D. 47 - Efficacy of the will of God

Division of the text

Having removed certain things whereby it seemed that the efficacy of the divine will was taken away, here he manifests its efficacy. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that the divine will is always efficaciously fulfilled; in the second, he explains certain doubts found in the authority whereby he proved what he proposed, at but diligent attention must be paid to how it is said above that something is done against God’s will, but not apart from it. (Sent. I, 47.1(204).3.)

In the latter he does three things: first, he presents the doubt; second he presents its solution, at but as we said above, God’s will is taken in different ways; (Sent. I, 47.1(204).4.) third, he concludes the proposed matter, at from what is said above, it is clear that the will of God which is himself is always invincible. (Sent. I, 47.3(206).1.)

Question 1

The efficacy of the will of God

Here four things are asked:

first, whether the will of good pleasure is always fulfilled efficaciously;

second, whether anything occurs outside his will;

third, whether what occurs outside his will is accommodated to his will;

fourth, whether what is outside his will can be subject to his precept.

Article 1

Whether the divine will is always fulfilled efficaciously

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, a. 3; above, d. 46, a. 1; ST I.19.6; On Truth, q. 23, a. 2; Commentary on 1 Timothy, ch. 2, lect. 1.) It seems that the divine will is not always fulfilled efficaciously.

Obj. 1: For a cause that stands open to each option is not efficacious in producing its effect. But the divine will is open to each option, for it can will and can not-will. Therefore and so on.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the effect of every cause whose effect cannot be impeded is necessary. Therefore, if the divine will is so efficacious that it could not be impeded, its effect will be necessary. But the divine will is the cause of all things, as was held earlier. (Above, d. 45, a. 3.) Therefore all things happen of necessity—which is impossible. Therefore so too is the antecedent.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, every first cause that produces an effect by the mediation of a second cause that can be impeded, does not efficaciously bring forth its effect. For example, the sun’s motion is the cause of the germination of trees by the mediation of the generative power of the tree, which can fail. Whence the effect is not produced efficaciously, nor can it be demonstrated from the first cause. But God’s will is the first cause, one that does not exclude secondary causes that can fail. Therefore it seems that it does not efficaciously produce its effect.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, whatever God wills now, he has willed from eternity. But from eternity he did not will to do anything but what he is doing. Therefore, if he could not do anything but what he wills (otherwise his will would not be efficacious), it seems to follow that he cannot do anything but what he is doing—which is false. Therefore so is the first thing from which it followed.

On the contrary, no cause is impeded except by some stronger agent. But nothing is stronger than the divine will. Therefore it cannot be impeded.

Furthermore, from the fact that a will does not reach what it wills, there results a diminution of joy. But God is the happiest, and his joy is the most perfect. Therefore nothing that he has willed fails to be.

I answer that whatever God wills with his consequent will occurs as a whole, whereas this is not the case with whatever he wills with his antecedent will. For he does not will the latter simply speaking and perfectly, but only in a certain respect; and this imperfection is not on the side of the will, but rather due to the condition of what is willed.

For the will and speculative cognition are contrary in this way: for speculative knowledge is perfected in the abstraction from singulars, whereas will, and whatever else is ordered to a deed, is perfected in the particular, that with which the activity is concerned. Therefore that which is subject to the will according to all particular conditions surrounding the particular itself is simply speaking and perfectly willed. And this pertains to God’s consequent will, which looks to the deeds and dispositions whereby someone is sufficiently ordered to that which is suitable to himself; and this is what God is said to will simply speaking, like salvation, or anything like it. And therefore this will cannot be impeded, just as neither can his foreknowledge, to which a reality is subject according to those conditions with which it actually exists.

However, what is rectified and good according to the universal condition of the reality does not have the account of being willed simply speaking, but only in a certain respect. For example, for a man, as a man, being saved is only good insofar as his nature is ordered to this; and God wills this with his antecedent will, according to which he is not said to will anything simply speaking. And therefore such a will is able not to be fulfilled.

Reply Obj. 1: God’s will stands open to each option not through the mode of changeability, such that he could will something before and not will it later, but rather through the mode of liberality—for the act of his will is always in his power. And therefore willing something before and later not willing it are incompatible with each other.

Reply Obj. 2: Although God’s will is unchangeable and invincible, nonetheless it does not follow that his every effect is necessary with an absolute necessity any more than the reality has its necessity from its proximate cause; rather, it is necessary with only a conditional necessity, as was also said of his foreknowledge. (Above, d. 38, q. 1, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 3: Not only is the fulfillment of effects subject to the divine will, but so is the order of all preceding causes, according to the conditions whereby they are determined to the effect without failure—for example, that such a one willing and meriting salvation be saved. For the effect along with all its causes is subject to his consequent will, insofar as these causes are not impeded.

Reply Obj. 4: God can do nothing that would not be willed by him if it were to occur. Nonetheless, there are many things in his power that are now neither willed nor good, for they neither are, nor will they ever be.

Article 2

Whether nothing occurs outside God’s will

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that nothing occurs outside God’s will.

Obj. 1: For the Lord says, he who is not with me is against me (Matt 12:30). Therefore what is outside God’s will is against it. But nothing occurs against God’s will; otherwise God’s will would be overcome. Therefore also nothing occurs outside it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that against and outside which nothing can occur is more powerful than that outside which something can occur. But God’s will is the most powerful. Therefore nothing occurs outside it.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the least permission has the account of the will. But nothing occurs outside his permission, as is said in the text. (Sent. I, 47.2(205).1.) Therefore much less is it outside his will of good pleasure or outside the different signs of his will.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Augustine says, it pertains to the duty of the innocent not only to do no evil, but also to prevent sins. (Augustine, The City of God, bk. 19, ch. 16 (CCSL 48; PL 41:644).) But nothing but sin can occur outside his will, which wills all good things. Therefore, since God is the most innocent, it seems that not permitting it pertains to him, but so does impeding everything that is outside his will.

On the contrary, the text says otherwise. (Sent. I, 47.2(205).1‒3.)

Furthermore, we see many things occur that he does not will to occur, as was held earlier. (Above, d. 46, q. 1, a. 4.) Therefore many things occur outside his will.

I answer that there are two ways something occurs outside the will: either such that the will is for the opposite—and this is not only outside the will but even against the will—or such that the will is not for this, but neither is it for the opposite—and this is outside the will, but not against it. Therefore we can be speaking about the will either of good pleasure or the will that is a sign, and as regards the will of good pleasure, one can be speaking about the consequent will or the antecedent will.

Therefore, speaking about the consequent will of good pleasure, something does occur outside it, but not against it. For the entirety of what he wills with his consequent will is fulfilled, as was said, whereas the opposite of what he wills with his antecedent will can occur, since it is not always fulfilled, and therefore something can occur both outside it and against it.

However, certain signs of his will correspond to his antecedent will, like a precept, a counsel, and a prohibition, by all of which the rational nature is ordered to salvation, which ordering belongs to his antecedent will. This is also why things can occur both outside it and against it. But the other two signs—permission and activity—correspond to the consequent will, but in diverse ways. For activity pertains to the effect itself, which is the concern of the consequent will; and therefore just as nothing can occur against his consequent will, but only outside it, so too neither can it occur against his activity, but only outside it. For nothing opposed to what God is bringing about can exist, because then opposites would exist simultaneously; but many things occur that God does not bring about. But permission pertains to a cause that is subject to the consequent will, such as one capable of failing and of not failing. Yet an effect of such a cause—that is, failing—does not pertain to either the consequent or antecedent will; rather, it pertains to that cause to which is given the permission in relation to its faculty. Whence what occurs outside his consequent will does not occur outside his permission; this is why nothing can occur outside his permission, nor against it. Nonetheless, the opposite of what has been permitted can occur, and this is nonetheless according to his permission; for permission looks to the power of a cause open to each opposite option, so neither opposite is against permission—rather, each is according to it.

Reply Obj. 1: Those who are not with God, insofar as it is in them, are against God insofar as they are against the antecedent divine will. Nonetheless, they do nothing against the consequent will, but only outside it; nonetheless these actions are not outside his permission.

Reply Obj. 2: It is not due to any lack of power in the divine will that something occurs outside it, but rather due to the order of his wisdom, whereby he bestows on things a power open toward each option. And this is good, and God wills it by his consequent will.

Reply Obj. 3: Permission looks to the power of a cause that stands open to each option, and therefore whatever occurs does not occur outside the permission. Whence this does not happen due to its proximity to the will of good pleasure, as the objection intimated.

Reply Obj. 4: The duty of the innocent is to prevent sins only according to the condition of others; for he should not tie men up lest they sin, but rather should prevent them from sin through admonition. And so it is with God: holding onto the condition of human freedom, he prevents sins by means of his laws.

Article 3

Whether what occurs against the will of God is accommodated to his will

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: above, a. 1; d. 46, a. 1; ST I.19.6; I.22.2; On Truth, q. 23, a. 2; Commentary on 1 Timothy, ch. 2, lect. 1.) It seems that what is against God’s will is accommodated to his will.

Obj. 1: For his consequent will is not contrary to his antecedent will. But the evil that is outside the divine will is against the antecedent will. Therefore it is not accommodated to his consequent will either.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything accommodated to the divine will, which always wills the good, consists in its order to the good. But the evil that occurs outside God’s will is in itself disordered. Therefore it is not accommodated to the divine will.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the good merit in that they are accommodated to the divine will, and based on this a reward is owed to them. Therefore, if evil men, by their acting outside God’s will, by sinning, are also accommodated to his will, then a reward is owed to them from the sin. And this is contrary to what the Apostle says: why not do evil that good may come?—as some people slanderously charge us with saying (Rom 3:8). Therefore the first also seems to be false.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, evil is outside the intention of every agent, for nothing acts while looking to the evil, as Dionysius says. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 19 (PG 3:715).) But what is outside the intention of the will is not accommodated to will that is about the intended end. Therefore things that occur outside his will are not accommodated to his will.

On the contrary is what Gregory is recorded in the text to have said. (Gregory the Great, Morals on the Book of Job, bk. 6, ch. 18, para. 28 (CCSL 143; PL 75:745); Sent. I, 47.2(205).2.)

Furthermore, the divine will is the most powerful cause. But it pertains to the power of something that even one trying to act against it would become accommodated to it. Therefore so it is for the divine will.

I answer that all things that occur outside the divine will, and even things against the antecedent will, are accommodated in a certain way to the consequent will.

However, the consequent will can be taken in two ways: either insofar as it follows the conception of the end alone—and in this sense, the will is about the end universally, without any determination of what is for the sake of the end—or insofar as it follows the conception of what is for the sake of the end, and its condition—and in this sense the consequent will is about the attainment of the end according to some determinate path. For example, a builder, when building a house, has two motions of his will: the one by which he wills to induce the form of a house into the matter, without his considering anything determinately about the house’s parts; and he has another motion whereby, having considered that such a stone is apt for the foundation, wills to place it in the foundation.

Now, in either mode of taking the consequent will in God, the evils that occur are accommodated to it. For if the will is taken insofar as it is about the order of the universe in common, it is certain that an evil that deviates from the order of a precept falls back into a contrary order, as Boethius says, (Boethius, The Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 4, prose 6 (CCSL 94; PL 63:820).) that is, into the order of a punishment for a fault; this is like a soft and light stone, which is not apt for the foundation, being placed at the top of a wall. Likewise also it is clear that it is accommodated to the consequent will in the second way of taking it, which is that such a one foreseen as a sinner would be punished. For unless this condition were to occur in him through his act of sin, the divine will regarding his punishment would not be fulfilled, just as the very heaviness of a stone is accommodated to the will of the artisan whereby he wills the stone to be so ordered that it is put in the foundation.

Reply Obj. 1: The antecedent and consequent wills are not contrary, since each is for the good. But the fact that something is against the one that is not against the other, but rather is accommodated to it, is on the side of what is willed, the conditions of which are being considered in diverse ways, as was said in the body.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as evil is not in itself ordered, so too it is not in itself accommodated to the divine will; rather, it is so incidentally, since it is outside the intention of the one doing the evil. For the sinner does not intend, by sinning, to be punished by God—wherein God’s will is fulfilled.

Reply Obj. 3: In an act both evil and good, there are two aspects to consider: one, insofar as it comes from its agent; and the other, insofar as it is ordered by him to the end. Therefore a good act is accommodated to the divine will in both respects, since both the agent himself orders it to the good, according to the good pleasure of the divine will, and God orders it through a consequent good, that is, the reward that he renders for the merits. And therefore, because the man himself is the cause of the accommodation, he merits. But an act that is evil insofar as it is from the agent is disordered, and yet it is ordered by God through the punishment that comes to it, or through some good that is elicited from it. And therefore an evil man is oriented only passively to the accommodation, and not actively; this is as it is said in the text (Sent. I, 47.2(205).1.) that God’s will is fulfilled concerning that which the man himself does not fulfill. And therefore he does not merit by being accommodated in this way, for one merits in reference to an act of which one is the cause.

Reply Obj. 4: Even though evil is outside God’s intention, still the ordination of evil is intended by God. And to this intention one doing evil is accommodated outside his own intention, as one doing what is outside God’s intention, that is, sin.

Article 4

Whether what is outside the will of God is not subject to God’s command

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In III Sent., d. 37, a. 4; ST I.103.8; I-II.94.5, ad 2; I-II.100.8; II-II.104.5, ad 2; On Evil, q. 3, a. 1, ad 17; q. 15, a. 1, ad 8.) It seems that what is outside God’s will, and especially sin, is not subject to his command.

Obj. 1: For a command is indicative of the divine will. But whoever presents himself as willing what he does not will is a deceiver—which is far from God. Therefore it seems that he commands nothing that is against his will or outside it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, since a command corresponds to his antecedent will, to which pertains the ordination of nature to the good, nothing can be commanded that is against this order. But every sin is like this, since it is against the law of nature. Therefore it seems that it is not subject to a command.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, no one obedient to the divine commands acts in an evil way. But certain things can only occur in an evil way, since they are joined to an evil end, for example, envy and such, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2. (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6, 1107a9‒25.) Therefore it seems that such cannot be commanded by God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the same judgment is made of things that are alike. But all sins are alike in that they are prohibited by divine law. Therefore, since certain things in no way fall under a command—for example, despairing of God, hating him, and such—it seems that no sin can fall under a divine command.

On the contrary, to kill an innocent son is a sin and against the law of nature. However, we read that this command was given to Abraham, and that he was commended for his obedience. Therefore it seems that sin can fall under a divine command. Likewise, we read in Hosea 1:2 that the Lord commanded that he take to himself a woman of fornication, and make from her children of fornications.

I answer that a command is a sign of the divine will corresponding to his antecedent will, and not to the consequent. Whence what is outside the consequent will falls under a command, but what is outside the antecedent will does not.

Nonetheless, in this matter one should consider that something taken according to itself is outside the antecedent will when it belongs to the antecedent will but with a certain added or subtracted condition: for example, things that, considered in themselves, are evil. But insofar as they stand under the divine command, they receive a certain account of goodness, such that in this way the will itself ought to tend toward them. This is possible in certain things that are evil through themselves, but not in certain others. For the good in real things arises from a double order, the first and principal of which is the order of all realities to the ultimate end, which is God, and the second is the order of one reality to another reality. And the first order is the cause of the second, since the second order is for the sake of the first. For from the fact that realities are ordered to each other, they mutually aid each other such that they be appropriately ordered to the ultimate end. Whence, it must be that with the subtraction of the goodness that is due to the order of a reality to the ultimate end, nothing of goodness can remain. But with the subtraction of the goodness that is due to the order of one reality to another reality, that goodness that is due to the order of the reality to the ultimate end nonetheless can remain. For the first does not depend on the second the way the second depends on the first.

Therefore I say that certain sins name a disordering of one reality to another reality—for example, murder, fraternal hatred, disobedience to one set above you, and the like. Whence if such things could retain that goodness that is due to the order to the ultimate end, then without a doubt they might be good, and the will could be carried to them.

But this could not be so except by the divine power, through which the order in realities has been instituted. For it cannot occur—except through a miraculous act of divine power—that what receives existence from the first agent by the mediation of some secondary cause would still have its existence with its secondary cause destroyed or taken away, such as that an accident might exist without a subject, as happens in the sacrament of the altar. In the same way, so too it cannot occur—except through a miracle of divine power—that what is naturally apt to receive its goodness from its order to the ultimate end by a mediating order to that reality, would still have its goodness when the order that was to that reality has been taken away. Whence the act that is to kill the innocent, or to resist one set above one, can neither be good nor be done well, except by the divine authority or command. Whence in such things no one can give a dispensation, except God doing so, as it were, miraculously.

In fact, certain sins immediately indicate a disordering from the ultimate end, such as despairing of God, hatred of him, and the like. And such sins can in no way have goodness, not even through the divine power, just as by the divine power it cannot come about that a reality have existence upon the cessation of the influence of the first agent. And therefore they are subject to no dispensation of a divine command, since they can never occur in a good way.

And on account of this, it is said that God cannot give a dispensation against the commands of the first tablet of the commandments, which order one immediately to God, but God can give a dispensation against the commands of the second tablet, which order one immediately to one’s neighbor. (Compare this statement, however, with what Aquinas says in the Summa theologiae I-II.100.8: praecepta decalogi sunt omnio indispensabilia, “the precepts of the decalogue admit of no dispensation whatever.”) However, men cannot give dispensations even in these.

Reply Obj. 1: Although God did not will with his consequent will that Abraham kill his son, still he did will with his antecedent will that Abraham’s will be carried toward doing it, insofar as it was right then ordered. And the precept expressed this will, and therefore it was not a deception.

Reply Obj. 2: The killing of the innocent itself, insofar as it stands under a disorder from the end, which comes to it after its complete species from its proximate object, is against the law of nature, and it cannot occur in a good way. But if this disorder be removed, it is congruent with the law of nature, which dictates that everything should be done that is ordered and commanded by God.

Reply Obj. 3: Thereby the solution to this is clear.

Reply Obj. 4: The account is not alike for all sins, as is clear from things said in the body of the article.

Exposition of the text

Whom he justly predestined to punishment. (Sent. I, 47.1(204).2, quoting Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 100, para. 26 (CCSL 46; PL 40:279).) On the contrary, it was said earlier (Above, d. 40, q. 1, a. 2.) that predestination is only about salutary goods, and therefore it is not about punishment. To this one should say that, when something is called “predestined” in an absolute way, its direction to the end is understood, which is eternal salvation. But if anything be added to it, then it can be directed to anything whatsoever, and in a certain respect and less properly it can be said to be “predestined” to that.

But not apart from his permission, which is not God himself. (Sent. I, 47.2(205).1.) On the contrary, the divine permission is his activity, but the divine activity is his essence, therefore and so on. To this one should say that “permission” here is being taken not for the divine activity, but for its effect, in the way that even “creation” names the undergoing of creation.

But to some who had been cured in the Gospel, to whom he commanded that they should not reveal it to anyone (Matt 12:16). (Sent. I, 47.3(206).1; however, a better Gospel citation might be Mark 1:44.) One should note that, even though by his consequent will he did not will the fulfillment of what he commanded here, nonetheless by his antecedent will he did will that men tend toward this, so that they might not seek earthly glory—using the example of the man Christ himself, who did not seek, by his human will, his own glory, but the glory of God. And this command expressed this will.