D. 23 - The name “person”

Division of the text

After having divided the divine names, here the Master excludes a certain name from the generality of other names—that is, this name “person,” which is indeed said according to substance, but it is nevertheless predicated in the plural. And this is divided into two parts: in the first, he presents the exception; in the second, he inquires into the reason for the exception, at and so here a difficult question arises. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).3.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he singles out this name “person” from the other divine names said in reference to the divine substance; and second, because nothing can be singled out from things unless it is contained among them, he shows that the name “person” signifies substance, at Augustine . . . shows that person is said according to substance. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).2.)

And so here a difficult question arises. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).3.) Here he asks for the reason for this exception, and this is divided into two parts: in the first, he asks why the name “person” is predicated of the several persons in the plural; second, he asks why the other essential names are not predicated in the plural, at but here the question is asked: since we say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three persons . . . why do we not similarly say ‘three gods’? (Sent. I, 23.3(97).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he proposes a question; second, he lays out a response, at because we wish to reserve at least one word to express the meaning of Trinity. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (PL 42:943).)

Here he does two things. First, he shows the urgent necessity for the Latins, why a certain name said according to substance needs to be predicated in the plural; second, he shows the same necessity is urgent for the Greeks, that a name signifying the substance might be predicated in the plural, that is “hypostasis,” at it is not the Latin language alone that labors under this need, but the Greek one too . . . is hemmed in. (Sent. I, 23.2(96).1.)

But here the question is asked: since we say that Father and Son and Holy Spirit are three persons . . . why do we not similarly say ‘three gods’? (Sent. I, 23.3(97).1.) Here he asks for the reason why the other essential names are not predicated in the plural. And first he asks about the name “essence,” at but here another question arises; (Sent. I, 23.4(98).1.) and he does two things in reference to this: first, he assigns the reason; second, he proves something that he was supposing in the reasoning, namely, that in God there is no diversity, on account of which “essence” is not predicated in the plural, nor is there singularity, on account of which “person” is predicated in the plural, at I believe it has already been sufficiently shown by what necessity we say three persons. (Sent. I, 23.5(99).1.)

Question 1

The name “person”

Here four things are asked:

first, about the distinction between the names “essence,” “subsistence,” “substance,” and “person,” and the corresponding names in Greek, which are “ousia,” “ousiosis,” “hypostasis,” and “prosopon”; (That is: οὐσίᾳ, οὐσίωσις, ὑπόστασις, πρόσωπον.)

second, whether the name “person” is said properly in the divine;

third, whether it signifies substance or relation;

fourth, if it in some way signifies substance, whether it is predicated in the plural.

Article 1

Whether “essence,” “subsistence,” “substance,” and “person” are said synonymously of God

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; ST I.13.4; SCG I.35; On the Power of God, q. 7, a. 6; q. 9, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, ch. 25.) It seems that the listed names have no distinction, since they are, as it were, synonyms.

Obj. 1: For Boethius says (Boethius, In Categorias Aristotelis libri IV, bk. 1 (PL 64:184): cum autem tres substantiae sint, materia, species, et quae ex utrisque conficitur undique composita et compacta substantia; hic neque de sola specie, neque de sola materia, sed de utrisque mixtis compositisque proposuit, “but since there are three substances, namely, matter, species, and what is fashioned from both, that is, substance completely composed and conjoined, here he proposed neither the species alone, nor the matter alone, but what is composed and assembled from both.”) in his commentaries on the Categories that ousia signifies a composite substance. But a composite substance is an individual subsisting in the genus of substance, which is signified by the name “substance,” or “hypostasis,” or “person.” Therefore it seems that this name “essence,” or “ousia,” does not differ in signification from the others.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, a thing does not subsist unless it has complete existence in itself. But complete existence is found only in a particular, since universals have no existence beyond the particulars, except in the soul, which is an incomplete existence. Therefore, since a particular in the genus of substance is called a “hypostasis,” or a “first substance,” it seems that a subsistence is the same thing as a substance.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, since in their names each of them indicates the position of something under something else, the same thing follows.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, Boethius says (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures (De duabus naturis), ch. 3 (PL 64:1344).) that the Greeks used the name “hypostasis” only for an individual of a rational nature. But an individual of a rational nature is called a “person.” Therefore it seems that “hypostasis” and “prosopon,” or “substance” and “person,” are wholly the same.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as the Greeks speak of “three hypostases,” we speak of “three substances.” Now, we do not speak of “three substances” just as “three ousioses” themselves. Therefore it seems that a “subsistence” among us is the same as a “hypostasis” among the Greeks—the contrary of which Boethius stated in On the Two Natures. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343).)

On the contrary, there is the authority of Boethius, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1342‒43).) who distinguishes the significations of these names; so too there is the authority of Cicero, whom Boethius notes there.

I answer that the four stated names differ according to signification, but the difference among them is assigned in diverse ways by different people. For some take their difference from the fact that in the divine there is something common and something distinct. And the common can be signified either as that by which it exists, and in this way it is the essence, or as that which exists, and in this way it is a subsistence.

Or in another way: because God can be signified either insofar as he gives existence to all things, and so he is called “essence,” or insofar as he has existence so sufficient that he stands in need of nothing, and so he is called “subsistence.” Likewise, what is distinct can be signified either concretely, and in this way there is the name “person,” or abstractly, and in this way there is the name “hypostasis.”

Or in another way: because he can be signified as distinguishable, and in this way he is signified by the name “hypostasis,” or as distinguished, and so he is signified by the name “person.”

Or in another way: because he is signified either as distinguished by a certain determinate property pertaining to nobility, and in this way the name is “person,” or he is distinguished absolutely by any property whatsoever, and in this way the name is “hypostasis.”

But such an approach does not resolve the question. For even if there were no distinction in the divine, these names would still be said of God, and they would not signify the same thing the way synonymous names do. And further, as regards some of them, this is even false. For God is not called “essence” from the fact that he gives existence, just as neither is he called “wise” from the fact that he gives wisdom; indeed, vice versa: from the fact that God has essence, so does he pour existence into created things, and the same goes for the others; for this is like how fire heats things from the fact that it has heat, and not vice versa. However, the divine wisdom and essence is made known to us through the existence and knowledge communicated to what is created. Likewise also, in the divine, since God is pure act without any mixture of potency, there is nothing in him capable of signification through the mode of a potency not joined to act and through the mode of act, as the distinguishable and the distinguished. Nor again is there what is proper in an abstraction, for in this way he is signified by the name of a property, like by the name “paternity,” which is signified not as a hypostasis, but as a being in a hypostasis.

Others take the difference between these names according to the distinction of account, by which it exists, and what exists. Of these, some say that three of these names signify him as that by which he exists, or the supposit’s substance, such that “essence” signifies the substance, or the nature of the genus, “subsistence” signifies the nature of the species, and “hypostasis” signifies the individual nature; the fourth, “person,” is taken according to what exists, and it signifies the substance that is the supposit. But others say the opposite, that one of them signifies that by which he exists, that is, “essence,” and the other three signify what exists, but in diverse ways: for the name “substance” signifies what exists through reference to the nature or essence, the name “subsistence” signifies what exists through reference to individuation, but the name “person” places a specific account or property pertaining to dignity. But of the first two, the converse is the case, according to Boethius; (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1344‒45).) for this teaching is taken following Augustine and Jerome. (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 4 (PL 42:939); this teaching is also found in Explanatio symboli ad Damasum, which had been attributed to Jerome but is now ascribed to Pelagius.) Others say that two of them signify that by which he exists. “Essence” indeed signifies that by which he exists, or the common nature, but not insofar as it is predicable—the way it is considered when one says, “man is a species”—whereas “subsistence” signifies the common nature insofar as it is predicable, according to Boethius. The other two signify what exists, and they differ in the way explained just above.

But because each of these names, setting aside the name “person,” is found used sometimes for that by which a thing exists and sometimes for what exists, it does seem that this is their essential distinction, according to any of the aforesaid modes. Therefore one should speak about this differently, following Boethius, so that the difference of these names, “essence,” “subsistence,” and “substance,” is taken according to the signification of the acts from which they are imposed, namely, to exist, to subsist, and to stand under. For it is clear that to exist is something common, and does not determine any mode of existing, whereas to subsist indicates a determinate mode of existing, insofar as something is a being through itself and not in another, like an accident, and to stand under is the same thing as to be placed under another. Thereby it is clear that “to exist” says what is common to all genera, whereas “to subsist” and “to stand under” say what is proper to the first category, according to two things that belong to it: namely, that it is a being complete in itself, and also that it stands under all the other accidents, the things that have existence in a substance.

Whence I say that “essence” is said as that of which the act is to exist, “subsistence” is that of which the act is to subsist, and “substance” is that of which the act is to stand under. However, this is said in two ways, as is clear in the individuals. For to exist is the act of something as what exists, just as heating is the act of what heats, and it belongs to something as that by which it exists—that is, that by which it is denominated as existing, just as to heat is the act of heat.

Now, one should note that if something follows on several things coming together, it cannot be denominated that way through just one of them, even though that one might be the principle of the whole; rather, it is denominated through the whole. For example, a flavor follows on something hot and moist insofar as they come together in some way; and although heat is the principle of flavor as its efficient cause, still the thing is not denominated “flavorful” from the heat, but rather, from the flavor, which embraces simultaneously the hot and the moist coming together in a certain way. Likewise, I say that since to exist follows on the composition of form and matter, even though the form is the principle of the existence, still something is not denominated a being from the form, but rather from the whole. And therefore “essence” does not signify only the form, but in things composed of matter and form it signifies the whole. And this is also how “whatness” and the “nature of a thing” is said, and this is why Boethius, in the Categories, says (Boethius, In Categorias, bk. 1 (PL 64:184).) that “ousia” signifies the composite of matter and form.

But such a nature, so considered, even though it signifies the composite of matter and form, still does not from this fact signify matter demonstrated by standing under determinate accidents, in which the form is individuated; for the name “Socrates” signifies a composite of this sort. However, this demonstrated matter is as the receiver of that common nature. And therefore “nature” or “essence” is signified in two ways. The first is as a part, according to which the common nature is taken along with a cutting away of everything not pertaining to the common nature; for in this way, it supervenes on the demonstrated matter in the composition of the demonstrated singular, the way the name “humanity” does. And in this way it is not predicated, nor is it a genus, nor is it a species; rather, by it he is formally denominated a “man.” Or it is signified as the whole, insofar as the things that pertain to the common nature are understood without that cutting away; for in this way even the demonstrated matter is included potentially in the common nature. And this is how he is signified with the name “man,” and he is signified as what exists.

And the name “essence” is found used in each way. Whence, sometimes we say, “Socrates is a certain essence,” and sometimes we say, “Socrates’ essence is not Socrates.” Thus it is clear that “essence” sometimes signifies that by which a thing exists, as when he is signified by the name “humanity,” and sometimes what exists, as he is signified by the name “man.”

Likewise also, to subsist is the act of something as what subsists or as that by which it subsists. Now, because “to subsist” signifies “to exist determinately,” and the entire determination of existing follows on form, which is the terminus, it is certain that something is denominated “subsisting” through its first form, which is in the genus substance; for example, a thing is denominated “white” through its whiteness, and “ensouled” through its soul. And this is why Boethius says in his commentary on the Categories (Boethius, In Categorias, bk. 1 (PL 64:184).) that ousiosis, or subsistence, is form receiving subsistence, relative to which it is brought to a halt (sub-sistitur). (Subsistere means both “to subsist” and, in its original usage, “to bring to a halt,” which latter meaning fits with the prior language in this response, regarding coming to a terminus.) However, if “subsistence” is taken for what subsists, then it properly names that in which is found, with priority, such a nature in this mode of existing. And since this is found primarily in substance as substance, and derivatively in the others insofar as they stand closer to substance, it is certain that the name “subsistence” primarily belongs to genera and species within the genus of substance, as Boethius says. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1345).) Also, it does not belong to individuals to have such existence except insofar as they are under a common nature. For although genera and species subsist only as in individuals who have existence, still the determination of the existing arises from the higher nature or “whatness.”

Likewise, “hypostasis,” or “substance,” is said in two ways. The first is that by which a thing stands-under, and because the first principle of standing-under is matter, Boethius says, in his Categories commentary, (Boethius, In Categorias, bk. 1 (PL 64:182‒85).) that “hypostasis” is matter, or what stands under, and this is primarily the individual in the genus of substance. For genera and species do not stand under accidents except by reason of the individuals belonging to that species or genus, and therefore the name “substance” first and principally belongs to the particular substances, following both the Philosopher and Boethius. (Aristotle, Categories 5, 2a14; Boethius, In Categorias, bk. 1 (PL 64:182‒85).)

Therefore in this way the difference between these three becomes clear in two ways. For if each is taken as that by which a thing exists, then “essence” signifies whatness insofar as it is the form of the whole, “ousia” signifies the form of the part, and “hypostasis” signifies the matter. However, if each is taken as what exists, then one and the same thing will be said to be: the “essence” insofar as it has existence; “subsistence” insofar as it has such an existence, that is, an absolute existence—and this belongs to the genera and species with priority over the individuals; and “substance” insofar as it stands under (sub-stat) accidents—and this belongs to the individuals with priority over the genera and species. Moreover, the name “person” signifies the particular substance insofar as it lies under a property that has a sound of dignity; “prosopon” is similar among the Greeks. And this is why “person” belongs only to an intellectual nature. And according to Boethius, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343).) the name “person” has been taken from sounding-through (per-sonando), because in tragedies and comedies the actors put on a certain mask to represent the one whose deeds they were narrating in song. And from there the word has been drawn into a usage such that every individual man about whom such a narration can occur is called a “person.” So too the Greek word prosopon is said from pros, which signifies “on,” and ope, which is the “face”; (More accurately, in Greek pros (πρός) means “toward” or “against” and ops (ὤψ) means “eye” but can also mean “face.”) for masks of this sort are placed before one’s face.

Reply Obj. 1: “Particular” signifies the thing composed from a demonstrated matter and form, whereas “universal” in composite substances also signifies a composite of matter and form, but not demonstrated, like man, composed of soul, flesh, and bone, yet not from this flesh and these bones. Whence it is not necessary that “ousia” signify the same thing as the particular substance; rather, it is open to each of these. And therefore everything that is in the genus of substance can be called “ousia,” whether it is universal substance or particular substance.

Reply Obj. 2: To subsist signifies two things: to exist, and a determinate mode of existing. And to exist simply speaking belongs only to individuals, but the determination of existing is from the nature or whatness of the genus or species. And therefore, even though genera and species subsist only in individuals, nonetheless to subsist properly belongs to them, and they are called “subsistences,” although the particular is also called this, but in a posterior way, just as species are also called “substances.”

Reply Obj. 3: “Substance” is said insofar as it exists under (sub-est) an accident or a common nature, but something is said “to subsist” insofar as exists under its own existence, and does not have its existence in another as in a subject.

Reply Obj. 4: Among the Greeks this name “hypostasis” has one thing from what is proper to its signification, and something else from its usage. For from what is proper to its signification it signifies every particular substance, whereas from usage it has been accommodated to just the nobler substances. And this is why they themselves use the name “hypostasis” the same way we use the name “person.” But this usage is not found among us in the name “substance.”

Reply Obj. 5: Among us the name “substance” is used equivocally. For sometimes it is used in place of the essence, insofar as we say, “a definition signifies a thing’s substance.” But sometimes it is used in place of the supposit of substance, as when we say, “Socrates is a certain substance.” And therefore, in order to avoid a misunderstanding, the saints did not want to use the name “substance” for a supposit, as the Greeks use it; rather, they altered it and posited “subsistence” as corresponding to “hypostasis,” and left “substance” as corresponding to “ousia,” even though the converse is the case, according to the true signification. For they cared more about avoiding error than about the proper meaning of the names.

Article 2

Whether the name “person” is said properly in the divine

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.29.3; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 3.) It seems that the name “person” is not said properly in the divine.

Obj. 1: For “person” signifies the masked man whose figure is being represented, as was said in the previous article. But this cannot fit God, except metaphorically, nor does he even have a figure that could be represented, as Isaiah 40:18 says: to whom then will you liken God, or what likeness compare with him? Therefore the name “person” does not properly fit God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, in the whole of nature, “person” appears to signify the greatest composition; for in an individual man there come together all natures, as it were, for his constitution, whether on the side of the soul or on the side of the body. Whence, it is also said to have something in common with all things. But God is in the highest way simple. Therefore it seems that the name “person” does not befit him.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, a “person” is said to be what stands under some property, or what subsists. But, as was said above from the words of Augustine, (Sent. I, 8.7(27).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, cc. 4‒5 (PL 42:941‒43).) God is not properly said to stand under anything that is in him. Therefore he is not properly called a “person.”

Obj. 4: Furthermore, “person” signifies a particular or singular substance. But the particular or singular does not belong to God. Therefore, it seems, neither does this name “person.”

On the contrary, “person” is said as though it says the “one through itself” (per-se-una). But this befits God most of all. Therefore it seems that so does the name “person.”

Furthermore, “person” signifies a complete thing existing in an intellectual nature. But this fits God. Therefore so does the name “person.”

I answer that the name “person” belongs properly to God, yet not in the same way as it is in created things, but in a certain nobler way—as is the case with all other things that are said of God and created things. For the account of “person” is preserved in the divine insofar as it is what has existence through itself subsisting in an intellectual nature.

Reply Obj. 1: In the signification of a name two things must be considered: that from which the name is imposed for signification, and that for the signification of which it is imposed. Now, it happens sometimes that the substance of something is named from some accident that does not follow upon the entire nature of which the name is being said, just as the name “stone” (lapis) is said from the fact that it hurts the foot (laedit-pedem), (For this medieval etymology, see Isidore, The Etymologies, bk. 16, ch. 3, para. 1 (PL 82:562).) yet not everything that hurts the foot is a stone, or vice versa. And therefore the judgment about a name should not be according to that from which the name is imposed, but rather according to what it is imposed for signifying. Whence, even though the name “person” has been imposed from the aforesaid representation, still it has been imposed for signifying a complete substance, one subsisting in a rational nature. And this latter befits God, even though what the name was imposed from does not befit him.

Reply Obj. 2: Such composition befalls “person” outside its own account. For because “person” signifies something complete in an intellectual nature, and in human nature there is found completion only through the greatest composition, therefore it incidentally signifies a composition in the nature. However, if one were to find the intellectual perfection in a simple body, like in fire, it would be said to be a person. And therefore the divine simplicity is not repugnant to personhood.

Reply Obj. 3: In God nothing is placed under anything else in reality, but only according to a mode of understanding, insofar as he is understood as standing under a property, whether personal or essential. And according to this he is called a “substance,” and to be called a “subsistence” insofar as he exists under them. Nonetheless, because according to reality nothing is there under something else, thus Richard of Saint Victor, wishing to speak properly, says (Richard of Saint Victor (d. 1173 AD), On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 20 (PL 196:943).) that the divine persons do not subsist (sub-sistunt), but exist (ex-istunt), insofar as they are distinguished by properties of origin; according to these properties one person is from (ex) another person, and they are not placed under (sub) them after the manner of a subject. And therefore he says the divine persons are not subsistences, but existences.

Reply Obj. 4: Properly speaking, in the divine there is no particular. For a thing is called “particular” by the fact that in it the common nature is particularized, receiving a part of it according to power, whereby it can be in many—even though the particular receives its entire account. But the divine nature is in the Father according to its entire power, so it cannot be called a “particular,” except perhaps only according to the account of a numerical multitude, as was said above, (In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, a. 2.) and as is clear from the words of Damascene. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 3, ch. 6 (PG 94:1002).) Likewise also, the name “God” cannot be particular or singular, since it would be predicated of several supposits, and it lacks matter, which is the principle of singularity. Whence “person” will be said of God not according to the account of particularization or singularity, but according to the account of completion, insofar as it names something complete subsisting or existing in an intellectual nature.

Article 3

Whether “person” signifies substance

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 26, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.29.4; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 4.) It seems that “person” does signify substance.

Obj. 1: It seems to signify substance, first, on the authority of Augustine, presented in the text, (Sent. I, 23.1(95).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (PL 42:943).) which seems to say this expressly.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, this seems to be the case based on Boethius’s definition; for he says, a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1344).) But “substance” signifies something absolute, and not relative. Therefore it seems that the name “person” does not signify a relation.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything relative, according to its name, refers to another. But this name “person” does not refer to another, according to its name. Therefore it does not signify relation.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, “what?” asks about the substance, or essence. But, as is said in the text, to the heretics who ask, “what are three?” the Church responds, “the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit receive the name ‘person.’” Therefore “person” signifies essence.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, “person” is said, as it were, as the “one through itself.” But “one” signifies the essence. Therefore it seems that “person” signifies the essence.

On the contrary, Boethius says, every name that takes its origin from the persons certainly does not pertain to the substance. (In fact, this quote is from Porretanus, that is, Gilbert of Poitiers (d. 1154 AD), from his own commentary on Boethius’s On the Trinity (PL 64:1302).) But no name so takes its origin from the persons as does the name “person.” Therefore and so on.

Furthermore, in nothing absolute is the Father distinguished from the Son, but only by relation. But he is distinguished in his person. Therefore “person” does not signify anything absolute, but a relation. The first premise is proved from the divine simplicity, and the perfection of the entire Trinity.

Furthermore, to whatever genus the lower is traced back, so too is traced back the higher. But under this common heading “person” is contained the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Therefore, since “Father” signifies toward-something, so does “person.”

I answer that the opinions of the doctors regarding the signification of “person” are manifold. For some say that the name is equivocal, and others say it is a univocal name. However, the equivocation on the name is designated in three ways by different doctors.

For some assign the multiplicity of the name according to a diversity of time. For before the questioning of the heretics, it used to signify the divine essence, insofar as it was distinguished from other essences; but after the questioning of the heretics, its signification was changed so that in the singular it would signify the essence, and in the plural, relation. But after the time of Boethius it signifies relation, according to modern usage, in both the singular and the plural. But this does not seem at all reasonable, since a plural is nothing but the doubling of the singular, so the signification in the singular and the plural is the same thing under diverse consignifications. Further, it is certain that the varied use of this name is not unreasonable, so something must be attended to in the signification of the name itself, something according to which we are able to use it either this way or that way.

Others assign the multiplicity of the name according to diverse things signified by it, not based on a diversity of time, but based on the name’s proper signification. For they say that simply speaking sometimes it signifies the essence, sometimes the hypostasis, and sometimes a property, as the Master seems to think below. (Sent. I, 26.2(106).3, 3(107).1.) But none of these seems to say completely the signification of “person.” Rather, “person” seems to include everything, for it signifies something subsisting in some nature and distinguished by some property.

Others assign the multiplicity from something joined to it. For they say that when it is taken through itself, it signifies substance, but due to a partitive or numerical term joined to it, it is drawn to signifying relation, for example, when one says “two persons,” or “another person.” But this does not seem correct, since names signifying the divine substance absolutely do not receive the addition of such things, for we do not say “several gods,” or “another God.”

Moreover, those who say the name is univocal differ as well. For some say that in its signification it contains only one, that is, substance, and it signifies the substance that is not the essence, but which is also called a “hypostasis,” or “first substance,” as was said above. (Above, a. 1.) But this does not seem to be enough, since nothing absolute in the divine is numbered. Whence, if it in no way brings in relation, it could not be predicated in the plural.

Others say that in its signification it includes two things, but one of them principally and, as it were, directly, and the other secondarily and, as it were, obliquely. And about this there are two opinions: some say that it signifies relation directly, and substance obliquely, and some say the opposite.

Others say that it contains in its signification two things principally, that is, substance and property. And these too are divided. For some say that that property is posited about substance as distinguishing it, so they say that “person” signifies substance distinguished by a property. But how something absolute is distinguished in the divine is not easy to see.

Others say further that it signifies two things principally, and one of them is not posited in reference to the other; for the property that it signifies does not distinguish substance. But how one name can signify several things, unless something in some way is made one out of them, is not fully seen.

And therefore, in order to see what there is of the truth in these individual opinions, and in what they fall short, one must see that “person,” as has been said above, (Above, a. 1.) signifies an individual substance. But the individual can be signified in two ways: either through the name of a second intention, like the name “individual” or “singular,” which does not signify a singular reality, but the intention of singularity; or through the name of a first intention, which does signify a reality, to which the intention of particularity belongs. And in this way it is signified by the name “person,” for it signifies a real thing itself to which accrues the intention of the individual. Therefore, according to this, we can speak in two ways of the signification of “person”: either through itself, that is, what this name “person” signifies according to itself; or incidentally, insofar as it is taken in this or that nature. Through itself it signifies an individual intellectual substance, whatever it be, and however it be individuated. However, if a human person is being taken, it signifies what subsists in such a nature, and is distinguished by a distinction of the sort that belongs to human nature, that is, through a determinate nature. And this is how we are speaking here about the signification of “person,” insofar as a divine person is said to be a person. And according to this it will signify a distinct thing existing in the divine nature.

Therefore, so that we might see what is distinct here, and how the account of a person belongs to it, one must note that, according to the need of the faith that one confess that in God there is three and one, one must assert something common according to which they are one, and something proper that distinguishes them, from which distinction they are three. And the essence or divine nature is what is common, insofar as it is signified by the name “divinity,” and what is distinguishing is a relation, like paternity. And because in the divine there is no composition, the Godhead must be understood to be, according to reality, the same thing as God, and the paternity the same thing as the Father.

Therefore if we take these four—namely, “Godhead,” “God,” “Father,” and “paternity”—it is certain that the account of person does not befit “Godhead” itself in two ways, insofar as it is signified as a certain nature: first, because it is not signified as a thing subsisting through itself, and second, because it is common to several, and “person” signifies a distinct thing. Likewise, the name “God” does not have the account of “person,” since even though it is signified as subsisting, still it does not have the account of distinction. For just as the Father and the Son come together in the Godhead, so too they come together in what is God. But it is true that, if the plurality of the persons were to be taken away, and consequently the commonness of the name “God,” the name “God” would still signify a certain person distinct from all other natures by essential properties. Whence the name “God” would be signified as a certain person. Likewise as well, “paternity,” since it is not signified as a subsisting thing nor as distinct but as distinguishing, is not signified through the mode of “person.” Similarly, “Father,” even though it is signified as something distinct, still it is not signified as subsisting in any nature, but more as a subject to some property. Whence, just as “white,” from the account of its name, is not the name of a person, so neither is “Father,” but inasmuch as the Father and God are the same—not the way an accident and its subject are, but through every way of not being different realities—so the Father, insofar as the Father is God, has it that he be a person.

And therefore I say that, in the divine, “person” signifies a relation through the mode of substance. For the relation itself, which does the distinguishing, is the distinct thing, since the paternity is the Father. And because “person” signifies something distinct existing in a certain nature, it is certain that it signifies relation insofar as relation itself is toward the very thing related, and insofar as the very thing related is subsisting in such a nature. And therefore it is clear that “person” signifies a relation through the mode of the substance, which substance is not the essence but the supposit that has the essence.

And from this it is clear that all the opinions above speak the truth in some respect. For those who say that it is equivocal, and sometimes signifies one thing, and at other times another, have spoken the truth insofar as property, hypostasis, and essence are included in “person,” and these do not really differ in God, and therefore it signifies relation as hypostasis; for it signifies an essence that is a hypostasis and it signifies also a property that is a distinct supposit itself. Whence, sometimes it can be used for the one, and other times for the other. But this is incidental to “person” because in the divine all the aforesaid are one in reality. Likewise, those who have said that “person” signifies only hypostasis are attending to the mode according to which the name signifies, since it signifies through a mode, what is subsisting in some nature, even though it will signify the distinct thing itself, which is also the distinguishing relation itself. Likewise, those who have said that it signifies substance directly are attending to the substance that is a hypostasis distinguished by a property, whereas those who have said the opposite attend to the substance that is the essence. And those who have said that it signifies the hypostasis, and posits a property of it, do not take “hypostasis” from the side on which it stands under the divine nature—such that it would be signified by the name “God,” which belongs to the three persons indistinctly—but rather, from the side on which the hypostasis is the very relation distinguishing the hypostasis, for in God what distinguishes and what is distinguished are the same thing. And those who have said that a property is not placed in substance as distinguishing it have considered hypostasis or substance in the opposite way.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is attending to the signification of “person” in reference to its mode of signifying, and not in reference to what it signifies. Therefore, even though relation is signified, still, because it is signified through the mode of substance, he therefore said that it signifies substance. And because moreover the substance in God is the same thing as the essence, it follows that it would signify the essence as well, insofar as the Father is God, and is even Godhead itself.

Reply Obj. 2: The response to this is clear from the definition of Boethius.

Reply Obj. 3: Likewise, although it signifies relation, still it does not signify through the mode of relation, and therefore it is not referred to another according to its name.

Reply Obj. 4: Sometimes “what” asks for the essence, as when one asks, “what is a man?” “A rational mortal animal.” But sometimes it asks for the supposit itself, as when one asks, “what swims in the sea?” and one answers, “fish.” And in this way too one was answering the heretics asking, “three what?” with “three persons.”

Reply Obj. 5: When “person” is said as though it were the “one through itself,” essential unity is not being signified, but more the unity of the person, which is due to what is proper to it. And therefore that argument is not relevant to the proposed matter.

Reply Sed Contra: Through this also the reply to the things objected on the contrary is clear. For they proceed in reference to what the name “person” signifies. For we find in the divine four modes of signifying. For one mode signifies the absolute through the mode of the absolute, like “God”; another signifies relation through the mode of relation, like “Father”; another, the absolute through the mode of relation, like “power of generating”; and another, the related through the mode of the absolute, like “person.” And this happens insofar as the relation is essentially the divine substance itself, and so on.

Article 4

Whether “person” should be predicated in the plural in the divine

To the fourth we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: In I Sent., d. 2, a. 4; ST I.30.1; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 5; Compendium theologiae, cc. 50, 55; Quodl. VII, q. 3, a. 1.) It seems that “person” is not predicated in the plural.

Obj. 1: For, as is noted in the text, (Sent. I, 23.1(95).3; 2(96).1–3, referring to the words of Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 4.) to be three persons is to be three somethings. But it is not granted that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are three; rather, they are one. Therefore it seems that they cannot be called “three persons.”

Obj. 2: Furthermore, “person” signifies what is existing substantially in some nature. But a distinction of properties does not distinguish what exists substantially in some nature. Therefore it seems that, since the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are distinguished only by properties, they cannot be called “three persons.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the personal properties are not more substantially in God than are the essential properties, like goodness, wisdom, and the like. But the essential properties do not make the persons plural. Therefore neither do the relative properties.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, just as the name “God” signifies what has the divine nature, so the name “person” signifies what subsists in the divine nature. But on account of the unity of the divine nature, it cannot be said that there are several gods. Therefore, for the same reason, neither can there be several persons.

On the contrary, there is what is said in the text, (Sent. I, 23.2(96).1; 3(97).1–2.) and what the common usage of the Church holds.

Furthermore, this is seen to be the case from Richard, who says, those fearing where there is no fear, rightly would fear ‘persons’ being said according to substance, if ‘person’ were to signify only substantial existence, and would not consignify anything else; (Richard of Saint Victor, On the Trinity, bk. 4, ch. 19 (PL 196:912).) by reason of this he says that “persons” is multiplied.

I answer that, as was said, “person” signifies something distinct subsisting in an intellectual nature. This is why wherever one finds any distinct things possessing an intellectual nature, one also finds several persons. Nor is it relevant for the plurality of persons whether or not they have the same nature. For in men the division of the nature in the several persons happens both because of the imperfection of human nature, which is not its own existence but receives it in its supposit—whence it is in a diversity of supposits according to a diversity of existences—and because of the mode of distinction, since human persons become distinct through matter, which is part of the essence. Whence a distinct person must not have a single essence with another person. And neither of these things is present in the divine persons, and this is why there are three persons subsisting in the one nature.

Reply Obj. 1: Augustine is taking the adjective “three” in a broad sense to mean the number three, as does Hilary as well, saying (Hilary, On Synods, ch. 29 (PL 10:503).) that by substance they are three, by consonance they are one, taking “substance” for hypostasis. Or it could be said that they are not three simply speaking, but three somethings, that is, three supposits.

Reply Obj. 2: In created things, a diversity of properties does not make several persons, since a property is not a subsisting person, whereas in the divine, the properties are the subsisting persons themselves. For the paternity is also the Father himself, and to be the Father is to be God; they are not different existences, for the Father’s existence is not something other than the Son’s existence. And therefore the number of the persons follows on the number of the personal properties.

Reply Obj. 3: The essential properties are also subsistent, but still one does not have a reason for being really distinct from the other—rather, they are distinct only according to account—whereas the relative properties do, by virtue of their opposition. Whence, just as the Father is something subsisting, so too he is good, but the Father and the Son are different subsistings, whereas the good and the wise is one and the same subsisting. This is why all such essential names are said of the individual persons, and therefore the essential properties do not make a number of persons; for number follows on distinction.

Reply Obj. 4: Substantive names do not receive plurality except due to a multiplication of the form from which they are imposed. And because the Godhead from which the name “God” is imposed is not multiple, therefore neither is the name that is imposed from this form. But the name “person” is imposed from the form of personhood, which expresses the account of the subsisting of this nature. Therefore, where there are several subsistings, there are several personhoods and several persons.

Exposition of the text

It is not one thing for God to be, and another to be a person. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:943).) This is said not only in reference to the identity of the reality, since in this way in God there is only one existence, but also according to account, since from the very fact that he has existence subsisting in the divine nature, “person” is said in God. Yet that to which the account of person belongs is the relation, insofar as it is a distinct subsistence; for no other such thing can be posited in the divine. And therefore, as far as its mode of signifying, “person” belongs among substantial names, but as far as what the name “person” supposes in the divine, it pertains to relative names.

We speak of nothing else than the substance of the Father, (Sent. I, 23.1(95).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 6 (CCSL 50; PL 42:943).) in such a way that still the name “substance” would be understood to mean not essence, but hypostasis.

This is the sense: the Father is the divine essence. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).2.) The Master adds this on his own, because it is not expressly said in Augustine’s words. And yet, in a certain way it is true, not by reason of the name’s signification, but by reason of the identity of the reality. For in the divine, the hypostasis and the essence are the same thing in reality.

And yet we say ‘three persons,’ not in order to say that, but so that it should not be passed over in silence. (Sent. I, 23.1(95).3, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 9 (CCSL 50; PL 42:918).) It seems that, according to this, “three persons” cannot be said properly. But to this one should say that nothing can be said properly of God, because none of our words perfectly expresses the divine truth. Nonetheless, in the way in which we say other things about God, this too, by a coercive necessity, comes into the use of speech. For since nothing is found handed on by canonical Scripture, they tried not to use such a mode of speech unless necessity forced it. Whence the need is more an excuse of presumption than an excuse of falsity.

For God is more truly thought than spoken about. (Sent. I, 23.2(96).2, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:939).) This seems false, since we say many things about God with our mouth that we do not understand with our heart, as is also pointed out by Chrysostom, below. (Sent. I, 37.3(166).4, quoting John Chrysostom, In Epistolam ad Hebraeos, hom. 2, para. 1 (PG 63:244).) But one should say to this that, although the heart does not reach such things that exceed the intellect by understanding the truth, still it holds them by faith, which it is not able to express perfectly with words. Nonetheless, how something is said more truly than understood, or vice versa, will be discussed below. (Below, d. 39, q. 1, a. 1.)

Because Scripture does not contradict. (Sent. I, 23.3(97).2.) This seems like nothing, since similarly Scripture would not contradict if we were to say he is one person. But to this one should say that Augustine is not assigning the entire reason, because this is not the cause why it can be said properly and truly. Rather, he is giving the reason why it is not opposed to piety, so that we may speak this way once one has observed what is proper to the signification.

It feared to say three essences, lest any diversity should be thought to exist in that highest equality. (Sent. I, 23.4(98).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 4 (CCSL 50; PL 42:939).) In “essence” there is also not understood to be something through which it could be drawn to relation, as in the signification of “person” there is found distinction. Whence a plurality of essences would not be preserved in the distinction of the relations; rather, it would require a division among things that are absolute.

With these words, an understanding of singleness and aloneness is excluded. (Sent. I, 23.5(99).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 38 (CCSL 62; PL 10:231).) Hilary, in the authority brought in, wishes to show both the unity of the essence and the plurality of the persons. For from the fact that the Father and the Son are named separately, the distinction of persons is understood. And this is why he says that an understanding of singleness is excluded, that is, lest God be thought to be single as though the Godhead were found in only one supposit, and of aloneness, that is, an understanding of solitude, as though there were no fellowship of the divine persons through the union of love. However, he proves the unity of the essence as a consequence of the vision; for he who sees the Son sees also the Father. (Sent. I, 23.5(99).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 38 (CCSL 62; PL 10:231), quoting John 14:9.)