D. 26 - The personal properties of the divine persons

Division of the text

After having considered the essence and the persons, here the Master considers the properties whereby the persons are distinguished. Now, this is divided into two parts: in the first, he considers the proper properties of the persons; in the second, he considers those appropriated to the persons at moreover, . . . it is necessary to consider. (Sent. I, 31.1(131).1.)

The first part is divided into two: in the first, he considers the personal properties; in the second, he considers the properties of the persons that are not personal. (Sent. I, 28.1(118).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he considers the personal properties; in the second, he compares names signifying the persons at here it can be asked. (Sent. I, 27.1(113).1.)

The first is divided into two: in the first, he considers the hypostasis that stands under the properties the way the distinguished stands under what distinguishes it; in the second, he considers the properties whereby the hypostases are distinguished, at let us now look at the properties of the persons. (Sent. I, 26.2(106).1.)

And this latter is divided into two: in the first, he assigns the personal properties of the persons; in the second, he removes certain doubts, at here it is asked how it is said to be proper to him who is born God that he is Son of God. (Sent. I, 26.4(108).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he assigns the number of the personal properties; second, he assigns the mode of predicating, in reference to three things: that they are not predicated substantially but relatively; that they are not predicated incidentally; and that they are not predicated temporally, but from eternity. And he confirms this through the authority of the saints, at therefore, it is to be known that not all which is said of God is said according to substance. (Sent. I, 26.3(107).1.)

Here it is asked how it is said to be proper to him who is born God that he is Son of God. (Sent. I, 26.4(108).1.) Here he first removes doubts: first, as regards a property of the Son; and second, as regards a property of the Holy Spirit, at the same is also to be said of the Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 26.6(110).1.)

And this latter is divided into two parts: in the first, he removes a doubt; in the second, he excludes an error, at and yet some believe that the Holy Spirit or gift is not so called relative to the Father and the Son. (Sent. I, 26.8(112).1.)

As regards the first, he does two things: first, he removes the doubt about the property of the Holy Spirit insofar as he is signified by the name “gift”; second, he does so insofar as he is signified by the name “Holy Spirit,” at here it can be asked whether the Father, or the Son, or even the Trinity itself, can be called Holy Spirit. (Sent. I, 26.7(111).1.)

Here two things are asked.

The first is about the hypostasis; (Q. 1.)

and the second is about the properties. (Q. 2.)

Question 1

Hypostasis

As regards the first, two things are asked:

first, whether “hypostasis” belongs in the divine, and what it would signify there;

second, whether, when one has by intellect abstracted the personal properties, there remain distinct hypostases.

Article 1

Whether “hypostasis” should be said in the divine, properly speaking

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel text: ST I.29.2.) It seems that “hypostasis” should not properly be spoken of in the divine.

Obj. 1: This is so, first, because of what Jerome says in the text, that this name is not worthy of trust, and a poison lurks beneath its honey. (Jerome, Epistulae, letter 15, “To Damasus,” n. 4 (CSEL 54:66; PL 22:357); Sent. I, 25.1(105).1.)

Obj. 2: Furthermore, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1343‒44).) “hypostasis” names the substance subject to accidents. But God does not stand under any accident, as Augustine said above. (Sent. I, 8.2(22).1; I, 26.3(107).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 5 (CCSL 50: PL 42:913).) Therefore it cannot properly be called a “hypostasis.”

Obj. 3: Furthermore, “hypostasis” names a reality of nature that is placed under some nature. But in every reality of nature it seems that the nature is simpler than the very reality that has the nature, and that the reality of the nature adds something to the nature; otherwise insofar as it is one nature, there would be only one reality of that nature. But wherever there is addition, there is composition. Therefore it seems that every hypostasis is composite. But there is no composition in God. Therefore neither is there hypostasis.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, every hypostasis is a subsistence and an essence, since everything that stands-under also subsists and exists. (The word “hypostasis” is formed from hypo- (“under”) and stasis (“standing”).) Therefore, if there be hypostasis in God, that hypostasis will be a subsistence and an essence. But this seems not to be so, since we say “three hypostases,” but not “three essences” or “three subsistences,” according to Boethius. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1344).) Therefore it seems that there is no hypostasis in the divine.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, all that is in the divine is either absolute or relative. But in the divine “hypostasis” does not seem to signify the absolute, since according to Augustine and Boethius, (Rather: Fulgentius (pseudo-Augustine), On the Faith, to Peter the Deacon, ch. 1 (CCSL 91A; PL 40:753); Boethius, On the Trinity, cc. 1, 4 (PL 64:1249, 1252).) in the divine nothing absolute is distinct, whereas a hypostasis is distinct. And neither is it toward-something, since in the divine relation distinguishes, but a hypostasis is what is distinguished. Therefore it seems that hypostasis is not in the divine.

Obj. 6: Furthermore, everything indeterminate stands toward the determinate as the possible and material. But “person” stands to “hypostasis” as determinate to indeterminate, or as distinct to what can be distinct, as some say; for a person is a hypostasis made distinct by a property pertaining to dignity.

On the contrary, as was said above, (Above, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1.) the Greeks call the same thing a “hypostasis” that we call a “person.” But “person” is said properly in God, but in the plural when said of the three, and in the singular when said of the individuals. Therefore so should “hypostasis.”

I answer that, as is clear from things said, and from Boethius’s words, among the Greeks a hypostasis is principally an individual of substance, what we call “first substance.” However, this is something complete and distinct and incommunicable in the nature of substance. Whence the divine hypostasis will be what is through itself subsisting, distinct, and incommunicable. Now, in the divine nothing absolute is distinct, but only what is relative; and just as the essence is the very thing that exists according to reality, so too the really distinguishing relation is the distinguished principle itself. And since the relation is the same thing according to reality as the essence, the very thing distinguished by the relation will be the same thing in reality as what subsists in the divine essence or nature; and this is what the name “hypostasis” signifies.

Whence I say that that name “hypostasis,” in the divine, signifies relation as distinguished through the mode of subsisting in the divine nature, just as was said of the name “person.” But they differ insofar as “hypostasis,” from its account, does not include a determinate account of distinction, whereas the name “person” includes a special account of distinction that pertains to dignity, insofar as it signifies something subsisting in a noble nature, that is, an intellectual one. However, the name “hypostasis,” in how it is used among the Greeks, signifies the same thing, as Boethius says, above. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 641344:).) But the name “Father” signifies something more distinct, in expressing the specific and determinate account of distinction pertaining to nobility, that is, the relation of paternity.

From this it is clear that four things stand as consequences: “hypostasis” signifies the subsisting thing distinct in whatever way; “divine hypostasis” signifies the subsisting thing distinct by relation, since no other distinction can be in the divine; “person” signifies the distinct thing by a distinction of relation pertaining to dignity; and “Father” in the divine signifies the subsisting thing distinct by a relation pertaining to nobility, which relation is paternity.

Reply Obj. 1: The name corresponding to “hypostasis” in the Latin language, that is, “substance,” is said equivocally for the substance, the essence, and for first substance. Thus, lest there be occasion for deception, Jerome did not want to use the name “hypostasis” before its signification was noted and declared or made determinate; otherwise the simple heretics might argue from the distinction of hypostases to the distinction of essences.

Reply Obj. 2: According to reality, in the divine there is nothing under something else or standing under something else by way of an accident. But nonetheless something is understood “to stand under” according to the mode of signifying, insofar as Damascene also says (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 9 (94:838).) that in the divine some things signify what follows on substance, like goodness, wisdom, paternity, and such. And in this way the name “hypostasis” can be used here.

Reply Obj. 3: In God a hypostasis is also a reality of nature. For one needs to know that “individual substance” is said in two ways: either from its standing under a common nature or from its standing under accidents and properties. And in both ways it can be signified through a name of first intention or a name of second intention. Through a name of first imposition, it is signified as standing under the nature with the name “reality of nature,” whereas through a name of second imposition, it is signified by the name “supposit.” Likewise, insofar as it stands under a property it is signified with a name of first imposition that is the name “hypostasis” or “person,” whereas by a name of second imposition that is “singular,” as the individual. These latter are not properly speaking in the divine, since they express the determinate mode of distinction that occurs through matter; but in place of them one can say “incommunicable” there. Nonetheless it is not necessary that the nature be simpler than the very reality of the nature, since in simple things, according to Avicenna, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 5, ch. 5.) the whatness of the simple is the simple thing itself; but they differ as regards the mode of signifying, since the whatness is signified as a form, and the simple reality itself is signified as subsisting. And the real distinction of the nature is not from the side of the nature, but from the side of the relations of opposites subsisting in that nature.

Reply Obj. 4: As has been said, (Above, d. 25, q. 1, a. 4.) in the divine, a person is not distinguished on the side of the nature, or on the side of the very existence, but only on the side of the properties. This is why those names that are said with reference to property, like “hypostasis” and “person,” are predicated in the plural—whereas names that are said with reference to existence, like “subsistence” and “essence,” are predicated in the singular. However, the name “subsistence,” in the usage of the saints, is taken for “hypostasis,” as was said before. (Above, d. 23, a. 1.) But there are some names that signify reference to the common nature that are predicated also in the plural, like “reality of nature,” and “supposit”; for although they do signify reference to a property through the mode of form, still insofar as they name something distinct under the common nature, in the divine they signify the relations as subsisting. However, “subsistence” and “essence” do not name the distinct; this is why they are also primarily in genera and species, rather than in the individuals, according to Boethius. (Boethius, On the Person and the Two Natures, ch. 3 (PL 64:1344–45).) And therefore if they are being taken properly, they are not predicated in the plural, as is done among the Greeks.

Reply Obj. 5: As was said in the body of the article, “hypostasis” in the divine signifies relation through the mode of substance. For just as, on account of his simplicity, in God the essence and the being are the same thing, so too in him the distinguishing relation and what is distinguished by the relation are the same thing. They differ only according to the mode of signifying, which is founded on the reality, since each name has its true signification in God; and therefore they differ even according to the mode of supposition, since when one is supposed the other is not. For just as we say that God generates and the Godhead does not generate, so we say that the hypostasis is distinguished and the relation distinguishes.

Reply Obj. 6: Just as the name “person” signifies something distinct in the divine, so does the name “hypostasis.” But the name “person” determines the specific mode of distinction, that is, through a noble property, which the name “hypostasis” does not determine. This is why they stand to each other as higher and lower, just as “some substance” is more common than “some man.” But this determination and non-determination, common and proper, in composite realities is traced back to the material and the formal according to reality; for the account of genus flows from matter and the account of difference from form, as has been said. (Above, d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.) But in simple realities there is nothing corresponding in reality that is indeterminate, as though it were material, and would be made determinate by the arrival of form. Rather, it is only according to the mode of signifying, insofar as each of them is signified truly in the divine.

Article 2

Whether the hypostases remain distinct when the intellect removes the relations

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.40.3; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 4; Compendium theologiae, ch. 61.) It seems that, upon the intellect’s removal of the relations, the hypostases do remain distinct.

Obj. 1: For, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 5 (CCSL 50; PL 42:914).) in everything that is spoken of as toward-another, one can take something that is said as through-itself; for the related is not only related but also is something. Therefore, if a hypostasis according to relation is spoken of as toward-something, it seems that, beyond the understanding of the relation, there is something intelligible subsisting. Thus, with the relative properties removed by the intellect, it seems that the subsisting hypostases themselves remain.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, hypostasis is more perfect in the divine than in created things. But in created things, when one removed, whether by the intellect or according to reality, the fact that one hypostasis is said to be toward another, there still remain the hypostases themselves, like Socrates and Plato. Therefore it seems that it would be so in the divine as well.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that falls within something’s definition can be understood without understanding that other part; for example, were the intellect to remove “rational,” whereby man is constituted, “animal” is still understood, which is placed in the definition of man. But a person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to dignity. Therefore, were the intellect to remove the relative property, there still remains the distinct hypostasis.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, the Father has it that he is someone and that he is the Father. Therefore either he has these things from the same source or from different ones. If he has it from the same, then since he is the Father by paternity, his paternity will be someone; but paternity is not in the Son, so then the Son will not be someone—which is false. Therefore one must grant that he does not have it from the same source. Therefore, when one removes from the Father that whereby he is called the Father, it still remains that he is someone. But “someone” names a hypostasis. Therefore, with the relation removed, the distinct hypostasis remains.

On the contrary, as Augustine says, (Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 6, cc. 2, 3 (CCSL 50; PL 42:924–27).) in all things besides those that are said relatively, the Father and the Son are one. Therefore, if the intellect removes that whereby the Father is said to be related, there remains only that wherein the Father and the Son are united. But this cannot be distinguished in the divine. Therefore if the intellect removes the relation, the hypostases do not remain distinct. The same thing appears from Boethius, who says (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 6 (PL 64:1254–56).) that in the divine only relation multiplies the Trinity.

I answer that there are two opinions about this. Some say that, just as is the case with created things, when relations and properties are removed, the hypostases themselves remain distinct by their very selves, so it is also in the divine. Whence they say that, having abstracted personhood—that is, the relation constituting a person—the hypostasis remains. But it does not seem that this can stand, according to what is supposed by the faith, for two reasons.

First, since plurality is always caused by some distinction, and distinction is either through essence, or quantity, or relation, therefore it is impossible that there be in God any distinction except what relation causes. Whence, were the relations to be removed by the intellect, simultaneously would be taken away the very understanding of distinction.

Second, in the divine nothing is predicated as an accident, or as a form inhering in something preexisting, so whatever is signified through the mode of form is the subsisting whole. Whence, just as, were the essence removed by the intellect, nothing would remain as receiving that essence, since the essence itself is subsistent, so too, were goodness removed by the intellect, nothing would remain as receiving the goodness, since the goodness itself is subsistent. And likewise, were the intellect to remove the relation, nothing would be left over as the substrate for that relation; rather, the relation itself is the subsistent reality. Whence, having abstracted the relation, properly speaking nothing remains, neither the absolute, nor the relative, nor the hypostasis, nor the essence.

But it is true that the essence can be understood while not understanding the goodness, as Boethius says, (Boethius, Hebdomads, question (PL 64:1311–14).) and likewise the essence can be understood while not understanding the paternity or relation, just as the Jews understand him, but not through the mode of abstraction. But it cannot be understood that in the divine the relation might be removed and something subsisting under the relation remain, since it itself subsists there. And therefore we concede with the others that in the divine, when the relation is removed, no distinct hypostasis remains. This is both because the distinction does not remain, and because nothing remains subsisting under the relation. But it is true that if there never were the relations that the faith distinguishes, God would be both a substance and a person from the fact that he would subsist in his own existence, and he would stand under his essential properties, whereby he would be distinguished from other essences.

Reply Obj. 1: In the divine one can take both the absolute and the related, but a relation does not come to the absolute as distinguishing it, but rather through the total identity of the reality. But what is distinguished by the relation is the relation itself; and this latter can be signified through the mode of subsisting and hypostasis, as is clear from things said.

Reply Obj. 2: In created things hypostases are distinguished through matter, and diverse properties manifest the distinction. But in the divine, hypostases are not distinguished except through relation, since one cannot find there any real otherness besides what is according to relative opposition. Whence, just as in created things, if the intellect subtracts the division of matter and quantity, the hypostases do not remain distinct, so does it happen also in the divine, when it subtracts relative opposition.

Reply Obj. 3: “Hypostasis” is placed in the definition of “person” because “person” adds something over and above hypostasis—but not relation, since relation belongs to the concept of a divine hypostasis just as it belongs to the concept of a divine person. Rather, it adds a determinate account of relation, that is, one pertaining to dignity. And therefore when relation is removed, the concept of neither hypostasis nor person remains in the divine. For even from the very fact that a divine hypostasis is posited, so too is posited subsistence in a noble property. This is why the account of nobility, which “person” adds, is included in the fact that it is a divine hypostasis. Whence, just as “human hypostasis” says nothing less than “person,” neither does “divine hypostasis.”

Reply Obj. 4: By his paternity the Father has it that he is someone and that he is the Father, yet it does not follow that the Son is not someone. For that whereby the Father has paternity the Son has filiation, which is also a relation. Whence if relation is abstracted, neither the Father is someone nor is the Son someone; yet each is someone by his own relation, just as each is a person by his own personhood. And nevertheless, the personhood of one is not the personhood of the other; how this is the case is clear from things said before, on the commonness of “person.” (Above, d. 25, q. 1, a. 3.)

Question 2

The properties

Next, one asks about the properties; and three things are asked about this:

first, whether relations are in the divine;

second, whether the persons are distinguished only by relations of origin;

third, about the number of the relations, notions, and properties, and how they differ.

Article 1

Whether relations are in the divine

To the first we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 33, a. 2; ST I.28.1; SCG IV.14; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 1; Compendium theologiae, cc. 53, 67; Commentary on John, ch. 16, lect. 4.) It seems that relations are altogether nothing in the divine.

Obj. 1: For, as Boethius says, (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 4 (PL 64:1252).) all things that enter into divine predication change into substance, and toward-something is altogether not predicated. But whatever is in God is predicated of him. Therefore relations are not in God.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, Boethius himself says (Boethius, On the Trinity, ch. 6 (PL 64:1254–56).) that the relations by which the Father is referred to the Son and the Son to the Father are like relations whereby something is referred to itself, as when we say something is the same as itself. But such relations in reality assert nothing in that of which they are said, as the Philosopher seems to say, (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.9, 1018a8.) but assert something only according to the understanding. Therefore it seems that relations are not really in God.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, everything that accrues to or withdraws from something due to a mere orientation, without any change occurring in it, does not place anything within it. For nothing can newly accrue to something without its own change, either through itself or incidentally. But relations accrue to and withdraw from a thing in this way; for example, through a change in something else an immobile column becomes on the right, or on the left, and upon the death of his son someone ceases to be a father, without any change occurring in him. Therefore it seems that relations of this sort are altogether nothing in the divine.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, if there is relation in the divine, it is either the same as the essence or it is something else. If it is the same as the essence, then, because the essence is one in all the persons, the relation will be one in all as well; or if the persons are distinguished by relations, they will also be distinguished in the essence—which is the heresy of Arius. But if it is something else, then it will make a composition with the essence—which cannot be the case. Therefore relation is altogether not present in the divine.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, the simplest things are distinguished in their very selves. But the divine persons are the simplest things. Therefore they are distinguished in their selves, so it seems that they are not distinguished by relations.

On the contrary, everything in God is either absolute or toward-something. But the divine persons are not distinguished in anything absolute, since in absolutes the three persons are one. Therefore either they are not distinguished, or else they are distinguished by relations. Therefore, if the relations are not really in the divine, but are there merely according to account, then the Father and the Son are not really distinguished—and then the heresy of Sabellius would follow. Therefore one must assert that there are relations in the divine.

Furthermore, the Father is referred to the Son and to the Holy Spirit, but not in the same way to each, since he is to the former by generating him, and to the latter by spirating him. Therefore it seems that one must signify in one person several relations whereby he is referred to another, just as in the one essence there are several persons. Therefore, just as in the divine we assert there to be not only the essence, but also persons, since we find several persons in one essence, so too one must assert relations.

I answer that among Catholics it is certain that there are relations in the divine. But in the assertion of the relations one finds diverse opinions among the doctors. Some, like Porretanus, (That is, Gilbert of Poitiers.) have said that the relations in the divine are only “assistant,” or “placed alongside.” On the other hand, others have said that the relations in the divine are the persons themselves, and when they are signified in the abstract this is only on account of a mode of speaking, like when we say, “I beseech your benignity,” meaning “you as benign”; and similarly one should resolve all other expressions wherein the relations or properties are spoken of abstractly. But others say that the relations both are the persons and they are in the persons even according to the truth of the reality, and not merely according to a mode of speaking. And all of these have spoken the truth in some respect. But the last opinion contains the entire truth.

To understand this one needs to know that, as was said earlier, (In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.) in relation, as with all the accidents, there are two things to consider: its own existence, according to which it places something in it, insofar as it is an accident; and its own account, according to which it is referred to another, due to which it is located in a determinate genus. And it is not due to this latter account that it places anything within that of which it is said, the way that all other absolute forms, due to their very account, place something within that of which they are said. And therefore certain relations are found placing nothing within that of which they are said. Attending to this, some philosophers have said that relation is not any one genus of beings, nor is it something in the nature of things, but is only in some respect sprinkled over all beings, and that relations are among the second intentions, which have existence only in the soul. The opinion of the followers of Porretanus seems to agree with this. But this is false, since nothing that is a being only in the soul is located in a determinate genus.

Whence, one should distinguish among relations. For there are some that have something in the reality on which their existence is founded, such as equality is founded on quantity; and relations of this sort are something really in a real thing. But there are some that have no foundation in the reality of which they are said, like right and left in things wherein such positions are not determinate according to nature, the way they are in the parts of an animal. For there, in the animal, such relations really exist, since they are founded in the diverse powers of diverse parts, whereas in other things they are there only according to the account of the orientation of one to another; this is why they are called relations of account or of reason. (We here give “reason” as an alternate translation of ratio, which we usually render as “account”; the scope of ratio includes both the intellect’s concept or articulation of the reality it knows (“account”) and the very faculty of reason itself. This breadth of meaning is present in this entire article, so both translations are defensible in this context.)

And this being relations of reason and not of reality happens in four ways. One way, as was said in this article, a little above, is when a relation has nothing in the nature of the reality on which it might be founded; and this is how sometimes it happens that a relation is really in one thing and not in the other, since in the one it has a certain motion on which it is founded, while it does not have this motion in the other. So it is in all those relations whereby God is referred to what is created; these relations are really in the created thing, and not in God. It happens in a second way when a relation does not hold any real diversity between its extremes, as in a relation of identity; and therefore this places nothing according to the reality, but only according to reason, as when one says something is the same as itself. A third way this happens is when some relation of a being to a non-being is being designated, as when one says we are before those who are to come in the future; for this priority is not a relation according to reality, but only one according to reason, since a real relation needs both extremes to be actual. The fourth way is when the relation of a relation is being asserted, for a relation itself is referred through its very self, and not through another relation. Whence in created things paternity is not joined to its subject through some middle relation. And Avicenna posits the last two modes, (Avicenna, Metaphysics, bk. 3, ch. 10.) whereas the first two can also be drawn from the words of the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1021a30‒b2; 5.9, 1018a8.)

Therefore, since these relations—paternity and filiation—have some foundation in the reality, that is, the nature itself, which is communicated according to a communication of nature, it is certain that they are really in God. And on account of his simplicity, they are the same as the persons in which they exist, and for the sake of manifesting the truth of the relations, they must be signified in a different way. Therefore, the first of those discussed, attending in the relations only to what is toward another, and not to the foundation that they have in the reality, said that relations are “assisting,” as though accruing due to the other’s orientation. The second ones, attending to the foundation of the reality and to the divine simplicity, said that the relations are not in the persons, but are the persons themselves. But the third ones, considering both, said that they are in the persons, on account of the true account of relation, and that nevertheless they also are the persons, on account of the divine simplicity. This is the same as how Godhead is in God, and nonetheless is God.

Reply Obj. 1: Boethius’s statement is understood of the toward-something insofar as it is toward what is other. And thus, it does not predicate anything within the reality of what it is said about, but rather asserts something outside it. Nonetheless some relations, as regards their existence, do assert something in the reality of the thing about which they are said.

Reply Obj. 2: In a relation of identity there are two things to consider: that in respect of which one is called identical, that is, the essence itself, like equality in respect of quantity; and that to which the identity belongs, what is being called the same according to the one essence, like the equal, which holds one quantity. And because the essence that the Father communicates to the Son is also numerically one, there is a likeness of these relations with a relation of identity as regards that with respect to which they are said. But this is not so as regards the things that are being referred to each other according to that respect. Whence the Son is not said to be the same as the Father in the masculine gender, but the same thing in the neuter.

Reply Obj. 3: Whenever something that belongs to a reality’s account is taken away, the reality itself is removed, just as with rational removed, man is destroyed. However, two things come together for the account of a relation that has a foundation in the reality: the foundation of the reality, which is quantity, which is the cause of the relation of equality; and even something else of its account, its respect to the other. And in each way it can happen that the relation is destroyed in real relations: either through the destruction of the quantity—whereby on this change of the quantity there follows, incidentally, the change of the relation; or even insofar as the respect to the other ceases, when that to which it was referred is removed, and thereby the relation ceases without any change made in it. Whence in those things wherein there is no relation except according to this respect, the relations accrue and withdraw without any change of that which is being referred.

Reply Obj. 4: The relation is really the same as the essence, but they differ only in account, as it is even with goodness and the essence. And due to that account relation makes the distinction within the divine, which does not belong to the essence.

Reply Obj. 5: The divine persons are also distinguished by their very selves, insofar as the persons, according to reality, are the relations themselves. But just as “person,” according to its mode of signifying, is not the same thing as a relation, so too they are not distinguished by their very selves, but by the relations. For example, God through his very self is God even though he is God by his Godhead, because he himself is his own Godhead.

Article 2

Whether relations of origin distinguish the hypostases

To the second we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: ST I.40.2; SCG IV.24; On the Power of God, q. 8, a. 3; q. 9, a. 4, ad 15; Quodl. IV, q. 4, a. 2.) It seems that relations of origin do not distinguish the hypostases.

Obj. 1: For what according to its concept follows after substance cannot be the principle of any distinction within substances. But relation is among things that follow after substance in God, at least according to concept, as do goodness and wisdom, as Damascene says. (John Damascene, On the Orthodox Faith, bk. 1, ch. 5 (PG 94:802); bk. 1, ch. 12 (PG 94:847–50); bk. 3, ch. 5 (PG 94:999–1002).) Therefore, since a hypostasis is a substance, it seems that relation does not make the distinction of hypostases.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, the order of the distinguishing elements ought to correspond to the order of distinctions. But among all the distinctions of things, the first is the distinction of the divine persons, since the procession of the persons is the cause of the procession of created things, as was said earlier. (In I Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1.) Therefore it seems that, since the first among beings is substance, the principle of that distinction is not relation, but substance.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, relation does not have the power to distinguish except insofar as it has the account of opposition. But it has the account of opposition only insofar as it is toward-another. Therefore it distinguishes only insofar as it is toward-another. But insofar as it is toward-another, relation does not have to be any reality, whether substance or hypostasis. Therefore relation will not be able to make a real distinction of hypostases.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, since there are many relations other than relations of origin, why are the divine persons distinguished only in reference to them? For in the divine one can also find equality, likeness, and such, which are certain relations. Whence, if these latter do not make a distinction, it seems that, for the same reason, neither would the former.

On the contrary, to the least distinction there should correspond, as a principle, that which has the least of being, and which makes the least composition. But among all other things, relation is of the weakest existence, as the Commentator says, (Averroes, Commentary on the Metaphysics, bk. 10, text. 19.) so much so that some have thought it is among secondary concepts, as was said in the previous article. Therefore it seems that relation is most befitting for the distinction of the persons.

I answer that some say that the principle of the distinction of the divine hypostases is not relation; rather, the hypostases are distinguished by their very selves through origin alone, whereas the relations manifest this distinction. This is like how, in created things, the properties do not make them numerically different, but rather, their difference is caused by the division of matter, and the properties only manifest this.

But this cannot be the case here. For things that are distinguished by their very selves have from their very selves some account of distinction, just as substance is distinguished from quantity through what is in the concept of each of them, which is to be subsisting, and to be a measure, and such. However, if two hypostases are considered, a hypostasis as hypostasis does not have within its own concept that whereby it would be distinguished from another hypostasis, since each of them is a hypostasis. Therefore it must have this either insofar as it is a hypostasis through a certain determination within it, or according to a determinate matter, as it is in created things but which cannot be the case in God, or according to something else. But if one says that it is only the origin whereby this hypostasis becomes determinate, then either the very relation of origin is being understood by “origin,” and this is what we assert, or “origin” is being signified through the mode of activity, and then in no way does it distinguish the hypostases; rather, it comes from an already distinct hypostasis. For every activity belongs to distinct individuals, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1, 981a17.)

And therefore we say that nothing else is the principle of distinction in the divine except relation. The reason for this is that every distinction or division is either through quantity or through form, according to the Philosopher. (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.6, 1016b1‒18.) Division in the divine cannot be according to quantity or matter, since quantity and matter are not there. Now, the principle of every formal distinction is a certain opposition, if “opposition” is taken in a broad sense, insofar as even the imperfect and the perfect are opposed, inasmuch as in the one is the negation or privation of the other. However, in all oppositions outside relation, the one stands as perfect and the other as imperfect; this is clear through itself in affirmation and negation, and privation and possession. It is also clear in contrariety, since according to the Philosopher (Aristotle, Physics 1.6, 189b9‒12; 1.9, 192a14‒25.) one of the contraries always stands as the more noble and the other as the more base and a privation: for example, white and black, cold and hot, and all such things. And therefore there is no such distinction in the divine, where there is all perfection. However, in relatives, neither one is the privation of the other or indicates a defect. The reason is that in relatives the opposition is not with reference to what is within any relative, but with reference to what is spoken of as toward-another. Whence, although one relation has annexed to it a negation of the other relation in the same supposit, nonetheless such negation does not indicate any defect; for defect happens only when something is naturally apt to be in a thing. Whence, since what holds a relative opposition to it does not assert something according to the account of opposition, but asserts only being toward-something, neither imperfection nor defect follows. And therefore only this opposition befits the distinction of persons.

Reply Obj. 1: Divine relation contains something as relation, and something else as divine. For insofar as it is divine it is the subsistent hypostasis, since nothing is an accident here, nor is there any inhering form that is not subsisting. Whence, although it does not distinguish the hypostasis from the fact that it is a relation, since then every relation would do this, still it does so insofar as it is a divine relation. For in this way it does not follow on substance, but in fact is substance itself.

Reply Obj. 2: The order of distinction can be considered in two ways: either according to the quantity of the distinction, or according to its dignity and causality. If considered according to the quantity of distinction, then the distinction of the divine hypostases is the least real distinction that can exist, as was said in the body. And therefore the least being—relation—befits such a distinction. But as regards the order of dignity and causality, that distinction exceeds all distinctions, as likewise does the relation that is the principle of the distinction exceed everything causing distinction within created things. This is not because it is a relation, but because it is a divine relation. It also excels by its causality, since from the procession of the divine persons it causes every procession and multiplication of created things, as was pointed out before. (In I Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 3: Although its being a certain reality is not due to its being spoken of as toward-another, nonetheless it is a certain reality insofar as it has a foundation in that which is being related. And beyond this, because of this, insofar as it is divine, it is a hypostasis or substance. And therefore it makes a real distinction of hypostases. This is just as wisdom is not a substance just due to its being wisdom, and yet because divine wisdom is a substance, God is wise substantially.

And therefore one should consider that where there is relation only according to an orientation, and not according to any natural existence, a real distinction of supposits is not required, but merely one according to account, as when one says something is the same as itself. However, when there is a relation present not merely according to orientation, but according to natural existence, a distinction of supposits is also really required, as when something is equal to something else. But where the relation itself is not only really there, but it is even the very substance of the related thing, it not only requires but even makes a distinction of supposits.

Reply Obj. 4: Because a relation does not have a natural existence except due to its having a foundation in the real thing, it thereby is located in the genus; this is why essential differences of relations are taken from the differences of other beings. This is clear from the Philosopher, where he says (Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.15, 1020b28‒1021a26.) that some are founded on quantity, and some on action, and so on. This is why the order of relations is also according to the order of the things in which relations are founded. Therefore just as we see in things that are distinguished by their essence that the principles of the substance, like matter and form, do the distinguishing, and other incidental realities are signs manifesting the distinction, so it is in things that are distinguished through relation: relations founded on the nature of a real thing do the distinguishing, and the other relations are signs of the distinction. However, the relations that have a foundation in the nature of the reality are relations of origin, for paternity is founded in the communication of the nature. And therefore the saints assert that the Father and the Son are distinguished by paternity and filiation, but their equality and likeness demonstrate their distinction. This is why Hilary earlier (Sent. I, 23.5(99).3, quoting Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 7, ch. 38 (CCSL 62; PL 10:231).) proved the distinction through the likeness of the divine persons.

Article 3

Whether there are only five notions

To the third we proceed as follows. (Parallel texts: below, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1; ST I.32.3–4; On the Power of God, q. 9, a. 9, ad 21, ad 27; q. 10, a. 5, ad 12; Compendium theologiae, cc. 57‒60.) It seems that there are not only five notions. (The five notions or properties are usually named as innascibility, paternity, filiation, common spiration, and procession. In this context, the word “notion” can be used somewhat interchangeably with “property,” depending on how one takes the meaning of that word, as Aquinas explains elsewhere: hae autem quinque ‘notiones’ personarum dici possunt eo quod per eas nobis innotescit in divinis distinctio personarum; non tamen haec quinque possunt dici proprietates, si hoc in proprietatis ratione observetur ut proprium esse dicatur quod convenit uni soli, nam communis spiratio Patri et Filio convenit. Sed secundum illum modum quo aliquid dicitur ‘proprium’ aliquibus per respectum ad aliud, sicut bipes homini et avi per respectum ad quadrupedia, nihil prohibet etiam communem spirationem proprietatem dici; “these five properties can be called ‘notions’ of the persons, for the reason that the distinction between the persons in God is brought to our notice through them. On the other hand, they cannot be called properties if the root meaning of a property is insisted on, so that a property is taken to mean a characteristic pertaining to one individual alone: for common spiration pertains to the Father and the Son. But if the word ‘property’ is employed in the sense of an attribute that is proper to some individuals as setting them off from others, in the way that two-footed, for example, is proper to man and bird as distinguished from quadrupeds, there is nothing to prevent even common spiration from being called a property” (Compendium theologiae, bk. 1, ch. 59).)

Obj. 1: For what is born for something, due to the mere orientation of the other to it itself, is multiplied according to the multitude of things to which it is related; for a plurality in the effect follows on the multiplication of the cause. But the relations are born due to the mere orientation of one thing to another. Therefore there will be as many relations in God as there are created things that have a relation to him.

Obj. 2: Furthermore, according to Augustine, (Augustine, Book of Eighty-Three Different Questions, q. 46 (CCSL 44A; PL 40:29–31).) the accounts of things to be created were in God from eternity, which accounts do not differ from each other except by their relations in reference to the created thing. Therefore it seems that there are as many relations in God as there are created things whose accounts are there.

Obj. 3: Furthermore, the divine persons are compared to each other not only according to the nature that one receives from the other, but also according to the different attributes. But in all those comparisons are understood certain relations, whether of equality or of likeness. Therefore it seems that there are as many relations as there are attributes.

Obj. 4: Furthermore, from every action is born some relation of the one acting toward what it is doing. But in God many activities are distinguished according to account, such as willing, understanding, and such. Therefore just as relations of origin follow, according to understanding, on the activity of generation, so too other relations should follow on the other activities, like that of the one understanding to what he understands, or of the one willing to what he wills. And so, the relations will be multiplied according to the number of the activities.

Obj. 5: Furthermore, just as the Father and the Son are alike in that they are related to the Holy Spirit as the principle, so too the Son and the Holy Spirit are alike in that they are related to the Father as to the principle. But common spiration is a relation that belongs to the Father and the Son. Therefore to be from the Father will be another relation common to the Son and the Holy Spirit. And thus there are more than five.

On the contrary (6), it seems that there are fewer than five, since, as was said in the previous article, the properties are the subsisting persons. Therefore there are as many properties as there are subsisting persons. But there are only three subsisting persons. Therefore there are only three properties.

I answer that three differences can be assigned between a notion, a property, and a relation. The first is with respect to the account of signification, and in this way one needs to know that paternity is called a “relation” insofar as it is referred to the Son, whereas it is called a “property” insofar as it belongs only to the Father, and is called a “notion” insofar as it is a formal principle that makes the Father known.

The second is with respect to the order of understanding; for, because nothing can be a principle for making something known unless it be proper to it, the conception of the property comes before the conception of the notion. And because a property belongs only to a reality distinct from others, and distinction in the divine is only through the opposition of relation, in the divine the concept of the relation comes before the concept of the property.

The third is with respect to their number, since the notions are five—paternity, filiation, procession, innascibility, and common spiration—whereas four of these are properties, which belong to one person only—paternity and innascibility, which belong only to the Father, filiation, which belongs only to the Son, and procession, which belongs only to the Holy Spirit. However, common spiration cannot be called a “property” simply speaking, since it belongs to two persons. But it can be so in a certain respect, insofar as something is said to be proper with respect to something; for it is a property of the Father and the Son with respect to the Holy Spirit. Also, only four of these notions are relations—paternity, filiation, procession, and common spiration; for innascibility is not properly called a “relation,” except by a tracing-back, insofar as a negation is traced back to the genus of affirmation, the way non-man is traced back to the genus of man. However, of these properties or notions or relations, only three are personal, the ones constituting persons; whence they hold, as it were, the act of a constitutive difference—namely, paternity, filiation, and procession. The other two are each notions of a person, but not personal properties.

Moreover, the sufficiency of these five notions is clear as follows. For three things are required for something to be called the “notion” of a person: first, that it pertains to origin, since the persons are distinguished by relations of origin; second, that it pertain to dignity, since a person is a hypostasis distinguished by a property pertaining to dignity; third, that it signify something specific, since what is common is not a sufficient principle to make something known.

Therefore I say that what pertains to origin can be signified either affirmatively or negatively. If it is signified affirmatively, it will be said either according to the account of a principle, as that from which another comes, or according to the account of what is from a principle, as one who is from another. Each of these signifies origin in common, so neither can be a notion. Therefore it must be made determinate according to a specific mode of origin, which is only in two ways, as was shown above: (In I Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 2.) through the mode of nature or through the mode of love. And according to each of these we have two relations, one that designates the account of the principle, and the other that designates the account of what is from the principle. Thereby there are four accounts—paternity and filiation with respect to the mode of the origin of nature, and procession and common spiration with respect to the mode of the origin of love.

If it is signified negatively, then one is negating either the account of a principle, or the account of what is from a principle. If the account of a principle is being negated, it is not pertinent to dignity, and thus it cannot be a notion of the Holy Spirit, nor is he the principle of any divine person. If the account of what is from a principle is being negated, then this is so either specifically or generally. If this is so specifically, it cannot be a notion, since to the degree that the affirmation is more specific, so too is the opposite negation more common; for example, non-man is more common than non-animal, since every non-animal is a non-man, but not vice versa. If it is negated generally, there will be a specific negation, and one pertaining to dignity; and this will constitute a notion of the Father, which is innascibility, which signifies not being from another, insofar as it is the property of the Father. Moreover, this is why “innascibility” is said through the privation of birth, as will be specifically discussed below. (Below, d. 28, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 1: Those relations that are signified in God from the orientation of created things to him place nothing really in God, as is clear from things said before. (Above, a. 1.) And therefore it does not follow that, according to this, relations really existing in God will be multiplied into infinity.

Reply Obj. 2: Those relations according to which one attends to the distinction of the ideas are not founded in the divine existence, but in his intellect. Whence they do not really have existence in God, but are only understood by him—for example, the form of a donkey, the form of a horse, and such, and unlike the way goodness and wisdom have existence in him.

Reply Obj. 3: Equality and likeness do not add any real relation over and above paternity and filiation. The reason for this will be explained below. (Below, d. 31, q. 1, a. 1.)

Reply Obj. 4: The relations under which there is no real distinction in the reality which is being referred is not a real relation. Whence whenever some activity is reflected back into the acting supposit, no real relation is born from the real activity, but only a relation of reason. And therefore when one says that God or the soul understands itself, no real relation is being indicated there, but only a relation of reason.

Reply Obj. 5: “To be from something” does not signify a determinate mode of origin, and therefore it does not signify a specific notion; rather, it is preserved in two notions, “filiation” and “procession,” with which it does not add to their number another notion. Likewise neither does the common add to the proper notions that are contained under it; but “common spiration” does signify a determinate mode of origin, insofar as the Father and the Son are one principle of the Holy Spirit. And therefore it signifies a specific notion.

Reply Sed Contra 6: Every property in the divine, and whatever is there, is subsistent. Yet it is not necessary that there be as many subsisting realities as there are properties, but only that there be as many as the really distinguishing opposition requires. Whence, just as in God goodness and wisdom are subsistent, yet they are not different subsistent realities, since they have no opposition, so too common spiration is subsistent, yet it is not a subsistent reality other than the paternity and the filiation, since they have no opposition to it. This is why it can be with each of them in one subsistent reality. Nonetheless it does not constitute the person in which it is, since it presupposes the paternity and filiation according to the order of nature, just as procession also presupposes the generation. And therefore it is not a personal notion. Likewise, innascibility, since it has no opposition to paternity, can be in the same subsisting reality. And because the indicated negation follows, according to the concept in it, on the positing of the principle, it does not constitute the person; rather, it is in the person constituted by paternity.

Exposition of the text

Nothing in God is said according to accident. (Sent. I, 26.3(107).1, quoting Augustine, On the Trinity, bk. 5, ch. 5 (CCSL 50; PL 42:913–14).) The argument here seems invalid, since many things are inseparable accidents, and these always follow on the subject and cannot be lost. To which one should say that every subject of an accident can be understood without the accident, even if sometimes an accident follows inseparably on its subject. And therefore, because the very supposit of the relation cannot be understood without the relation, since the relation itself is the subsisting supposit, it cannot be an accident. For in every accident that accrues to a thing there is a certain composition of the subject with the accident, on account of which the former can be understood without the latter. And where there is composition there is changeability as regards the nature of the composition, for everything composed is divisible unless it be impeded by some cause.

Furthermore, for men are sons of God by being made so, (Sent. I, 26.4(108).2.) that is, by creation. Yet not every created thing has the name “filiation,” but only the things that are according to his image. Or better: a man is also said to be a son “by being made so” through adoption, since, although he before would not have been a son, he has now been made a son. And he does not have the fact that he is a son of God from the origin of his birth, as the eternal Son has. And this interpretation is consonant with things that follow. There will be a discussion of this sonship of adoption later. (In III Sent., d. 10, q. 3, a. 1.)

No one except the Son is properly speaking a son of God. (This quotation and the others in this paragraph are paraphrases of Hilary’s remarks in Sent. I, 26.4(108).3, which quotes Hilary, On the Trinity, bk. 12, cc. 12, 13 (CCSL 62A; PL 10:440–41).) He says this because filiation is his entire substance. Whence the divine substance is not being excluded, since the divine essence in the Son is filiation. He says, by origin, and not by adoption, against Nestorius and Photinus, who used to say that the person of God and of the man are different, from which it follows that the Son of man is not the Son of God naturally, but by adoption. In truth, not by appointment, is added against Sabellius, who said that the Father and the Son are subject to no real distinction by these names. By birth and not creation, is added against Arius, who said that the Son of God is a creature. The other parts are clear from things said earlier about the Holy Spirit. (In I Sent., d. 18. q. 1, a. 2.)