D. 44 - Whether the power of God is limited to the quality of things

Division of the text

Here he excludes the error of those mentioned before as regards their asserting that God’s power is limited to the quality of things. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he excludes the error; in the second, he considers a certain question whereby a diminution of the divine power seemed to be asserted, at moreover, it is usual to ask whether God can always do what he was once able to do. (Sent. I, 44.2(189).1.)

The first is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks whether God’s power might be limited to the goodness of realities; in the second, he asks whether it might be limited to the mode of realities, at after these matters, it is to be considered whether he can do the things which he does in another or better way than he does. (Sent. I, 44.1(188).4.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he excludes the argument of those who asserted that God cannot make realities better than he does; second, he destroys their assertion through argument, at but here I beseech them to answer why they say. (Sent. I, 44.1(188).3.) The thought in the text is clear.

Question 1

Whether the power of God is limited to the quality of things

Here four things are asked:

first, whether God may have been able to make each and every reality better than he did;

second, whether he may have been able to make the universe itself better;

third, of the more excellent creatures, whether God could have made them better;

fourth, whether whatever God was once able to do he is also able to do now.

Article 1

Whether God may have been able to make a creature better than he did

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.25.6.) It seems that God could make no creature better than exists.

Obj. 1: For according to Dionysius and Plato, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694); Plato, Symposium, 197c; see also 212a.) it belongs to the best to bring forth the best things. But there can be nothing better than the best. Therefore there can be nothing better than the things that God, who is the best, has made.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Basil, (Basil the Great, Homiliae et Sermones, homily 15, “De fide,” para. 2 (PG 31:467).) Receiving from the Father is common to both the Son and everything created. But in things that are of one account, the same mode of arguing holds. Therefore, since Augustine argues (Augustine, Against Maximinus, bk. 2, ch. 18 (CCSL 87A; PL 42:785); Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 50 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:31).) that because in God there can be no envy, he could not generate a son better than the one he begot, it seems that he could not make created realities better than they are.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, an effect that is produced by a cause according to its entire power cannot become better due to that cause. But God brings about everything created by his entire power, since he does this through his essence, which is indivisible. Therefore he can make no reality better than that which is.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, one reality does not fall short of the goodness of another except by the fact that it falls short in its participation of the divine goodness. Now, that defect is not on the side of God, who stands equally toward all created things, according to Dionysius; (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, paras. 5–6 (PG 3:643).) rather, it is on the side of the reality itself, which has a greater or lesser capacity for the divine goodness. Therefore it seems that God could not make each reality better than they are.

On the contrary, it is possible to add to anything finite. But the goodness of everything created is finite. Therefore an addition can be made to it. But God, who is omnipotent, can do whatever can come to be. Therefore it seems that he could make any reality whatsoever better.

Furthermore, whatever nature makes, God also can make. But in the activity of nature realities are changed for the better; for example, a man comes from infancy to youth. Therefore God too can make things better than they are.

I answer that of each and every reality, considered in itself, there are two sorts of goodness, just as there are two sorts of existence, since being and good are convertible: there is the essential goodness, such as being alive and rational, for a man; and there is incidental goodness, such as health, knowledge, and such. Speaking of incidental goodness, God could have conferred a greater goodness on each and every reality; moreover, speaking of essential goodness, he could have made a different reality better than every created reality, but he could not have made this reality be of a greater goodness. For if something were added to a thing’s essential goodness, it would not be the same reality, but another; for according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 8.3, 1043b34‒1044a2.) just as in numbers, a unit added or subtracted always varies the species, so too in definitions, an added or subtracted difference changes the species; for example, if “rational” be added to the definition of “ox,” it will right away not be an ox, but another species, that is, man, and if “sensitive” were taken away, “living” will remain, with the life of trees. Whence, just as God cannot make three, while remaining three, have four units, even though he can make a number greater than any number whatsoever, so too he cannot make it that this reality remains the same, and it have a greater essential goodness, or a lesser. For from all these things it would follow that an affirmation and a negation would be true simultaneously—which God cannot do, as was said before. (Above, d. 42, q. 2, a. 2.)

Reply Obj. 1: Any reality whatsoever, considered in itself, is not the best, except perhaps insofar as it attains its every essential goodness; for example, if three were said to be “greatest” because it attains the quantity of its species. But in its order to the universe, it is best, as Augustine says. (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 10 (CCSL 46; PL 40:236).)

Reply Obj. 2: Although receiving from the Father is common to the Son along with everything created by a commonness of analogy, still having it by his nature is proper to the Son, as Basil himself says. (Basil the Great, Homiliae et Sermones, homily 15, “De fide,” para. 2 (PG 31:467).) And therefore equality to the Father is owed to him by his nature. Whence if God the Father had not begotten his equal, since he could have, he would be envious, for it would have taken away from the dignity of the Son, which dignity he ought to have and could have. But the created can never attain equality with God, nor is any measure of goodness owed to him other than according to the determination of the divine will. And therefore no envy results in God if he could make a reality better than he did make. And this is why Hilary says (Hilary, On Synods, para. 58 (PL 10:520).) that God’s will bestowed substance upon all created things, but his nature gave it to the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: Although God produces each created thing by his own entire infinite power, still the quantity of goodness does not follow in the effect except according to the will of the craftsman, which will stands as the commander of the work that the power brings forth in the execution.

Reply Obj. 4: The diverse gradation among beings is not only on the side of the realities, the capacities of which are distant from each other; it is also due to the order of the planning wisdom, which gives diverse capacities to the realities—on which capacities he later bestows his own gifts, according to his own providence; these gifts are participated in by diverse things in diverse ways, as befitting the diversity of the capacities ordained by God.

Reply Sed contra: The response to the other arguments is clear from the body of the article.

Article 2

Whether God could have made a better universe

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.25.6.) It seems that God could not have made a better universe.

Obj. 1: For, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Enchiridion on Faith, Hope, and Charity, ch. 10 (CCSL 46; PL 40:236).) the things God established, even the individuals, are good, and all things together are exceedingly good. But nothing can be better than what is superlatively good. Therefore nothing can be better than the universe.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the universe includes every good. But nothing can be better than every good. Therefore God could not make a better universe.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, according to Dionysius, (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 4, para. 1 (PG 3:694).) the good and the better are found in real things insofar as certain things participate more in the divine goodnesses than do other things; for example, things that live are placed before things that merely exist, and so on. But all divine perfections that are communicable to the created are communicated to certain created things. Therefore it seems that the universe could not be better.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, a thing is better to the degree that something is more ordered; this is also why Augustine defines evil through the privation of order. (Augustine, On the Nature of Good, para. 4 (CSEL 25:857; PL 42:553).) But in the universe there is nothing without order, since even evil itself has been ordered by God, as was said earlier. (Above, d. 36, q. 1, a. 2.) Therefore it seems that the universe could not be better.

On the contrary (5), according to the Philosopher, (Aristotle, Topics 3.) what is less mixed with black is whiter. Therefore what is less mixed with evil is better. But God was able to make a universe in which there would be no evil. Therefore because in this universe there are many evils, it seems that God could have made a better universe.

Furthermore (6), if an equal be added to the greater, the whole would be greater. Therefore also if the better be added to the better, the whole would be better. But an angel is better than a stone. Therefore two angels are something better than an angel and a stone. Therefore also if every part of the universe were an angel, the universe would be much better. Now, God could do this. Therefore and so on.

I answer that, according to the Philosopher in Metaphysics 11, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 11.2, 1060a4‒b30; 12.10, 1075a11‒25.) the good of the universe consists in a double order: in the order of the parts of the universe toward each other, and in the order of the whole universe to the end, which is God himself; this is like how in an army there is both an order of the army’s parts to each other, according to their diverse duties, and an order to the good of the general, which is victory. And this latter order is the chief one, on account of which it is the first order.

Therefore, taking the good of order that is in the parts of the universe toward each other, it can be considered either in reference to the very parts so ordered, or in reference to the order of the parts. If it is considered in reference to the parts themselves, then the universe becoming better can be understood, even by an addition of many parts—for example, many other species might be created, and many grades of goodness that could exist might be fulfilled, since even between the highest created thing and God there is an infinite distance. And in this sense, God could have made, and can make, a better universe. But that universe would stand to this as a whole to a part, and thus it would be neither thoroughly the same nor thoroughly different. And this addition of goodness would be through the mode of discrete quantity.

Or it could be understood to become better, as it were, intensively, and this by changing all its parts for the better; for if some parts are improved without the others being improved, the goodness of the order would not be as great as before. This is clear with a cithara: if all its chords were improved, the harmony becomes sweeter, but if only some were improved, dissonance would occur. Now, this improvement of all the parts can be understood either according to an incidental goodness—and then such improvement could come from God while the parts and the universe remain the same—or according to an essential goodness—and in this way too it would be possible for God, who can establish an infinity of other species. But in this sense the parts would not be the same, and consequently neither would the universe be the same, as is clear from things said before.

However, if the very order of the parts is being taken, in this sense it cannot be better through the mode of discrete quantity, unless perhaps there be an addition in the parts of the universe. For in the universe nothing is without order. But intensively it could be better while the parts remain the same as regards the order that follows incidental goodness. For to the degree that something redounds to a greater good, so much better is that order. But the order that follows essential goodness could not be better unless different parts and a different universe were to come to be.

Similarly, the order that is for the sake of the end can be considered either on the side of the end itself—and in this sense, it could not be better, such that the universe were to be ordered to a better end, as nothing can be better than God—or with reference to the order itself. And in this latter sense, insofar as the goodness of the parts of the universe might increase, as would the order of their parts to each other, the order to the end could be improved. This would happen from their standing closer to the end, insofar as they would better attain a likeness to the divine goodness, which is the end of all things.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is speaking about the order of the universe while already supposing the nature of such parts are the same. For in this sense a better order could not exist, as was said in the body.

Reply Obj. 2: We are not speaking about the universe as regards this name, but as regards this reality that is now called the “universe.” In that, even though everything that is actually good is contained in it, still not every good that God can make is in it.

Reply Obj. 3: There are many modes of participating in the same divine perfection, just as the participation in the divine wisdom is in the intellectual substances, that is, angels, in one way, and in another way in the rational substances, that is, men, and it extends even all the way to the beasts, which have sense cognition. Therefore although perhaps all perfections communicable to what is created are communicated to what is created, still they are not communicated in every mode in which they can be participated in by what is created.

Reply Obj. 4: Although the order of the universe could not be better, due to more parts of this universe being ordered, nonetheless it could be better if it were ordered to a better good as to a proximate end. This would happen if better parts of the universe were to come to be, as was said.

Reply Sed Contra 5: A universe in which nothing evil were to exist would not have as much goodness as does this universe. For there would not be as many good natures in that one as there are in this, wherein are certain good natures to which no evil is joined and others to which evil is joined. And it is better that both natures exist than only one of them.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Although an angel is absolutely better than a stone, still both natures are better than only one, and therefore the universe in which there are angels and other realities is better than one where there are only angels. For the perfection of the universe is viewed essentially in reference to the diversity of natures in which are fulfilled the diverse grades of goodness, and not according to the multiplicity of individuals in a single nature.

Article 3

Whether God could have made Christ’s humanity better than it is

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.25.6, ad 4.) It seems that God could not have made Christ’s humanity better than it is.

Obj. 1: For to the degree that each thing is better, so much closer is it to God. But nothing created can be closer to God than what is united to him in the unity of persons, as is the human nature in Christ. Therefore it seems that God could make nothing better than it.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, nothing can be greater than the infinite. But the goodness of Christ’s soul is infinite, for the Spirit was not given to him according to measure, according to John 3:34. Therefore he can bring about nothing better.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, it seems that he could not make someone better than the Blessed Virgin. For according to Anselm, (Anselm, On the Virginal Conception, ch. 18 (PL 158:451).) it was becoming that the Virgin whom God prepared for his only begotten Son as his mother would shine with purity; and under God, nothing greater than this can be understood. But God can do nothing that might be equal to himself in goodness or purity. Therefore it seems that he could make nothing better than the Blessed Virgin.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, according to Augustine in the Confessions, (Augustine, Confessions, bk. 12, ch. 7 (CCSL 27; PL 32:828).) the angels were made close to God. But the Blessed Virgin has been exalted above even the chorus of angels, as Augustine has taught, (Augustine, Sermon 208, “On the Feast of the Assumption,” para. 2 (PL 38:2130); or Jerome, Epistulae, letter 9, “To Paul and Eustochius,” n. 7 (PL 30:128).) and the Church sings this of her. Therefore nothing can be closer to God than she, and thus nothing better.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, it seems that neither could he have made something better than created beatitude. For according to Boethius, (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 2 (CCSL 94: PL 63:724).) beatitude is a state perfected by its gathering together of all goods. But nothing can be better than every good. Therefore nothing can be better than created beatitude.

On the contrary, the uncreated Good infinitely excels every created good. But many intermediates can be between things infinitely distant. Therefore God can make much better things than any created good whatsoever.

I answer that just as something can be better than any created good whatsoever, in that it is finite, so too nothing can be better than the uncreated Good, in that it is infinite. And therefore the goodness of a created thing can be considered in two ways: either what belongs to it absolutely in itself—and in this way there can be something better than every created thing; or in its connection with the uncreated Good—and in this way the dignity of a created thing receives a certain infinity from the infinity with which it is connected: for example, Christ’s human nature insofar as it is united to God; the Blessed Virgin insofar as she is the Mother of God; grace insofar as it joins one to God; and the universe insofar as it is ordered to God.

Nevertheless in such connections there is also a double order.

The first is because a thing is nobler to the degree that it is referred to God by a nobler connection—and in this way, the human nature in Christ is the noblest, since it is connected to God through the union, and after this, the Blessed Virgin, from whose womb was taken the flesh united to the divinity, and so on.

The second is because some of these connections are according to relation only, as the universe to its end, and the mother to her Son.

And therefore from the dignity of its connection one cannot draw a judgment about the reality absolutely, so that one might say that there cannot be anything better than the Blessed Virgin; but one can make the judgment about it in a certain respect, so that one could say that there cannot be a mother of anyone better, nor can the universe be ordered to a greater good.

But a certain connection, through union, is also according to existence; and therefore a judgment as regards the goodness of the connection can be made, simply speaking, as regards the united nature, so that one could say that nothing can be better than Christ the man. But outside this connection, the judgment is only in a certain respect, as when one says that there can be something better than the human nature in Christ, as something created; and this is because the nature, when considered outside its existence, is only according to a consideration of reason.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the human nature is united to the divinity in person, still the natures remain infinitely distant, and on this side there can be something better than the human nature in Christ; but this is not so on the side of that to which it is united.

Reply Obj. 2: The habitual grace infused into Christ’s soul is not infinite simply speaking and through itself, but only in a certain respect, just as it was said above (Above, d. 43, q. 1, a. 2.) that the power of an intelligence is infinite in reference to what is below, insofar as it is capable of an infinity of effects. In this way also Christ’s grace is called “infinite,” in a certain respect, insofar as it is capable of all the effects of grace, and incidentally, insofar as it is suitable for the very union of the infinite Good, as a middle of congruity, and for Christ’s activity, which is of infinite value insofar as it is the activity of a divine person.

Reply Obj. 3: Purity is intensified through a withdrawal from its contrary. And therefore something created can be found than which nothing purer can exist in created realities, if it is not stained by any contagion of sin. And such a purity was there of the Blessed Virgin, who was unmarked by original and actual sin. (Though Aquinas was mistaken in his opinion about the Immaculate Conception as found in ST III.27.1, this passage from the early Sentences commentary shows that his thought on this matter, not yet defined by the Church, was not constant. Nor is this position as found here simply an earlier position of Aquinas, as his Sermons on the Hail Mary (ca. 1268‒1272) attest: ipsa enim purissima fuit et quantum ad culpam, quia nec originale, nec mortale, nec veniale peccatum incurrit; “she is purity itself, wholly lacking in every guilt of sin, for she never incurred either original, or mortal, or venial sin.”) Yet this was beneath God, insofar as the power to sin was in her. But goodness is intensified through an approach to a terminus that is infinitely distant, that is, the highest good. Whence something better can come to be than any finite good.

Reply Obj. 4: There is an infinite distance between angels and God, so God could make many intermediate grades of goodness. And therefore, even though the Blessed Virgin is exalted above the angels, still, because she is not exalted all the way to equality with God, she yet remains infinitely distant. And therefore something yet better can exist.

Reply Obj. 5: Created beatitude has a certain infinity because it joins one to the infinite good. For considered in itself it comprehends all goods in which man can participate. Whence, if the capacity of the nature were greater, the participation would be greater, and the beatitude more perfect; for example, the beatitude of one saint is placed before the beatitude of another. Nonetheless one should note that Boethius intends this definition (Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, bk. 3, prose 10 (CCSL 94; PL 63:763).) to belong to uncreated beatitude essentially, and to the others by participation.

Article 4

Whether God is able to do everything that he was once able to do

To the fourth we proceed as follows. It seems that God cannot do everything that he once was able to do.

Obj. 1: For God’s power extends not only to species but even to individuals, for he makes both form and matter. But before Socrates existed, he was able to make Socrates. Therefore even while Socrates is existing he can make Socrates. But this is false, because then a reality’s substance might exist twice, which is impossible. Therefore not everything that he was able to do, is he able to do.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God was once able not to become incarnate. But now he is not able not to be incarnate, nor can he make something past not have been. Therefore not everything that he was once able to do can he do now.

Obj. 3: You might say that just as he was once able to do something, so he is now able to have done it, and this is one and the same ability.

On the contrary, similarly, he who has become blind is now able to have seen, since before he was able to see, and yet we do not say that whatever he was able to do he is able to do. Therefore it seems that neither should this be said of God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, God was able from eternity not to predestine Peter, whom he did predestine voluntarily. But now he is not able not to predestine him, since it cannot be that someone be predestined before and later not be predestined. Therefore he is not able to do anything he was able to do.

On the contrary (5), the quantity of a power follows the multitude of its objects, since a virtual quantity is divided according to its objects. But God’s power cannot be diminished. Therefore it seems that whatever God was able to do once, he is able to do now.

I answer that to deny someone’s being able to do something can happen due to two sources: either due to a lack of power, as one who does not have the power of sight is said not to be able to see; or due the object’s part, which does not have the account of the possible, as one who has sight is said not to see sound, which is not visible. And in the first way, there is nothing that God is not able to do, since his power is the most perfect; but in the second way, he is said not to be able to do certain things, such as making the same thing be and not be at the same time. Whence it would be more properly said that such things are not able to occur, than that God is not able to do such things.

Likewise one should say that someone not being capable of what he was capable of can occur due to two sources: either because he loses a certain power that he had—and this does not befit God, and in fact this is how the Master’s solution proceeds in the text; (Sent. I, 44.2(189).2‒4.) or due to a change in the object, such that it loses the account of the possible that it had before. For an active power is relative to something that is to be done. Whence when something has already been made determinate such that it is present in act, or passes into the past, it loses the account of the possible. And therefore it is said that God is not able to do that which is indeed the same reality, though it is signified by statements diverse only because of a diversity of tense.

Reply Obj. 1: When a thing is already actually existing, it loses the account of the possible as regards coming to exist.

Reply Obj. 2: Likewise as regards this objection, which followed based on the past.

Reply Obj. 3: When one says, “someone is able to have done this or that,” it can be understood in two ways: either such that the past stands on the side of the possible—and then the statement amounts to nothing, since what is past loses the account of the possible; or it is understood as being about its possibility for coming from that power. And in this sense, one says, “God is able to have done this or that,” because he has the power whereby he did this. But this does not fit the blind man example, for he does not have the power whereby he at one time saw; whence in no way is it true that the blind man is able to have seen.

Reply Obj. 4: The act of predestination is measured by eternity, and does not pass over into the past. And therefore it always has the account of the possible in the same way, insofar as it is from the liberality of the divine will. But on the side of the effect, it passes over into the past, and in this respect it loses the account of the possible.

Reply Sed Contra 5: This too is clear from things said in the body of the article.

Exposition of the text

Although he cannot now become incarnate. (Sent. I, 44.2(189).2.) This seems to be false. For just as the Son has assumed flesh, so too the Father was able, and is able to assume flesh, as will be said in Book III. (In III Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 3.) Therefore it seems that even now he could become incarnate.

To which one should say that the Master is understanding numerically the same incarnation that was brought about at one time. For if he were now to become incarnate, it would not be numerically the same incarnation, but another incarnation.