D. 30 - Things said of God from time

Division of the text

Having shown that “principle,” with respect to what is created, is said of God from time, consequently he shows how something could be said of God from time. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he shows that something is said of God from time; in the second, he shows the mode in which such things are said, at how, then, shall we maintain that nothing is said of God according to accident? Unless because nothing befalls his nature that may cause it to change. (Sent. I, 30.1(129).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 16, para. 17 (CCSL 50; PL 42:922).)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he shows its truth; second, he excludes an objection, at but here someone will say that his title of Lord does not pertain to God in time. (Sent. I, 30.1(129).2.)

How, then, shall we maintain that nothing is said of God according to accident? (Sent. I, 30.1(129).3.) Here he shows the mode in which such things are said of God. And in regards to this he does two things: first, he shows the mode—namely, because they are said of him without his own change, both without any accident coming to him and without any real relation; rather, only the name is relative. Second, based on the determinate mode, he resolves a certain question that had been left unresolved earlier, at here can be solved the question posed above. (Sent. I, 30.2(130).1, referring back to Sent. I, 18.6(71).1–2.)

Question 1

Things said of God from time

Here three things are asked:

first, whether anything is said of God from time;

second, whether such things signify the divine essence;

third, whether such relative names assert a relation really existing in God.

Article 1

Whether anything is said of God from time

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 37, q. 2, a. 3; ST I.13.7; I.34.3, ad 2; On the Power of God, q. 7, aa. 8, 9, 11.) It seems that nothing is said of God from time.

Obj. 1: For that about which something is said from time, and which before was not said, can be said to become that. For example, a man is said to become white if before it was not truly said that he was white. But becoming in no way befits God, just as neither does changing, since he is the first mover. Therefore it seems that nothing in God is said from time.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, what is predicated of something is said either through itself or incidentally. But the things said from time are not predicated through themselves, since what is in him through himself is always in him, whereas these things are not predicated of God from eternity. But neither are they predicated incidentally, since there is nothing incidental in God; and further, because everything incidental is traced back to something that is through itself, these things would be said of something else through themselves—which is not so, since nothing other than God is called “Creator” or “Lord of the universe.” Therefore it seems that in no way are such names said of God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, one might say that this is a predication by causality.

On the contrary, wherever there is predication by causality, this predication can be resolved and expounded through a proposition denoting the relation of a cause. For example, if one says, “God is our hope,” this can be expounded as “our hope is from God.” But one cannot say, “the Creator is from God.” Therefore when one says, “God is the Creator,” this is not a predication by causality.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, everything true is either necessary or contingent. Therefore, if these things are predicated of God truly, then they are predicated necessarily or contingently. But they are not predicated with necessity, since they are not always so, and neither are they predicated contingently, since nothing in God is contingent. Therefore it seems that they cannot be predicated of God.

On the contrary, there is everything said in the text, both by Augustine and by the Master, (Sent. I, 30.1(129).1–2, 5–6; Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 16 (CCSL 50; PL 42:922).) and the common way of speaking both according to the faith and according to philosophy.

I answer that it is necessary that something be said of God from time. For, because every existence of every reality whatsoever flows forth from God himself—not only that of the universe, but of every part of it whatsoever—he must be designated with the orientation of a principle relative to all the things that exist. And because many of the things that exist have not always existed, even if one were to assert that the universe has always existed, which some philosophers have erroneously thought, (Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a8–28, 251b13–16.) names designating that orientation must not be said of God from eternity, but rather from time. For an actual relation requires two extremes actually existing; whence he cannot be referred to a created thing as an actual principle of the created thing except with the created thing actually existing, and he cannot be referred to what has not always existed except from time.

However, it is not possible for the other names, the ones said of God absolutely, that they are said of him from time. For things said absolutely, according to their proper accounts, assert something in that subject of which they are said, such as quantity, quality, and such. Whence none of such things is found that is not really in God, of whom it is said truly and properly. And on account of this, they cannot be said of something from time unless that thing changes through a reception of what it did not have before.

But relation, according to its own account, does not assert something in the thing of whom it is said. Rather, it asserts only an orientation to another. Whence some relations are found, as was said earlier, (Above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.) that do not really exist in that of which they are said. And therefore in such things those orientations are newly said of something through a change not of it, but of that in reference to which it is said. And so it is in all things that are said of God from time.

Reply Obj. 1: Just as such orientations do not assert that something really is in God, but that something is in him only according to reason, so too from the fact that they are newly said of God it does not follow that something comes to be in him according to a reality, but only according to reason. This is as is said in the Psalms: Lord, you have become our refuge (Ps 90 [89]:1). (RSV reads you have been instead of you have become.) Nevertheless, even if one concedes he has become something, like a refuge or such, according to reason only, still in no way should one say he has changed, since “change” is imposed for a removal of what a thing moves from, whereas “coming to be” is imposed for the attainment of what the motion ends at. Now, in no way is anything removed from God, even if some orientation accrues to him according to reason; whence, even if he is said to “become” something, one should not say he “changes” into that.

Reply Obj. 2: According to the Master, (Sent. I, 30.1(129).3.) these things are being predicated incidentally, but not that they are in God, but that they are in the created things. Yet one should understand that in such names one should consider two things: the orientations themselves, and that upon which the orientation’s account is founded in God, just as the orientation of creation has the divine power as its foundation in God, to whom it belongs to lead things into existence out of nothing. Therefore, if one considers what they have for their foundation in the divine reality, it is certain that they are being spoken of through themselves; for the divine essence, power, and activity is from eternity. However, if one considers the orientation itself, then they are said of God incidentally in this respect.

Now, “accident” (Or “incidental.”) is said in two ways: either insofar as it names the nature of an accident as divided from substance, and in this way there are no accidents in God; or insofar as it names something that belongs through another, as when we say, “the white builds” accidentally, (The example is a little obscure; an equivalent example in English would be “the poor you always have with you,” where the adjective is taken substantively, so that it implies an underlying substance.) since it is joined to what is causing the building through itself, that is, the builder. And in this way it does befit God to be referred accidentally to another outside himself, for he is not spoken of as related except because something else is being referred to him. This is like how the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a30‒b1.) that the knowable is relative, not because it itself is referred, (That is, to the knower.) but because the latter is referred to it. Nevertheless, it does not follow that the orientation that is being designated in God belongs to anything else through itself, but rather the opposite reference, which is to be created, or to be a servant, or something of this sort.

Reply Obj. 3: This cannot properly speaking be called a predication by causality, unless perhaps it is understood that such names predicate the orientation of some cause.

Reply Obj. 4: This is clear from what was said to the second objection, since they are predicated in the same way necessarily as through themselves, and in the same way contingently as incidentally. Yet it does not follow that anything in God is contingent.

Article 2

Whether things said of God from time signify the divine essence

To the second we proceed as follows. It seems that such names as are said of God from time do not signify the divine essence.

Obj. 1: For the divine essence is eternal. But these names are not said of God from eternity. Therefore they do not signify the divine essence.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, God is called, from time, “our patience” and “our hope” and the like. But such names, because they have an imperfection connected to them, cannot befit the divine essence, the way the divine essence is called “charity,” in the concept of which there is no imperfection. Therefore it seems that not all things said of God from time signify the divine essence.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the divine essence is common to the three persons. But some things said of God from time do not befit the three persons, like “sent,” “given,” and such. Therefore they do not all signify the divine essence.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, God is said to be a man from time. But “man” signifies a human nature, which in the Incarnation has not been blended with the divine nature, but rather remained distant from it. Therefore it seems that things that are said from time do not signify the divine essence.

On the contrary, the masters say that every name connoting an effect in what is created signifies the divine essence. But things that are said of God from time, are said in reference to what is created, as has been said. (Above, a. 1.) Therefore they do signify the divine essence.

Furthermore, Dionysius says (Pseudo-Dionysius, On the Divine Names, ch. 2, para. 1 (PG 3:635).) that every beneficent naming of God, of whichever of the divine persons it is said, must be received unobservantly in the entire Godhead. (In his commentary on the same passage (Commentary on Dionysius’s On the Divine Names, ch. 2, lect. 6, n. 221), Aquinas takes Pseudo-Dionysius’s inobservanter as equivalent to “without a doubt” (absque dubio), perhaps then taking the prefix in- as an intensifier, which would be uncommon in Latin but not unheard of. In that case, the meaning might also be expressed by “carefully” rather than “unobservantly.”) But all those names that signify an orientation to what is created name some blessing in created things. Therefore they pertain to the entire Trinity without distinction, and so the same thing as before.

I answer that, as was said, (Above, a. 1.) nothing is said of God from time except what indicates an orientation toward what is created. Now, God’s orientation toward the created can be designated in two ways: either insofar as what is created is referred to him as to its principle, or insofar as what is created is referred to him as to its terminus. If this is in the first way, it happens in two ways: for either something is predicated of God from time by a proper predication, which designates the orientation of the principle to what is derived from it; or something is predicated that designates the very thing derived from God as principle, as when there is a predication by causality, as when one says, “God is our hope.”

If it is in the first way, this too happens in two ways: for sometimes a name is imposed so as to signify the orientation itself, for example, the name “Lord” and the like, which are relatives according to being; and others said of God are indeed relatives—since they also signify, from their primary understanding, an orientation that is in God according to reason—but in a consequent way they cause an understanding of the essence, insofar as this orientation is founded on something essential.

However, sometimes a name is imposed to signify that on which the orientation is founded, as the name “knowledge” signifies a quality, on which follows a certain relation to what is knowable. Whence such names are not relatives according to being, but only according to speech. Whence such names principally give one understanding of a reality that belongs to another category, and indicate relation in a consequent way. And so it is in the divine, as is clear in the name “Creator,” which is imposed to signify a divine action, which belongs to the essence itself, on which follows a certain orientation to what is created. And such names principally signify the essence, and in a consequent way indicate a relation to what is created. And the account is similar with names wherein there is predication by causality. For such expressions are resolved into the orientations of a cause, as when one says, “God is our patience,” that is, the cause of our patience. And in all such names that are said of God from time, and indicate the orientation of a principle to what is derived from it, it is true simply speaking that they befit the entire Trinity.

However, if one considers the relation of what is created to its Creator as to its terminus, it is possible that such a relation of the created thing is toward either something essential or something personal. Now, this happens in three ways: either according to an activity, as someone can understand or name God or paternity; or according to exemplarity, as in the creation of things there is a termination at the likeness of the essential attributes, and in the infusion of charity there is a termination at the likeness of the personal procession of the Holy Spirit; or there is a termination according to being, and this mode is unique to the Incarnation, through which a human nature was assumed to the being and unity of a divine person, but not to the unity of the divine nature. But this relation, whereby what is created is referred to God as to its terminus, includes in a consequent way in itself the relation that is to God as to its principle.

Whence in all things that are said of God according to his orientation to what is created, from the fact that the created is referred to him as to a terminus, one should consider that, with respect to the orientation of a terminus, they can belong only to a single person. But the account of a principle, which is included there, in a consequent way belongs to the entire Trinity. This is why according to one orientation they can cause the understanding of the person, and according to another they cause the understanding of the essence. This is clear when he is called “incarnate,” for this belongs only to the Son, since the Incarnation is terminated at the person of the Son only, though still the entire Trinity causes it.

Reply Obj. 1: Names of this sort belong to God from time by reason of the orientation indicated, either principally or in a consequent way: principally as when he is called “Lord,” but in a consequent way when he is called “Creator.” And this orientation is not the divine essence, nor is it some reality in God; but such names belong to God from eternity, as it were, habitually, according to his essence, in which this orientation is founded.

Reply Obj. 2: God’s essence is not our patience or hope, nor is it being signified when one says, “God is our hope”; rather, what is being signified, in reference to the divine essence, is the orientation of a cause relative to such effect in us. Whence it is similar for both sorts of names.

Reply Obj. 3: “Sent,” “incarnate,” and such indicate two orientations, namely, that of a terminus and that of a principle. The former of them, the orientation of a principle, belongs to the entire Trinity; this is why we say that the entire Trinity sends or causes the Incarnation. But the latter belongs to a certain determinate person, on account of which such names are not said of the entire Trinity.

Reply Obj. 4: God is called “man,” insofar as a supposit of the divine nature, the Son, subsists in a human nature through union. Now, this union is a certain relation really existing in the assumed creation. Indeed, when considered according to the orientation to its terminus, it is terminated at the Son’s person, wherein the union has been accomplished; but according to the orientation to its principle, it is referred to the entire Trinity, which has accomplished the union.

Article 3

Whether the orientations designated by these names said of God from time are really in God

To the third we proceed as follows. It seems that the orientations designated by these names are not really in God.

Obj. 1: For a name and account to which nothing in reality is subject is pointless and false. But we do not pointlessly and falsely call and think on God as Lord and Creator. Therefore such names have the relations that they signify corresponding to them really in God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, that which is according to reason only will no longer remain upon the ceasing of the intellect reasoning about it. But even if there were no one reasoning, God would still be Lord and Creator. Therefore such names signify something really existing in God, and not something merely according to reason.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, to every relation corresponds its own correlative, which is opposed to it. But when we say a creature serves God, a certain relation really existing in the creature is being indicated. Therefore one must put its opposite relation somewhere. But it is not in the creature, since then the creature would be lord of its very self, and its own creator, and opposite respects would be in the same thing. Therefore the respects opposite to the relations of the creature to God must be placed really in God.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, we find that those relatives, wherein there is no relation according to a reality, are toward-something only according to speech, like “knowable”; about this the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a30‒b1.) that it is related because something else is being referred to it itself. But some relatives are said of God that are toward-something even according to being, like “Lord,” “King,” and such. Therefore they, at least, signify some real relation in God.

On the contrary, in God there is nothing but the eternal, since whatever is in God is God. But orientations of this sort are not eternal, and this is why neither are their names said of God from eternity. Therefore they are not really in God.

I answer that it is true commonly according to the theologians and the philosophers that the relations by which God is referred to what is created are not in God according to reality, but only according to account. For our intellect cannot receive something said in relation to another unless it understands it under an opposed orientation.

Nevertheless one should know that an account in the understanding of real things stands in three ways. For sometimes it apprehends something that is in reality in the way it is apprehended, as when the form of stone is apprehended. But sometimes it apprehends something that is in no way in reality, as when someone imagines a chimera, or something of this sort. However, sometimes it apprehends something to which is subject some nature in reality, yet not according to the account whereby it is being apprehended. This is clear, for example, when it apprehends the intention of a genus of a substance, which in reality is some nature not determined according to itself to this or that species. And to this apprehended nature—according to the mode wherein it is in the apprehending intellect, which receives from all the things in which that nature is found some one common “what”—it attributes the account of genus, which account is not in reality.

So too it is with relations of this sort, which our intellect attributes to God. For it finds in him the power, and essence, and activity by which what is created is brought forth having a relation to him. And therefore it attributes an orientation to that essence or activity, and insofar as it understands him this way, so does it impose relative names.

Reply Obj. 1: The response is clear, because our understanding is neither empty nor pointless, since it has something corresponding to it in reality, although it does not correspond according to the mode by which it is in the account. This is just as even the understanding of mathematicians is not false or pointless, even though there is no line abstracted from matter in reality, as they consider them. Whence the Philosopher says, there is no lie in abstractions. (Aristotle, Physics 2.2, 193b35.)

Reply Obj. 2: Even if there were no intellect, it would still be in God; whence he could be both called and understood truly to be Lord, that is, by his power of controlling things subject to him. But he would not be called or understood to be Lord in act.

Reply Obj. 3: One finds three sorts of diversity of relatives. There are some of which each indicates a relation not existing in the reality, but in reason alone; for example, when being is referred to non-being, or a relation is referred to a relation, or something like this, as was said above. (Above, d. 26, q. 2, a. 1.) But there are some where each indicates a real relation, like with the Father and the Son. (The reader should note that the capitalization of Pater and Filius here is an editorial assumption; one could just as easily take them as lower case, and if so, this would be a claim about the relations of father to son and son to father more generally.) And there are some where the one indicates a real relation and the other indicates a relation only of reason, like with knowledge and the knowable. And the reason for this diversity is that that on which the relation is founded is sometimes found in only one, and sometimes it is found in both, just as it is clear that the relation of knowledge to the knowable is founded on the apprehension according to the spiritual existence of the thing known. Now, this spiritual existence, on which is founded the relation of knowledge, is only in the knower, not in the knowable thing, for there reality’s form exists according to its natural existence; thus, a real relation is in the knowledge, but is not in the knowable. The contrary is the case for the lover and the beloved, since the relation of love is founded on the appetite for the good, but the good is something existing not only in the soul, but also in real things. This is why the Philosopher says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 6.4, 1027b27.) that good and evil are in realities, but the true and the false are in the soul. And therefore Avicenna says (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 10.) that in the lover and the beloved one can find in each relative a disposition whereby it is referred to the other, but not in the knower and the knowable; and therefore the relation is real for each, just as it is with equality, which is immediately founded on quantity, which is in each of them. And all the relations of created things to God are founded on the mode in which they receive from God—which mode is not in God, since they do not reach the perfect mode according to which God acts on them—therefore to the relations that are in the created there corresponds no relation really in God. But to the relation that the Son receives from the Father, there does correspond a certain relation in the Father. For the Father gives and the Son receives the divine nature according to one and the same mode and account.

Reply Obj. 4: This is not relevant to the proposed matter. For about each of the relatives there are found certain things that indicate a real relation, and others that indicate a relation of reason. For example, the same thing indicates a relation of reason even though it is relative according to being; knowledge too indicates a real relation, even though it is a relative according to speech.

Exposition of the text

To this it may be said that, although he did not begin to be Lord of time from time, yet he began to be Lord of time. (Sent. I, 30.1(129).2; the Silano translation has been modified to read from time (ex tempore), whereas Silano reads in time.) The intention of this solution is that God began to be Lord of time when time began to be, so just as time did not begin to be in time or from time, so too neither is God called the “Lord of time” from time or in time. And one says, in time, (Sent. I, 30.1(129).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity*, bk. 5, ch. 16 (CCSL 50; PL 42:922).)* so as to designate the orientation of a measure, since just as what has place is in its place as in its measure, so too what is in time is in its measure. But he says, from time, (Sent. I, 30.1(129).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 16 (CCSL 50; PL 42:922).) insofar as time is a measure that encloses what it measures, whence it must be greater than it in each direction. And therefore things that always exist, insofar as they always exist, are not measured by time, but things that exist for a while are, as the Philosopher says. (Aristotle, Physics 4.12, 221b4.) And therefore things that are measured by time are from time, since time precedes them. However, time is not measured by time, just as neither is place measured by place; and therefore time begins neither in time nor from time. But God is the Lord, in time or from time, of the different things that begin in time or from time, and some things are such—like this and that generated thing—even if the universe has always existed, as some philosophers have asserted. (Nicolaï says this perhaps refers to Socrates, Plato, and their followers; see also Aristotle, Physics 8.1, 251a8–28; 251b13–16; On the Heavens, bks. 1–2.) Whence to ask this does not pertain to the proposed matter, since whichever is true, what is proposed holds—that God is Lord from time, at least for some things.

Here can be solved the question posed above. (Sent. I, 30.2(130).1.) The Master proposed this question in Distinction 18, (Sent. I, 18.6(71).1–2.) and he solves it here by means of the things just said. For such names that are said of God from time do not indicate real relations existing in God, but ones according to account and name. And therefore, when the Holy Spirit is said to be given by his very self, the real relation is in what is created; and this relation is referred to the entire Trinity as to its principle, and to the Holy Spirit as to its terminus, by way of exemplarity. But in the Holy Spirit there is only a relation according to account. And it is not unfitting that by such an account something be referred back to its very self, as when one says, “a thing is the same as itself.”