetite; and neither is it retarded or impeded by anything. This is why, in seeing what God wills, which they themselves also will, they experience joy. Of this the Psalm says, the righteous will rejoice when he sees the vengeance (Ps 58:10 [57:11]).

Reply Obj. 1: What is divinely willed, as regards his antecedent will, is known to us from the natural inclination itself. But what is willed by the consequent will he makes known to us either through a revelation or through his activity.

Reply Obj. 2: That position is, as it were, impossible. For to no one is his damnation revealed, not even to the angels, as Augustine says. (Augustine, On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis, bk. 11, cc. 17‒18 (CSEL 28.1:349; PL 34:438).) Yet if it were to be revealed to someone, he could believe it to be said as a threat, and not as his foreknowledge. Nonetheless, he is bound to willing with a deliberate will this order of justice whereby if one dies in his sins, he is damned. For this is what God wills, and not damnation through itself, nor the fault.

Reply Obj. 3: By a deliberate will of reason, Christ willed his own passion—and likewise, the Blessed Virgin, and every saint—even though their natural will would dissent.

Reply Obj. 4: The divine permission never signifies that the will is for the fault, but for the good that is joined to the fault.

Exposition of the text

God did not will the action of the Jews. (Sent. I, 48.2(208).3.) It seems that this is false, for the Passion is the effect of the action, so if he willed the Passion, he willed the action. To this one should say that Christ’s Passion was subject to two activities: the action of the Jews insofar as it was an affliction—and in this sense, it was not willed by God, just as neither was the action; and the action of Christ’s will, insofar as it was meritorious—and in this sense it was pleasing to God. Whence the saying: the action was displeasing, the Passion was favored. For frequently the will and reason divide things that nature joins together.

This was such a great good that the Apostle Peter, when he was unwilling for it to happen, was called a Satan by him who was killed. (Sent. I, 48.2(208).3, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 101 (CCSL 46; PL 40:279).) This is taken from Matthew 16:23, and he is called “Satan”—that is, adversary—insofar as, by his own will, based on piety, he was averse to Christ’s good will.

Epilogue

We have now, as far as we have been able, treated carefully the things that are known to pertain to the mystery of the divine Unity and Trinity, albeit only in part. We now turn to a consideration of created things.

This seems to have been ordered in an unfitting way, since, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 1.1, 184a17.) for us the inborn path is to go from posterior things to prior things, and thus, from created things to the Creator. To this one should say that this holds in things that we know by natural cognition, things that take their principle from sensation. But in things that we know through faith, our cognition reposes on the first truth itself. Whence it is necessary that we proceed from the first truth, which is God, to things that are from him, following a likeness with the cognition that the saints will possess in the Word, where they will fully know both the Word and realities. The Word itself, the Son of God, will make us participants in this cognition—he who initiated this knowledge in us through faith, to whom is the honor and the glory, through the infinite ages of ages. Amen.