D. 43 - Whether the power of God is limited to realities that occur

Division of the text

Here the Master excludes the error of certain ones who, opposed to the things determined above, limited God’s power, saying God’s power is not simply speaking over all things. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he disproves their error insofar as it limited God’s power with respect to the realities that occur; in the second, he does this insofar as they limited it with respect to their qualities, for they said God was not able to do different things nor better things than he did, at now it remains to be discussed whether God can do anything better than he does. (Sent. I, 44.1(188).1.)

The first part is divided into three: in the first, he reports their position; in the second, he presents their proofs, and answers them, at they strive to fortify this opinion of theirs with plausible arguments and imagined causes and even by the witnesses of sacred authorities; (Sent. I, 43.1(187).1.) in the third, he brings in authorities to prove the truth, at and so let us profess that God can do many things which he does not will, and can leave undone many things which he does. (Sent. I, 43.1(187).8.)

They strive to fortify this opinion of theirs with plausible arguments and imagined causes and even by the witnesses of sacred authorities. (Sent. I, 43.1(187).1.) Here he presents their proofs. And it is divided into three parts: in the first, he presents certain probable arguments that they held; in the second, he presents certain causes that they discovered, at they also add some other things; (Sent. I, 43.1(187).3.) in the third, he presents certain authorities that they brought in to confirm their opinion, at but these searchers, who ‘undid their searches by their searching,’ put forth the testimonies of the Saints. (Sent. I, 43.1(187).7; the quotation is from Psalm 63:7 in the Vulgate (64:6 in RSV, which reads somewhat differently).) But the proofs and his responses are clear in the text.

One must ask two things regarding this opinion, insofar as they asserted two things.

First, they asserted that he cannot do any of the things he does not do; and in this they denied the infinity of the divine power. Whence the first question is about the infinity of the divine power. (Q. 1.)

Second, they asserted that God cannot not do what he does do; and in this they conclude that God acts from necessity. And therefore the second question will be whether God acts from necessity. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

The infinity of the divine power

As regards the first question, two things are asked:

first, whether God’s power is infinite;

second, whether his omnipotence, which belongs to him according to the infinity of his power, is communicable to what is created.

Article 1

Whether God’s power is infinite

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.7.1; I.25.2; III.10.3, ad 1; SCG I.43; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 2; Compendium theologiae, cc. 18‒20; Quodl. III, q. 1, a. 1; Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, bk. 8, lect. 23; Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 12, lect. 8.) It seems that God’s power is not infinite.

Obj. 1: For, as the Philosopher says, (Aristotle, Physics 3.6, 207a27.) the infinite holds the account of a part, and of matter, and thus, of the imperfect. But God’s power is most perfect. Therefore it should not be called infinite.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Physics 1.2, 185a32.) the finite and the infinite belong to quantity. But every quantity is divisible. Therefore, since the divine power is simple, it seems that it should be called neither finite nor infinite.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to philosophers, (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1020a1‒5; On the Soul 3.12, 434a30.) if there were any active power to which no passive power corresponds in nature, it would be pointless. But there is no passive power for receiving an infinite effect. Therefore, since God’s active power is not pointless, it seems that it is not infinite.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, nothing infinite can be comprehended, since, according to Augustine in On Seeing God, (Augustine, Epistulae, letter 147, “To Paulina” (De videndo Deum), ch. 9 (CSEL 44:295; PL 33:606).) a thing is comprehended when its boundaries are looked upon. But the divine intellect comprehends its own power, since God knows all his power. Therefore his power is not infinite.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, every power can be brought to act. Therefore, if God’s power were infinite, he would be able to make an actual infinity. But were he to make an actual infinity, either he could also make something even greater—and then there would be something greater than the infinite—or he could make nothing greater—and then he would be rendered lacking in power because of the things he made, and his own power would be bounded by his works, and thus it would not be infinite. And all of these things are impossible. Therefore God’s power is not infinite.

On the contrary, in an infinite magnitude there will always be an infinite power, as the philosophers prove, (See Aristotle, Physics 8.10, 266a25‒b25.) whether this be a magnitude of bulk—and yet this being infinite is impossible—or a magnitude of power. But in Psalm 145 [144]:3 it is said, of his magnitude there is no limit. (Magnitudo could also be translated as “greatness”; thus, RSV reads his greatness is unsearchable.) Therefore his power or potency is infinite.

I answer that the infinite can be taken in two ways: either privatively—and in this sense it does not belong to God, since nothing can properly speaking be said of him in a privative way (as was said earlier) (In I Sent., d. 7, q. 2, a. 2.)—or negatively—and in this sense God is said to be infinite, according to Damascene, (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 2 (PG 94:791) and ch. 4 (PG 94:798).) since he is in no way bounded. How this is so should be investigated.

For some, taking “finite” and “infinite” only insofar as they are attributes of quantity, were not able to discover infinity in God except insofar as they found in him the account of virtual quantity. Whence they said that God is infinite because his power is infinite. Therefore it happened that some have denied that God’s essence, considered in the account of essence, is infinite. And they asserted that so it seemed to the saints. But this is erroneous.

And therefore one should explain it differently, saying that, following the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.17, 1022a5‒12.) “end” or “boundary” is said in many ways. In one way, a boundary belongs to quantity, like the point to a line; and in this way “finite” and “infinite” are said due to the assertion and denial of such an end insofar as such is an attribute of quantity. And in this sense, these things are not present in incorporeal things. In another way, an “end” is spoken of in reference to a reality’s essence, like the last constitutive difference is that at which a species’ essence is “finished,” or “made finite.” Whence what signifies a reality’s essence is called its “definition” or “boundary.” And in this sense, each thing is said to be “finished” through what determines or contracts its own essence, just as the nature of a genus, which of itself is indifferent to many species, is finished through one specific difference; and first matter, which of itself is indifferent to all forms—whence it too is called “infinite”—is finished through form; and likewise, a form, which in and of itself can perfect the diverse parts of matter, is finished through the matter in which it is received.

And the divine essence is called “infinite” due to the negation of such an end. For every form in its proper account, if it be considered abstractly, holds an infinity; for example, in whiteness considered abstractly, the account of whiteness is not finite with respect to anything, yet in it the account of color and the account of existing are determined, and are contracted to a determinate species. And therefore what has an existence that is absolute and in no way received in anything—and indeed is itself its own existence—that is infinite simply speaking. And therefore his essence is infinite, as is his goodness, and whatever else is said of him. For none of these things are limited to anything, as what is received in something is limited to its capacity. And from the fact that his essence is infinite, it follows that his power is infinite. And this is said expressly in the Book of Causes, where it says (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 16.) that the first being has a simply infinite power, because he himself is his own power.

Reply Obj. 1: That objection is based on the infinite that is spoken of privatively, that is, what is naturally apt to have an end and does not have it. And thus, its account consists in matter with privation. And this does not belong to God.

Reply Obj. 2: That objection is based on the infinite insofar as it is said from privation of an end that is the boundary of quantity.

Reply Obj. 3: God’s active power is not for the sake of an end, but is the end of all things; and therefore even though no passive power is equal to it, it is not pointless. For the pointless is what is for an end that it does not induce. Nonetheless other active and passive powers approach God’s power as much as they can.

Reply Obj. 4: Two things belong to the account of comprehension. One is that the ends of its reality are reached or contained; and in this sense, the infinite is in no way comprehended, not by the finite nor by the infinite—nor in this sense does God comprehend his very self, since he has no ends. The other belongs to its account, namely, nothing of the thing comprehended is outside the one comprehending it; and in this sense, the infinite comprehends its very self, and in this sense too the divine intellect comprehends even his own essence and power, since nothing is outside it.

Reply Obj. 5: No effect is produced through any power in a manner that is contrary to its very account, just as a motive power does not make all the parts of a motion exist simultaneously—for then the motion would not exist, since succession is of the account of motion. And such an act, that is, one that is always mixed with potency, goes to infinity, according to the Philosopher; (Aristotle, Physics 3.4, 202b30; 3.6, 206a22.) and therefore it is not reduced to act except successively. And therefore it does not follow that God could make exist in act all the infinities that he can make, since then the infinities would be finite.

Article 2

Whether God’s omnipotence can be communicated to what is created

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: In III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 4.) It seems that God’s omnipotence could be communicated to something created.

Obj. 1: For God’s omnipotence is not of greater dignity than his goodness. But his goodness can be communicated to created things. Therefore so too his omnipotence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, just as it is of the divine perfection to have every power, so too to have knowledge of all things; and knowledge even extends to more things, because it includes good and evil things. But it belongs to Christ’s soul to have a communicated knowledge of all things. Therefore so too to have omnipotence. And thus omnipotence seems to be communicable to what is created.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, faith makes all things possible, since nothing is impossible to one who believes, as is said in Matthew 17:20. But faith is infused into the creature. Therefore so too omnipotence is communicated.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, as has been proved by the philosophers, (See Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 6.) every power separated from matter is infinite, since there cannot be a proportion of material power to the power of a separated substance. But angels, which are created, are substances separated from matter, according to Dionysius. (Pseudo-Dionysius, Celestial Hierarchy, ch. 7 (PG 3:206).) Therefore, since God is called omnipotent on account of the infinity of his own power, it seems that the omnipotence can be communicated to certain created things.

On the contrary, the creation of each thing pertains to God’s power. But to no reality could it be bestowed that it could bestow existence on itself by creating. Therefore to no created reality could omnipotence be bestowed.

Furthermore, whatever of the divine perfections is communicable to any created thing has been wholly communicated to Christ’s soul. But omnipotence was not communicated to him, as is said in Book III. (In III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 4.) Therefore it is not communicable to any creature.

I answer that power or potency always follows on essence, which is why it is impossible that there be an infinite power in a finite essence. Now, it is impossible that any created essence be infinite, because its existence is not absolute and subsisting, but received in something. For if its existence were absolute, it would not differ from the divine existence. For there can be no plurality of any nature, like of whiteness or white, unless in the manner that one is absolute and another is joined to it, or each of them is received in diverse things; this is because the substance of each reality is all at once, as is clear from Metaphysics 5. (See Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.14, 1020b8.) Whence just as it cannot be communicated to anything created that it be God, so too it cannot be communicated to it that it be of infinite essence and infinite power, and that it have omnipotence.

Reply Obj. 1: Whatever there is of perfection in a created thing is wholly from the divine perfection as exemplar, yet it exists more perfectly in God than in the created thing, nor is it in the created thing in the mode in which it is in God. Therefore every name that designates a divine perfection absolutely, when not concerning any mode, is communicable to what is created—for example, “power,” “wisdom,” “goodness,” and so on. However, every name that is concerned with the mode wherein that perfection is in God is not communicable to the created—for example, being the “highest good,” “omnipotent,” and such.

Reply Obj. 2: “Power” is signified as going forth from the essence; whence an infinite power cannot be communicated to what has a finite essence. But the soul’s knowledge consists in a receiving, so it can have all knowledge to the degree that it is united to something infinite as its object. And in this way Christ’s soul sees all things.

Reply Obj. 3: The scope of “all” should be accommodated here. For the power of faith does not extend to all things in an absolute sense, as to the creation of the heavens and such, but only to things that the faithful do to strengthen faith, such as raising the dead, healing the sick, and such. Nor are even these things brought about by some created power that is in the believer, but by the uncreated power as a reward of the faithful. That is why it was said earlier, (See above d. 42, q. 2, aa. 2, 3.) that a man does these things neither through himself nor from himself. However, this is attributed more to faith than to another virtue insofar as the things that are believed are in a certain way proved by the miracles, as is said in Mark 16:20: the Lord worked with them and confirmed the message by the signs that attended it.

Reply Obj. 4: Here and in the Book of Causes it is said (Proclus, Book of Causes, prop. 16.) that the power of a created intelligence is not infinite simply speaking, and this is proved from the fact that the very power of an intelligence is not subsisting through itself, but is received in something subsisting. For no intelligence is its own power, nor is any other created thing. Yet it is said there that it is infinite in reference to what is below it, not in reference to what is above, and this is explained in the same passage as follows. If the power of an intelligence is compared to what is above it, that is, God, it is manifested as finite insofar as it does not receive the divine power in itself according to the latter’s entire infinity, but in the mode possible to itself. But in comparison to things that are beneath it itself, it is said to be infinite insofar as it can move them into infinity, and it can produce an infinity of effects through that motion, according to the position of the philosophers who assert that the intelligences move the heavenly spheres; (Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 12, text. 47.) for example, even the power of the sun can be said to be infinite from below, insofar as an infinity of things could be generated by it were the world always to endure.

Question 2

The necessity of the divine activity

Next, we ask about the necessity of the divine activity. And about this two things are asked:

first, whether he acts out of a necessity of nature;

second, whether he acts out of a necessity of his justice.

Article 1

Whether God acts by a necessity of his nature

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 45, a. 3; ST I.19.3‒4; SCG I.80‒87; On Truth, q. 23, a. 4; On the Power of God, q. 1, a. 5; q. 10, a. 2, ad 6.) It seems that God acts by a necessity of nature.

Obj. 1: For Dionysius says, just as our sun, without reasoning or choosing, diffuses its rays on all bodies, so too the divine goodness does on all beings. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) But to act without reasoning and choice is to act by a necessity of nature. Therefore God acts by a necessity of nature.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, everything acting by its own essence acts through a necessity of nature; for what follows on any reality’s essence as essence follows from it necessarily, if it is posited as existing. But God acts through his own essence, since he is the first agent, as Dionysius also says in the same passage. (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) Therefore he seems to act out of a necessity of nature.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, just as God is good through himself, so too he is a being necessary through himself; for all things have necessity from him, and everything that is through another is traced back to what is through itself. But in what is good through itself there is nothing but the good. Therefore also in God as necessary through himself there is nothing but the necessary; and so too his activity is necessary, and he acts out of necessity.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, it is impossible that the cause of the necessary not itself be necessary. But all beings are created through the divine activity. Therefore if it were not necessary, nothing in the world would be necessary; rather, all would be contingent. But this is false, and contrary to both sensation and every science. Therefore it seems that God acts out of necessity.

On the contrary, only one thing comes from a single thing acting according to a necessity of nature; for, according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption 2.10, 336a26‒30.) the same thing always does the same thing. Therefore if God were acting by a necessity of nature, only one thing would come from him immediately—and from that one thing would come another, and something else, and so on. But this is false, and contrary to the faith, which confesses God to be the Creator of all beings, and that nothing else is a creator. Therefore he does not act out of a necessity of nature.

Furthermore, everything acting by a necessity of nature produces an effect coeval with itself, unless it be impeded from doing so. But God’s power, which is infinite, cannot be impeded. Therefore if he were to bring about realities out of a necessity of his nature, then he would have created a world coeternal with himself—which is also contrary to the faith. Therefore he does not act by a necessity of nature.

I answer that everything that is from a necessity of nature is either intended or ordered to an end, or it is not.

And if it is not intended or ordered to an end, it will be by chance, since chance is nothing other than nature acting outside its intention, as is said in Physics 2. (Aristotle, Physics 2.5, 197a35; 2.6, 197b19.) And in this way monstrosities in nature come to be out of the necessity of nature, and so too the corruption of an animal occurs from the necessity of the nature of this particular individual—although it is ordered to an end by the universal nature, such that the corruption of one thing might be the generation of another. However, it cannot be in this sense that God acts from a necessity of nature, since it would follow that all things would be happening by chance, like things that occur incidentally from the necessity of matter, and that no nature would intend an end—which is contrary to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Physics 2.9, 200a6‒15.) For a created nature does not intend an end except insofar as it has been ordered by its cause.

However, if it is ordered to an end, this is either due to something separate ordering it, or due to something joined ordering it. If this is due to something separate ordering it, the activities of the nature that are for the sake of the end tend with certainty to that end due to the foresight and ordination of some cause so ordering it. This is why Themistius says (Themistius, Commentary on the Physics, bk. 2, ch. 4.) that nature acts as if it would be moved by higher causes, that is, insofar as there is a certain instinct in it from the ordination of the separated substances. And in this way too it cannot be the case that what is from God is ordered to the end in this mode; for in this sense something would have to be prior to God, from whose direction and ordination his own activity would intend and attain its end.

Therefore what is left is that the things that are done by the power of his own nature are ordered to the end due to what orders being itself joined to the agent itself—this is his wisdom. And thus, the things done by him come forth from the order of his wisdom, and through his will, which loves this order—and not from a necessity of nature. And this is especially apparent in the arrangement of the heavens, in which there are many things, like the number of the stars, and their distances, and the quantity of the spheres, and so on, about which no reason can be assigned except from the order of the establishing wisdom. But perhaps a reason can be assigned for some of the diversity found in generable and corruptible things, based on the diversity of matter. And on account of this, often in Scripture when displaying his divinity God takes us back to consider the heavens; for example, it is he who sits above the circle of the earth, . . . who stretches out the heavens like a curtain, and spreads them like a tent to dwell in. . . . Lift up your eyes on high and see: who created these? (Isa 40:22, 26).

Reply Obj. 1: Dionysius does not intend to assign the congruence between the divine goodness and the visible sun in reference to the necessity of its agency, but in reference to the universality of its causation. This is clear from the fact that he shows that the rays of divine goodness are diffused continuously to the last of beings.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as will, essence, and wisdom are the same reality in God, but are distinguished in account, so too his activities are distinguished according to the accounts of the diverse attributes, even though his activity is only one thing—and this is his essence. And therefore, although the creation of things is the activity of his essence, still it is not only according to his essence alone, but also according to his wisdom and will; and therefore creation follows the condition of his knowledge and will. And because a will is free, therefore God is said to make realities out of the freedom of his will, and not out of a necessity of his nature.

Reply Obj. 3: Whatever is in God is his essence, and therefore his entirety is eternal and uncreated and necessary. Nonetheless an effect that comes forth from his activity does not come forth with necessity, for it comes forth from his activity as from his will. And therefore he produces his effect according to the freedom of his will.

Reply Obj. 4: One should not say that God’s will is contingent, and neither his activity, since “contingency” indicates changeability, and properly speaking there is no such thing in God. Nevertheless there is freedom of his will, and of his activity insofar as it comes from his will.

Article 2

Whether God acts out of a necessity of justice

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that God acts from a necessity of justice.

Obj. 1: For on 2 Timothy 2:13, which says, he cannot deny himself, a Gloss says (Glossa ordinaria, at 2 Timothy 2:13, 6.740.) that he would deny his very self if he were to set aside his justice, which he himself is. Therefore, since it is necessary that God not deny his very self, it seems that he acts out of a necessity of justice.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, whatever is not just, if it occurs, occurs unjustly and contrary to justice. But God can do nothing unjustly and contrary to justice, since then he could sin. Therefore it seems that he acts from the necessity of justice.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, natural causes are said to act through a necessity of nature, in that they are determined to one act. But God’s will is unchangeably determined to justice. Therefore it seems that he acts from a necessity of justice.

On the contrary (4), on Jonah 2, (Jonah 2:9: deliverance belongs to the Lord.) a Gloss says, the merciful God is disposed to save through his mercy those whom he cannot save through his justice. (Jerome, Commentarii in prophetas minores, on Jonah 2:9 (CCSL 76; PL 25:1137).) And thus, it seems that he does not act from a necessity of justice.

Furthermore (5), it is certain that to save those who are in hell does not belong to justice; rather, it seems more contrary to justice. But it is recorded (“Legenda beati Gregorii,” in S. Gregorii Vita, bk. 2, para. 44 (PL 75:105). Aquinas refers here to the popular legend in which Pope St. Gregory the Great, greatly moved by stories recounting the justice and goodness of Trajan, interceded for the emperor and raised him from the dead so that he could be converted to the true faith before dying again; for the most famous recounting of this story, see Dante’s Divine Comedy, Paradise, 20:103–38. However, in the recounting of this story in Jacobus de Voragine’s The Golden Legend (c. 1260 AD), ch. 46, St. Gregory only hears God’s voice assuring him of Trajan’s salvation.) that, at the prayers of blessed Gregory, the Lord called back from hell and restored to life the emperor Trajan, who had been damned for his idolatry. Therefore it seems that he does not act from a necessity of justice.

Furthermore (6), if one cannot act except according to justice, this is understood to be about created justice or uncreated justice. But it is not about created justice, because the activity of God is not ruled by this justice. And neither is it about uncreated justice, since that is not contrary to his power or will. Therefore it seems that he does not act from a necessity of justice.

I answer that “God acting from a necessity of justice” can be understood in two ways. The first way is that nothing can be done by him that, if it were to occur, would not be just. And in this sense, it is true. For just as he cannot do anything such that, if it were to occur, it would not be willed by him, and such that it would not be known to him, so it is with being just. For he can do nothing such that, if it were to occur, it would not be just.

Or it can be understood such that out of his own justice he would be determined toward doing some one thing such that he could not do something else. And in this sense, it is false. The reason for this is that whenever the entire determination of a work is on the side of the doer, it is in the doer to determine this or that to this mode. However, when the very work is determinate in itself, the determination is no longer in the doer. For example, in human deeds there is something that is of its nature indifferent, like sitting or not sitting; and each deed is determined to being virtuous on the side of the man who applies the appropriate circumstances. Whence one is forced to neither deed out of a necessity of justice, but whichever he does, it will be just when the appropriate circumstances are applied from the order of reason. However, something can be determined to one species by its own form—for example, lying, which is in itself evil, or upholding the equality of justice, which is in itself good. Nor can we disregard the former, nor do otherwise than the latter, without injustice.

Therefore I say that whatever is ordered, just, or good in created realities is wholly from the very will of God ordering it. And therefore he does not do this from the necessity of justice in such a way that he could not also do something else as well. For the mode of order that he puts into this he could also put into something else; for just as his knowledge is the cause of the truth of created things, while it is the other way around for our knowledge, so too his just will is the cause of just things. Whence if he were to do something different, he would make that just, and it would not be unjust.

Reply Obj. 1: “Justice” can be taken in two ways. Either it is the very ordination of the divine will, which is in God—and in this sense he cannot do anything outside justice, just as he cannot do anything outside his knowledge—or it can be taken insofar as, from the order of his will, justice is determined in some caused work. And he can do something outside that justice, nor would he then be denying his very self; for even in this thing that he might do, the order of his justice would be apparent, and therefore he would act neither contrary to justice nor unjustly.

Reply Obj. 2: The response is clear.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God’s will is unchangeably determined to justice, nonetheless the order of justice is not determined to this reality or to that. Whence it does not follow that he does this or that out of a necessity of justice.

Reply Sed Contra 4: Justice is said of God in two ways. In one way it names his repayment for one’s merits; and this corresponds to any justice spoken of specifically. And because this attends to equality and order on the side of the realities themselves, therefore God is sometimes said “to set aside” this justice, and his work proceeds according to his mercy. In another way, justice is said to be “the concord of divine goodness,” to which corresponds, in politics, justice spoken of universally, which is universal virtue, according to the Philosopher. And because this looks to the order on the side of God himself, therefore God never acts nor can act outside of it; for he can do nothing that does not accord with himself. And to this justice is not opposed the liberality whereby what is not owed to someone is bestowed on him; this is God’s mercy, whereby even on sinners worthy of death he pours grace, so that they might be worthy of life. And in this sense, he places another order within the reality itself, namely, such that from his guilt he was ordered to punishment, but from grace he might be ordered to glory.

Reply Sed Contra 5: It is the same for Trajan, who perhaps was revived after five hundred years, as for others who were revived after one day: for of all of these one should say that they were not finally damned. For God foreknew that they were going to be liberated from their punishments by the prayers of saints and be restored to life. And thus, from the liberality of his goodness he bestowed pardon on them, even though they merited eternal punishment. For the case is not similar for the one against whom alone the sin is committed; whence too he can freely forgive it without offense to anyone. It is also not similar for another judge who has to punish a fault committed against another, or against the republic, or against God. Whence the judge cannot licitly forgive the punishment.

Reply Sed Contra 6: God is said to be unable to act unjustly not on account of a contrariety between his justice and power, but on account of his incompatibility with injustice. For these two things—that God do something, and that the thing not be just—are incompatible.

Exposition of the text

But we respond to them by disclosing the double meaning of the words. (Sent. I, 43.1(187).2.) The Master’s solution consists in the following: when one says, “God cannot do anything but what is just,” what I am calling “just” can be understood to be joined with the verb “is,” by which it is restricted to standing for things present, prior to being joined with the verb “can.” And understood this way, it is false. For the meaning then is, “God cannot do anything but what is now just.” And that is false. For he can do certain things that now are nothing.

Or “just” can be understood to be joined with the verb “can,” as possessing the force of fulfilling, before being joined with the verb “is.” And in this sense, it is true. For in this sense, the name “just” stands for the confused present without reference to any determinate time. And then the meaning is, “God cannot do anything that is not just, at whatever time he be asserted to do it.” And all the objections proceed in this way.